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ABSTRACT 
Outsourcing is gaining increasing importance as a form of business collaboration. 
Outsourcing in the services sector involves transferring total or partial ownership of 
performing the business activity(ies) to a vendor(s).  To ensure the success of 
outsourcing, the integration of the tasks between the firm and the vendor must be well 
and efficiently managed. The purpose of this study is to identify the factors that need to 
be managed in the process of integration of outsourcing tasks.  
This study identified that managing organizational dependency and governance in the 
process of the exchange of resources are the most fundamental aspects of outsourcing 
success. Accordingly, managing organizational dependency is examined through the 
Resource Dependency Theory, while governance in the exchange of resources is viewed 
from the perspective of the Social Exchange Theory.  Degree of outsourcing, vendor 
management capability and vendors‟ service performance are identified as factors that 
have a direct impact on outsourcing success in services. This study also tests the effects 
of the magnitude of the partners‟ compatibility and partnership quality in the 
collaborative business, on „outsourcing success‟. Cross-sectional data is collected 
through a survey of managers in the banking and hotel sectors in Sri Lanka using self-
administered structured questionnaires. A total of 207 usable responses are collected.  
Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) is used to analyse the survey responses.  
The findings of this research confirmed that dependency and exchange are crucial 
aspects that need to be managed in services outsourcing, as they constitute 95 per cent 
of the success.  The degree of outsourcing is determined by the level of breadth and 
level of depth, of which only the former significantly affects the success of outsourcing. 
The empirical evidence also verified that the influence of contractual governance on 
outsourcing success is higher when the partners‟ compatibility and/or partnership 
quality is higher.  
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This research has contributed to the area of strategic service supply chain management. 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge as it provides validated measurement 
constructs for outsourcing success in the services sector. The present study adapted the 
INDSERV scale developed by Gounaris (2005a) to measure vendors‟ service 
performance, and it found that the scale should be localized in future research. In 
addition, the empirical verification of the moderating roles of partners‟ compatibility 
and partnership quality are the main contributions to the theory. The influence of 
partnership quality and partners‟ compatibility on contractual governance is different. 
This raises several managerial implications. Maintaining a higher level of partners‟ 
compatibility is more important than partnership quality for the focal firm as it 
minimizes the efforts of vendor management activities. In contrast, a higher level of 
partnership quality becomes more important than partners‟ compatibility for vendors as 
it enhances the impact of vendors‟ service performance on outsourcing success.  As a 
whole, the identification of prominent managerial factors, which are related to 
outsourcing success, allow all the service industry stakeholders to plan, execute and 
assess the outsourcing function as a collaborative business practice that ensures the 
mutual benefits as well as mutual survival.  
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ABSTRAK 
Penyumberan luar semakin semakin penting sebagai satu bentuk kerjasama perniagaan. 
Penyumberan luar dalam sektor perkhidmatan melibatkan pemindahan pemilikan 
keseluruhan atau sebahagian daripada aktiviti perniagaan kepada penjual. Integrasi 
tugas antara firma dan penjual mestilah diuruskan dengan cekap untuk memastikan 
kejayaan penyumberan luar. Tujuan kajian ini adalah untuk mengenal pasti faktor-faktor 
yang perlu diuruskan dalam proses integrasi tugas penyumberan luar. 
Kajian ini mengenal pasti bahawa pengurusan pergantungan organisasi dan pentadbiran 
dalam proses pertukaran sumber adalah aspek yang paling asas untuk kejayaan 
penyumberan luar.  Pengurusan kebergantungan organisasi dikaji melalui Teori 
Kebergantungan Sumber, manakala pentadbiran dalam pertukaran sumber dilihat 
daripada perspektif Teori Pertukaran Sosial. Tahap penyumbaran luar, keupayaan 
pengurusan penjual dan prestasi perkhidmatan penjual dikenal pasti sebagai faktor-
faktor yang mempunyai kesan langsung kepada kejayaan perkhidmatan penyumberan 
luar. Kajian ini juga menguji kesan magnitud keserasian rakan kongsi dan kualiti 
perkongsian di dalam perniagaan kerjasama ke atas kejayaan penyumberan luar. Data 
rentas keratan dikumpul melalui borang soal selidik berstruktur yang  diedarkan kepada 
pengurus yang bekerja di dalam sektor perbankan dan hotel di Sri Lanka. Sejumlah 207 
borang soal selidik yang boleh digunakan telah dikumpul.  Permodelan Persamaan 
Struktur (SEM) digunakan untuk menganalisis jawapan kajiselidik. 
Dapatan kajian mengesahkan bahawa pergantungan dan pertukaran adalah aspek 
penting yang perlu diuruskan dalam perkhidmatan penyumberan luar kerana kedua 
faktor ini meyumbang 95 peratus  kepada kejayaan pentumbaran luar. Tahap keluasan 
dan tahap kedalaman adalah dua elemen yang menentukan tahap penyumberan luar. 
Hanya elemen tahap keluasan dikenal pasti menjejaskan kejayaan penyumberan luar. 
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Bukti empirikal juga mengesahkan bahawa  pengaruh pentadbiran urusan kontrak 
kepada kejayaan penyumberan luar adalah lebih tinggi apabila keserasian rakan kongsi 
adalah tinggi.  
Penyelidikan ini telah menyumbang kepada perkhidmatan strategik pengurusan rantaian 
bekalan. Secara teorinya, kajian ini menyumbang kepada badan ilmu pengetahuan 
kerana ia menyediakan konstruk pengukuran yanng disahkan untuk kejayaan 
penyumberan luar dalam sektor perkhidmatan. Kajian ini merubah skala INDSERV 
yang dicipta oleh Gounaris (2005a) untuk mengukur prestasi perkhidmatan penjual dan 
didapati bahawa skala seharusnya diubah mengikut konteks setempat di dalam 
penyelidikan yang akan dilaksanakan di masa depan. Di samping itu, pengesahan 
empirik peranan keserasian rakan kongsi dan kualiti perkongsian sebagai faktor yang 
mengubah kejayaan penyumberan luar adalah sumbangan utama kepada teori. Pengaruh 
kualiti perkongsian dan keserasian rakan kongsi  terhadap pentadbiran pengurusan  
kontrak adalah berbeza dan ini menimbulkan beberapa implikasi pengurusan. 
Mengekalkan tahap keserasian rakan kongsi yang tinggi adalah lebih penting daripada 
kualiti perkongsian bagi firma kerana ia mengurangkan usaha aktiviti pengurusan 
vendor. Sebaliknya, tahap kualiti perkongsian yang lebih tinggi menjadi lebih penting 
daripada keserasian rakan kongsi untuk penjual kerana ia meningkatkan kesan  prestasi 
perkhidmatan penjual terhadap kejayaan penyumberan luar. Secara keseluruhannya, 
pengenalpastian faktor-faktor pengurusan yang berkaitan dengan kejayaan 
penyumberan luar membolehkan semua pihak yang mempunyai kepentingan dalam 
industri perkhidmatan merancang, melaksana dan menilai fungsi penyumberan luar 
sebagai amalan perniagaan kerjasama yang memastikan faedah bersama. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
The contribution from the service industry to the world‟s economy is flourishing and 
becoming dominant. However, increasing globalization, technological advancements, 
and increased customer expectations create complex market structures and tighten 
competition in the marketplace. These factors have made the sustainability of firms 
more challenging than ever. Organisations that survive, adapt the best practices in order 
to maximize the usage of their existing resource base. However, more often than not, 
this proves to be inadequate, as organizations cannot possibly acquire all the resources 
they require. One way around this problem is to share external resources (Hessels and 
Terjesen, 2010).  
Collaboration between firms enhances their respective competitiveness and develops 
their resource bases (Al-Natour and Cavusoglu, 2009), which can be in the form of 
strategic alliances, mergers, partnerships or outsourcing. It is imperative that any form 
of collaboration relies on the strength of the members‟ relationship beyond traditional 
purchasing. In this context, outsourcing has been identified as a strategy that is capable 
of achieving both operational and strategic objectives for sustainable development in 
modern business settings (Fixler and Siegel, 1999; Petersen et al., 2008; Li and Choi, 
2009; Lacity et al., 2009).  
Outsourcing is defined as the transfer of responsibility of performing internal business 
activities and processes to an external party (Lee, 2001; Kotabe and Mol, 2009; Li and 
Choi, 2009; Kroes and Ghosh, 2009; Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2009). However, the 
outsourcing of services involves a structural change, in which an agent acts as the 
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service provider in delivering the service to the end customer (Lam and Han, 2005; Li 
and Choi, 2009; Banerjee and Williams, 2009). This is the most significant difference 
between the service sector and the manufacturing sector practice of outsourcing.  
Outsourcing, in general, is claimed as a strategic tool that enhances organisational 
performance (Fixler and Siegel, 1999; Lee, 2001; Domberger et al., 2002; Kakabadse 
and Kakabadse, 2003 Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 2004:2005a; Gewald et 
al., 2006; Li and Choi, 2009; Cusmano et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2009; Ozcelik and 
Altinkemer, 2009; Lacity et al., 2009). Regardless of the claim, it is still riddled with 
uncertainties, such as confidentiality leaks (Lansdale and Cox, 1997; Dyer, 1997; Li and 
Choi, 2009), unexpected costs (Kumar and  Eickhoff, 2005; Belcourt, 2006), quality 
issues (Young 2008; Carr et al., 2008; Li and Choi, 2009), loss of mutual trust (Lee, 
2001; Marshall et al., 2007; Han et al., 2008; Young, 2008; Cui et al., 2009), and the 
termination of the contract before the agreed period (Lam and Han, 2005; Young, 2008; 
Jean et al., 2008). These issues are common to the service sector as well. Despite the 
existence of these weaknesses, there are still ways to manage the outsourcing function 
to avoid these issues. Consequently, the focus of recent academic research interest has 
been on the examination of the different managerial factors of outsourcing function. For 
example, investigations on critical success factors (Whipple and Frankel, 2000; Ogden, 
2006; Rajabzadeh et al., 2008; Banerjee and Williams, 2009; Cusmano et al., 2009), 
outsourcing agility (Young, 2008; Kroes and Ghosh, 2009; Liou and Chuang, 2010), 
and outsourcing structural dimensions (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Espino-Rodrı´guez 
and Padro´n-Robaina, 2004; Marshall et al., 2007; Thouin et al., 2009) have been 
carried out widely.   
The factors discovered by the above studies are dispersed among the functional, 
behavioural and relational requirements in outsourcing. Furthermore, certain factors 
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identified in the studies are common requirements in general management. For instance, 
„top management commitment‟ and „better communication‟ are fundamental practices 
in business.  However, Li and Choi (2009) recognized the outsourcing of services as a 
structural change of performing a task. Even though, this structural variation may 
require identifying unique factors that are needed to be managed in services 
outsourcing, it has not been successfully integrated and addressed in previous literature. 
Therefore, this study focuses on identifying factors that influence the success of 
outsourcing, specifically, in the context of services. In relation to the purpose of this 
study, several gaps were identified in the existing epistemology, described below. 
First, as far as the nature of services is concerned, interaction among the focal firm (i.e. 
main service provider), vendor and customer is required to produce and deliver a 
service. This is known as the triadic relationship. The lack of connection between actors 
in the triad is denoted as a „structural hole‟ (Burt, 2002:2004; Li and Choi, 2009). The 
„structural hole‟ is recognized as one of the central causes that demolish outsourcing 
contracts. Thus, Li and Choi (2009) perceived the focal firm as the bridge connecting 
both the vendor and the customer.  This bridge needs to employ a proper vendor 
management system for subsequent and continuous interaction. The subsequent and 
continuous interaction is further enriched by the deployment of social capital (Li and 
Choi, 2009; Bernardes, 2010). This is widely tested and commonly denoted as 
partnership quality or relationship quality in the outsourcing literature. However, having 
a proper vendor management system and the deployment of social capital does not 
guarantee the success of outsourcing. Specifically, the vendor becomes a key executor 
of managing the outsourcing function, as he is fully or partially acting as the focal firm 
in delivering the service to the end customer. This places a direct responsibility on the 
vendor to manage the service function successfully as specified by the contract.  
However, the direct responsibility of the vendor in the service delivery is not integrated 
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with the total responsibility of managing the outsourcing function and its influence on 
the success has not been empirically tested in the previous literature.  
Next, it is also commonly recognised that the match between partners (Bettis et al., 
1992; Shamdasani and Sheth, 1994; Whipple and Frankel, 2000; Wasti et al., 2006; 
Selviaridis et al., 2008) is a critical success factor in the business-to-business (B2B) 
context. This denotes the compatibility of partners. Compatibility in tangible resources 
is easier to assess than it is for intangible resources, making it easier to determine the 
vendor‟s compatibility in the manufacturing sector than in the services sector. Many 
studies (e.g. Shamdasani and Sheth, 1994; Whipple and Frankel, 2000; Jean, Sinkovics 
and Kim, 2000; Roh et al., 2008) noted that compatibility of partners as a variable 
determines the potential alignment of partners to conduct joint business. Largely, it has 
been discussed in terms of organisational culture (Harrigan 1985; Lam and Han, 2005; 
Whipple and Frankel 2000; Roh et al., 2008). Next, compatibility of core competencies 
is also highlighted as another basic requirement of a collaborative business success 
(Skinner, 1966; Espino-Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina, 2005a; Wu and Park, 
20092009; Jarvenpaa and Mao, 2008; Kroes and Ghosh, 2009).  For example, the 
impact of information technology (IT) compatibility is identified as a crucial element 
for the outsourcing success of information systems (Bettis et al., 1992; Lee, 2001; 
Tallon, 2008). In this case, firms may observe the IT resource capability of the vendors 
at the stage of vendor selection, as it provides an opportunity to perform an objective 
assessment.  Despite the physical examination, it is questionable, as to what extent non-
physical factors (e.g. culture, competencies) can be accurately assessed prior to working 
together. Indeed, these assessments are limited.  The actual behaviour is becoming an 
experience which can only be seen after the contract is executed. As an example, the 
real management philosophy of the vendor can only be observed once they start to work 
with the firm. The issue becomes critical in services, as most of the resources are 
5 
 
intangible and attached to human capabilities, such as, skills and knowledge. Culture is 
one of the elements that shape human action/behaviour. Therefore, the human resource 
holds attributes of its culture.  Although vendor‟s compatibility cannot be entirely 
assessed at the initial stage of selection, its influence matters throughout the outsourcing 
process.  It is empirically proven that the partners‟ compatibility is imperative to the 
success of an alliance (Shamdasani and Sheth, 1994; Liou and Chuang, 2010). It is also 
commonly accepted that a compatible business partner could contribute more to the 
partnership compared to a less compatible business partner (Shamdasani and Sheth, 
1994; Whipple and Frankel, 2000). This means that the level of compatibility of the 
chosen vendor is indirectly proportional to the success of outsourcing.  The link is 
largely absent in the existing literature. Thus, this study wishes to oversee the indirect 
role of partners‟ compatibility in the context of the services outsourcing.  
Third, Kotabe et al. (2008), and Kotabe and Mol (2009) discovered that the firms‟ 
profitability has a negative curvilinear relationship with sourcing alternatives. Thus, 
they proposed to balance sourcing levels (i.e. in-source and outsource), due to the fact 
that it accumulates negative consequences after it passes the optimal point. However, 
Fixler and Siegel (1999), Gilley and Rasheed (2000), and Thouin et al. (2009) reported 
that the magnitude of organisational performance is positively correlated to the 
magnitude of outsourcing in the manufacturing sector. With regards to services, the 
findings of Espino-Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina (2004) are also aligned with a 
positive linear relationship. Cook and Yamagishi (1992) proposed that exchanges 
proceed towards an equilibrium point, where partners depend equally upon each other 
for valued resources. Although different firms may have different optimal levels, it is 
not known what elements are significant for the determination of the optimum level of 
outsourcing. These confusing arguments led to the identification of determinants of the 
degree of outsourcing. Poppo and Zenger (1998), and Gilley and Rasheed (2000) 
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identified the degree of outsourcing as a multiplied variable of „breadth‟ and „depth‟. 
Breadth refers to the number of activities outsourced in the firm while depth is denoted 
as the portion of the value of each activity outsourced. Thus, it is crucial to identify 
whether the level of breadth or level of depth is more important for the determination of 
the degree of outsourcing particularly in the context of services. It is also answering to 
the question of which level of outsourcing brings the optimal success. For example, 
„low breadth high depth outsourcing‟ or „high breadth low depth outsourcing‟ 
contributes more to the outsourcing success.  
Concisely, the current study addresses three research gaps that influence the service 
sector's outsourcing success. The study emphasizes the uniqueness of outsourcing 
services and assigns the dual responsibility for managing the outsourcing function to the 
vendor, in addition to the focal firm. Then, the role of partners‟ compatibility and the 
impact of different levels of degree of outsourcing on outsourcing success are identified 
as the areas that need further investigation. The following section explains the 
fundamental aim of the study.  
 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The service industry is advancing all over the world. As a result the competition among 
service firms is also rising. To be an „order winner‟ in the industry, firms have to offer 
competitive services (Barney, 1991). Outsourcing is recognized as a strategy of 
bundling expertise knowledge that offers a competitive edge.  Despite this common 
reliance on outsourcing, the existing literature on the subject is rather scarce (Sun et al., 
2002; Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2009). 
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Services outsourcing differs from manufacturing outsourcing as it involves the 
exchange of intangible goods (Li and Choi, 2009), is performed simultaneously, and is 
bidirectional (Sampson, 2000). However, its outcome is less clear (Fixler and Siegel, 
1999), making it difficult to quantify (Gounaris, 2005). Uncertainty in output is higher 
in services (Senguptha et al., 2006), as the final customer determines the quality, which 
may vary from customer to customer (Gounaris, 2005; Young, 2008; Li and Choi, 
2009). The uncertainty in demand is also higher in services (Zhang et al., 2009). As a 
whole, it is more difficult to manage outsourcing in the services sector than in the 
manufacturing sector.  
As far as the business-to-business (B2B) context is concerned, only a few studies (e.g. 
Jean et al., 2006; Han et al., 2008; Lacity et al., 2009) have been devoted to identifying 
the critical managerial factors in outsourcing. Specially, detailed empirical 
investigations into the identification of critical managerial factors related to B2B aspects 
in services sector have not been conducted. Thus, this study aims to carry out an 
empirical investigation on critical managerial factors related to B2B context, affecting 
the services sector outsourcing success. 
The factors affecting outsourcing success are twofold, some beyond organisational 
control, while others are controllable. Market uncertainty (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; 
Espino-Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina, 2004; Kotabe and Mol, 2007; Jean et al., 2008; 
Banerjee and Williams, 2009), market thickness (Dyer, 1997; Li and Choi, 2009; De 
Vita et al., 2010) and anticipated rivalry (Lahiri et al., 2009) are confirmed to be beyond 
the primary control of the organisation. These aspects will be excluded from this study. 
The controllable factors that affect the success of outsourcing are organisational 
resource capability (Lee, 2001; Han et al., 2008), vendor management capability (Lee, 
2001; Chan and Chin, 2007; Han et al., 2008), asset specificity (Wang, 2002; Zhang et 
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al., 2009; De Vita et al., 2009), organisational culture (Lam and Han, 2005; Jarvenpaa 
and Mao, 2008; Young, 2007:2008; Jean et al., 2008) and partnership/relationship 
quality (Dyer, 1997; Lee, 2001; Marshall et al., 2007; Han et al., 2008; Cui et al., 2009; 
Zhang et al., 2009).  
The organisational resource capability (Han et al., 2008; Ozcelik and Altinkemer, 2009) 
and assets specificity (Vining and Globerman, 1999; Gonzalez-Diaz et al., 2000; 
Saussier, 2000; Hubbard, 2001; Leiblein et al., 2002) are the determinants of the degree 
of outsourcing of the firm; having no direct impact on success. Additionally, 
organisational culture explains the business pattern and passion of a particular firm, and 
hence determining partners‟ compatibility in outsourcing.  
Among the factors mentioned above, the importance of vendor management capability 
and partnership quality is widely recognized. Unlike outsourcing in the manufacturing 
sector, the vendor bears co-responsibility in outsourcing in the service sector. Therefore, 
vendor‟s service performance has a direct impact on outsourcing success (Li and Choi, 
2009; Carr et al., 2006; Young, 2008). In addition to that, the present study identified 
the degree of outsourcing as a determinant to outsourcing success. The impact of depth 
and breadth on outsourcing success needs further investigation. Accordingly, this study 
added that the degree of outsourcing and „vendor‟s service performance‟ are critical 
determinants of success.  
It is also noted that the role of partner‟s compatibility on the success of the outsourcing 
of services needs further investigation.  The notion of partners‟ compatibility is 
perceived as the ability to plan and work together (Whipple and Frankel, 2000). The 
partners‟ compatibility is activated once the collaboration begins. For example, Liou 
and Chuang (2010) measured „compatibility in operational flexibility‟ in terms of the 
extent to which the vendor is capable of adapting to abnormal situations. The 
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compatibility of partners has a strategic value to the influence of activities, abilities and 
orientations of outsourcing on its success (Shamdasani and Sheth, 1994). Based on the 
argument developed above, this study seeks to examine the indirect influence of 
partners‟ compatibility on outsourcing success.  
In short, this study outlines vendor management capability, vendor‟s service 
performance, degree of outsourcing, partnership quality and partners‟ compatibility as 
the most significant manageable factors in outsourcing in the service sector. 
The identification of appropriate underpinning theory(ies) helps in the proper deduction 
(Watjatrakul, 2005; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Marshall et al., 2007) of the 
aforementioned variables. Therefore, the following section attempts to identify the 
appropriate underpinning theory(ies), in order to provide a theoretical foundation to this 
research.   
 
1.3 RESEARCH THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING   
In a more conventionalist perspective, Thomas Kuhn (1970a) introduced the paradigm 
of scientific knowledge in research (cited: Johnson and Duberley, 2000).  This refers to 
the fact that certain theories are unable to solve current societal issues, requiring 
researchers to develop new theoretical overviews. In relation to the theories applied in 
the outsourcing literature, many drawbacks have resulted due to the limitations of their 
explanatory scope. For example, the majority of previous studies applied transaction 
cost economies (TCE), resource based view (RBV) or knowledge based view (KBV).  
Some examples of detraction and criticisms of TCE are its failure to recognise corporate 
capabilities (Holcomb and Hitt, 2007), the ignorance of other aspects of organisational 
behaviour (Espino-Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina, 2005a), and the failure to analyse 
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broader perspectives of outsourcing. Moreover, TCE's approach is incompatible within 
highly uncertain environmental conditions (Williamson, 1979; Kotabe and Mol, 2009).  
The resource based view (RBV) mitigates the weakness prevalent in TCE and considers 
a firm's specific characteristics, such as its resource capability and competencies. 
Barney (1991), and Wu and Park (2009) explained that the RBV mainly focuses on 
evaluating the capability of internal resources to produce profits and compete. Some 
scholars, however, perceived that the TCE and RBV complement each other (Marshall 
et al., 2007), while others viewed them as interconnected approaches that strengthen 
one another (Leiblein, 2003). Burrell and Morgan‟s (1979) explanation on the meta-
theoretical assumptions of social science revealed that RBV is limited to positivist 
realism, as it ignores the aspect of human behaviour. For instance, RBV perceives the 
human element as another strategic resource, and has withdrawn the interpretation on 
behavioural elements, such as that the behaviour could be either „determinism‟ or 
„voluntarism‟. The knowledge based view (KBV) is an emerging research domain in the 
field of information system outsourcing. The KBV considers the core competency of a 
firm as knowledge (Kroes and Ghosh, 2009) that accumulates value for the organisation 
in the modern information era. Additionally, organisations are engaging in a constant 
learning process for continuous improvement that ensures and enhances their 
competitive edge. Thus, in outsourcing, firms use the knowledge of an external body to 
generate a competitive advantage (Kroes and Ghosh, 2009). Sharing information, 
mutual learning, joint decision-making and knowledge sharing (implicit and explicit) 
are key characteristics of KBV. It considers knowledge as the fundamental resource 
focusing on improving competitiveness, making it highly applicable for knowledge 
based firms.  
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However, the boundary between TCE and RBV is not exact or deterministic, and these 
aspects address two different issues in the firm (Marshall et al., 2007). Marshall et al. 
(2007) explained that TCE addresses „why firms exist‟ and RBV addresses „why firms 
differ in practices‟. The KBV is widely applied in evaluating the outcomes of 
information systems outsourcing rather than those of general outsourcing. However, all 
three paradigms (TCE, RBV, and KBV) have specific orientations on outsourcing 
outcomes, and do not provide a holistic picture of the context. Outsourcing is not merely 
an outcome, but it represents a system, including inputs, processes, and outcomes, and is 
also influenced by task environmental factors.  Understanding the outsourcing context 
as a system which provides answers to many questions. There are three basic questions 
related to the inputs: (1) Why do organisations outsource? (2) What do they outsource? 
and (3) who is the vendor?  
The resource dependency theory (RDT) provides background information for oversee  
these questions. The primary objective of management is to create a stable internal 
environment to deal with uncertain external environments. Therefore, organisations are 
embedded with a network of exchange relationships in order to cope with uncertainties 
in the external environments (Petersen et al., 2008).   As a result, firms depend on other 
firms for survival (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Organizational survival becomes 
challenging when they lack the resources to perform competitively. In such situations, 
they rely on external resources to accelerate their activities. According to the resource 
dependency theory, outsourcing is identified as an adoption of the required resources 
from an external party (Liou and Chuang, 2010) to perform internal business activities, 
and thereby face external environmental uncertainties (Barney, 1999; Kedia and Lahiri, 
2007; Petersen et al., 2008). 
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Second, outsourcing deals with managing organisational dependency (Petersen et al., 
2008; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Basically, service supply happens directly and in real 
time, and, hence, the firms should delegate the appropriate power to the vendor to 
maintain service quality. This simultaneously determines the level of the firm‟s 
dependency on external resources and their leverage. Thus, managing dependency 
becomes the organisational choice of adjustment of power (Pfeffer, 2003), while power 
asymmetry creates negative consequences (Heide and John, 1990). The „depth of 
outsourcing‟ and the „breadth of outsourcing‟ are tools that adjust the organisational 
power of outsourcing. These two decisions are fundamental and complex. First, firms 
must understand the capabilities of internal resources and thereby outline the activities 
that require support from external resources, which is denoted as breadth (Lonsdale and 
Cox, 1998; Li and Choi, 2009 and Mc Ivor, 2000).  Then, the appropriate level of 
external party involvement should be decided based on vendor‟s resource capability, 
which is known as depth (Carr et al., 2006; Petersen et al., 2008; Gilley and Rasheed, 
2000). These basic decisions are imperative to services, as the vendor needs 
considerable autonomy on service delivery, while the focal firm needs to maintain its 
dependency for a successful partnership.  
The success of the partnership becomes a matter of strategic fit between participants. 
RDT assumes that organisations make active choices to achieve their respective 
objectives (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hessels and Terjesen, 2010). Thus, managers 
have to carefully determine the nature of the vendor(s) that they intend to collaborate 
with (Shamdasani and Sheth, 1994; Whipple and Frankel, 2000; Senguptha et al., 2006; 
Jarvenpaa and Mao, 2008; Liou and Chuang, 2010). A compatible partner supports the 
notion of complementary dependency (Al-Natour and Cavusoglu, 2009; Hessels and 
Terjesen, 2010). A higher level compatibility will accumulate more positive gains for 
the partnership than a lower level compatibility. Based on this argument, the present 
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study perceives that the higher the partners‟ compatibility is, the stronger will be the 
complementary dependency, and therefore, will provide more value to the collaboration.  
However, RDT holds the mechanisms for inter-organisational exchange and 
governance. Theories such as resource dependence and social network utilize ideas from 
the Social Exchange Theory (SET) (Petersen et al., 2008; Al-Natour and Cavusoglu, 
2009; Li and Choi, 2009), which place heavy emphasis on governance in exchange.    
SET discusses governance in a bilateral resource exchange (Lawler, 2001; Cook and 
Rice, 2003). Managing inter-firm bilateral exchanges are twofold (Cook and Rice 2003; 
Ferguson et al., 2005; Zafirovski, 2005). These are negotiated and reciprocal exchange. 
Negotiated exchange represents contractual governance, with each party having its own 
responsibilities for mutual benefits (Marshall et al., 2007; Han et al., 2008; Park-Pops 
and Rees, 2010; Byramjee et al., 2010). In this case, the vendor is responsible for 
delivering the agreed service to the client, while the focal firm is responsible for 
carrying out a sufficient level of vendor management activities. The success of the 
exchange depends on the fulfilment of each respective party's role. Relational 
governance represents a set of norms developed over a period of time (Ferguson et al., 
2005, p. 221).  It emphasizes mutual co-operation for mutual benefits (Cook and Rice, 
2003; Zafirovski, 2005) and covers soft issues in managing relationships (Lacity et al., 
2009). As previously mentioned, the relational governance represents partnership 
quality characteristics, which is contingent upon each other‟s behaviour.  Therefore, 
SET perceives the nature of human behaviour as situational (i.e. determinism).  
SET further assumes that the satisfaction of an actors‟ preferences become the prime 
mover of exchanges (Cook, 1990, p. 115).  Thus, the existence and continuation of 
exchange is influenced by the satisfaction of the selected partner.  The exchange is 
deemed successful when the partners are suitably matched to each other (Whipple and 
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Frankel, 2000). Outsourcing efforts collapse due to the incompatibilities between the 
client firm and the vendor (Shamdasani and Sheth, 1995; Lam and Han, 2005; Liou and 
Chuang, 2010). This is largely due to the fact that compatibility attributes are only fully 
evident during the exchange process. 
Based on the facts, the applicability of the resource dependency theory and the social 
exchange theory are found to be mutually complementary (Al-Natour and Cavusoglu, 
2009) in identifying the critical managerial factors in outsourcing. Both theories 
promote collaboration with compatible partners for inter-dependency and mutual 
survival. Based on the theoretical highlights, the study has derived three research 
questions, which will be presented in the next section.  
 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research Question 1 
To what extent does organisational dependency impact on the success of 
outsourcing in service firms? 
The most important factor highlighted by RDT is success as a matter of managing 
power and dependency (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Li and Choi 2009; Hsiao et al., 
2010; De Vita et al., 2010). As previously explained, organisations have to determine 
the appropriate level of outsourcing, as it directly influences outcomes (Gilley and 
Rasheed, 2000; Espino-Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina, 2004; Kotabe and Mol 2007; 
Hessels and Terjesen, 2010).  
The focal firm‟s capabilities and resources determine the best sourcing (i.e. in/out 
source) decisions (Barney, 1999). Determining the appropriate level of outsourcing is a 
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structural decision taken by managers. They initially decide which activities need to be 
outsourced (breadth), along with the intensity of the power assigned to the vendor 
(depth). Therefore, outsourcing success becomes a matter of determining the correct 
blend of breadth and depth.  
Espino-Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina (2005a), Kotabe and Murray (2004), and Quinn 
and Hilmer (1994) suggested that organisations should only outsource non-core 
functions. The recent debates distinguishing core and non-core logic are quite neutral. 
There are critiques with regards to core and noncore logic, such as, it is not static and 
does not have clear boundaries (Marshall et al., 2007). This is due to the dynamic nature 
of core competencies (Leavy, 2004; Wu and Park, 2009), making it difficult to 
generalize core and non-core logic across organisations.  Regardless of the nature of the 
activity (i.e. core or non-core), the number of activities outsourced (i.e. level of breadth) 
might have a significant impact on outsourcing success.  
Next, the depth of outsourcing also determines its success. In services, managing depth 
creates a dilemma between maintaining service quality and controlling the power. This 
is because vendors require adequate power in performing activities (Sun et al., 2002; 
Carr et al., 2008), while firms need considerable power to monitor and control such 
activities (Petersen et al., 2008; Li and Choi, 2009). Accordingly, firms have to decide 
upon the appropriate level of depth of outsourcing that produces the optimal outcome. 
Thus, the extent of depth may also significantly impact the success of outsourcing.  
The different combinations of breadth and depth levels create different groups of 
„degrees of outsourcing‟. Each of these groups may have a different level of impact on 
outsourcing outcomes.  Therefore, this study wishes to examine the impact of different 
groups of degree of outsourcing (i.e. groups based on different combinations of breadth 
and depth) on outsourcing success.   
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Research Question 2 
What are the important factors in the exchange of resources that have an impact 
on outsourcing success? 
The social exchange theory (SET) serves as a general paradigm for the social and 
anthropological research domain (Zafirovski, 2005). It discusses shared responsibility 
and mutual benefits over activities that are jointly performed by two or more parties 
(Lawler, 2001). However, the nature of outsourcing relationship has shifted from a 
purely contractual to a partnership basis (Lee, 2001, Chan and Chin, 2007; Lahiri et al, 
2009). A successful partnership is based on both contractual and relational governance.  
Contractual governance includes managing the formal contract (Petersen et al., 2008; 
Lacity et al., 2009). From SET's perspective, contractual governance is a negotiated 
exchange, which includes a set of responsibilities and benefits. Basically, the 
responsibility of managers on exchange is to implement a successful vendor 
management system (Lam and Han, 2005; Chan and Chin, 2007; Han et al., 2008; 
Rajabzadeh et al., 2008), which includes vendor evaluation, selection, monitoring, and 
performance evaluation (Rajabzadeh et al., 2008; Chan and Chin, 2007). The secondary 
purpose of vendor management is executing corrective actions for improvements (Chan 
and Chin, 2007). Thus, vendor management is one of the core capabilities that guarantee 
the success of outsourcing (Han et al., 2008).  
According to the service triad, not only the focal firm, but the vendor also has the 
responsibility to deliver the service as stipulated in the contract (Byramjee et al., 2010; 
Liou and Chuang, 2010; Young, 2007:2008; Carr et al., 2008). The role of outsourcing 
has changed from traditional purchasing to strategic activity (Chan and Chin, 2007). 
Thus, the vendor becomes a business partner who deals with operational control of 
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functions (Rajabzadeh et al., 2008), adds value to the business process (Liou and 
Chuang, 2010), and enhances the sustainable competitive advantage (Miles and Snow, 
2007; Whipple and Frankel, 2000).  Based on these factors and the nature of service 
delivery, the vendor has a greater responsibility in managing the outsourcing function.  
The success of the service supply chain is highly based on the deployment of relational 
resources rather than only management by contract (Senguptha et al., 2006; Young, 
2008). Therefore, relational governance has been identified as the „golden key for 
getting the best of supplies‟ (Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2009, p. 368). Relational 
governance represents a set of norms that develops over time (Ferguson et al., 2005; 
Petersen et al., 2008). The governance emphasizes mutual cooperation for mutual 
benefits (Cook and Rice, 2003; Zafirovski, 2005). It is passive and contingent upon each 
other‟s behaviour. The relational governance aspects have been studied under different 
terminologies, such as „social embeddedness‟ (Uzzi, 1999), „relationship quality‟ 
(Byramjee et al., 2010; De Vita et al., 2009) and „partnership quality‟ (Kedia and 
Lahiri, 2007; Lee, 2001; Han et al., 2008), all of which, to a lesser or greater extent, 
measure the strength of the relationship. Nevertheless, the commonly used term to 
explain relational governance in outsourcing is „partnership quality‟. 
As far as the role of partnership quality is concerned, there is no warranted consensus.  
It has a direct impact (Lai, Lee and Hsu, 2009; Whipple and Frankel, 2000), mediating 
impact (Lee and Kim, 1999; Lee, 2001; Cheng, Yeh, and Tu, 2008) and possibly a 
moderating impact (Byramjee et al., 2010) on performance.  This means that relational 
governance could accumulate value for the intended outcomes directly or indirectly.  
As explained by SET, the exchange process collapses and is discontinued in the long 
run if there is no reciprocity (Zafirovski, 2005). Thus, the mutual reinforcement is vital 
in achieving expected outcomes in exchanges (Cook and Rice, 2003; Zafirovski, 2005; 
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Homans, 1961). Accordingly, Petersen et al. (2005) stated that the degree of trust 
between the focal firm and the vendor affects the collaborative planning effectiveness, 
and, inadvertently, supply chain and firm performance. However, Petersen et al. (2008) 
recognized that, individually, the relational governance could not produce economic 
benefits in outsourcing, and it could only facilitate in producing better outcomes of 
contractual governance. Thus, relationship quality might moderate the influence of 
contractual governance on performance.  
Consequently, this study seeks to investigate the moderating effect of relational 
governance (i.e. partnership quality) on the relationship between contractual governance 
and the success of outsourcing. Precisely, vendor management capability and vendor‟s 
service performance are the components of contractual governance.  Thus, the 
relationship between both vendor management capability and vendors‟ performance on 
the success of outsourcing will be moderated by partnership quality. 
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Research Question 03 
What is the role of partners’ compatibility in assuring the outsourcing success of 
the service sector?  
From the resource dependence perspective, the failure of one party in the dependency 
might affect the dependent‟s goals in the process of the exchange of resources (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; Al-Natour and Cavusoglu, 2009). Therefore, dependents (i.e. both, 
the organisation and vendor) should strive to ensure the success of the dependency. 
Partners‟ compatibility acknowledges a high level of mutual interdependence (Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994). From the resource dependence perspective, the vendors can enhance 
their power once they are on equal footing with their collaborative client firms.  Thus, 
both the vendor and the focal firm are required to enhance their compatibility in order to 
survive (Liou and Chuang, 2010).   
Even though, the respective dependency (i.e. degree of outsourcing) is determined by 
the level of compatibility, it cannot entirely be assessed before the exchange of 
resources starts (Sun et al., 2002; Wadhwa and Ravindran, 2007). This is because most 
of the criteria are not quantifiable (Kannan and Tan, 2004) and, consequently, there is 
no guarantee that the selected vendor is fully or partially compatible. Furthermore, the 
success of the degree of outsourcing may not be equal for different levels of 
compatibility. This means that the same level of degree of outsourcing may be more 
effective with a highly compatible partner than with a less compatible partner.  As far as 
outsourcing of services is concerned, both firms should have similar working patterns, 
operating philosophies, directions and competitive priorities, as the vendor acts on 
behalf of the firm during service delivery. Otherwise, even though the vendors are 
sufficiently empowered, they are incapable of producing the expected outcome.  
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Therefore, the influence of the degree of outsourcing on outsourcing success may vary 
with the level of compatibility between partners.  
Next, SET also assumes that the mutual reinforcement is fundamental (Homans, 1961) 
for successful exchange. Even though the management styles are not unique across 
partnered firms, they are compelled to adjust to each other for the successful exchange 
of resources (Whipple and Frankel, 2000).  Research Question Two outlined that the 
responsibility of resource exchange is dual.  Both the focal firm and the vendor have co-
responsibilities in the process of the exchange of resources. This is presented as 
contractual governance, and, hence, the success of contractual governance is reliant on 
the compatibility of the partners involved in the venture. Accordingly, compatibility 
between partners has a moderating impact on the relationship between both the 
dependency and exchange on outsourcing success.  
In conclusion, the three research questions led to the identification of the critical 
managerial aspects in the outsourcing of services context, which are basically 
dependency and exchange. Consequently, the degree of outsourcing determines the 
level of dependency. The vendor management capability and vendors‟ service 
performance‟ reflect the contractual governance. These two aspects directly impact on 
outsourcing success. Moreover, the reciprocal nature of relational governance between 
the focal firm and the vendor is recognized as partnership quality, which moderates the 
influence of contractual governance on the outsourcing success. Moreover, partners‟ 
compatibility also moderates the effectiveness of factors that ascertain outsourcing 
success. Based on the identified constructs, the conceptual framework is derived.  
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1.5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The conceptual framework is developed based on the logical rationale deduced in the 
previous section. The framework integrates aspects of resource dependency and social 
exchange theories.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework 
 
This study determined that the degree of outsourcing, vendor management capability 
and vendors‟ service performance have a direct impact on the success of outsourcing. 
The level of partner‟s compatibility in the partnership will moderate all the 
aforementioned direct impacts of outsourcing success. The partnership quality also 
moderates the relationship between both the vendor management capability, and 
vendors‟ service performance on “outsourcing success”. Figure 1.1 clearly illustrates the 
conceptual relationships on the services outsourcing success. Based on the research 
questions and conceptual framework, the following research objectives are derived.   
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1.6 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Basically, the study attempts to understand the managerial factors that affect 
outsourcing success in service organisations. The conceptual framework clearly outlines 
the research objectives, pertaining to each research question. These are: 
1. To investigate the impact of degree of outsourcing on outsourcing success in 
services. Additionally, the impact of different combinations of „degrees of 
outsourcing‟ (based on different levels of breadth and depth) on outsourcing 
success will also be investigated. 
2. To verify the positive relationship between vendor management capability and 
outsourcing success in services. 
3. To examine the impact of the vendor‟s service performance on outsourcing 
success in services. 
4. To investigate the moderating effect of partnership quality on the relationships 
between 1) vendor management capability and outsourcing success,  2) vendor‟s 
service performance  and outsourcing success. 
5. To investigate the moderating effect of partners‟ compatibility on the 
relationships between (1) degree of outsourcing and outsourcing success,       1) 
vendor management capability and outsourcing success, 2) vendors‟ service 
performance on outsourcing success. 
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1.7 INTRODUCTION OF MAIN CONSTRUCTS  
There are six main constructs in this study. These are outsourcing success, the degree of 
outsourcing, vendor management capability, vendor‟s service performance, partnership 
quality, and partners‟ compatibility. Each of these constructs is briefly described below.  
1.7.1 Outsourcing Success.  
Outsourcing success can be defined as the positive contributions of the outsourcing 
activity to the organisational performance. Zhang et al. (2009) measured outsourcing 
success in terms of „financial‟, „operational‟ and „overall‟, while, Grover, Cheon and 
Teng (1996) employed „strategic‟, economic‟ and „technological‟ indicators. Lee (2001) 
and Han et al. (2008) also applied economic, strategic and technological indicators to 
measure the success in outsourcing of information system. Nevertheless, the outcome of 
services is both tangible and intangible. Thus, behavioural dimensions are added in 
order to measure the success of outsourcing (Lee, 2001; De Vita et al., 2010; Espino-
Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina, 2005a; Han et al., 2008; Benamati and Rajkumar, 
2008). Accordingly, this study uses tactical, strategic and behavioural measures, in 
order to determine outsourcing success.   
1.7.2 Degree of Outsourcing 
Gilley and Rasheed (2000) and Espino-Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina (2004: 2005a) 
had a similar approach to define the degree of outsourcing based on its „breadth‟ and 
„depth‟. This study is aligned along their definition. Accordingly, the degree of 
outsourcing is defined as a combined construct of breadth and depth of outsourcing (i.e. 
breadth X depth). Then, the total degree of outsourcing of a firm is equal to the number 
of activities outsourced as a portion of total activities, with their corresponding power 
assigned to the vendor in each activity. This study further classified breadth and depth 
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into three levels (i.e. low, moderate and high), for the purpose of identifying the 
combined effect of the different levels of breadth and depth on outsourcing success. 
This will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
1.7.3 Vendor Management Capability 
The focal firm is held responsible for ensuring the success of outsourcing (Han et al., 
2008; Lacity et al., 1995; Lee, 2001; Rajabzadeh et al., 2008). Basically, the focal firm 
is responsible for, selecting, monitoring, evaluating, and developing vendors (Han et al., 
2008; Chan and Chin, 2007; Byramjee et al., 2010).  The focal firm‟s ability to 
compensate the vendor as per the agreed level is also an important aspect of managing 
vendors (Sun et al., 2002). Therefore, vendor management capability is defined as the 
focal firm‟s ability to select, monitor, evaluate, develop and compensate vendors 
adequately.  
1.7.4 Vendor’s Service Performance 
Whipple and Frankel (2000) perceived that the vendor‟s ability to meet performance 
expectations is one of the key factors that guarantee success in strategic alliances. The 
most appropriate vendors are those who can meet the needs of the client‟s organisation 
in terms of capacity, quality, technology, price, and services (Ogden, 2006). Taking 
these facts into consideration, this study defines vendor‟s service performance as their 
„ability to meet or exceed service performance specifications applied in the contract‟ 
(Whipple and Frankel, 2000; Gounaris, 2005; Carr et al., 2008).  
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1.7.5 Partners’ Compatibility  
A partnership is a purposive strategic relationship in which partners share compatible 
goals, strive for mutual benefits and acknowledge a high level of mutual 
interdependence (Mohr and Spekman, 1994, p.135).  Many scholars proposed, and, in 
fact, prefer the formation of a compatible organisational culture (Whipple and Frankel, 
2000; Lam and Han, 2005; Jarvenpaa and Mao, 2008; Cheng et al., 2008), and also 
work with a partner whose competitive priorities are similar (Skinner, 1966; Espino-
Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina, 2005a:b; Wu and Park, 2009; Kroes and Ghosh, 2009 
Tallon, 2008; Jarvenpaa and Mao, 2008). Based on the facts, this study identified 
partners‟ compatibility as the degree to which a vendor and focal firm have similar 
organisational, cultural and competitive priorities in order to perform a joint business 
activity.    
 
1.7.6 Partnership Quality 
Partnership quality explains the reciprocal behaviour and relational norms in an 
exchange process (Sun et al., 2002). Lee and Kim (1999), Lee (2001) and Byramjee et 
al. (2010) defined partnership quality as a reciprocal interactive, inter-organisational 
relationship to achieve shared goals. Consequently, this study incorporates partnership 
quality as the level of reciprocal business relationship holding by the focal firm and the 
vendor in the exchange process.  
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1.8 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The significance of the present study is as follows. It is explained separately under the 
contribution to the theory and contribution to the current practice.  
1.8.1 Theoretical Contribution 
Bryman and Bell (2007: p. 10) explained three aspects through which a researcher can 
contribute to the theory. This study has five theoretical contributions which address the 
all three aspects.  
The first aspect is a researcher can address the „neglected aspects‟ in previous studies. 
Within this aspect, this study has two theoretical contributions. The first contribution is 
the present study recognised the importance of dual responsibility of outsourcing of 
services, due to the real-time and the direct nature of service delivery. In response, this 
study integrated the responsibilities of both the firm and vendor when determining the 
success of service sector outsourcing. Following this, the dual responsibility is 
successful whenever a strategic fit exists between partners. Investigation of the 
influence of partners‟ compatibility on an on-going outsourcing contract is absent in the 
current literature. Consequently, the impact of partners‟ compatibility on outsourcing 
success will also be empirically evaluated.  This would be the second contribution of 
this study. Thus, it is expected that the empirical investigations concerning these two 
neglected aspects will add innovative ideas to the body of knowledge in the area of 
service sector outsourcing. 
The second aspect is a researcher can empirically inspect variables that have not been 
previously empirically tested. The third and fourth theoretical contributions of this study 
can be explained through this aspect. The present study wishes to examine the impact of 
the different combinations of the degree of outsourcing on its success. This will help to 
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distinguish the relative importance of the levels of breadth and depth in determining the 
appropriate degree of outsourcing in services. This is the third contribution of the study.  
Although the moderating role of partnership quality is proposed (Byramjee et al., 2010), 
this phenomenon is still lacking empirical investigation. Thus, empirical examination 
concerning the moderating role of partnership quality in service sector outsourcing is 
the fourth contribution to the study. 
Bryman and Bell (2007) stated that researchers could also address the „incommensurate‟ 
issues. This is the third aspect and subsequently there is one theoretical contribution of 
this study. This basically means that there are some aspects that have not been covered 
by the underpinning theories previously applied. The majority of them address a 
specific set of outcomes. However, transaction cost economics and the resource based 
view on the service outsourcing context are not without their critics. Thus, this study 
employed the „resource dependency theory‟ and „social exchange theory‟ to oversee the 
outsourcing context. Basically, these two theories highlighted dependency and exchange 
as the most crucial aspects that need management in services outsourcing. These 
theories expanded the dimensions of outsourcing success to a wide range including 
tactical, strategic and behavioural aspects. This will be the fifth contribution to the 
study.  
Consequently, the study contains five theoretical contributions to the established body 
of knowledge.  
1.8.2 Managerial Contribution 
This study intends to investigate the service sector in Sri Lanka. The future plan of Sri 
Lanka is to become one of the emerging economic hubs in the Asian Region (Central 
Bank Report -2012).  Where key economic indicators are concerned, the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) annual growth rate was reported at 6.43 percent for the year 
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2012. The highest contribution to GDP was  by service sector (58.8 percent), followed 
by the industrial sector (32.4 percent) (Central Bank Report -2012). 
The present study provides a guideline for managing the outsourcing function in the 
services sector.  Basically, outsourcing is perceived as a system rather than an activity. 
Furthermore, this study is highly concerned with the specific nature of services 
outsourcing. The factors identified provide guidelines for plan inputs and also manage 
the process of services outsourcing. This is the first managerial contribution of the 
study.  
Next, managers in the services sector can use the model to evaluate the success of 
outsourcing. Additionally, they will able to assess the level of partnership quality and 
partners‟ compatibility of the vendor(s). This will bring many strategic implications for 
practice.  For instance, if it is deemed that the compatibility between partners‟ 
moderates outsourcing success, then managers must pay more attention to methods that 
enhance the alignment of the vendors and themselves. Such actions may include 
assigning a certain time to adapt the vendors to their culture, communication of 
organisational culture and control by working as a team with the vendors (Daityari, 
Saini and Gupta, 2008).   The findings of this study are not merely beneficial to the 
focal firms, but are equally beneficial to other stakeholders. This allows the vendors to 
easily recognize their assumed role as competitive players in the market.  Likewise, the 
model developed by the study will help to evaluate the success of outsourcing activities, 
and, thereby, it will help to take counteractions. This is the second managerial 
contribution of the study.  
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1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter one discusses the basic and overall theme of the study, with emphasis on the 
existing literature gap(s), while establishing a solid background for the proposed study. 
This includes the problem statement, underlying theories, general research framework, 
and introduction to the main variables and the significance of the study.  
The second chapter reviews the epistemological and ontological background of the 
outsourcing phenomena. It covers related academic works from multiple research 
streams, such as outsourcing, services management, supply chain management and 
performance management. This is followed by a critical evaluation of the underpinning 
theories in the field of outsourcing, and their respective impacts on the research 
findings. Finally, a comprehensive analysis of the literature concerning all the variables 
incorporated in the research framework is included. The second section of this chapter 
examines the relevant issues arising from the preceding discussion. In relation to the 
issues observed, corresponding hypotheses are established for empirical verification.    
Chapter three provides details of the methodology and constructs employed. In 
particular, sample frame, sampling method, rationale and item generation and evidence 
for instrument development are included. Furthermore, this chapter includes the results 
of the pilot study and its corresponding adjustments.  In addition, the foundation for the 
statistical background for data analysis is provided and discussed. 
In Chapter four, the results from the analysis of the data are interpreted, both 
descriptively and inferentially. Descriptive statistics include analysis of the 
demographic profile and mean (µ) analysis of variables. The inferential statistics started 
with scale purification and the development of the measurement model. Using this as a 
starting point, several relevant structural models are developed. The findings of the 
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study corresponding to each of the hypotheses established earlier in Chapter 2 are 
discussed.   
Chapter five summarizes the results of the hypothesis tests, together with the discussion 
on the research findings.  It presents the answers to the research objectives and research 
questions of the study, along with the contribution of the study to the practice and 
theory.  The final section of this chapter highlights the limitations of the study and 
potential future research areas.  Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the 
research findings.  
SUMMARY 
Chapter one outlined the preliminary information pertaining to the study, identifying 
that the existing literature has ignored the uniqueness of services in determining the 
managerial aspects of outsourcing. Consequently, three epistemological gaps were 
identified. The resource dependency theory and social exchange theory were used to 
outline the specific requirements of managing services outsourcing. Three research 
questions were identified, which address the main aim of the study.  
The proposed framework presents critical managerial factors in services outsourcing, 
including managing dependency and exchange. The degree of outsourcing is a critical 
deterministic point, as it indicates the level of external resource implication. The social 
exchange theory facilitates the interpretation of the governance structure in the 
exchange process.  In services, the dual responsibility of the focal firm and vendors 
were identified. Accordingly, the vendor management capability of the focal firm and 
the vendors‟ service performance directly affect the success of services outsourcing. 
This study also identified the moderating role of relational governance (i.e. partnership 
quality) in the exchange of resources.  In addition, the compatibility between partners is 
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proposed to have a moderating impact on outsourcing success. Consequently, the model 
intends to answer five research objectives.  
This chapter also briefly introduced the constructs of the study, and then elaborated the 
contributions of the study to theory and current practices. The study has five theoretical 
and two managerial contributions. The model developed by the study `provides 
guidelines for both partners in making proactive and reactive strategic decision in the 
context of services outsourcing. This is the main implicational value of this study. The 
following chapter will explore the pertinent literature related to this dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  INTRODUCTION  
The supply chain is gaining increasing recognition as it directly influences 
organisational performances (Lejeune and Yakova, 2005; Ketchen and Giunipero, 2005; 
Miles and Snow, 2007). The focus of supply chain management is to integrate the firm‟s 
value chain with the stakeholders‟ value chain, in order to deliver competitive 
product(s) or service(s). The value chain integration with the external stakeholders is 
commonly known as collaboration. As such, outsourcing is a business collaboration that 
establishes links between suppliers and vendors. 
Outsourcing evolves from purchasing and develops to business partnerships. All the 
involved parties in the partnership share resources in order to gain a competitive edge in 
their respective markets. The partnership enhances the strength of the business, and 
thereby improves overall performances. Globalization and Information Technology (IT) 
greatly accelerate the expansion of outsourcing even with offshore vendors. Regardless 
of geographical dispersion (domestic/ international), the fundamental reason for 
outsourcing is to overcome deficiencies in the required resources and to be competitive. 
However, it does not always report positive outcomes. Therefore, in recent years, 
substantial research has been attempted to examine, the latent causes of negative 
outcomes as well as coping strategies.  
For instance, some studies reported that the negative outcomes are due to the risk 
associated with the outsourcing task, such as the vendor‟s adverse reactions (Lam and 
Han, 2005; Bon and Hughes, 2009), high switching cost (Donada and Nogatchewsky, 
2009), uncertainty in the market (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Kotabe and Mol, 2009; 
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Lahiri et al., 2009) and the suppliers‟ opportunistic behaviour (Lam and Han, 2005; 
Gewald et al., 2006; Bon and Hughes, 2009). Outsourcing also accumulates negative 
consequences due to the negative emotional experiences received by either/both party 
(ies) as well (Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2009). Liou and Chuang (2010) developed a 
hybrid multi–criteria model for selecting outsourcing partners, assuming that the 
performance differences are vendor-related. In contrast, studies on coping strategies are 
few. 
Therefore, the primary aim of this study is to identify factors that have to be managed in 
coping with aforementioned negative consequences. Accordingly, the study identified 
the degree of outsourcing, vendor management capability, vendor‟s service 
performance, partner‟s compatibility, and partnership quality as the main factors that 
have to be managed.  The resource dependency theory and social exchange theory 
provide the guidelines to oversee these factors.   
In turn, this chapter offers a comprehensive review of outsourcing literature, which 
facilitates the deduction of the aforementioned variables, with regards to outsourcing in 
general and services outsourcing in particular. The review also allocated a greater 
attention on underpinning theories and theoretical backgrounds of the constructs used in 
this study.   The diagram below depicts (Figure 2.1) the flow of the literature review.   
The last part of this chapter presents the theoretical foundation for research hypotheses 
for the relationships identified in Chapter 1.  
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Figure 2.1: Literature Review Conceptual Diagram 
 
Partnership 
Quality 
Outsourcing: an overview 
Service sector outsourcing 
Outsourcing outcomes 
Positive as 
expected 
Yes 
No 
STOP 
Why 
Factors which are within 
the management control 
Factors which are beyond 
the management control 
Managing Exchange 
(Social exchange Theory) 
Managing Dependency 
(Resource Dependency 
Theory) 
Vendor 
Management 
Capability 
Vendor‟s 
Service 
Performance 
Partner‟s 
Compatibility 
Degree of 
Outsourcing 
Outsourcing Success 
35 
 
2.2 OUTSOURCING: AN OVERVIEW 
The notion of outsourcing has evolved with the transformation of business environment. 
Most of the studies conducted before 2000 perceived outsourcing as a „make or buy’ 
decision (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1995; Rothery and Robertson, 1995; Fixler and 
Siegel, 1999), while some other studies after year 2000 perceive outsourcing as a value 
creation strategy (Lee, 2001; Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 2005a; Lam and 
Han, 2005; Han, at el., 2008; Liou and Chuang, 2010; Byramjee et al., 2010). When the 
contract is seen as purchasing, outsourcing is recognised as a decision of choice 
between buy and make. In comparison, outsourcing is viewed as a value creation 
strategy when the contract is more likely to be a collaborative partnership for mutual 
benefits.  However, a review of existing literature reveals that outsourcing has been 
perceived differently in different research paradigms. A paradigm is referring to a set of 
beliefs, values, assumptions and techniques centred around successive exemplars of 
successful practical application (Johnson and Duberley, 2000 , p. 68). The following 
section further describes the impact of different theoretical domains on the outsourcing 
context.  
2.2.1  Research Domains in Outsourcing 
An ontological overview of outsourcing context facilitates the identification of „why‟ 
and „how‟ (nature) the present knowledge of outsourcing exists. A clear classification 
can be done, based on the underpinning theories applied by previous studies. It outlines 
the objective of the study, conceptualization of constructs, data collection and its 
interpretation. However, grand theories are not seen as a comprehensive guide in social 
science, and in light of this, management and business researchers use the middle range 
theories (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 08). Bryman and Bell (2007) therefore posits that 
„unlike grand theories, middle range theories operate in limited domains‟ (p. 08). 
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Similarly, the theories applied in outsourcing literature are middle ranged; hence some 
strengths, as well as weaknesses are associated with the research outcomes. As a 
solution, some scholars applied a mix-method (i.e. more than one theory) in their 
attempt to mitigate the weakness of a single theory.  
Literature review identified four types of dominant research domains in outsourcing, 
which are transaction cost economies (TCE), resource based view (RBV), and 
knowledge based view (KBV) and relational specific theories. Relational specific 
theories (RST) include social network theory, social exchange theory and other theories, 
which consider business transactions, as a social phenomenon. Kotabe and Mol (2009) 
and Kroes and Ghosh (2009) previously categorised characteristics of outsourcing based 
on TCE, RBV and KBV perspectives. By combining these ideas, Table 2.1 depicts the 
variation of perception on outsourcing in different research domains.   
 
1. Transaction Cost Economies (TCE) Theory 
TCE is viewed as one of the most powerful research domains in outsourcing literature 
(Jarvenpaa and Mao, 2008; Thouin et al., 2009; Wu and Park, 2009). It focuses on 
efficient governance (Marshall et al., 2007) of resources for the purpose of reducing 
transaction cost (Kotabe and Mol, 2009). TCE is based on two basic assumptions of 
human behaviour: decision makers are rationally bound, and the necessity of monitoring 
each other‟s behaviour due to possibility of opportunism (Thouin et al., 2009, p. 464).  
Thus, TCE stresses contractual governance.  
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Table 2.1:  Research domains used in outsourcing literature  
 
Domain 
Definition of outsourcing Drives of outsourcing Outsourcing contract  Examples 
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Tactical approach:  
Involvement of external party to 
perform routine and focus on 
specified tasks efficiency. 
Cost reduction, reduce lead-
time, downsize the human 
resource, proximity issues. 
 
Arms-length, purchasing, 
contractual relationship 
between partners.  
 
Lacity and Hirschheim (1995); 
Dyer (1997); Thouin et al. 
(2009); Daityari and Gupta 
(2008); Young (2008); Bon and 
Hughes (2009); De Vita et al. 
(2009) 
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Strategic approach: 
Use of external resources to add 
value to business process for 
effectiveness. 
Focus on core- business, risk 
sharing, competitive advantage, 
and value addition. Business 
environment uncertainty, 
expertise knowledge. 
Business partners to 
strengthen the 
competitiveness. 
Barney (1996); Espino-
Rodrı´guez  and Padro´n-
Robaina  (2004; 2005a:b) Kedia 
and Lahiri (2007); Chi (1994); 
Venkatesen (1992), Arnold 
(2000); Jean et al.(2008). 
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Knowledge approach 
Contribution of external 
knowledge to learn and 
improvements. 
 
Knowledge sharing, foresee the 
potential opportunities and 
threats,  
 
Long –term business 
partnerships, supplier as co-
partner 
 
Lee (2001), Singh and Zack 
(2006); Cusmano et al. (2009);  
Capron and Mitchell (2004) 
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 Relational approach 
Working together with an 
external party for mutual 
reinforcement.  
 
Mutual benefits,  
mutual growth,  
 
 
Partnership  
long-term business 
relationship with mutual 
understanding,  
 
Lee (2001);  Li and Choi 
(2009);  
Bernardes (2010); Hsiao at 
al.(2010) 
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Some important aspects of TCE include, the facilitation of analysing short-term 
business and discrete transactions (Marshall et al., 2007) and also covers operational 
performance dimensions (Watjatrakul, 2005; Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2009; Thouin 
et al., 2009). Additionally, TCE is valid for business-to-business transaction analysis, as 
the fundamental purpose of each party engaged in the transaction process exceeds the 
benefits of the incurred cost (Byramjee et al., 2010). Therefore, Bon and Hughes (2009) 
highlighted the need for „careful analysis of the cost anticipated in the outsourcing‟ in 
order to obtain the expected results.  According to the Table 2.1, TCE perceives the 
reduction of cost as the main drive of outsourcing (Lam and Han, 2005; Kedia and 
Lahiri, 2007; Banerjee and Williams, 2009; Kroes and Ghosh, 2009). Therefore, 
establishing an arms-length, contractual relationship is sufficient (Lacity and 
Hirschheim, 1995; Dyer, 1997).  
Although the TCE theory is viewed as a powerful research domain, it is not without its 
detractors. Some criticism levelled on TCE includes the failure to recognise corporate 
capabilities (Holcomb and Hitt, 2007), ignoring other aspects of organisational 
behaviour (Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 2005a) and its limited scope of 
extracting outsourcing outcomes.  Furthermore, the TCE approach is deemed 
incompatible within the highly uncertain environmental conditions (Williamson, 1979; 
Kotabe and Mol, 2009). As a whole, the main focus of the TCE perspective is „efficient‟ 
governance more than the „effective‟ governance of resources. Thus, modern 
organisations are advised to understand and avoid the pitfalls of cost-focused 
outsourcing, and apply business-outcome-focused outsourcing, in order to be successful 
(Cohen, L. and Young, Gartner studies 2008, p. 05). Many scholars (e.g. Venkatesen, 
1992, Chi, 1994; Arnold, 2000; Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 2004; Miles 
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and Snow, 2007; Kedia and Lahiri, 2007) highlighted the fact that the appropriateness 
of „resource based view‟, focuses on the strategic importance of outsourcing.  
 
2. Resource Based View (RBV)  
RBV is one of the dominated theoretical research paradigms in outsourcing, as the 
gradual increase of supply chain structures, which aims at reducing cost, provides little 
sustainable competitive advantage. Thus, RBV perceives outsourcing as a decision that 
is undertaken to solve an internal issue (s) for the purpose of future strategic 
movement(s). Donada and Nogatchewsky (2009) categorized these issues into four, 
which are financial issues, operational issues, resource and competency issues and 
organizational issues.  
Consequently, acquiring expertise from outside (Lee 2001; Kedia and Lahiri 2007; Jean 
et al., 2008; Banerjee and Williams, 2009), simplifies the complex business process 
(Banerjee and Williams, 2009), and risk sharing (Kedia and Lahiri, 2007), are some 
examples for motivations of outsourcing which mitigate the aforementioned four 
strategic issues. The successful strategic movements are also driven by sustainable and 
close relationships. Moving away from arms-length relationship facilitates the 
establishment of sustainable and close relationship with vendors (Zhang et al., 2009). In 
accordance to this, Park-Poaps and Rees (2010) and Chan and Chin (2007) encourage 
the incorporation of long-term relationship with vendors. This allows vendors to be 
considered as „business partners‟ in outsourcing (Arnold, 2000).  
Moreover, RBV identifies firm-specific capabilities, and examines ways on how the 
capabilities are utilized in order to enhance performance (Arnold, 2000; Espino-
Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 2004; Watjatrakul 2005; Kedia and Lahiri, 2007).  
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The main focus of RBV is to achieve competitive advantage through effective resource 
utilization. Effective resources however, should be able to add value to the organisation, 
and those resources should be valuable, rare, imitable and manageable (Barney, 1991).  
Consequently, RBV covers broader aspects than TCE. However, Marshall et al. (2007) 
stated that the boundaries between TCE and RBV are rather contradictory. In contrast, 
Watjatrakul (2005) empirically justified that these two approaches (i.e. TCE & RBV) 
promote different sourcing decisions for the same study context. In more constructive 
point of view, TCE and RBV complement each other (Marshall et al., 2007) and 
strengthen one another (Leiblein, 2003).  In conjunction with this, Byramjee et al. 
(2010) has developed a cost benefit analysis of partnership, with regards to the value 
creation process of the focal firm. Although RBV is considered as one of the most 
interesting and useful research paradigms in the management discipline, it also ignores 
the behavioural aspects of the strategic outsourcing.   
 
3. Knowledge Based View (KBV)  
KBV approach is considered an emerging research domain, especially in the realm of 
information systems outsourcing. KBV perceives, knowledge sharing and foresees the 
potential opportunities and threats as the primary motivations of outsourcing (Capron 
and Mitchell, 2004; Singh and Zack, 2006; Cusmano et al., 2009). 
Miles and Snow (2007) and Kroes and Ghosh (2009) stated that the core competency is 
an accumulated knowledge that creates value to the firm in order to generate 
competitive advantages. Knowledge is accumulated through learning, and learning 
organisations need knowledge and information in order to sustain continuous 
improvement related to the planned, as well as unplanned outputs (Miles and Snow, 
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2007). Sharing information, mutual learning, visionary decision-making, joint decision-
making and knowledge (implicit and explicit) sharing are key characteristics of the 
KBV.  These activities provide opportunity for organisations to learn and improve; but 
this is possible to perform only with mutual trust among partners (Lee, 2001; Cusmano 
et al., 2009). Thus, the research domain upgrades the vendor as co-partner of the 
business (Singh and Zack, 2006; Cusmano et al., 2009). 
However, earlier views of the context reported that outsourcing acts as a barrier for 
learning and innovation (Bettis et al., 1992; Hendry, 1995). Falsifying the argument, 
Cusmano et al. (2009) and Cui et al. (2009) empirically found that outsourcing leads to 
innovations.  
Considering these three paradigms, KBV also focuses on improved competitiveness, but 
considers knowledge as the key resource, which can arrange and direct other resources, 
making it very suitable for knowledge based firms.  
 
4. Relational Specific Theories’ domain 
Managing materialistic resources is easier due to the static nature of existence. This is in 
contrast to managing relational resources, which are unpredictable and dynamic in 
nature. All aforementioned approaches (i.e. TCE, RBV, KBV) are concerned with non-
human resources in order to create a competitive advantage, but with the expansion of 
supply chain management and outsourcing activities to the strategic level (Ketchen and 
Giunipero, 2005), firms are compelled to incorporate human and relational elements 
more than ever (Sriram and Mummalaneni, 1980; Larson and Kulchitsky, 1998; Li et 
al., 2005; Ferguson et al., 2005; Lahiri et al., 2009). Modern supply chains are 
vertically and horizontally integrated and interconnected, and all the participants along 
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the supply chain have to be simultaneously satisfied in order to realize total success.  
The network/chain might be made up of buyers, suppliers/vendors, end customers, and 
employees. The study therefore notices an emerging research interest on managing soft 
aspects (relational resources) of outsourcing. 
The relationship management in the supply chain is important for the purpose of 
managing behavioural and emotional elements (Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2009).  
Consequently, some studies attempted to oversee the outsourcing context, which 
emphasizes on the social relational aspects.  For instance, Lee (2001), Sun et al. (2002) 
and Lacity et al. (2009) applied social exchange theory, while Li and Choi, (2009) and 
Bernardes (2010) employed the social network theory.  Both theories focus on social 
capital investments for successful trade.   The social network theory is an expanded idea 
of SET, focusing more on management than social science.  In fact, Gewald et al. 
(2006) combined the perceived risk theory and the theory of reasoned action to analyze 
the risk associated with outsourcing in business process. These theories implicitly 
explain the impact of behavioural consequences on decisions.  
As discussed, different domains focus on different issues. The following section further 
elaborates the definitions of outsourcing perceived by each domain, shown in Table 2.1. 
The analysis of definitions is taken as a separate section, as it is worthwhile to discuss 
separately.  
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2.2.2 Outsourcing Definitions 
The „sourcing‟ decision determines whether to use internal or external resources to 
accomplish a particular organisational objective(s) (Holcomb and Hitt, 2007). The 
common characteristic in all definitions of outsourcing includes „involvement of 
external party‟   (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993; King and Malhotra, 2000; Kakabadse 
and Kakabadse, 2003; Aubert et al., 2004).  „External‟ denotes performing the task or 
creating the value not by the firm‟s own resources (Arnold, 2000), but by the recourses 
where the primary ownership is not with the firm. Thus, a firm can buy or share 
resources.  
However, these definitions are varied on the perception of „resources‟.   Resource is 
generally known as anything that is used as a production input. It can be tangible or 
intangible (Barney, 1999). All resources are not equally important. They can be more or 
less strategic (Cheon et al., 1995). The characteristics of strategic resources are: 
valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991).  However, different 
theories have different perceptions on value of resources. Table 2.1 shows a clear 
variation in the approach to define outsourcing in different theories.  
Transaction cost economies theory generally perceived, outsourcing as a method of 
cost-cutting maneuver (Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2009). However, some studies in 
the domain defined outsourcing as a value added strategy as it could perform tasks 
comparatively at a lower cost. For example, it is perceived as, 
Hybrid structures that allow firms to reap some of the benefits of vertical 
integration (lower transaction costs) alongside the economic gains that accrues 
from market transactions (in the case of outsourcing, cost savings and value 
adding). (De Vita et al., 2009, p.658). 
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Then, resource based view (RBV) defines outsourcing as a strategic tool, as it covers 
strategic importance of external resources. The approach identified the value of 
outsourcing beyond cost reduction, such as value creation strategy for networked 
business (Leiblein et al., 2002; Byramjee et al., 2010). Specifically, Espino-Rodrı´guez 
and Padro´n-Robaina, (2005a, p. 708) defined outsourcing as … a result of acquire 
desired and  specific types of resources that the firm does not otherwise possess and 
which are provided more efficiently by third parties.  
The definition elaborates the competitive and relative importance of resource utilization 
for sustainable competitive advantage. However, Gilley and Rasheed (2000) claimed 
that the rejection of internalization due to the lack of capital or expertise is not merely 
outsourcing. However, their argument is not clear, because substitution can be taken as 
a result of the absence of certain resources or the absence of capital to acquire those 
resources (i.e. physical or non-physical resources). Moreover, outsourcing is perceived 
as a mode of providing added capabilities for the business process in resource based 
supply chains (Miles and Snow, 2007).  
Next, the knowledge based view (KBV) defines outsourcing in a much broader context 
than resource based view. It is viewed as a mechanism for learning and innovation 
(Cusmano et al., 2009; Miles and Snow, 2007). This places outsourcing in a position to 
respond to the need of reaping specialization gains while exposing itself to a variety of 
learning experiences (Cusmano et al., 2009, p. 185).   Usually, KBV is utilized by 
studies focusing on outsourcing in information systems (IS), where the resources which 
refer to knowledge and its exchange are intangible. Indeed, firms have recognised the 
value of knowledge and learning associated with outsourcing. Bounfour, (1999) 
however, posits that organisations are reluctant to consider this fact as the contribution 
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of knowledge and learning is difficult to quantify. However, Miles and Snow (2007) 
perceive knowledge shared by the members in the network as an expandable, rather than 
diminishing resource (p. 462). Moreover, Singh and Zack, (2006) claim that 
…outsourcing is an activity which becomes a strategic decision to continue or 
discontinue defending a competitive knowledge position (p. 13).  
From the perspective of organisational learning and innovation, outsourcing provides a 
platform for bringing expertise knowledge to the firm (Arnold, 2000; Capron and 
Mitchell, 2004; Singh and Zack, 2006; Cusmano et al., 2009). Accordingly, Cusmano et 
al. (2009) perceived … outsourcing implied widespread leverage of technology and 
knowledge from external sources, in the attempt to flexibly respond to the pressures and 
challenges of competition (p. 183). 
However, the research focus has evolved, along with the purpose of outsourcing. 
Nowadays, in modern businesses, relational resources for maximum benefits are 
deemed to get maximum benefits out of other tangible resources utilized. Table 2.1 
further reflects the expansion of the notion of outsourcing, from the hard aspects to the 
soft aspects. For instance, the path from transaction cost economies (TCE) to relational 
specific theory (RST) approach (i.e. TCE to RBV to KBV to RST) recognizes the value 
of relational and behavioural aspects in outsourcing. Relational resources are basically 
recognised as a social capital, and treated as a critical determinant of performance 
(Bernardes, 2010). Accordingly, studies based on relational or behavioural approaches 
are used to define outsourcing as a collaborative business with an external party for 
mutual reinforcement. For example, Donada and Nogatchewsky (2009) stated that 
client– supplier/vendor relationship is the golden key for getting the best supplies (p. 
368).  Park-Poaps and Rees (2010) identified the need for stakeholder perspectives in 
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the supply chain management studies due to increasing globalization, and the increased 
level of social expectations of stakeholders. Thus, the success of collaborative business 
has become a matter of successful relationship management in a business-to-business 
context. Studies that recognize the value of relational resource are used to define 
outsourcing as a social phenomenon. For example, Li and Choi (2009) applied social 
network theory and defined „service outsourcing‟ in-terms of …shifting relational 
structures among buyer, supplier and customer in the service supply network (p. 35). 
In short, factors such as drives, contract type and definitions of outsourcing have 
various approaches. Those approaches are followed by the research domain, applied by 
the particular study. However, in practice, managers may have a multiple and mixed 
interests with regards to outsourcing. Thus, they will have different approaches in 
setting the outsourcing structures.  
 
2.2.3 Outsourcing Structure   
In practice, different outsourcing structures can be observed. The formation of different 
structures relies on resource capability and competencies of the firm (Barney, 1999; 
Kotabe and Mol, 2009).  In general, outsourcing is a vertical supply chain whereby the 
focal firm acts in an intermediate role in the transaction process.  
Dibbern et al. (2004) outlined four types of structural elements of outsourcing. These 
are the degree, the mode, the ownership and the time frame. The „degree‟ refers to the 
level of vendor‟s involvement  (i.e. total or partial); the „mode‟ details the  number of 
players in the exchange process;  while the ownership dictates whether the outsourced 
function is totally owned, partially owned or externally owned by the company. The 
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time frame could be a short term or a long term outsourcing contract. However, it is a 
known fact that the concept of „ownership‟ and the degree of outsourcing cannot be 
separated. In lieu of this, Suhaimi, Hussin and Mustaffa (2007, p. 646) combined the 
ideas, and identified various types of outsourcing setups.  The categorisation is based on 
the number of buyers (i.e. focal firms) and suppliers (i.e. vendors) involved in the 
process.   
1. Simple dyadic; 
2. Multi-vendor; 
3. Multi-client; and 
4. Complex relationship. 
Simple dyadic relationship is the simplest mode of structure, where a single vendor is 
involved with the one-client firm.  A multi-vendor setup involves more than one vendor 
with one client firm.  Multi-client and complex relationship modes are practising with 
business synergies within or between the respective industries.  However, multi- client 
outsourcing describes multiple clients (in the alliance) obtaining services from a single 
vendor.  When, several client companies form outsourcing relationships with more than 
one vendor, making it a complex arrangement.   
Apart from the above categorization, Croom et al. (2000, p. 71) identified three levels of 
vertical supply chain: dyadic level, chain level and network level. The dyadic level is 
similar to „simple dyadic‟ method explained earlier; while the vertical chain includes 
more than one layer of vendors (i.e. vendor‟s vendor).  Network level is complicated 
and concerns operations throughout upstream and downstream supply chains.  
Eventually, „simple dyadic‟ is the foremost micro level of outsourcing relationship. All 
other complex relationships can be broken down into minor relationships, which are 
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dyadic at the operational level.  Faes and Mattyssens (2009) cited some practical 
advantages of dyadic relationship, such as better negotiations, fewer investments in 
warehousing and lesser handling cost. Thus, Ogden (2006) suggested that the reduction 
of the supply base would be better for supplier/vendor handling, but single dyadic 
relationship is also disadvantageous in certain aspects. For instance, the production 
process may be interrupted due to the opportunistic behaviour or lack of performance of 
a single vendor.  
Usually, outsourcing theory and knowledge are built around dyadic relationship 
(Byramjee et al., 2010; Croom et al., 2000; Park-Poaps and Rees, 2010; Donada and 
Nogatchewsky, 2009). It considers the immediate involvement and interaction of both 
parties in the transaction, allowing the understanding of dynamics of such engagement 
better than the other levels (Yadav and Gupta, 2008, p. 40). The dyadic relationships 
between heterogeneous players that do not have overlapping capabilities (Zhang et al., 
2009) are easier to analyse. For an example, Byramjee et al. (2010) developed a cost 
benefit analysis model, based on dyadic relationship, but they mentioned that, it can be 
used for multiple supplier settings as well.  Thus, dyadic arrangement is the most 
appropriate structure for investigating outsourcing, especially for services, as the 
exchange is bilateral. 
Time duration of outsourcing is also identified as a critical decision in outsourcing. It is 
widely recommended for a long-term establishment (Park-Poaps and Rees, 2010; Chan 
and Chin, 2007) for a cumulative relationship in order to ensure the successful 
execution of outsourcing (Qu, Oh and Pinsonneault, 2010).   However, the degree of 
outsourcing, and the selection of the appropriate mode (i.e. number of layers of vendors) 
becomes a matter of leverage that each firm wishes to maintain. Thus, the degree of 
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outsourcing becomes the most fundamental structural decision. Having identified the 
theoretical and practical perspectives in outsourcing in general, the next section will 
discuss the service sector outsourcing in its context.  
 
2.3  SERVICES OUTSOURCING   
2.3.1 Overview of Services Outsourcing 
The services are simultaneous, perishable, intangible and heterogeneous (Zeithaml et 
al., 1985; Sampson, 2000). These are attributes of services and explain that, service 
production and consumption occur at the same time, they cannot be inventoried, do not 
have a physical existence, and the demand is assorted accordingly. Therefore, the 
demand depends on the „presentation‟ and „interpretation‟ of the service product (Zhang 
et al., 2009). However, the human labour forms a significant component of service 
delivery (Senguptha et al., 2006) and hence outsourcing in services is more critical than 
manufacturing. The simultaneous nature of services led to the end of customers directly 
interacting with service providers (Gounaris, 2005; Li and Choi, 2009; Zhang et al., 
2009).   
The service industries are maturing, and have become more competitive, and hence 
there is a growing need to increase efficiency, productivity and competitiveness. The 
service sector growth is considerably faster than the manufacturing sector (Fixler and 
Siegel, 1999), making it the engine of the world‟s growth (Hufbauer and Stephenson, 
2007, p. 605). In short, the world‟s business interest and attention is moved away from 
Wal-Mart to Ritz Carlton. In conjunction with this, the focus of academia is shifted to 
exploring the ways and means of world-class services more than world-class 
manufacturing.   Basically, this is due to the digitalization of the service delivery 
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process (Zhang et al., 2009; Gewald et al., 2006).  Moreover, outsourcing has led 
services  to a position of prominence (Fixler and Siegel, 1999), especially in industries 
such as financial and banking (Gewald et al., 2006; Suhaimi et al., 2007; De Vita et al., 
2009), hospitality (Lam and Han, 2005; Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 
2004:2005a; Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2009; Zhang et al., 2009; De Vita et al., 2009) 
healthcare (Young, 2008; Thouin et al., 2009), and telecommunication  (Marshall et al., 
2007; De Vita et al., 2009) have increasingly adopted outsourcing as a strategy to 
improve their competitiveness. 
Outsourcing in IT (Information Technology) and IS (Information Systems) have 
become a trend of business process re-engineering all over the world (Yadav and Gupta, 
2008). As Suhaimi et al. (2007, p. 644) stated, IT and IS outsourcing is high in USA, 
UK and Australia, followed by Western Europe and South America. East Asia comes in 
third, and South Asian countries lag far behind.  
However, the basic idea of outsourcing has not changed, but has evolved, expanding 
both the range and depth of services being outsourced (Ozcelik and Altinkemer, 2009, 
p. 03). Service outsourcing is focusing on purchasing  value-added services from the 
outside (Banerjee and Williams, 2009). Lam and Han (2005) viewed service 
outsourcing as a management pattern, where a firm can hire specialized resources from 
an outside agent. Li and Choi (2009) perceived this as a structural change in the 
relationship between the focal firm, the vendor and the end customer.  
As far as the digitalization of service delivery is concerned, the business scope is 
expanded not only to domestic customers, but also to offshore customers. In the opinion 
of   Hufbauer and Stephenson (2007), the digitalization of service delivery process 
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facilitated the emergence of the outsource business functions to the international market. 
This creates a greater potential to expand the business scope of services with the support 
of IT and IS. International (offshore) outsourcing is viable if a vendor could overcome 
barriers in terms of distance, time zone and culture (Jarvenpaa and Mao, 2008). In fact, 
labour shortage in developed countries has compelled organisations to outsource their 
services to developing countries for cheaper prices but high quality services (Hufbauer 
and Stephenson, 2007). Despite geographical limitations, firms employ outsourcing for 
different purposes.  
As Gilley and Rasheed (2000) reported, firms should design organisational structure and 
utilize managerial practices that best suit their internal capabilities and competencies, in 
order to increase efficiency. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize the purpose of 
outsourcing across the organizations. The early views of domestic outsourcing explain 
that the primary focus of outsourcing is the „cost reduction‟ (Ang and Straub, 1998). For 
instance, firms seek vendors who can offer equivalent services at lower prices (Fixler 
and Siegel, 1999). Later on, it is further evolved and perceived as, getting value added 
services at reasonable cost from external sources (Lam and Han, 2005; Senguptha et al., 
2006;Young, 2008;Banerjee and Williams, 2009).  This shift makes the lowered cost a 
secondary consideration, where value creation is preferred (Banerjee and Williams, 
2009).  Exceptionally, Benamati and Rajkumar (2008) viewed that, outsourcing 
(particularly IS outsourcing) as a risk reduction tool instead of cost reduction strategy.  
The variations of the motivation have led to the forming of different types/levels of 
partnerships such as tactical, strategic and transformational (Kedia and Lahiri, 2007).  
Kedia and Lahiri (2007) further explained that when a firm has a higher level of 
motivation, it tends to form advanced level of partnership. For example, risk sharing and 
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flexibility improvements are strategic motivations of outsourcing which cannot be 
achieved through tactical partnerships. Thus, the level of partnership depends on the 
firm‟s motivations of outsourcing.   
The factors that drive firms to outsource can be categorized as „push‟ and „pull‟. The 
issues in core competencies such as cost pressure, service quality and service delivery 
speed (Fixler and Siegel, 1999; Gewald et al., 2006; Kedia and Lahiri, 2007; Jarvenpaa 
and Mao, 2008; Young, 2008; Banerjee and Williams, 2009) may constitute push 
factors. On the other hand, labour related issues such as inadequate skills required to 
deliver services (Young, 2008, p. 452), can be also taken as a push factor. Pull factors 
such as sharing external expertise knowledge (Han et al., 2005; Banerjee and Williams, 
2009), sharing business risk (Kedia and Lahiri, 2007; Benamati and Rajkumar, 2008), 
mutual learning and information sharing (Han et al., 2008), and innovations (Cusmano 
et al., 2009) help firms to move forward. Moreover, a new form of 
competitions/competitors (Gewald et al., 2006; Kedia and Lahiri, 2007; Zhang et al., 
2009) and competition among the vendors (Banerjee and Williams, 2009) are some of 
the other stimulating factors. This led outsourcing being recognised as a change 
management strategy and not a panacea for financial, quality and work related issues 
(Young, 2008, p. 462). 
The outsourcing decision, however, is influenced by a managers‟ perceived risk (Lam 
and Han, 2005; Gewald et al., 2006). Gewald et al. (2006) recognized four types of 
associated risks, which are financial, strategic, performance and social.  In situations 
where direct contacts or encounters with customers are outsourced, it incurs risks such 
as loss of control over function, disruption of service delivery and loss of focus (Linder, 
2004; Senguptha et al., 2006; Li and Choi, 2009). Besides, opportunistic behaviour of 
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vendors (Lam and Han, 2005; Bon and Hughes, 2009; Kotabe and Mol, 2009; De Vita 
et al., 2010), out of touch with technological developments (Bettis et al., 1992; Hendry, 
1995), and issues in information security (Lonsdale, 1997; Dyer, 1997; Li and Choi, 
2009) are some other perceived risks of outsourcing. Generally, the „tender process‟ is 
employed by firms to choose vendors that offer the most competitive prices and 
specifications. This system hardly guaranteed favourable outcomes due to the issues 
associated with the procedures (Domberger et al., 2002). Some of these issues are: 
winning bids were underpriced, variations in documented capabilities of vendors with 
actual capabilities (Young, 2008) and uncertainties of task environmental factors 
(Espino-Rodríguez and Padro´n-Robaina, 2005). These issues are magnified in the 
service sector as meeting the client‟s specifications is the very core of the partnership 
success.  The following section analyses the differences of outsourcing in the services 
sector compared to the manufacturing sector. 
 
2.3.2 Outsourcing: Services Vs Manufacturing 
The service is an idea or concept thought up by the service provider, and it is an 
experience to the receiving customer. Whenever a task is outsourced, the firm assigns 
an outside party to transform the idea into an experience. The service delivery is 
dynamic, as customer requirements are heterogeneous, making it quite difficult to 
dictate and specify in the contract (Young, 2008; Li and Choi, 2009). This necessitates 
careful articulation of service contract. Next, the service delivery is bidirectional 
(Sampson, 2000), meaning that only two parties (i.e. service provider and customer) are 
involved in the delivery of a single service encounter. In this case, the provider can be 
the focal firm or the vendor. Unlike manufacturing, services are perishable, making it 
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impossible to be stored for future trade. Thus, service firms have to bear resource idle 
times which make outsourcing more challengeable. Thus in services, task based 
outsourcing is preferable to time based outsourcing. According to McCollough et al. 
(2000), service sector is at risk of losing customers if it does not have a satisfactory 
recovery system. There is a need to evaluate vendors‟ service recovery plans during the 
tender assessment process. Alternatively, „service process standardization‟ helps the 
service firms to be more flexible in applying various business strategies such as 
outsourcing, franchising and alliances. Wüllenweber et al. (2008) found that service 
process standardization has a positive impact on outsourcing success, as it facilitates 
better monitoring, communication and coordination. However, the assessment of the 
outcome of outsourcing in services is more complex than it is for the manufacturing. 
The uncertainties in outputs are higher in services than manufacturing. This is due to the 
higher level of human involvement (Senguptha et al., 2006). Specially, uncertainty with 
regards to the vendor‟s performance is quite strong (Lee, 2001; Han et al., 2008). Fixler 
and Siegel (1999) conducted a comparative analysis based on 30 years data in the US 
manufacturing and services sector. They discovered that the impact of outsourcing on 
productivity is „clearer‟ in manufacturing than it is for the labour intensive services 
sector. This is due to the fact that service outsourcing outcomes are hard to quantify 
(Kannan and Tan, 2004). Additionally, there is a higher uncertainty in demand (Zhang 
et al., 2009) and hence the services outsourcing outcomes are not static (Li and Choi, 
2009). These factors caused scholars to introduce behavioural dimensions, such as 
satisfaction with vendors (Lee, 2001), and intention to outsource (Dyer, 1997; Lee, 
2001; Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 2005a; Han et al., 2008).  
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Other than these factors, the difference is quite pronounced between the service supply 
chain and the manufacturing supply chain, as shown in Figure 2.2 (Li and Choi, 2009). 
The manufacturing supply chain is linear, as the focal firm acts as an intermediary 
between the vendor and the customer. Figure 2.2 clearly illustrates that no direct contact 
is needed between the vendor and the customer in the outsourcing of manufacturing 
sectors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, the simultaneous nature of services supply chain led to a direct interaction 
between the customer and the service provider. As identified in the chapter 01, services 
outsourcing is denoted as employment of an external party in order to produce certain 
services. Consequently, service supply chain connects the focal firm, the vendor and the 
customer as a triad in the outsourcing context. First, the firm identifies the customer‟s 
needs. Next, they evaluate the internal and external resource capabilities in fulfilling 
those needs. External sources become a feasible option of resource utilization if they 
Figure 2.2: Manufacturing Vs Service Supply Chain 
Source: Li and Choi (2009), Comparison of supply chain triadic relationship structures in 
manufacturing vs. services. Page.29. 
Vendor 
Focal firm 
Customer 
Services Supply Chain in Outsourcing 
Manufacturing Supply Chain in Outsourcing 
Vendor Focal firm Customer 
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could produce competent, cheap, and quality service compared to internal resources. 
However, the selection of external resource may have different motivations. The focal 
firm has to communicate their expectations on outsourcing to the vendor in addition to 
the customer‟s requirements and expectations. Thus, Li and Choi (2009) perceived the 
focal firm as a bridge between vendors and customers. A service failure will occur if 
there is a gap of communicating expectations and understanding responsibilities of each 
other, which is  known as „structural hole‟ (Li and Choi, 2009).  
However, Burt (2004:2007) was with the opinion that structural hole maintains a 
competitive advantage in social networks. He further explained that the „bridge‟ 
position can expand the structural hole in order to achieve greater advantages. This may 
hold true for social relationships, but outsourcing is mainly an economical phenomenon 
striving for mutual benefits. Accordingly, the focal firm should connect the vendor and 
the customer in order to maximize outsourcing benefits. For example, a hotel can 
outsource their transport system to a travel agency. In this case, expanding the 
connection between the travel agency and the tourists is not practical in order to 
maintain the competitive advantage of the firm. Instead, the firm has to connect the 
vendor and the customer in order to deliver the expected service.  Likewise, services 
outsourcing is more complex, due to the nature of services and its supply chain. 
Consequently, outsourcing is identified as one of the most complex and key decisions 
(Faes and Matthyssens, 2009) that affects organisational performance.  
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2.4 OUTCOMES OF OUTSOURCING  
The main focus of outsourcing studies is to investigate ways and means of ensuring the 
success of outsourcing. The definition of success is however, subjective. It is incumbent 
on the meeting of expectation of the involved party(ies) for it to be considered a 
success. Moreover, the impact of outsourcing on performance is difficult to segregate 
from overall organisational performance (Fixler and Siegel, 1999; Kotabe and Mol, 
2009; Das, 2009; Kroes and Ghosh, 2009). The current literature however revealed that 
the level of outsourcing is positively correlated to the organizational performance 
(Fixler and Siegel, 1999). Raa and Wolfe (2001) conducted a microeconomic analysis 
on outsourcing services in manufacturing organisations using secondary data for the 
past five decades, and their findings are consistent with Fixler and Siegel (1999). 
Comparatively, a large number of cross-sectional studies have been conducted in order 
to ensure the outcomes of outsourcing efforts in different industries.  However, it is 
generally accepted that the manufacturing sector is subjected to more rigorous empirical 
investigations than the services sector. The next section discusses the advantages of 
outsourcing, regardless of sector. 
2.4.1 Advantages of Outsourcing 
Gilley and Rasheed (2000) pointed out the advantages of outsourcing in terms of 
financial and non-financial improvements; while Chen and Paulraj (2004) measured the 
supply chain performance with financial and operational indicators. Non-financial 
indicators, however, contain both operational and strategic gains, thus, the performance 
is commonly measured in terms of financial, operational and strategic outcomes (Jean et 
al., 2006; Zhang et al., 2009).  In detail, financial benefits include the reduction of 
operational costs (Lee, 2001; Kroes and Ghosh, 2009), the reduction of regulatory and 
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legal costs (Kroes and Ghosh, 2009), the value added returns (Kotabe and Mol, 2009), 
the transaction value (Dyer, 1997), and the profits (Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-
Robaina, 2005a). Basically, quality improvements and productivity growth are 
considered as operational outcomes. However, very few studies (e.g. Espino-Rodrı´guez 
and Padro´n-Robaina, 2004:2005a; Young, 2008; Liou and Chuang, 2010) highlighted 
the importance of „quality improvements‟ as a dimension of measuring the performance 
of outsourcing. In addition to that, „productivity‟ is recognized as another indicator of 
operational success in terms of quantity (Fixler and Siegel, 1999; Espino-Rodrı´guez 
and Padro´n-Robaina, 2004; Kotabe and Mol, 2009).  
Next, the strategic outcomes contain long-term impact on performances, and are able to 
gain sustainable value for organisations (Porter, 1980; Barney, 1991; Kim et al., 2005; 
Jean et al., 2008). More specifically, focus on core business (Lacity and Willcocks, 
1998; Lee, 2001; Domberger et al., 2002; Gewald et al., 2006; Kroes and Ghosh, 2009; 
Ozcelik and Altinkemer, 2009), sharing expertise knowledge and information (Malhotra 
et al., 2005; Han et al., 2008; Banerjee and Williams, 2009), innovations (Cui et al., 
2009; Cusmano et al., 2009), reduction of business risk (Lee, 2001; Kedia and Lahiri, 
2007; Cusmano et al., 2009) and competitive advantage (Bettis et al., 1992; Jean et al, 
2008) are some of the strategic outcomes of outsourcing.  
 
2.4.2 Disadvantages of Outsourcing 
There are no perfect business practices that could result only in positive gains.   The 
same is true for outsourcing, as it also has possible negative consequences. For example, 
there are hidden costs, loss of confidentiality of valuable information (Dyer, 1997; 
Lansdale and Cox, 1997; Li and Choi, 2009) and problems in service quality (Young, 
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2008). In order to maximize the positive gains from outsourcing, organisations need to 
make extra efforts to eliminate these problems. Chapter 1 divided the factors affecting 
outsourcing success into two, which are managerial factors and factors beyond the 
management control. The following section discusses these factors in detail.  
2.5 FACTORS AFFECTING OUTSOURCING SUCCESS 
Several studies (e.g. Whipple and Frankel, 2000; Chan and Chin, 2007; Jarvenpaa and 
Mao, 2008; Rajabzadeh et al., 2008) emphasized factors that guarantee the success and 
sustainability of the supply chain, which are aptly named „critical success factors‟ 
(CSF). For instance, Whipple and Frankel (2000) highlighted five CSFs in strategic 
alliances, which are trust, senior management support, the ability to meet performance 
goals, clear goals and partners‟ compatibility. A proper communication system (Ogden 
2006; Chan and Chin, 2007; Rajabzadeh et al., 2008) and managing appropriate level 
relationship with vendors (Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2009) are also key success 
factors in outsourcing. Qu, Oh and Pinsonneault (2010) explained the value of long term 
cumulative relationship in the business to business context. This is due to the fact that, a 
long-term close relationship with vendor is facilitating to the understanding of long-
term and short-term goals (Rajabzadeh et al., 2008). Rajabzadeh et al. (2008) further 
stated that, a collaborative business success depends on: the recognition of core 
activities of the organisation, having a full structured contract, having a strategic view, 
clear vendor selection criteria and continuous process evaluation and improvement. In 
addition to these factors, Cui et al. (2009) claimed that bi-directionality is required to 
ensure outsourcing success. In this context, bi-directionality is defined as trust and 
communication, strong partner competence, strong in-house competence, clear problem 
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definition and incentive alignment. However, The Critical Success Factors (CSF) carries 
a broader meaning. Boynlon and Zmud (1994, p.19) defined, critical success factors as 
few things that must go well to ensure success for a manager or an organization, and, 
therefore, they represent managerial or enterprise area, that must be given special and 
continuous attention to bring about high performance. CSFs include issues vital to an 
organization's current operating activities and to its future success. . This study concern 
only with critical managerial factors, assuming that enterprise factors are unique and its‟ 
impact is contextual.  
Furthermore, these factors are scattered around functional, behavioural and relational 
norms. Due to the scattered nature of factors, it does not help services sector managers 
to plan and implement outsourcing tasks. Some of these factors are considered 
prerequisites in general management. For example, top management support, better 
communication and clear problem definition are some of the fundamental functional 
requirements in the management. There is also the possibility to discover other factors 
that are prominently affecting outsourcing success. 
The scope of this work covers only manageable factors which precisely impact 
outsourcing success, and those are outlined and discussed in chapter 1. Thus, the 
following section briefly discuses only the factors. 
 
Manageable Factors 
First, ‘organizational resource capability’ is noted as, the relevant firm’s capabilities 
that have an impact on the process of outsourcing, in influencing a relationship with a 
vendor’ (Han et al., 2008, p. 33). Consensus on required capabilities could not be 
formed due to the diversity of tasks. As Lee (2001) pointed out, the ability to scan, 
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acquisition, assimilation, and exploitation are among a firm‟s capabilities in IS 
outsourcing. Han et al. (2008) measured the firm‟s capability in terms of technical, 
relationship and vendor management perspectives. These capabilities outline the 
structural dimensions of outsourcing contract. 
Lacity et al. (2009) stated that outsourcing decision in Information Technology (IT) 
includes degree of outsourcing, top management commitment and an evaluation 
process. The top management commitment is regarded as fundamental in general 
management, while the evaluation process is a part of vendor management activity. 
Only degree of outsourcing is important in this category. Furthermore, Lacity et al. 
(2009) stated that contractual details, contract type, contract duration and contract size 
are factors requiring precise articulation. These are contractual characteristics that are 
dynamic and situational, influenced by both internal and external environmental factors. 
For example, the contractual period becomes a less reliable factor in determining 
success, as the agreement duration is attached to other factors such as seasonal variation 
in demand, or the firm‟s future strategic movements. 
Based on facts above, the contract is identified as a formal document that specifies the 
degree of outsourcing, and each party‟s responsibilities. Thus, the outsourcing structural 
decision includes the decision on outsourcing level, the level of vendor management 
activities needed and the expected service performance level of the external party.  
The degree of outsourcing explains the depth and breadth of outsourced tasks. Higher 
level of outsourcing does not always result in favourable outcomes (Lacity and 
Willcocks, 1998), leaving firms to decide on the appropriate level of outsourcing that 
optimizes outcome(s) (Kotabe et al., 2008; Kotabe and Mol, 2009). Next, Han et al. 
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(2008) viewed vendor management capability in the context of a firm‟s capabilities, 
which influence outsourcing success. Several studies (e.g. Lacity and Willcocks, 1998; 
Lee, 2001; Sun et al., 2002; Chan and Chin, 2007; Han et al., 2008) however, pointed 
out the direct impact of vendor management capability on outsourcing success. 
By having a proper vendor management system, firms would able to curb potential 
threats in outsourcing (Jean et al., 2008) such as, vendors‟ opportunistic behaviour 
(Lam and Han, 2005; Bon and Hughes, 2009). It also aligns vendor selection criteria 
with the outsourcing drives of the firm (Young, 2008; Wadhwa and Ravindran, 2007; 
Kroes and Ghosh, 2009).   
The transaction cost economies theory identified asset specificity (Wang, 2002; Zhang 
et al., 2009; De Vita et al., 2009) as one of the determinant factors that influence 
outsourcing success. Asset specificity refers to, the transferability of assets to an 
identified transaction. High asset specificity proposes „insourcing‟ more than 
„outsourcing‟; (Watjatrakul, 2005, p. 391). Williamson (1979) highlighted that asset 
specificity, uncertainty and transaction frequency are the root causes of transaction 
difficulties. Besides, De Vita et al. (2009) discovered that the vendors‟ low level asset 
specificity has a negative impact on the relational satisfaction in outsourcing. 
Eventually, Gonzalez-Diaz et al. (2000), Saussier (2000) and Leiblein et al. (2002) 
stated that assets specificity determines the level of outsourcing of the firm, and 
indirectly affects its success.  
Outsourcing intricately connects two organisational cultures in business. Organisational 
culture represents values, beliefs and working pattern of an organisation. Whipple and 
Frankel (2000) believed that partners‟ compatibility with each other plays a major role 
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in ensuring their success. This assumption has led many (e.g. Lam and Han, 2005; 
Jarvenpaa and Mao, 2008; Young, 2008; Jean et al., 2008) to highlight the importance 
of compatible organisational cultures in outsourcing, as cultural clashes often contribute 
to failures and discontinuation of business contracts. The correct vendor is a vendor that 
will meet and augment the organisation‟s long-term needs and corporate culture 
(Wadhwa and Ravindran, 2007).  
The vendor‟s performance is critical to outsourcing success (Carr et al., 2008; Young, 
2008; Cui et al., 2009). However, the level of contribution from vendors is highly 
dependent on a number of factors. For instance, if the vendor depends upon the buyer 
firm for a higher level of its sales, they are committed more to the relationship (Carr et 
al., 2008: p. 901). The opposite is also true, in the case where the vendor monopolizes 
the supply market; the buyer (i.e. focal firm) will need to take necessary actions to 
initiate maximum gain from the vendor. Despite, the impact of market structure on the 
leverage, vendor has to align with the contract in order to deliver the agreed service as 
retention in the business is primary rather than chase for new tenders/business 
The vendor‟s performance basically includes quality and other performance 
specifications. Those are generally evaluated through SERVQUAL scale (Parasuraman 
et al., 1885:1988). But, it appears to perform weaker in business to business (B2B) 
contexts (Gounaris, 2005a: b; Lee, G.J 2011). Alternatively, Gounaris (2005a) 
developed a measurement scale to evaluate vendor‟s service performance known as 
INDSERV. This is widely accepted for the evaluation of service performance in B2B 
context.  The scale comprises of four service quality dimensions that a firm expects 
from its B2B business partners, which are potential quality, hard process quality, soft 
process quality and output quality. Together, these dimensions explain 22 aspects 
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(items) of service quality and other performance expectations, which will be further 
discussed later in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 3.  
According to the justifications provided in the previous section 2.5, this study outlines 
the fact that managing outsourcing success in the service industry has become a matter 
of managing dependency and governance in-exchange. Accordingly, the 
aforementioned factors can be explained as the determinants of dependency and 
governance in exchange. This study applied the resource dependency theory to oversee 
the organisational dependency, while the social exchange theory is used to interpret the 
governance in-exchange process. The following section discusses the dependency and 
governance structures from the perspective of the aforementioned theories in the context 
of service‟s outsourcing.  
 
2.6 RESOURCE DEPENDENCY THEORY  
The Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) is considered as an economic theory, which 
focuses on efficiency of resource (Sun et al., 2002). Resource Dependency Theory is the 
study of how the external resources of organizations affect the behavior of the 
organization. (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Pfeffer, 2003). However, it has its roots in the 
social exchange theory (Al-Natour and Cavusoglu, 2009), and the open system theory 
(Aldrich, 1999). In a nutshell, RDT explains the latent causes for relationships with 
external stakeholders (Hessels and Terjesen, 2010), and also is concerned with the 
notion of effectiveness (Aldrich, 1999). The main focus of RDT is balancing the 
dependency on external resources in order to balance the firm‟s leverage (Pfeffer, 
2003). RDT perceives resource scarcity as the main cause of seeking external resources 
(Al-Natour and Cavusoglu, 2009). Therefore, the purpose of external resource 
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involvement, as explained by RDT is common to any economic organisation, and it has 
many forms: mergers, alliances, franchise, and outsourcing (Sun et al., 2002; Al-Natour 
and Cavusoglu, 2009; Hessels and Terjesen, 2010). External resource involvement goes 
beyond „making deals‟ and instead designs business models that will work together 
(Linder, 2004, p. 30), creating interdependence business networks. The purpose of 
networked business is mutual gains and survival (Petersen et al., 2008). Thus, RDT 
suggests that firms should adjust their boundaries (i.e. scope of operations) in order to 
overcome the environmental uncertainties, thereby improving performances (Kedia and 
Lahiri, 2007, p. 30).   
Next, RDT outlines several strategies a firm can use to expand their power. For 
example, they can take the control of resources needed by others, such as make strategic 
alliances with sole supplier/vendor. It is also helpful if the firm can reduce the level of 
dependency on vendors (Ulrich and Barney, 1984). Kedia and Lahiri (2007) explained 
that the use of external resources to manage environmental dynamism succeeded in 
turning around failing businesses. Therefore, as far as an individual firm is concerned, 
managing dependency is situational, and it relies on task environmental factors. 
Participants who can balance their dependencies will be successful in the network 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
Pfeffer and Salancik, (1978) suggested that three basic strategies to manage 
dependencies are 1) altering organisational interdependence through collaborations, 2) 
establishing collective structures to form a „negotiated environment‟, and 3) using legal, 
political or social action to form a „created environment‟. These strategies are further 
discussed in the following section.  
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2.6.1 Organizational Dependency in Outsourcing 
The first strategy explains the fundamental motive of outsourcing. When an 
organisation outsources a task, they share external resources with another firm(s). 
Therefore, they have to decide on the appropriate level of external resource involvement 
(Hessels and Terjesen, 2010). Accordingly, the focal firm can increase or reduce the 
level of external resource involvement to increase their competitiveness (Hessels and 
Terjesen, 2010). Likewise, resource dependency theory stresses on strategic choice of 
resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Kedia and Lahiri, 2007). 
The second strategy encourages relationship management, and consequently, Petersen et 
al. (2008) stated that, dependency, socialization process, supplier integration and 
relational capital have a complex set of interrelationships (p. 62). Once a focal firm has 
a dependency on vendor it increases vendor‟s contribution to the partnership (Petersen 
et al., 2008). It also leads to the strengthening of relationship and trust with external 
stakeholders (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This is especially prevalent in the 
outsourcing of services, where the vendors need a sufficient amount of authority for 
successful service delivery to the customers (Carr et al., 2008).  
The third strategy promotes management of dependency through a formal governance 
mechanism (Al-Natour and Cavusoglu, 2009). The legitimized dependency would be 
expected to safeguard stakeholders in order to minimize the risk associated with the 
resource exchange (Hessels and Terjesen, 2010). This is also reflective of the firm‟s 
ability to access external resources, and legitimize the extent of control over them. 
Nevertheless, Al-Natour and Cavusoglu (2009) pointed out that not all dependent 
relationships create equal performance outcomes (p. 106). 
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Moreover, the resource dependency theory outlines that the level of firm‟s dependency 
relies on the purpose of sharing external resources (Hessels and Terjesen, 2010, p. 206). 
As noted previously, some of them are: cost benefits (Lam and Han, 2005; Kedia and 
Lahiri, 2007; Banerjee and Williams, 2009; Kroes and Ghosh, 2009), knowledge 
transfers (Lee, 2001; Kedia and Lahiri, 2007; Banerjee and Williams, 2009) and focus 
on core function (Kedia and Lahiri, 2007; Kroes and Ghosh, 2009).  As highlighted by 
the RDT, scarcity of resources becomes the latent motivator of sharing external 
resources (Al-Natour and Cavusoglu, 2009).   
Resources have alternative opportunities to budgetary constraints, making selection of 
the best resource utilization as crucial. For instance, firms may lack resources such as 
capital, knowledge, or technology. This will force the firm to choose whether to buy 
(external) or to produce (internal) resources. A good combination of sourcing 
destination (i.e. in-source/outsource) will determine organisational performance 
(Watjatrakul, 2005; Thouin et al., 2009; Kotabe and Mol, 2009).  Accordingly, RDT 
provides guidelines on planning resource utilization of organisations. The 
aforementioned factors hence elaborated the appropriateness of RDT for the context of 
outsourcing.  
2.6.2 Dependency and Degree of Outsourcing 
The organisational dependency emerges as a result of the inability of the organisation to 
accomplish its goals independently (Al-Natour and Cavusoglu, 2009, p. 109). Thus, it 
falls on the manager to take the necessary actions to integrate external resource 
involvement successfully (Chin et al., 2004). RDT defines organisational success in 
terms of maximizing their power (Ulrich and Barney, 1984). Accordingly, success 
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becomes a matter of the correct utilization of external resources.  Therefore, managers 
should determine the level of external resource involvement prior to declaring legal 
collaboration. 
The level of external resource involvement is denoted as „degree of outsourcing‟ in the 
context of outsourcing. For instance, Sun et al. (2002) defined dependency in IS 
outsourcing as “service receiver‟s perceived reliance on the outsourcing vendor” (p. 04). 
Here, „perceived reliance‟ portrays the „degree of outsourcing‟. As noted in Chapter 01, 
the degree of outsourcing is a combined construct of breadth and depth (Gilley and 
Rasheed 2000; Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 2005a). 
The degree of outsourcing is basically determined by its costs and benefits (Banerjee 
and Williams, 2009; Byramjee et al., 2010). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) proposed that 
there are three factors that influence the level of dependency, which are (1) the level of 
importance of the resource to the business performance (2) the scarcity of the resources, 
and (3) the competition between organisations for control of those resources. Therefore, 
different organisations will have different optimal levels of outsourcing. Altogether, 
these factors determine the relative importance of the particular task to the business, 
which will help managers clarify core and non-core activities for their respective firms.  
Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina (2005a), Kotabe and Murray (2004), and 
Quinn and Hilmer (1994) suggested that organisations should only outsource non-core 
functions. Any attempt to outsource the core function must be carefully examined 
(Alexander and Young, 1996; McCarthy and Anagnostou, 2004; Marshall et al., 2007; 
Jiang et al., 2007; Cusmano et al., 2009; Wu and Park, 2009). However, recent debates 
on core and non-core logic are quite neutral. Marshall et al. (2007) challenged the value 
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of using core and non-core logic, and reported that different businesses have different 
interpretations on what is core and non-core. The logic is inapplicable for extremely 
dynamic industries. According to Wu and Park (2009) and Leavy (2004), there is no 
clear boundary that separates core from non-core, due to its ever-changing nature. As a 
solution, Wu and Park (2009) introduced „dynamic outsourcing‟ models instead of „core 
and „non-core logic‟. Leavy (2004) further pointed out that the importance of defining 
core competencies in terms of customer perspective, rather than organisational 
perspective. Nonetheless, organisations are unique systems, and defining what is core 
and non-core is unique to each organisation, making it difficult to generalize.  
Based on these facts, the degree of outsourcing is becoming the main determinant of 
managing dependency and it is an initial task of outsourcing plan.  The correct blend of 
breadth and depth of outsourcing is referred as effective degree of outsourcing which 
brings favourable outcomes for the partnership. The impact of the degree of outsourcing 
on outsourcing success will be further discussed in the hypothesis development section.  
The following examines the value of governance in resource exchange in the 
outsourcing execution process, and the deduction of factors relating to the governance 
in outsourcing.  
 
2.7 SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY  
Social Exchange Theory (SET) serves as a general paradigm for social and 
anthropology research domain (Zafirovski, 2005).  It can be identified as one of the 
most applicable theories to explain the social network structures and relational norms. 
SET describes the formation and subsistence of shared responsibilities and mutual 
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benefits in exchange (Lawler, 2001).  As SET is rooted by utilitarianism (Zafirovski, 
2005), the exchange processors are outcomes of the actors‟ efforts on the attempt to 
satisfy their needs (Cook, 2000). Social Exchange Theory posits that all human 
relationships are formed by the use of a subjective cost-benefit analysis and the 
comparison of alternatives (Homans, 1961).  Thus, it is clear that human actions are 
guided by the outcomes; hence relationships are formed for favourable outcomes. 
Relationships can be identified as the fundamental social unit/network, and it is 
interdependent on demand and supply of resources (Ruben, 1998). Thus, modern social 
exchange theorists borrowed „concepts and principles from microeconomics‟ (Cook, 
2000, p. 687) to analyse social transactions.   
SET also facilitates the study of a variety of social exchange aspects. Firstly, it includes 
some elements of transaction cost economies perspective. For instance, SET analysis of 
microeconomic activities (Blau, 1964), considers the dynamic nature of interaction, and 
potential opportunistic behaviour (Montgomery, 1996). Next, Chen and Choi (2005) 
applied SET to oversee the knowledge exchange, and mentioned that knowledge sharing 
has become a key aspect of exchange with the increase in information technology. 
However, Zafirovski (2005) critiqued the capacity of SET to analyse economic 
exchange, as it violates the diminishing marginal utility theory. Falsifying the argument, 
it has been discussed under both economic exchange, as well as social exchange 
perspectives (Ruben, 1998; Cook and Rice, 2003). In fact, both types are important for 
business transactions.  
However, Blau (1964) and Sun et al. (2002) stated that, formal contracts alone would 
not satisfy partners completely, hence the need to utilize relational aspects for a 
successful exchange. Therefore, the resource exchange incorporates exchange of 
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relationship as well. As far as the link between social and economic exchange is 
concerned, Cook and Rice (2003) mentioned that, the base of SET lies on the „Game 
Theory‟. They explained, power as a function of social relations that initiate subsequent 
development of micro-theories connecting social networks to power (p. 57). 
Accordingly, another aspect of social relationship is to maximize the power of social 
network. The previous section, however, explains managing power in the outsourcing 
context. The “resource exchange theory” is also considered a branch of SET (Al-Natour 
and Cavusoglu, 2009). Based on these facts, outsourcing can be interpreted as a 
microeconomic activity.  Power is defined as the strength of the competencies for 
competitiveness, which is the main focus of resource based view as well. As a whole, 
SET covers numerous important aspects of resource exchange.   
Blau (1964) explained social exchange process as an interpersonal interaction that 
actors form social relations based on the benefits and costs they provide one another. 
„Actors‟ may be any kind of meaningful social unit, including individuals, collective 
entities, firms, organisations, and divisions within an organisation (Cook and Rice, 
2003). Therefore, SET provides a realistic and practical platform to study social 
networks. Moreover, there is an emerging trend of overseeing management and 
organisational phenomena, based on SET (Ruben, 1998; Chen and Choi, 2005), as it 
concerns the human/behavioural element, and covers a wide range of epistemology. 
Furthermore, Lawler (2001) mentioned „self-efficacy‟ in social exchange, which simply 
means strong positive emotions among parties to produce the most favourable 
outcomes. Outsourcing is basically a B2B exchange process, which aims to produce 
favourable outcomes for both the parties involved. In the process of exchange, each 
party expects to receive valuable outcomes (Lee, 2001). Thus, self-efficacy is driven by 
   
72 
 
the expected outcomes. The success of outsourcing also depends on all participants in 
the exchange, and as a result partners are depending on each other (Sierra and 
McQuitty, 2005).  The absence of self-efficacy results in negative emotions, which 
causes firms to ultimately switch vendors (Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2009).  
Consequently, there should be a mutual gratification of individuals or parties involved 
in the transaction in-order to obtain the expected benefits (Zafirovski, 2005).  
With regards to the services outsourcing, Sierra and McQuitty (2005) stated that, „there 
is a natural social exchange in services due to the inseparable nature of consumption 
and production of it’ (p. 396).   Thus, it requires the maintenance of a long-term, 
trustworthy (Dyer, 1997; Marshall et al., 2007; Cui et al., 2009), and collaborative 
relationship with the vendor (Lee, 2001; Sun et al., 2002). Indeed, this depends on the 
compatibility of the vendor with the focal firm in terms of working pattern and strategic 
focus (Chamberland, 2003; Chan and Chin, 2007; Wadhwa and Ravindran, 2007).  
The services outsourcing is defined as „transfer of power of performing an internal 
business activity to the vendor‟. Although the transfer of power is unobservable 
(Zafirovski, 2005), Li and Choi (2009) developed a model to represent the transfer of 
power in the triadic relationship in services outsourcing. Next, Sun et al. (2002),  
pointed out certain assumptions applied in the social exchange models, which are 1) 
social behaviour is a series of exchanges 2) individuals attempt to maximize their 
rewards and minimize their costs and 3) when individuals receive rewards from others, 
they feel obligated to reciprocate. These assumptions demonstrate the latent reasons of 
social exchange relationships. Therefore, SET is the most suitable candidate to oversee 
the exchange process in services outsourcing, as it has a multidisciplinary approach, 
which could explain gains and losses in exchange, the motivation behind exchange, and 
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it also integrates basic principles of human behaviour and economic exchange (Ruben, 
1998). 
Accordingly, SET compelled two types of manageable exchanges, which are the 
negotiated and reciprocal exchanges. Basically, „negotiated exchange‟ covers economic 
aspects, and „reciprocal exchange‟ represents social aspects of resource exchange (Sun 
et al., 2002; Ferguson et al., 2005). Based on that, Lacity et al. (2009) highlighted two 
types of governances in outsourcing; 1) contractual governance which manages 
negotiated exchange, and 2) relational governance which deals with reciprocal 
exchange. The following section further discusses the governance mechanisms involved 
in resource exchange process of outsourcing.  
2.7.1 Governance in Outsourcing Exchange 
Homans (1961) stated that, the social exchange process is based on mutual exchange of 
reinforcement and relationship that could be terminated due to the failure of 
reinforcement. Therefore, any type of successful social exchange process is required to 
fulfil each other‟s expectations.  
As far as resource exchange in outsourcing is concerned, it is pertinent to maintain 
proper contractual and relational governance for favourable outcomes (Sun et al., 2002; 
Ferguson et al., 2005; Lacity et al., 2009). Day (2000) illustrated this, in a relationship 
spectrum, noted as „transactional-relational continuum‟. It describes two opposing 
governance structures in exchange (Ferguson et al., 2005; Lacoste and Fenneteau, 
2008). Business to business transactions comprise of exchange of resources as well as 
relationships, and managing both aspects is important, as they result in different types of 
benefits (Ford, 2002). For instance, pure contractual governance that is found to be 
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problematic is required to maintain a sufficient relationship with the vendors (Sun et al., 
2002; Young, 2008). However, the deployment of relational resources is a fundamental 
requirement for a successful business transaction where tangible resources are 
secondary in services. Thus, SET is applicable in explaining the exchange of resources 
in the service industry. However, Lacoste and Fenneteau, (2008) proposed to balance 
both aspects, as they are nurturing each other. The next sections explain contractual and 
relational governance in services outsourcing. 
2.7.2 Contractual Governance  
A contract is recognised as a formal governance mechanism of interests. The purpose of 
a formal contract is to reduce the risk associated with resource exchange (Williamson, 
1996). It includes detailed clauses in the outsourcing contract, such as clauses that 
specify prices, service levels, benchmarking, warranties, and penalties for non-
performance (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Lacity et al., 2011).  However, the transaction 
cost economies (TCE) domain perceived contractual governance as terms of a specific 
set of transaction responsibilities (Williamson, 1996; Ferguson et al., 2005). The 
transaction responsibilities are not only applicable to the vendor, but also demonstrate 
the focal firm‟s role and responsibilities in the contractual relationship.  Thus, the 
contract basically represents each party‟s role and responsibilities in performing specific 
tasks. Having a well-defined contract is crucial for service outsourcing, as the resources 
exchange is intangible and simultaneous. According to Al-Natour and Cavusoglu (2009) 
quoted by Teece (1992) ‘agreements are characterized by the commitment of two or 
more firms to reach a common goal entailing the pooling of their resources and 
activities’ (p. 19). However, Li and Choi (2009) extended the buyer‟s role as a „bridge‟ 
between the vendor and the final customer in service delivery.  
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As far as the bilateral relationship is concerned, both the focal firm and the vendor have 
their own responsibilities in ensuring outsourcing success.  As noted in the problem 
statement, the focal firm‟s responsibility is to carry out vendor management activities. 
Then, the vendor is responsible to deliver the services at the agreed level of quality.  
Basically, outsourcing success is determined by the „vendor management capability‟ of 
the firm. Additionally, the vendor‟s role is stressed in services, due to the potential and 
inherent variability of services, which have may have errors that are often visible to the 
customers (Armistead, 1989, p. 248). Thus, producing a successful and competitive 
service is the responsibility of both the focal firm and the vendor.  
However, achieving performance outcomes is recognised as the ultimate objective of 
economic transactions. Whipple and Frankel (2000) further highlighted a win-win 
situation, where both parties could achieve their performance objectives. Therefore, 
outsourcing as a type of joint business venture requires governance towards achieving 
common business goals, which indirectly benefited the vendors. This connection divides 
the responsibility equally between the focal firms and the vendors (Sun et al., 2002; 
Carr et al., 2008).  
The focal firm‟s capability in performing vendor management activities and the 
vendor‟s responsibility to deliver the agreed service at the agreed quality has been 
identified as the main aspects of contractual governance in services outsourcing. The 
impact of these two variables on outsourcing success will be discussed in the hypothesis 
development section separately.  
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2.7.3 Relational Governances 
Lawler (2001) and Sierra and McQuitty (2005) reported that the greater the 
responsibility that each party of the exchange process owned, the stronger emotional 
attachment they will have to a particular unit of social exchange. The strong positive 
emotions create a pleasant working environment for the successful resource exchange. 
The perceived benefits and the perceived risks of outsourcing determine the level of 
relationship required. It is empirically proven that, an effective supply chain relies on 
the success of relationship management (Croom et al., 2000; Sun et al., 2002; Zhang et 
al., 2009). Kedia and Lahiri (2007) introduced three types of partnerships in 
international outsourcing. These are tactical, strategic and transformational partnerships, 
all of which are often discussed from the perspectives of transaction cost economies, 
resource based view and resource dependency theory. 
As SET explains, a sustainable relationship might develop over time with the reciprocal 
stimuli received by the partners in the exchange process (Homans, 1961; Zafirovski, 
2005; Ferguson et al., 2005).  In the modern business context, firms operate in a 
networked business environment, based on mutual understanding and trust. Thus, 
relational resources are equally important as tangible resources. Bernardes (2010) 
perceived relational resources as social capital in business. For example, the level of 
trust and commitment (Lee, 2001; Han et al., 2008;Lahiri et al., 2009; Lai et al., 2009), 
the level of knowledge and information sharing (Marshall et al., 2007; Han et al., 2008), 
quality of communication (Han et al., 2008; Park-Poaps and Rees, 2010), symmetry of 
information (Bettis et al., 1992;Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2009; Banerjee and 
Williams, 2009), and risk sharing (Lee, 2001; Cui et al., 2009) are relational 
investments.  
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Dyer (1997) described the relational governance mechanisms of Nissan Inc. The 
company assisted one of their suppliers/vendors (seats supplier) to build a plant adjacent 
to its factory. The main purpose was to minimise transportation cost, reduce delivery 
time, and increase manufacturing flexibility. At the same time it enhances the vendor‟s 
production capacity. This is a realistic example of an extended level of relational 
governance. Finally, inter-organisational relationships produce social learning 
experiences (Lee and Kim, 1999) in order to be a competitive player in the market.  
Nevertheless, the primary objective of business collaborations is to develop a 
sustainable and profitable relationship, and thereby deliver a satisfactory product or 
service to the end customer (Gounaris, 2005; Young, 2008). As noted above, 
investments on social capital help firms building long-term sustainable relationships 
with vendors (Lee, 2001; Sun et al., 2002; Bernardes, 2010).  Thus, relational 
governance has a notable impact on outsourcing success.   
Next, the success of managing dependency and exchange is influenced by the extent to 
which the vendor is compatible with the firm.  Both the resource dependency theory and 
the social exchange theory highlighted the importance of compatibility of partners. The 
next section explains the theoretical background of compatibility, in the context of 
services outsourcing.  
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2.8 THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF PARTNER’S COMPATIBILITY. 
The notion of partner‟s compatibility combines both the theoretical aspects of resource 
dependency theory (RDT) and social exchange theory (SET). The basic tenet of RDT is 
that a firm intends to access external resources to remedy resource deficiencies (Hessels 
and Terjesen, 2010). Thereby, firms depend on external resource providers. In RDT's 
perspective, the compatible partners have complementary dependency, rather than a 
competing dependency. For example, Mohr and Spekman (1994) defined partnership as 
a purposive strategic relationship, where partners share compatible goals, strive for 
mutual benefits and acknowledge a high level of mutual interdependence (p.135). 
Furthermore, RDT stresses the partner‟s role in guaranteeing the success of 
interdependency. In RDT perspective, outsourcing involves the commitment of two 
parties for the purpose of achieving common objectives with pooled resources (Al-
Natour and Cavusoglu, 2009). Based on these facts, compatibility becomes a 
prerequisite of complementary dependency and hence acknowledged mutual 
interdependency.  
Since RDT assumes that the managers make active choice for organisational wellbeing 
(Hessels and Terjesen, 2010), they have to select a vendor who can contribute to the 
requirements of the partnership. It is supported to the extent that vendor is having 
required competencies, and complementary organisational culture (Whipple and 
Frankel, 2000; Ogden, 2006; Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2009). Accordingly, RDT has 
identified the need of a compatible partner to enhance the effectiveness of resource 
utilisation. Otherwise, the organisational dependency may not produce a value for their 
dependents, and it also violates the core ideology of sharing external resources.  
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One of the basic assumptions of social exchange theory is the mutual gratification of 
individuals or parties involved in the transaction (Zafirovski, 2005). Only compatible 
partners could offer mutual gratifications to each other. Therefore, the success of 
transactions relies on the compatibility of partners (i.e. the firm and the vendor) in 
outsourcing (Chan and Chin, 2007). An empirical study based on the hotel sector in 
China, found that the incompatibility of corporate cultures between local management 
and vendors as an obstacle to the successful execution of outsourcing strategy (Lam and 
Han, 2005). Therefore, compatible operating idiosyncrasies among partners are essential 
for an effective supply chain management (Shamdasani and Sheth, 1995; Whipple and 
Frankel, 2000; Lam and Han, 2005; Jarvenpaa and Mao, 2008; Liou and Chuang, 2010). 
RDT perceives that the compatibility ensures the survival of the partnership, while SET 
perceives it as a requirement for a successive exchange. Therefore, both theories 
advocate having a compatible vendor for outsourcing. This is critical in services 
outsourcing, as the vendor directly interacts with customers, especially in direct service 
encounters. The unique nature of services outsourcing emerged as a necessity of having 
a compatible partner to overcome issues dealing with the services outsourcing.  
Compatibility has been operationalized and studied with different terminologies, such as 
congruence, match and strategic fit. The partners‟ compatibility is identified as a key 
success factor in outsourcing (Whipple and Frankel, 2000; Jarvenpaa and Mao, 2008).  
The core challenge is determining the level of the potential partner's compatibility. The 
compatibility of tangible resources is visible, but, as far as services are concerned, 
partners are usually sharing intangible resources such as knowledge and competencies. 
These resources are bundled with organisational cultural elements and their strategic 
orientations, making it difficult to determine the compatibility of the services, which are 
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intangible and concurrent. However, this is essential, as it affects the dependent‟s 
survival and mutual benefits. 
Initially, Harrigan (1985) categorised compatibility into three types; 1) cultural, 2) 
strategic and 3) functional. Shamdasani and Sheth (1995) found strategic compatibility 
to be an important factor for the satisfaction and the continuity in marketing alliances.  
They viewed “strategic compatibility” of partners with respect to the complementary 
goals and similar orientation. However, Roh et al. (2008) had a much broader 
explanation on organisational culture. To them, the organisational culture consists of 1) 
artefacts, 2) espoused values and 3) basic underlying assumptions.  Artefacts refer to the 
visible components, such as organisational structure, which elaborates hierarchical 
level, flow of authority, and span of control. It also includes organisational practices 
such as language, clothing, manners, and technology (Schein, 1996).  Roh et al. (2008) 
further divided espoused values into strategies, goals, and philosophies, which are less 
visible. Underlying assumptions are hypothetical terms, which form cognitive stability 
(Schein, 1996). However, Roh et al. (2008) have included strategic component of 
compatibility as an element of culture, while Harrigan (1985) separated strategic 
orientation from the culture. In fact, some other scholars mixed partnership quality 
characteristics with partners‟ compatibility. For an instance, Liou and Chuang (2010) 
measured compatibility in terms of relationship, flexibility and information sharing. 
Here, only flexibility can be considered an element of compatibility, which partially 
explains the firm‟s competitive priority.  Wasti et al. (2006) combined partnership's 
quality and compatibility aspects into a different variable called „social climate‟.   
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However, recent business research promotes compatibility of competitive priorities. 
Kroes and Ghosh (2009) recommended the importance of maintaining congruence 
between firm‟s outsourcing drives with firm‟s competitive priorities. Thus, there should 
be a match between outsourcing drives and vendor selection. This ensures that, the 
selected vendor is possibly aligned with the focal firm‟s competitive priorities. 
Accordingly, Gilley and Rasheed (2000) and Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina 
(2004) found that firm‟s operation strategies (i.e. competitive priorities) have a 
moderating effect on outsourcing decisions.  
Consequently, there are frustrating and fragmented arguments on classifying 
compatibility aspects. To simplify the aforementioned debates, the study defined 
organisational culture as a set of operating philosophies and management style that 
strive for common goal(s). Then, the competitive priorities are a „portfolio of 
capabilities‟. Competitive priorities are hedging goals to a particular direction, and 
deploying organisational resources according to these priorities (Roh et al., 2008). 
These are commonly identified in terms of cost, quality, flexibility and on-time service 
delivery (Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 2004; Chase et al., 2006; Jarvenpaa 
and Mao, 2008; Kroes and Ghosh, 2009).   In short, the study identified two types of 
compatibility aspects; 1) culture, and 2) competitive priorities for empirical 
investigation.  
As a whole, it is identified that the services outsourcing context needed separate 
treatment as the fundamentals of services differ from those of manufacturing sectors. It 
is also recognised that managing dependency and exchange are crucial elements that 
ensure outsourcing success. The previous sections further explained the indirect impact 
of partnership's quality and partners‟ compatibility on outsourcing success. Based on 
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these facts, the next section attempts to build a theoretical relationship(s) among 
variables. 
 
 2.9 DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH MODEL 
From the review of epistemological background of the study, it is apparent that there are 
sufficient supports for the consideration of the five variables (i.e. degree of outsourcing, 
vendor management capability, vendor‟s service performance, partnership quality and 
partner‟s compatibility) as critical managerial factors that are expected to influence 
(directly/indirectly) the dependent variable of outsourcing success. Although numerous 
studies on outsourcing success have been conducted over the decades, discrepancies 
concerning the extent to which outsourcing success can be managed in the services 
context continue to elude researchers. Accordingly, the study has three research 
questions that will be answered through five research objectives. This section attempts 
to develop the research model for determining outsourcing success in the context of 
services. 
First, the following section explains the theoretical relationships among the identified 
variables in order to develop research hypotheses for empirical verifications. The flow 
of discussion will be guided by the five research objectives. The theoretical framework 
is then developed, based on the theoretical relationships constructed.  
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2.9.1 Hypotheses Development 
The hypotheses of this study are derived based of the research objectives. The first 
research objective is to investigate the impact of the degree of outsourcing on the 
outsourcing success in services. There is a positive correlation between the degree of 
outsourcing and organisational performance (Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 
2004; Kotabe and Mol, 2009). Gilley and Rasheed (2000) and Leiblein et al. (2002) 
argued that the relationship is moderated by environmental factors, for example 
outsourcing produces greater organisational performance outcomes for the firms that 
pursue cost leadership and innovative differentiation strategy (Gilley and Rasheed, 
2000).  Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina (2004) further discovered that hotels 
expecting to gain greater strategic performance outcomes have a greater propensity to 
outsource. 
In addition, Kotabe and Mol (2009) had different views regarding performance 
outcomes of outsourcing. They found a direct impact between the degree of outsourcing 
and the financial performance, of which the correlation is not linear. The degree of 
outsourcing has a curvilinear relationship with financial performance; hence there is an 
optimal level of outsourcing (Kotabe and Mol, 2009). Therefore there is a need to select 
the appropriate level of outsourcing, as the negative outcomes could occur after the 
optimal level outsourcing is reached (Kotabe and Mol, 2009; Espino-Rodrı´guez and 
Padro´n-Robaina, 2004).  
Accordingly, numerous studies empirically proved the positive correlation between the 
degrees of outsourcing and the organisational performance. For instance, Fixler and 
Siegel (1999) reported that the magnitude of growth in output is positively correlated 
with the magnitude of outsourcing.  This observation has been consistent over the 
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decades. Lately, Kim et al. (2005) discovered that the partners‟ interdependence (i.e. 
degree of outsourcing) is positively associated with the extent of electronic information 
transfer capability in the supply chain relationship. As previous stated (refer section 
2.6.2), the degree of outsourcing is a combined construct of breadth and depth of 
outsourcing.   
Though the isolation of breadth and depth is less meaningful (Gilley and Rasheed, 
2000), they have been addressed separately in practice, as they are associated with 
series of tasks.  The breadth reflects the number of activities outsourced as a percentage 
of total number of activities that a firm is performing (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000). Some 
firms are willing to outsource a greater proportion of activities than others. This 
basically depends on the firms‟ motivation and their resource capability (Ozcelik and 
Altinkemer, 2009). Depth refers to the level of the vendor‟s involvement, making it a 
capability benchmark of both parties. Based on the breadth and the depth, a firm can 
approach different levels of degrees of outsourcing.  These different combinations may 
result in different levels of success. Thus, it is worthwhile to understand the effect of 
different combinations of degree of outsourcing on performance. Therefore, this study 
aims to investigate,  
1. The influence of the degree of outsourcing (D X B) on the outsourcing success. 
2. The influence of the different levels of breadth (B) and depth (D) of outsourcing 
on the outsourcing success. 
 
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is developed to test the Research Objective 1. 
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Research Objective 01: 
To investigate the impact of degree of outsourcing on outsourcing success in services. 
Alternative Hypothesis 
H1: The degree of outsourcing (DOO) influences the outsourcing success (OS). 
 
The study would carry out relevant statistical analysis to identify the relative importance 
or the differences of breadth and depth in influencing the outsourcing success.  
Subsequently, post-hoc analysis would assist in determining the impact of the different 
levels of combinations of breadth and depth of outsourcing on the outsourcing success. 
The second objective is to verify the relationship between vendor management 
capability and outsourcing success in services.  Sourcing decision mainly depends on 
the firm's capabilities and resources (Barney, 1999). Moreover, managing business is 
the primary responsibility of the company, which cannot be totally outsourced (Whipple 
and Frankel, 2000; Weidenbaum, 2005). As Kotabe and Mol (2009) suggested, 
outsourcing increases the firm‟s performance, and identified an efficient way of 
addressing organisational competitiveness (Rajabzadeh et al., 2008). Therefore, the 
focal firm is recognised as a fundamental key decision maker (Weidenbaum, 2005) and 
the executor of value creation process in outsourcing (Petersen, 2005; Byramjee et al., 
2010). Their ability to manage the outsourcing task and vendor is denoted as vendor 
management capability.  
Outsourcing is perceived as a method of resource allocation and asset management 
(Quelin and Duhamel, 2003), which involves top management decisions affecting 
company-wide resource base (Kotabe and Mol, 2009). The focal firm needs to manage 
and control the vendor in order to ensure a high level of service quality (Li and Choi, 
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2009, p. 35). It is more critical in services than in manufacturing firms, as vendor is 
directly involved with the end customer (Li and Choi, 2009). 
Chan and Chin (2007) stressed that a strong vendor management system is a key 
success factor in strategic outsourcing. As highlighted by many scholars (e.g. Lee, 2001; 
Lam and Han, 2005; Chan and Chin, 2007; Rajabzadeh et al., 2008; Petersen et al., 
2008; Han et al., 2008; Lacity et al., 2009) the vendor management capability is the 
main determinant  that leads to outsourcing  success.  In a more constructive point of 
view, vendor management is taken as a corrective action for improvements (Chan and 
Chin, 2007).   
The reduction of the supply chain base however, facilitates a closer „vendor monitoring‟ 
system, and enhances the supply chain performance (Ogden, 2006). Likewise, it is 
empirically proven that various characteristics of the vendor management system also 
positively influence outsourcing success. However, a considerable amount of resources 
is needed to monitor the outsourced businesses (Byramjee et al., 2010).  
In summary, vendor management has been identified as a fundamental component for 
outsourcing success (Chan and Chin, 2007; Han et al., 2008; Rajabzadeh et al., 2008). 
This study attempts to verify the relationship in the context of services outsourcing. 
Accordingly, a directional hypothesis is established to verify the impact of vendor 
management capability on outsourcing success based on the second objective of the 
study.   
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Research Objective 2: 
To verify the positive relationship between vendor management capability and 
outsourcing success in services. 
Alternative Hypothesis 
H2: There is a positive relationship between vendor management capability (VM) 
and outsourcing success (OS). 
 
The third objective of the study is to examine the impact of vendor‟s service 
performance on outsourcing success in services. As far as services are concerned, 
outsourcing produces a structural change in performing businesses (Li and Choi, 2008). 
For instance, the focal firm transfers the responsibility (full or partial) of delivering the 
service and satisfying the certain requirements of customer to the vendor. The transfer 
of responsibility however associated with risks. This is due to the fact that, the services 
are simultaneous and hence there is less probability to re-establish customer satisfaction 
if the service fails at the first time. Even though the „recovery paradox‟ explains that the 
satisfaction after recovery is higher than the initial satisfaction (De Matos et al., 2007), 
it still incurs costs in terms of time, material, and labour. The issue becomes more 
serious if the activity is outsourced. This is because there might be contractual limits, 
damages of trusts between business partners, and compensation issues. Repeated 
negative experiences may result in the focal firm to switch the vendor (Dyer, 1997).  
The role of outsourcing has changed from traditional purchasing to strategic activity 
(Chan and Chin, 2007). Simultaneously, the vendor‟s role is expanded to that of 
business partner dealing with operational control of functions (Rajabzadeh et al., 2008). 
The vendor‟s contribution should provide value as a competitive advantage (Liou and 
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Chuang, 2010; Miles and Snow, 2007).  Indeed, some recent studies have already 
identified the strategic value of the vendors‟ role in determining collaborative business 
success. Whipple and Frankel (2000) carried out an empirical study on strategic alliance 
success factors for both the buyer and the vendor. According to their findings, the 
vendor‟s ability to meet performance expectations can be identified as a significant key 
success factor. They further viewed that the vendors‟ performance has greater impact on 
the supply chain efficiency and the focal firm‟s performance.  
In a modern business context, outsourcing has been recognised as a value creation 
strategy that enhances organisational competitiveness (Petersen et al., 2005; Rajabzadeh 
et al., 2008; Byramjee et al., 2010). Therefore, the vendor is identified as a specialist, 
who can contribute to „breakthrough ideas or activities‟ (Cui et al., 2009, p. 60). 
Accordingly, outsourcing and vendor‟s performance are two strongly related 
phenomena (Takeishi, 2001). Outsourcing can be a better option if the vendor can 
provide the expected support to the focal firm for a better competitive position than the 
firm can accomplish on its own (Venkatesan, 1992; Rajabzadeh et al., 2008; Carr et al., 
2008). 
Based on these arguments, it is clear that the vendors‟ service performance directly 
impacts outsourcing success. Accordingly, the influence of the vendor‟s service 
performance on outsourcing success can be hypothesized to test the third objective of 
the study.  
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Research Objective 3: 
 To examine the impact of vendor‟s service performance on outsourcing success in 
services 
Alternative Hypothesis 
H3: There is an association between vendor‟s service performance (VSP) and 
outsourcing success (OS). 
 
The fourth objective is to investigate the moderating effect of partnership's quality on 
the relationships between both vendor management capability and vendor‟s service 
performance with the outsourcing success. 
Modern business has moved away from power based hierarchical relationship to mutual 
development based partnership (Chen and Paulraj, 2004: p.125). Accordingly, 
„partnership quality‟ has been identified as one of the most important determinants of 
outsourcing success (Chi, 1994; Dyer, 1997; Kedia and Lahiri, 2007; Marshall et al., 
2007; Han et al., 2008; Li and Choi, 2009; Cui et al., 2009; De Vita et al., 2010). Lee 
(2001) defined partnership quality as „an inter-organisational relationship to achieve 
shared goals. Establishing a limited number of supplier base (Ogden, 2006; Faes and 
Matthyssens, 2009) helps build close and long-term relationships rather than arms-
length contractual relationship, for better performance (Lam and Han, 2005; Zhang et 
al., 2009; Byramjee et al., 2010). Consequently, Lahiri et al. (2009) viewed partnership 
quality as a relational resource, which affects the focal firm‟s performance.  
However, Byramjee et al. (2010) proposed a moderating impact of partnership quality 
on „total value orientation‟ of the business. As explained in SET, the actors‟ role in the 
exchange is determined by the reciprocal stimulus they receive (Cook and Rice, 2003; 
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Zafirovski, 2005). The subsequent impact of partnership characteristics is visible only 
when the resource exchange starts. More importantly, relational governance cannot 
stand alone to produce economic benefits (Sun et al., 2002; Zafirovski, 2005).  Instead, 
Ferguson et al. (2005) discovered that greater relational governance results in greater 
exchange performance in the banking industry. This means that the magnitude of 
partnership quality is associated with the magnitude of success of exchange.  
SET perceived mutual reinforcement as a facilitator for achieving mutual benefits in 
exchange (Homans, 1961; Cook and Rice, 2003; Zafirovski, 2005). In agreement with 
scholars (Lee, 2001; Petersen et al., 2005; Sun et al., 2008; Han et al., 2008; Lai et al., 
2009; Lahiri et al., 2009), the level of trust and commitment between a buyer and a 
vendor affects the effectiveness of the integrated supply chain performance. Despite 
„trust‟ and „commitment‟, there is a wide range of other partnership characteristics 
discussed in literature. The level of sharing information and knowledge (Marshall et al., 
2007; Han et al., 2008), risk sharing (Cui et al., 2009; Lee, 2001) and collaborative 
participation (Han et al., 2008), are some examples. 
Concluding the facts, partnership quality is noted as an integrated construct of trust, 
commitment and cooperativeness of partners to the partnership. With respect to the role 
of partnership quality, it does not produce economic benefits alone, and it only 
commences once the resource exchange started. This confirms that partnership quality 
affects the effectiveness of resource exchange.  
Managing mechanism of resource exchange is identified as contractual governance.  
Therefore, the study proposes a moderating effect (Byramjee et al., 2010) of relational 
governance (i.e. partnership quality) on the relationship between contractual governance 
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and outsourcing success. More specifically, vendor management capability and 
vendor‟s service performance are identified as the main elements of contractual 
governance in services.  Thus, partnership quality moderates the relationships between 
1) vendor management capability and outsourcing success, 2) vendors‟ service 
performance and outsourcing success. Based on these arguments and facts above, the 
study deduced the following hypotheses (H4 and H6) which are derived from the fourth 
objective of the study. Supplementary hypotheses (H5 and H7) are also developed to 
test the impact of each dimension of the partnership quality construct for the same 
relationships. 
Research Objective 4: 
To investigate the moderating effect of partnership quality (PQ) on the relationships 
between 1) vendor management capability (VM) and outsourcing success (OS), 2) 
vendor‟s service performance (VSP) and outsourcing success (OS). 
Alternative Hypotheses 
H4: The relationship between vendor management capability and outsourcing 
success is moderated by partnership quality. 
H5: The relationship between vendor management capability and outsourcing 
success is moderated by a) trust between partners in the partnership. b) 
commitment of partners to the partnership. and c) cooperativeness of partners 
to the partnership.  
H6: The relationship between vendor‟s service performance and outsourcing 
success is moderated by partnership quality. 
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H7: The relationship between vendor‟s service performance and outsourcing success 
is moderated by a) trust between partners in the partnership. b) commitment of 
partners to the partnership. and c) cooperativeness of partners to the 
partnership.  
 
The fifth research objective of the study is to investigate the moderating role of 
partners‟ compatibility on the outsourcing success in services. Literature recommends 
selecting a compatible vendor at the initial stages of outsourcing (Shamdasani and 
Sheth, 1994; Chamberland, 2003). However, there are some practical issues during 
selection, such as, difficulty in quantifying and observing evidences for compatibility of 
the vendor until the service is actually performed (Kannan and Tan, 2004). It is hard to 
demonstrate prototypes of services and hence the true nature of the vendor is also 
difficult to recognise prior to the collaboration (Kannan and Tan, 2004; Wadhwa and 
Ravindran, 2007). Despite the issues in selecting a compatible partner, it becomes „a 
crucial element which affects the extent to which orientations, abilities and activities of 
organizations can be integrated successfully (Shamdasani and Sheth, 1994, p.11). 
Therefore, both the vendors and service firms should make attempt to examine each 
other‟s‟ roles and functions. 
 Referring to literature, there are two main components of compatibility, which 
determine the extent of orientations, abilities and activities of partnership. First, the 
congruence of competitive priories is identified.  Competitive priorities are direct 
manifestations of strategic orientations (Kannan and Tan, 2004; Kroes and Ghosh, 
2009), hence different orientations may result in different outcomes.  Outsourcing 
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becomes a mutual effort and hence both firms should have the same strategic 
orientation. Moreover, the vendor performs the service delivery on behalf of the focal 
firm. Thus, there should be a similarity of competitive priorities between the focal firm 
and the vendor that align activities to a same direction. This is vital for a successful 
exchange.  
Next, the divergence of organisational cultures is recognised as one of the main barriers 
to an alliance's success (Whipple and Frankel, 2000; Lam and Han, 2005; Roh et al., 
2008).  In terms of meta-theoretical thinking of human nature in management research 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979), a partner‟s compatibility can be distinguished as 
„voluntarism‟.  This demonstrates that human actions arise out of culturally derived 
meanings (ibid). Often, employees‟ actions which aim for immediate economic returns 
are guided by organisational culture (Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2009). As a result, 
partners‟ differences are obvious. Roh et al. (2008), Jean et al. (2008) and Daityari et al. 
(2008) therefore, stressed on altering organisational culture in order to adapt the 
partnership requirements, as it facilitates positive gains throughout the duration of 
partnership. Additionally, events such as gatherings and workshops to communicate and 
display each other's cultures would also facilitate the understanding of partners‟ cultures 
(Daityari et al., 2008). Some organisations train their suppliers in order increase their 
agility with organisations‟ climate and culture (Carr et al., 2006). Likewise, adjusting 
cultural compatibility in an on-going outsourcing contract will enhance the effectiveness 
of any attempts that are taken to ensure outsourcing success (Kannan and Tan, 2004; 
Tallon, 2008; Jean et al., 2008; Daityari et al., 2008). 
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In fact, firms cannot accurately determine the most appropriate vendor at the beginning, 
and therefore, unable to decide on the accurate level of dependencies (Kannan and Tan, 
2004). For this reason, the same degree of outsourcing may result in different outcomes 
for vendors with different level of compatibilities. Working with a business partner who 
is not aligned with the firm‟s business culture and strategic movements is a challenge 
(Wadhwa and Ravindran, 2007). For example, focal firms may need to spend more 
time, attention and money for vendor management activities in order to direct the 
vendor with the objectives of outsourcing. With regards to the vendor‟s service 
performance, vendors can contribute more to the firm, if their strategic orientation and 
business culture is compatible with the focal firm (Carr et al., 2006; Liou and Chuang, 
2010; Wadhwa and Ravindran, 2007).  
In summary, the role of partners‟ compatibility for on-going outsourcing context has yet 
to be established. However, it is operationalised in terms of compatibility of culture and 
competitive priorities of vendor(s) and the focal firm. Therefore, this study aims to 
empirically investigate the moderating role of compatibility in the services' outsourcing 
context. The following hypotheses have been derived from the fifth objective of the 
study. Particularly, the influence of the degree of outsourcing, vendor management 
capability, and vendor‟s service performance on the outsourcing success may vary with 
the level of compatibility between partners. Supplementary hypotheses would test the 
impact of each dimension of compatibility on the above relationships.  
   
95 
 
Research Objective 05 
To investigate the moderating effect of partners‟ compatibility (CP) on the relationships 
between (1) degree of outsourcing (DOO) and outsourcing success (OS),       (2) vendor 
management capability (VM) and outsourcing success (OS), and    (3) vendors‟ service 
performance(VSP) and outsourcing success (OS). 
Alternative Hypotheses: 
H8:  Partners‟ compatibility moderates the relationship between degree of 
outsourcing and outsourcing success. 
H8a: Cultural compatibility moderates the relationship between degree of 
outsourcing and outsourcing success. 
H8b: Compatibility of competitive priorities moderates the relationship between 
degree of outsourcing and outsourcing success. 
H9:  Partners‟ compatibility moderates the relationship between vendor 
management capability and outsourcing success. 
H9a: Cultural compatibility moderates the relationship between vendor 
management capability and outsourcing success. 
H9b: Compatibility of competitive priorities moderates the relationship between 
vendor management capability and outsourcing success. 
H10: Partners‟ compatibility moderates the relationship between vendor‟s service 
performance and outsourcing success. 
H10a: Cultural compatibility moderates the relationship between vendor‟s service 
performance and outsourcing success. 
H10b: Compatibility of competitive priorities moderates the relationship between 
vendor‟s service performance and outsourcing success. 
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In total, there are twenty hypotheses developed and would be tested from five research 
objectives. Figure 2.3 depicts the model of research framework which contains all the 
variables that would be examined and the hypotheses that would be tested.  
 
2.9.2 The Research Model  
From the discussion above, the research model of this study is developed. It is shown in 
Figure 2.3.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: The Model of Outsourcing Success in Services 
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The model consists of three independent variables which are: degree of outsourcing, 
vendor management capability and vendor‟s service performance. These variables were 
expected to influence the dependent variable, which is outsourcing success. The model 
also tests the moderating role of partners‟ compatibility on all the aforementioned direct 
relationships. In addition to that, there is a moderation effect of partnership quality in 
the relationship between contractual governance and outsourcing success. In particular, 
the influence of vendor management capability and vendors‟ service performance on 
outsourcing success is moderated by the partnership quality. 
 
SUMMARY 
This chapter presents an overview of epistemological and ontological background of 
outsourcing success in the services sector. Firstly, the chapter discussed the literature on 
general outsourcing and then narrowed it down to the services outsourcing. The specific 
nature of services outsourcing is hence identified and also recognized the fact that the 
previous studies have not sufficiently considered the uniqueness of services 
outsourcing. Limited works have been conducted to investigate the factors affecting the 
outsourcing success in the services sector. 
The review also found that, literature on the managerial aspects of outsourcing is 
scattered largely due to the issues of underpinning theories applied by previous studies. 
Thus, extensive literature analysis is conducted to identify appropriate underpinning 
theory (ies) to oversee the service outsourcing context.  In contrast to the dominant 
theories in the area of research, the explanatory power of resource dependency theory 
and social exchange theory is acknowledged.  
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Following that, the study identified that organisational dependency and resource 
exchange are the   crucial managerial elements for services outsourcing success. Next, 
partners‟ compatibility is identified as a variable, which mitigates the efforts of 
outsourcing on its success. This proposes a moderating effect of partners‟ compatibility 
on the effectiveness of managerial factors identified (i.e. both dependency and resource 
exchange). In addition to that, SET perceived partnership quality as a reciprocal 
behaviour in the exchange process. This provides another moderating variable, which 
affects factors relating to the exchange performance.  
The following chapter outlines the methodology utilized to examine the model 
constructed in Chapter 2. 
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CHAPTER 3  
METHODOLOGY 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the detailed methodology employed in this research.  It consists of 
sampling, operationalisation of constructs, instrument development, pilot testing and 
methodological procedures that would be used to test the proposed research model.  
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Domain of „school of thought‟ guides research design. Various schools of thought have 
different research approaches. The approaches are defined by the ontological and 
epistemological perspectives of the certain school of thought. As such, it is denoted as 
dualism (binary model) in philosophy (Johnson and Duberley, 2000, p. 179). Figure 3.1 
depicts different schools of thoughts, and their corresponding approaches in social 
science research. As noted in Chapter 1, the study lies in „positivism‟, in which thoughts 
are guided by objective ontology and objective epistemology. This work believes that 
reality has an independent existence, and there is a possibility to access the external 
world objectively (i.e. theory-neutral observational language). Therefore, the reality in 
the external world (i.e. social phenomena in this research) can be objectively measured. 
Based on this fundamental thought, the study outlines its research design.  
Bryman and Bell (2007) conceived that social research design is about prioritizing a 
range of dimensions of research processes, including expressing causal connections 
(hypothesizing), sampling (generalizing to a large group), understanding the behaviour 
of social context, and considering temporal appreciation of social phenomena and their 
interconnections (p. 36). 
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Research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007, p. 40).  A meta-analysis carried out by Churchill and Peter (1984) found 
that research design significantly affects the reliability of the findings. Therefore, the 
formulation of the most appropriate research design allows the researcher to figure out 
how to perform the research work. Besides, it facilitates the generation of more reliable 
and valid research results. Developing a research design is not a simple task, as it deals 
with multiple factors, rather than just one or more variables that cause a problem 
(Cavana et al., 2001). Each element is interconnected within a particular research 
paradigm/domain, and this guides researchers on the appropriate research 
implementation and interpretation. 
Subjective 
Neo-positivism 
Subjective 
ONTOLOGY 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
Objective Subjective 
Objective 
Postmodernism 
Incoherent 
Conventionalism 
Critical Realism 
Pragmatism 
Critical Theory 
Positivism 
Figure 3.1: Research approaches based on Ontology and Epistemology 
Source: Johnson and Duberley (2000, p. 180), Reflexivity and management research  
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As the current research lies in the positivist research paradigm, the objective measures 
of constructs will be employed with the purpose of examining the influence of selected 
factors on outsourcing success. Therefore, this study investigates causal relationships 
quantitatively (Baumgartner and Hensley, 2006, p. 17).  Sandhusen (2000), however, 
classified such researches as conclusive research, while Malhotra (2004) categorised 
conclusive research into causal and descriptive. The causal relationships should be 
investigated with the use of experimental research designs in a controlled environment 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 47- 49). Therefore, experimental design involves 
manipulating or introducing changes in people or environment that presumably affects 
the outcome(s) of interest (Fraenkel and Wallen, 2000).  
The descriptive research is further classified into the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
design (Malhotra, 2004). A cross sectional study attempts to offer „a snapshot of one 
point in time‟ (Cooper and Schindler, 2003, p. 148). A longitudinal design collects data 
from two or more periods of time, using the same samples of respondents, and 
measuring the same variables. The current study is identified as a cross sectional, as it 
aims to examine the phenomena at a certain point of time. Based on the characteristics 
pertaining to the research design, this study applies the survey method in order to 
accomplish the main aim of the research. 
3.2.1 Research Method – Survey  
Most of the time, quantitative researches in social science are carried out as cross-
sectional data collection (Bryman and Bell, 2007). Survey is the most popular data 
collection tool within the descriptive research, and is usually defined by its structured 
nature in gathering data from a large sample (Ruane, 2004). It provides certain factual 
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and descriptive information, which can be intrapolated to the population. Survey  is a 
relatively easy method to administer, as well as economical and efficient in reaching its 
target population (Malhotra, 2004). Due to these reasons, and the fact that it is a suitable 
research method for a descriptive research design, a structured self-completion 
questionnaire was chosen for this study in order to gather cross-sectional data. The 
following section describes the development of research instruments, including 
operationalisation of constructs and scaling.  
3.2.2  Population of the Study 
Bryman and Bell (2007, p.182) defines population as the „universe of units from which 
a sample is to be selected‟. The sample should be drawn from the best representation of 
the population for more generalized results. The current study aims to investigate 
outsourcing practices of the service sector in Sri Lanka. The sector has more than 55 per 
cent share of the GDP (during 2009-2011) and is the main growth driver with average 8 
percent a year. Telecommunication, trading, port, hospitality and financial services are 
main contributors to the growth (Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka website available: 
http://www.cbsl.gov.lk/2011). As far as the study context is concerned, only banking 
and hotel industries in the service sector have applied outsourcing for multiple activities 
as their main strategy of competing. These two industries have also  recorded  the 
highest service sector contributors to the gross domestic production (GDP) in Sri Lanka 
in 2009 and 2010 (source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka website available: 
http://www.cbsl.gov.lk).   
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Zhang et al. (2009) stated that hotels are a sensitive and competitive industry to be 
studied, as they use outsourcing for multiple activities as their main competition 
strategy (Lam and Han, 2005). The banking industry also uses outsourcing to add value 
to their business process (Banerjee and Williams 2009; Ang and Straub1998; Barako 
and Gatere, 2008). There is a significant rise in outsourcing activities in the banking 
sector due to the advanced technology and usage of the Internet to enhance business 
performance (Barako and Gatere, 2008).  In this context, both sectors applied 
outsourcing for strategic purposes. Thus, the successful empirical investigation on the 
deduced model can be realised within these two sectors of services.   
3.2.3 Sample Frame 
The telephone directory issued by Sri Lanka Telecom Corporation is identified as the 
most updated sample frame of the study. In fact Sri Lanka Telecom Corporation is the 
only landline service provider. Most of the organisations use landline telephones due to 
their relatively lower cost and ease of services. According to the 2011 directory 
(rainbow pages), there are 27 banks and 396 hotels in Sri Lanka. In this study however, 
81 „one star‟ and 24 „unclassified‟ hotels were omitted from the population, in order to 
minimize the „outliers‟ from the analysis. These hotels are less likely to outsource due 
to their small sizes. Thus, a total population of 318 units was considered for the study. 
3.2.4 Unit of Analysis 
Lam and Han (2005) identified departmental managers and senior executives in hotels 
as respondents. Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina (2005a:b) and Donada and 
Nogatchewsky (2009) stated that the execution of the outsourcing function is a middle 
level management responsibility, following the top management decisions. However, 
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the decision-making body in outsourcing may differ from one firm to another. Thus, this 
study defines its respondents as the middle level managers or executives who are 
responsible for outsourcing (general or specific activity). These managers however are 
not considered as the unit of analysis, but rather as representative to respective 
organisations. As stated earlier, this study aims to examine the outsourcing success of 
services firms.  Therefore, service organisations that applied outsourcing for strategic 
purposes were considered as units of analysis of this study.  
 
3.3 SAMPLING  
3.3.1 Sample Size 
According to Sekaran (2003), researchers are not required to calculate sample size due 
to the uncertainty of receiving all of them back. As previously noted, the population is 
318, which comprises of 27 banks and 291 hotels. Other similar studies around the 
world had much lower sample sizes. Lam and Han (2005) sampled four to five-star 
hotels in Shanghai, China, in which the population and the sample size were 38.  
Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina (2004:2005a:b) identified 58 registered hotels 
in Canary Islands Spain, and they included 50 hotels as their sample.  Donada and 
Nogatchewsky (2009) investigated two tourists‟ destinations, and have not specifically 
mentioned the population size, but they gathered 65 (30 hotels from Turkey and 35 
hotels from France) responses from hotels. It is common for organisational research to 
analyse a smaller sample size compared to consumer research.  
The sample size is important as it affects the magnitude of difference in covariance 
matrices (Hoyle, 1995; Loehlin, 2004).  If the sample is inadequate, the probability to 
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project the results to the population becomes severely limited. Therefore, a „minimum 
sample size‟ is needed to be identified. A priori statistical power analysis can be 
calculated using various heuristics. Subsequently, there are different arguments on the 
size of the sample. Bentler and Chou (1987) stated that, the minimum sample size 
would be five respondents for each free parameter to be estimated, if other multivariate 
assumptions are met (p.3). Previous research used this as a rule of thumb to decide on 
the sample's size. Moreover, some scholars measured sample sizes according to the 
requirement of the statistical software/package that was used to analyse the data. 
Accordingly, the Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) technique generally expects a 
minimum sample size that ranges from 150 to 200 (Hair et al., 2010).  Schumacker and 
Lomax (2004) have concluded that an adequate level of a sample should be greater than 
150.  
Cochran‟s (1977) constructed two comprehensive formulas to calculate the minimum 
sample size for categorical and continuous variables. Thus, this study wishes to apply 
Cochran‟s (1977) sample size formula for continuous variables, as it considers the 
variability of the dependent variable‟s scale, in addition to its error margin and 
confidence level. The formula is shown below (formula and its description quoted from 
Bartlet, Kotrlik and Higgins, 2001, p. 46).  
    
       
  
 
 
                   
       
             
 
  
   
106 
 
Where, 
    = sample size (before population size adjustment)  
 t = confidence level at 96% (standard value of 2.6122) 
(the alpha level of .04 indicates the level of risk the researcher is willing 
to take true margin of error may exceed the acceptable margin of error.) 
s = estimate of standard deviation in the population = 1.167. 
(estimate of variance deviation for 7 point scale calculated by using: 7 
[inclusive range of scale] divided by 6 [number of standard deviations 
that include almost all (approximately 98%) of the possible values in the 
range]). 
d = acceptable margin of error for mean being estimated = 0.21 
(number of points on primary scale * acceptable margin of error; points 
on primary scale = 7; acceptable margin of error = .03 [the error 
researcher is willing to except]). 
 
Accordingly, the study needs 211 participants. Cochran‟s (1977) further stated that, if 
the estimated sample is greater than 5% of the population, the correction formula should 
be applied (quoted from Bartlet et al., 2001, p. 46). The adjustment formula for 
population is shown below, 
   
  
   
  
          ⁄
   
n  
   
         ⁄
             
 
n = Final minimum sample size adjusted for the population 
Based on the correction formula, the minimum sample size for the study is 127. 
However, many researchers suggested increasing the sample size by 30% to compensate 
for non-responses (Israel, 1992). Therefore, the sample size needs to be increased to 
(127 x 1.3), which makes it 165. According to Hair et al. (2010), this amount is 
marginal in terms of the requirement of statistical package applied for data analysis (i.e. 
SEM: AMOS). Thus, the study sets the required sample size at 200. This amount 
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satisfies the AMOS requirement, which exceeds the minimum sample size calculated 
based on Cochran‟s (1977) and Israel's (1992) methods.  
3.3.2 Sampling Technique 
As previously noted, the population consists of 27 banks and 291 hotels, which is a 
significant proportionate difference. In this case, the proportion for each stratum has to 
be determined in order to accurately represent a considerable amount from the minority. 
This approach is known as proportionate/stratified sampling. However, the sampling is 
only feasible when the relevant information is available, and the difference between the 
two strata is readily identified (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 188). In accordance with the 
theory above, this study allocated a portion to each sector, based on the calculated 
minimum sample. The calculation is as follows, 
 
 
  (
   
   )              
                  
  (
   
   )                 
 
 
According   to  the  calculations,  the survey needs to cover at  least  17  banks  and  183 
hotels. The survey instrument is a structured questionnaire. As a matter of fact, the 
development of the instrument includes transforming the constructs into measurable 
formats, and developing scales to measure the magnitude involvement of such 
measures. The next section discusses the transformation of research constructs of this 
study into measurable formats.  
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3.4 MEASUREMENT OF CONSTRUCTS 
The theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter outlines six constructs.  
However, constructs are not directly observable, and the meanings are conceptualized 
for a given context. Further, the definition of each construct is depending on the purpose 
of the research. Therefore, the constructs should be transformed into variables.  The 
variables are the properties being studied, and they are used to test the hypotheses 
(Cooper and Schindler, 2003) which have been established in the earlier part of this 
thesis.   
There are three types of variables included in this study. They are criterion (dependent), 
predictor (independent), and moderator. Bryman and Bell (2007) defined „criterion‟ as a 
variable that is causally influenced by another variable (s) (i.e. independent variable), 
while a variable that has a causal impact on another (i.e. dependent variable) is 
identified as the independent variable / predictor (p. 727-728).  Finally, moderator is the 
qualitative or quantitative variables that are responsible for the different levels of 
strength in the relationships among variables (Baron and Kenny, 1986). 
According to the description, outsourcing success depends on the degree of outsourcing, 
vendor management capability of the firm, and the vendor‟s service performance. The 
relationship between the aforementioned independent variables to the dependent 
variables will be moderated by the partners‟ compatibility and partnership quality. The 
following section discusses the measurable forms of each construct considered in the 
study.  
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3.4.1 Criterion Variable: Outsourcing Success 
This study wishes to identify outsourcing success in a broader perspective. Previous 
studies have used different measurement indicators to determine the success of 
outsourcing. Basically, there are mainly two types of classifications of the dimensions 
applied to determine outsourcing success. Table 3.1 depicts the classification of 
dimensions applied by the related research work. Some studies have covered many of 
these aspects, while others have their own theoretical limits.  Besides, some studies 
which focused only one particular industry, have added customized measurement 
indicator(s) to measure outsourcing success. For instance, Lee (2001) who examined IS 
outsourcing, adds „increase of IT competence‟ and „access to key IT‟ as indicators for 
outsourcing success.  
A clear deviation can be observed in performance indicators based on the applied 
underpinning theory. Firstly, studies based on TCE‟s perspective have been using 
financial and operational performance indicators. Profitability (Zhang et al., 2009; 
Kroes and Ghosh, 2009; Thouin et al., 2009; Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 
2005a), and reduction of total cost (Kedia and Lahiri, 2007; Lam and Han, 2005; Zhang 
et al., 2009), have been highlighted by many studies as financial performance measures.  
Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina (2005a) applied „occupancy rate‟ as a 
dimension representing the productivity of the hotel industry. 
Additionally, increasing overall quality is one of the main operational aspects in 
outsourcing, and it has been applied as a performance indicator with different 
terminologies. Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina (2005a) and Zhang et al. (2009) 
used „quality improvements‟ to measure operational performance.  
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Table 3.1:  Dimensions of Outsourcing Success 
Measure Source 
Financial  
 
Operational, (non- financial) 
 
Overall 
Zhang et al., 2009; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; 
Thouin et al., 2009; Espino-Rodrı´guez and 
Padro´n-Robaina, 2004; Ozcelik and 
Altinkemer, 2009 
Zhang et al., 2009; Lee, 2001; Benamati and 
Rajkumar, 200); Espino-Rodrı´guez and 
Padro´n-Robaina, 2005a; Ozcelik and 
Altinkemer, 2009 
Lee, 2001; Benamati and Rajkumar, 2008; 
Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 2005a 
Strategic, Economical and 
Technological 
Han et al., 2008; Grover et al., 1996; Lee, 2001; 
Lee and Kim, 1999 
 
Kedia and Lahiri (2007) however, described TCE as a leading platform for interpreting 
tactical partnerships. The present study categorized the operational and financial 
outcomes under „tactical‟ performance measures to avoid the overlaps of dimensions. 
Secondly, studies that used resource based view (RBV) and knowledge based view 
(KBV), were embarked on investigating strategic value addition from outsourcing such 
as focus on core business (Han et al., 2008; Lee, 2001; Kroes and Ghosh, 2009) sharing 
expertise (Lee, 2001; Han at el., 2008; Banerjee and Williams, 2009; Bettis et al., 1992; 
Lansdale, 1997), innovations (Cui et al., 2009; Cusmano et al., 2009), reduce business 
risk (Lee, 2001; Kedia and Lahiri, 2007) and competitive advantage (Bettis et al., 1992). 
Therefore, focusing on core business, expertise, competitive advantage, reduction in 
business risk and innovations are the main strategic outcomes of outsourcing. 
Thirdly, only a few studies confirmed that outsourcings success is measured in terms of 
behavioural perspectives such as satisfaction and intention to outsource. Lee (2001) 
used „overall satisfaction with suppliers‟ to measure information system‟s outsourcing 
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success. De Vita et al. (2010), Lee (2001) and Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina 
(2005a) applied „overall outsourcing relationship performance‟ to measure supplier‟s 
satisfaction. In fact, organisations are unsatisfied with existing vendors as they tend to 
switch the vendor/supplier due to negative emotions (Donada and Nogatchewsky, 
2009). Thus, the buyer does not have the intention to engage in future interactions with 
particular suppliers (Dyer, 1997; Lee, 2001; Han et al., 2008). The outsourcing contract 
will be extended/ continued only if the buyer is satisfied with their supplier/vendor, 
thus, the „willingness to continue the contract with the vendor/supplier‟ is an indicator 
of successful outsourcing (Shamdasani and Sheth, 1994).   
In addition to that, the present experience on outsourcing demonstrates future intention 
to outsource. The „outsourcing acceptance model‟ (Benamati and Rajkumar, 2008) has 
identified „future intention to use outsourcing‟ as a behavioural outcome of a successful 
outsourcing experience. Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina (2004) further 
explained that, the propensity to outsource (i.e. intention to outsource) is one of the 
determinants of outsourcing success. In brief, „outsourcing relationship performance‟, 
„willingness to extend existing outsourcing contracts‟ and „future intention to outsource 
which are currently in-sourced‟ can be identified as behavioural dimensions reflecting 
the focal firm‟s satisfaction of outsourcing.  
Based on these arguments, outsourcing success is operationalized as follows. Table 3.2 
elaborated the dimensions and items adapted to measure outsourcing success.  
Working Definition:  Outsourcing Success 
The level of achieved expected results and satisfaction of the outsourcing can be 
measured in terms of tactical, strategic and behavioural outcomes.  
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Table 3.2: Operationalization of Outsourcing Success 
Dimensions Number 
of Items 
Items Source 
Tactical  
 
 
04 
1. Profitability 
 
2. Reduction in total cost 
3. Occupancy rate/ 
productivity 
 
4. Quality improvements 
 
 
Zhang et al., 2009; Kroes and Ghosh, 
2009; Thouin et al., 2009. Espino-
Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 2004: 
2005a. 
 
Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-
Robaina, 2004: 2005a; Lam and Han, 
2005; Kotabe and Mol, 2009; Young, 
2008.  
Strategic 05 1. Focus on core business 
2. Expertise knowledge 
 
3. Competitive advantage 
4. Reduce business risk 
5. Innovations 
Han et al., 2008; Lee, 2001; Kroes and 
Ghosh, 2009; Banerjee and Williams, 
2009. 
 
Bettis et al., 1992; Lonsdale, 1997;  
Cusmano et al., 2009; Cui et al., 2009. 
Behavioural 
 
03 1. Overall satisfaction with the 
supplier/vendor 
 
2. Willingness to continue the 
contract with supplier 
 
3. Future intention to outsource 
(currently in-sourced) 
Lee, 2001; Espino-Rodrı´guez and 
Padro´n-Robaina, 2005a; De Vita et al. 
2009. 
Shamdasani and Sheth, 1994. 
 
Benamati and Rajkumar, 2008; 
Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-
Robaina, 2005a.  
 
 
Outsourcing success depends on the degree of outsourcing, vendor management 
capability and vendors‟ service performance. The following section is allocated to 
discuss the measurement development of independent variables.  
 
3.4.2 Predictor 1: Degree of Outsourcing 
As noted in both preceding chapters, the degree of outsourcing is a combined construct 
of breadth and depth of outsourcing. This is consistent with Gilley and Rasheed (2000) 
and Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina (2004)‟s measurements of the degree of 
outsourcing. The breadth represents the number of activities outsourced by a certain 
firm; and depth denotes as the intensity of power assigned to the vendor to perform a 
certain task.  
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The study however aims to investigate banking and hotel organisations in the service 
industry. Therefore, the activities of each type of firms have to be separately identified 
in order to measure breadth and depth. Barako and Gatere (2008) conducted an 
empirical investigation on the Kenyan banking industry related to the level of 
outsourcing of each activity in a bank (p. 44). This study adopted their classification of 
the banking sector (i.e. eight activities) for the pilot study in order to investigate the 
degree of outsourcing in the Sri Lankan context. Next, Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-
Robaina (2004; 2005a) investigated the hotel industry for the same purpose, and listed 
twenty activities categorised under core, complementary and non-core activities (p. 
715). As a matter of fact, Donada and Nogatchewsky, (2009) used the same 
classification in their work. Table 3.3 depicts an activity index of each type of 
organisation applied in this study.  
Table 3.3: Activity Index of Firms 
Banking Sector 
Barako and Gatere  (2008) 
Hotel Sector 
Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina 
(2004;2005a); Donada and Nogatchewsky, (2009) 
1. ATM 
2. Card processing 
3. Internal auditing 
4. Debt collection 
5. Account processing 
6. Human resources  
7. Information technology (IT) 
8. Sales/ marketing 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Reception 
2. Reservations 
3. Purchasing and receiving 
4. Kitchen 
5. Restaurant 
6. Bars 
7. Administration 
8. General maintenance (technical services) 
9. Hotel leisure activities 
10. Employee training 
11. Personnel selection 
12. Information systems 
13. Sales activity 
14. Promotion and advertising 
15. Common areas cleaning 
16. Room cleaning 
17. Laundry 
18. Swimming pool maintenance 
19. Gardening 
20. Safety and security 
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3.4.3 Predictor 2: Vendor Management Capability  
A formalised vendor management system is crucial for coping with the negative 
consequences of outsourcing (Lacity et al., 1995; Lee, 2001; Han et al., 2008; 
Rajabzadeh et al., 2008). It starts with the selection of the most appropriate vendor(s), 
which is one of the most critical decisions (Carr et al., 2006; Rajabzadeh et al., 2008; 
Cusmano et al., 2009) that ensures the success of long-term businesses (Quinn, 1999). 
Organisations must have pre-determined criteria (based on motivations) to evaluate 
potential vendors for selection (Chan and Chin, 2007). The evaluation process should be 
continued even after the contract has begun. Wagner (2006) stated that organisations 
should identify and remove deficient vendors in order to improve performances. 
Therefore, focal firms need to implement a monitoring system that constantly surveys 
and evaluates the vendor's performance.  
Han et al. (2008) applied vendor selection, vendor‟s performance evaluation, managing 
outsourcing process, managing outsourcing contract and controlling vendor as the 
elements of measuring a vendor's management capability.  Chan and Chin (2007), 
however, used extended measures, including vendor selection based on multiple criteria, 
vendor assessment, formal evaluation, feedback for improvement, vendor certification, 
training and education, and transferring best practices. Besides, the ability to 
compensate vendors as stipulated in the contract reflects the focal firm‟s financial 
obligation of managing vendors (Carr et al., 2006). 
Concluding the facts, Han et al. (2008) and Chan and Chin (2007) attempted to measure 
the focal firm ability to select, (and) monitor, (the) performance evaluation and the 
development of the vendors, while Carr et al. (2006) highlighted their compensation 
ability. Therefore, the present study combined the measurements of Han et al. (2008), 
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Chan and Chin (2007) and Carr et al. (2006) by designing an overall measurement for 
vendor management capability, shown in Table 3.4.  
Table 3.4: Vendor Management Capability 
Items  Source 
Selection of vendors  
Monitor vendors 
Vendors‟ performance evaluation 
Develop vendors 
Compensate vendor appropriately  
Han et al., 2008; Chan 
and Chin, 2007 
 
 
Carr et al., 2006 
 
Based on these facts and Table 3.4, the study defines the vendor's management 
capability as,  
Working Definition:  Vendor Management Capability 
The focal firm’s abilities to select, monitor, evaluate, develop vendors and 
compensate them appropriately.           
 
3.4.4 Predictor 3: Vendor’s Service Performance 
Whipple and Frankel (2000) pointed out that the vendor‟s ability to meet performance 
expectations is a key success factor in a B2B business context. The best vendors are 
those that can meet the needs of the buying organisation in terms of capacity, quality, 
technology, price, and service (Ogden, 2006). Petersen et al. (2005) attempted to 
measure vendor‟s performance by improvements in on-time delivery, quality and 
responsiveness. Nevertheless, prompt delivery has been highly recognised as an 
important aspect of outsourcing (Chan and Chin, 2007; Selviaridis et al., 2008; 
Rajabzadeh et al., 2008; Byramjee et al., 2010).  Furthermore, many authors see pricing 
as an important aspect of economic transactions and relationships, but different studies 
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used different terms to measure pricing performances, such as accuracy in budgeting 
(Rajabzadeh et al., 2008) and competitive cost of goods from the suppliers (Chan and 
Chin, 2007).  
In addition to that, the service quality improvements (Bettis et al., 1992; Allen and 
Chandrasekhar, 2000) and knowledge contribution (Cusmano et al., 2000; Banerjee and 
Williams, 2009) are also used to measure a vendor‟s performance. The service quality is 
generally measured using the SERVQUAL scale, developed by Parasuraman et al. 
(1985; 1988). However, the appropriateness of the SERVQUAL scale is doubted, as it is 
specifically designed for the B2C (business to customer) context (Gounaris, 2005; Lee, 
J.G, 2011). Gounaris (2005) developed a measurement instrument called INDSERV that 
specifically deals with business to-business (B2B) service quality which is applied in 
the present study.  
INDSERV Scale 
Gronrøos, (1984) is the pioneer in conceptualizing business to-business service quality. 
He claimed that the service quality in a B2B context could be measured in terms of 
„technical quality‟ and „functional quality‟, which was the foundation for the 
development of the INDSERV scale. Referring to Gounaris (2005a: 2005b), the 
development of a proper scale for B2B service has evolved in the past two decades. 
Table 3.5 shows the summary of different quality aspects, identified by the previous 
studies.  
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Table 3.5: Service Quality in B2B Context 
Measure Source 
Citations from:  
Gounaris (2005a) 
Technical quality /hard quality: core operation-related  elements 
Functional quality/ soft quality: interaction between individuals 
Gronrøos, 1984; 
Szmigin, 1993 
Process quality: quality of service delivery 
Outcome quality: quality of service received 
Morgan, 1991 
Potential quality : search attributes of provider‟s ability to 
perform the service (i.e. vendors‟ ability) before the relation has 
actually begun 
Bochove, 1994 
 
Source: Gounaris (2005a) Measuring service quality in B2B services: an evaluation of the SERVQUAL 
scale vis-a` -vis the INDSERV scale 
 
The technical/ hard quality and functional/soft quality represent the different quality 
aspects of service delivery process. Gounaris (2005a) however, combined Gronrøos, 
(1984), Szmigin, (1993) and Morgan‟s (1991) ideas for the classification of process 
quality and established, 1) hard process quality, 2) soft process quality. Combining it 
all, he formulated four dimensions as the INDSERV scale to measure service quality in 
a B2B service context. Table 3.6 depicts the items of INDSERV scale.   
There are 22 items, which cover the aspects of potential quality, hard process quality, 
soft process quality and output quality that measure the vendor‟s performance. 
Moreover, with respect to the items in the INDSERV scale, they cover not only the 
quality aspects, but also a range of other performance indicators of vendors‟ service 
performance, compared to the scales/measures applied  previously (e.g. Whipple and 
Frankel, 2000; Ogden, 2006; Petersen et al., 2005; Chan and Chin, 2007; Selviaridis et 
al., 2008; Rajabzadeh et al., 2008).  
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Table 3.6: INDSERV Scale 
Potential quality (PTQ) 1. Offers full service  
2. Has required personnel 
3. Has required facilities 
4. Has required management philosophy 
5. Has a low  personnel turn-over  
6. Uses network of partners/ associates 
Hard Process quality (HQ) 7. Keeps  time schedules  
8. Honours financial agreements / stays in budget  
9. Meets deadlines 
10. Looks at details  
11. Understands our needs  
Soft process quality (SQ) 12. Accepts agreement  enthusiastically  
13. Listens to our problems  
14. Opens to suggestions/ideas 
15. Has pleasant personality 
16. Argues if necessary  
17. Looks at our interests 
Output quality (OQ) 18. Reaches objectives  
19. Has a notable effect  
20. Contributes to our sales/image  
21. Is creative in terms of its offering 
22. Is consistent with our strategy  
 
Source: Gounaris (2005a) Measuring service quality in B2B services: an evaluation of the SERVQUAL 
scale vis-a` -vis the INDSERV scale, Journal of Services Marketing, 19/6 (2005) p. 427. 
 
 
INDSERV therefore, has become one of the most suitable scales to measure vendor‟s 
service performance in a B2B context. Accordingly, the study defines vendor‟s service 
performance as, 
 
Working Definition:  Vendors’ service Performance 
To the extent the vendors are aligned with potential quality, hard process quality, 
soft process quality and output quality.  
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3.4.5 Moderator 1: Partnership Quality 
The study perceived partnership quality as the relational governance mechanism in the 
resource exchange process. It covers a broader aspect, including trust, norms, 
communication, information sharing, dependency and corporation (Lacity et al., 2009). 
However, it has been operationalised in different ways, as shown in Table 3.7. 
Table 3.7: Different Views of Partnership Quality 
Source Key dimensions/ items Research 
Type 
Lee, 2001; Lahiri et al., 2009 Trust, business understanding, benefits and 
risk sharing, commitment, conflict 
Empirical 
Marshall et al., 2007; 
Donada and Nogatchewsky, 
2009;  Cui et al., 2009 
Trust, communication Empirical 
Han at el., 2008 Relationship formation: Information 
sharing, communication quality, 
collaborative participation  
 
Relationship outcomes: Trust, commitment 
Empirical 
Sun et al., 2002 Power, trust, commitment, conflict Empirical 
Lai et al., 2009 Trust , Commitment Empirical 
Lacity et al., 2009 Trust, norms, communication, sharing 
information, dependency and corporation 
Conceptual 
 
The partnership quality is widely conceived as trust and commitment among business 
partners (Lee, 2001; Han et al., 2008; Cheng et al., 2008; Lahiri et al., 2009; Lai et al., 
2009). Han at el. (2008) recognized information sharing, communication quality and 
collaborative participation as relational formation behaviours, which result in „trust and 
commitment‟ outcomes. Moreover, this study noticed that the behavioural elements are 
scattered around partners‟ cooperativeness.   For example, sharing/communicating 
information, knowledge and collaborative participation aspects (Lee, 2001; Han et al., 
2008; Lacity et al., 2009; Lahiri et al., 2009) reflect the level of partners' cooperation. 
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Accordingly, this study identified partnership quality as an integrated construct of 
reciprocal behaviours and its outcomes.   
As identified above, the study incorporated cooperativeness as another dimension of 
partnership quality in order to address behavioural elements, and consequently, 
partnership quality is operationalised as:  
Working Definition:  Partnership Quality 
The level of trust, commitment and cooperativeness maintain by the partners to 
the partnership.  
 
3.4.6 Moderator 2: Partners’ Compatibility  
Even though compatibility has been studied in different collaborative business setups, 
there is no consensus on the operationalisation of the construct. This is due to the 
dynamic nature of compatibility requirements in different contexts. However, different 
approaches of measuring compatibility are explained in Chapter 2. Then, referring to 
literature, the study grasps compatibility of culture and competitive priorities between 
partners as highlighted in previous studies.  
Organisational culture is defined as a set of operating philosophies and management 
style, striving for common goal(s) (Shamdasani and Sheth, 1994; Whipple and Frankel, 
2000; Jarvenpaa and Mao, 2008). The competitive priorities are commonly identified in 
terms of cost, quality, flexibility and prompt service delivery (Espino-Rodrı´guez and 
Padro´n-Robaina, 2004; Chase et al., 2006; Jarvenpaa and Mao, 2008; Kroes and 
Ghosh, 2009). By aggregating both aspects, the definition for compatibility can be 
defined. Table 3.8 further elaborates the items considered under each dimension. 
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Working Definition:  Partners’ Compatibility 
The level of cultural and competitive priorities’ alignment between the focal firm 
and the vendor(s) in the outsourcing partnership. 
Table 3.8: Partners‟ Compatibility 
Dimension  Items Source 
Culture Operating philosophy 
Management style 
Complementary  goals  
Roh et al., 2008; 
Whipple and Frankel, 2000; 
Shamdasani and Sheth, 1994 
 
Competitive 
priorities 
Cost  focus 
Quality focus 
Flexibility focus 
Delivery time focus 
 
Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 
2005a; Chase et al., 2006; Roh et al., 2008; 
Kroes and Ghosh, 2009.  
 
N.B: Shamdasani and Sheth (1994) included complementary goals as (a) 
component of strategic compatibility, but Schein (1996) and Roh et al. (2008) 
argued that „goals‟ are an element of espoused culture. Therefore, the study 
included it as an item indicating organisational culture. However, when defining 
a single firm's organisational culture, „goals‟ become „common goals‟, aligning 
the business into the same direction, but as far as outsourcing context is 
concerned, it can be recognized as a vertical supply chain integration (Chen and 
Paulraj, 2004; Lejeune and Yakova, 2005). In vertical integration, partners 
should have complementary goals that strengthen one another (Shamdasani and 
Sheth, 1994; Lam and Han, 2005). Therefore, in a vertical integration context, it 
is more meaningful to define goals as „complementary‟ rather than „common‟.   
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3.5 INSTRUMENTATION 
The research instrument of this study is a structured questionnaire. The structured 
questionnaire is identified as the best instrument for self-completion/ self-administered 
data collection method (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p. 240- 242). An eight-page 
questionnaire was developed and designed as a double-sided booklet (please refer 
Appendix A) for the pilot study. The front page is a covering letter that provides brief 
information regarding the purpose of the research project. Respondents were invited to 
participate in the survey voluntarily. Furthermore, it was enclosed with a statement, 
which demonstrates the research ethics, whereby the participant‟s privacy was 
guaranteed.  The estimated time (15-20 minutes maximum) required to complete the 
survey was also stated on the cover page.  
Scaling of the questionnaire basically follows the original source with minor 
modifications in order to fit into the theme of the study (Churchill, 1979). Even though 
Nunnally (1978) suggested the formation of both positively and negatively worded 
questions to maintain the symmetry of the questionnaire, it limits the questions ability to 
capture the measured concept (Alexandrov, 2010). Likewise, Alexandrov (2010, p. 02) 
quoted that, negatively-worded items have strong method effects and exhibit 
longitudinal invariance (Motl and DiStefano, 2002; Horan et al., 2003) and it changes 
the dimensionality of the construct (Herche and Engelland, 1996; Mook et al., 1991; 
Tomas and Oliver, 1999). Therefore, the study did not include any negative worded 
questions, as the purpose of the study is not to measure the respondents‟ comprehension 
of the context, but to gather actual information. Thus, the researcher believes that 
questions should be simple, understandable and clear.  
 
   
123 
 
 The questionnaire consists of three sections. The next subsection explains the 
development of questions, and the scale developed for each measure, pertaining to each 
section.   
 
3.5.1 Questionnaire: Section A 
Section A contains only one part, allocated for measuring a firm's degree of 
outsourcing. Since the study investigates banks and hotels, there are different activities 
listed (Table 3.3). As previously noted, this study follows Barako and Gatere (2008) 
activity index for banking organisations, and Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina 
(2004;2005) and Donada and Nogatchewsky (2009) activity classification for the hotel 
sector.  Barako and Gatere (2008) applied the activity index to investigate the current 
situation of outsourcing such as, whether the banks have already outsourced the 
function or under consideration, etc. (p. 43). The scale applied by them is basically 
nominal, and the aggregate responses were calculated as a percentage of total cases 
studied.  Nevertheless, some scholars have applied a percentage of outsourcing for each 
activity (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Poppo and Zenger, 1998), while others used the 
Likert scale (Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 2004:2005; and Donada and 
Nogatchewsky, 2009). The data collected from Likert items become significantly less 
accurate when the number of scale points drops below five or exceeds seven (Johns, 
2010, p. 06).  Therefore, a 5-point or 7-point Likert scale is preferable. Despite the 7-
point Likert scale being the expanded choice of response; it is associated with some 
clarity problems. For example, respondents become confuse and unable to distinguish 
labelling differences in the middle points (not the two extreme ends in the scale), or 
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labelling options are hard in longer scales (Johns, 2010). As far as the degree of 
outsourcing is concerned, the extreme points of 7-point Likert scale are clear (i.e. 0= not 
outsourced at all, and 7= totally outsourced) but, the meaning of the middle points are 
too narrow to break down into a range of 2 – 6 (i.e. 4 distinct points).   In such cases, 
Churchill (1979) suggested options for scaling such as 1) adopted, 2) modified and 3) 
extended.  Therefore, the study modified the scale used by Espino-Rodrı´guez and 
Padro´n-Robaina (2004; 2005a) from a 7-point scale to a 5-point scale, in order to avoid 
issues in clarity of each point. Therefore, the 5-point scale is refined as suitable for 
measuring the degree of outsourcing in banking and hotel organisations are shown in 
Table 3.9.  
Table 3.9: Likert Scale - Degree of outsourcing 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Not  outsourced at 
all 
Outsourced to a 
limited extent 
Outsourced to a 
moderate extent 
Outsourced to  a 
greater extent 
Totally 
outsourced 
1 2 3 4 5 
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3.5.2 Questionnaire: Section B 
Section B consisted of parts 2, 3, 4, and 6 of the questionnaire. Part 2, 3, 4 and 6 
measured the items using a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 = „strongly disagree‟ to 
7 = „strongly agree‟. However, some scholars (e.g. Coulthard, 2004; Laroche et al., 
2004) disputed the „odd scales‟ as the midpoint value, which does not truly reflect the 
respondent‟s actual response. Laroche et al. (2004) stated that Asian respondents often 
prefer to ensure harmonious relationships and hence avoid giving scores that are 
extreme. As far as the context of study is concerned (i.e. Sri Lanka), there is no such 
issue reported yet.  Further, the scales without midpoints force the respondents to 
choose either positive or negative.  However this study had no intention to use the 6-
point scale, but chose the 7-point scale instead. Indeed some respondents may really 
want to select the midpoint of agreement, but, if it is missing from the choice, 
respondents may get a negative feeling, which may affect the entire response. As a 
result, there would be a probability of obtaining missing values.  
Furthermore, Johns (2005) reported that when the midpoint is omitted from the scale, 
respondents have a tendency to select disagreements instead. Therefore, the study 
decided to use the 7-point Likert scale for section B, as it provides an option to 
ambivalence  (i.e. definite but mixed feelings) and indifference (i.e. no particular 
feelings about the statement) (Johns, 2010). Accordingly, all items in part 2, 3, 4 and 6 
have used the 7-point Likert scale of agreement.  
Part 2 measured the vendor management capability of the firm. It was operationalized as 
shown in Table 3.4, while Table 3.10 shows the adapted questions. 
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Table 3.10: Questions: Vendor Management Capability 
Code Items Source 
VM 1 We select only qualified suppliers/vendors 
with satisfactory assessment of selection 
criteria 
Adopted:  
Han et al., 2008; 
Chan and Chin, 
2007 
 
 
 
 
VM 2 We have systematic process to monitor 
suppliers/vendors 
VM 3 We evaluate suppliers‟/vendors‟ performance 
with specified criteria 
VM 4 We have systematic process in the 
development of suppliers‟/vendors‟ 
capabilities. 
VM 5 We have the ability to compensate/ pay 
supplier/vendor fees according to the contract 
Adapted:  
Carr et al., 2006 
  
Part 3 investigated the vendors‟ service performance and adapted the INDSERV scale, 
which has 22 items (as shown in Table 3.6) developed by Gounaris (2005).  The 
questions were created for each item (Please refer the Part 3 in Appendix A).  
Table 3.11: Questions: Partnership Quality 
C
o
d
e 
Dimension Items Source 
COP 1 
C
o
o
p
er
at
iv
en
es
s 
We share information that affects each other‟s business Adapted: 
Lee, 2001;  
Lahiri et al.,  
2009 
COP 2 
We share business knowledge on core business 
processes 
COP 3 We share benefits and  risk of the business 
COP 4 
We make decisions for business objectives and 
directions together. 
Adopted: 
Han et al., 
2008 COP 5 We solve most of the  problems together 
COP 6 We are willing to comply with each other‟s requests 
COP 7 We are keen  in solving each other‟s problems 
COP 8 We are cooperative in conducting business 
PQT 1 
T
ru
st
 
We always take  decisions which are favorable for both 
of us 
Adapted: 
Han et al., 
2008;  
Lai et al., 2009 
PQT 2 We assist each other in performing business 
PQT 3 We are  sincere at all times 
PQT 4 We have friendly relationship 
PQC 1 
C
o
m
m
it
m
en
t We have strong relationship 
PQC 2 We do our best to maintain  a good  relationship 
PQC 3 We always try to keep each other‟s promises 
PQC 4 We are   willing  to continue the relationship 
   
127 
 
Part 4 measured the quality of the relationship maintained by the focal firm and their 
vendors in the context of outsourcing. The Table 3.11 shows the questions and related 
source used to measure the partnership's quality. It consisted of 16 items, categorized 
under three dimensions. 
Part 5 attempted to measure partners‟ compatibility. Respondents were asked to select 
the appropriate answer according to their agreement to a particular statement. Basically, 
a 7-point Likert scale was used in order to measure the level of agreement with the 
statements (Shamdasani and Sheth, 1994; Whipple and Frankel, 2000). However, Kroes 
and Ghosh (2009) measured the level of importance of compatibility between firms 
outsourcing drivers and competitive priorities with a 5-point Likert scale. The labeling 
of the scale (i.e. 5 point Likert) is more meaningful than 7 point scale.  Accordingly, the 
present study also used a 5-point Likert scale, and modified labels in order to measure 
the respondents‟ agreement on the „extent of compatibility‟, in which partners are 
working to maintain. On a scale where, 1= not at all; 2= to limited extent; 3= to 
moderate extent; 4= to somewhat large extent; and 5= to great extent. 
Accordingly, the statements shown in Table 3.12 were formed to measure partners‟ 
compatibility on a 5-point Likert scale. 
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Table 3.12: Questions: Partners‟ Compatibility 
 
Code Statement Source 
CPC1 
Your firm and your vendor firm (s) have similar 
operating philosophies  
Adopted: 
Whipple and Frankel, 
2000 CPC2 
Your firm and your vendor firm(s) have a similar 
management style. 
CPC3 
 Your firm and your vendor  firm(s) have    
complementary  goals 
Adapted: Roh et al., 
2008; Shamdasani and 
Sheth, 1994 
CPP1 
Your firm and your vendor  firm(s) consider „cost‟ as 
an important dimension in doing business 
Adapted: 
Espino-Rodrı´guez and 
Padro´n-Robaina, 
2005a; Kroes and 
Ghosh, 2009. 
CPP2 
Your firm and your vendor  firm(s) consider ‘quality‟ 
as an important dimension in doing business 
CPP3 
Your firm and your vendor  firm consider (s) „delivery 
time‟ as an important dimension in doing business 
CPP4 
Your firm and your vendor  firm(s) consider „flexible 
reaction to demand‟  as an important dimension in 
doing business 
 
Part 6 measured a 12-item scale of outsourcing success, which is the dependent 
variable. The 12 items represent tactical, strategic and behavioural dimensions, which 
were integrated to measure outsourcing success in the services industry.  Table 3.2, 
therefore elaborates the list of items adapted for the study, with respect to the 
corresponding source.  Most of the items were measured with a 7-point Likert scale. 
Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina (2004) and Lam and Han (2005) for example, 
also measured the financial performance in the hotel sector with a 7- point Likert scale 
(p. 296).  
As far as the study context is concerned, some units of analysis are ill equipped with 
proper governance mechanisms. For example, all hotel organisations are not public 
listed companies; hence, they produce financial statements only for internal references. 
Moreover, they are not willing to disclose such statements (i.e. statements with figures 
and values) to a third party. In contrast, all banking organisations are public listed, or 
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attached to the government (government link corporations), where transaction 
transparency and accountability of statements are guaranteed. In this study banking 
organisations are rather small in number. Moreover, the prevalent issue of the monetary 
values becomes less reliable in the study context, due to the higher level of economic 
instability. For example, USD1 (American Dollar) = LKR109 (Sri Lankan Rupee) in 
July 2011, however, it has increased to 130 in March 2012 (source: Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka website available: http://www.cbsl.gov.lk/htm/english/_cei/er/e_1.asp). This 
confirms that, the values calculated from monetary figures might not represent the 
actual results of the business performance (e.g. profitability, return on investments, 
etc.). As far as the unit of analysis is concerned, their monetary success is not in a fixed 
range. For example, 20 per cent of profitability may not be a satisfactory achievement 
for a five star hotel when compared with a two star hotel.   Therefore, the study planned 
to obtain only subjective responses of outsourcing success, in order to align the 
contextual limits, which may possibly result in missing values. Additionally, this study 
measures „success‟, which has a meaning that is broader than performance, and is quite 
subjective.  
Unlike tactical outcomes, the strategic and behavioural outcomes were measured with 
attitudinal scales. Thus, the study aims to maintain a consistency of responses over 
items measuring the same variable (i.e. outsourcing success) for the purpose of 
aggregation easiness.  
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3.5.3 Questionnaire: Section C 
Section C included the demographic profile of the unit of analysis. The unit of analysis 
was identified as „service organisations‟. Basically, two types of services organisation(s) 
would be investigated, leading to the customisation of certain parts of the profile. Some 
questions were enclosed for the purpose of identifying certain characteristics of firms 
related to the background of the outsourcing. At the beginning, respondents were asked 
to provide information regarding the name (if preferred) and the type of the 
organisation. There were two types of categorisation used, shown in Table 3.13.  The 
categorisation was discrete, with no overlapping. The question was formed as a check 
box, to make it easier to select and minimize time spent for responding. Even though 1 
Star hotels were omitted from the sample, Table 3.13 included it as to maintain the 
clarity of the well -known categorization. This also provides an opportunity to detect 
cases which are not belonging to the sample.  
Table 3.13: Type of the Organization  
Bank Hotel 
Government 
Semi –Government 
Private 
Foreign  
Other............................... 
(Please specify) 
1 Star 
2 Star 
3 Star 
4 Star 
5 Star 
Above 5 Star (5+) 
 
The third question enquired the number of employees and the fourth question examined 
the branches operating in the context of study. The purpose of the fifth question was to 
identify the length of time period, in which the organisation has engaged in outsourcing. 
Basically questions 2, 3, 4 and 5 were designed to facilitate the descriptive analysis of 
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demographic details. Finally, respondents were asked to provide their contact details if 
they are interested in the research findings. The purpose was to convey gratitude for 
participation, and to demonstrate the opportunity of mutual benefits of research. The 
questionnaire however, ended up with a short statement, which appreciates their 
participation, and expressing the value of their responses to the study (i.e. Thank you 
very much for your valuable time and responses).  
Then, the developed questionnaire was forwarded for a pre-pilot test to ensure content 
validity.  Thereafter, the validated research instrument (i.e. structured questionnaire) 
was used for the pilot test for reliability analysis. The following section explains the 
procedure and outcomes of pre-pilot and pilot tests.  
 
3.6 RESEARCH INSTRUMENT VALIDATION  
3.6.1   Content Validity 
The content validity is “a subjective but systematic evaluation of how well the content 
of the scale represents the measurement task at hand” (Malhotra, 2004, p. 269). It can be 
determined by having a panel of experts examining whether the items sufficiently 
describe the constructs being measured in the context of the study. Bryman and Bell 
(2007) viewed it as an „intuitive‟ process (p. 165). Alexandrov (2010)  claims that this 
is the only validity needed in scale development, and the typical item purification 
through statistical procedures is unnecessary because it can change the meaning of the 
measured concepts” (p. 01). Content validity was evaluated in two rounds.  
Firstly, it was forwarded to peers. The group comprised of twelve senior PhD students 
from University of Malaya, Malaysia; University of Nagoya, Japan and University of 
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Otago, New Zealand. They have been asked to check the appropriateness of wordings, 
flow of questions, or any other suggestions, which in their opinion require 
improvements. Minor changes were proposed, and corrections were carried out.   
Secondly, the altered questionnaire was forwarded to five individuals. Three of them are 
academics from the UK, Japan and Sri Lanka, who are familiar with services 
management and supply chain management. One individual was selected from the hotel 
industry (i.e. Chairman, Jetwing Hotel Inc-2011), and another from banking industry 
(i.e. Head, Strategic procurement Management, Nation‟s Trust Bank -2011) in Sri 
Lanka. Basically, academics proposed to include a blank space for „others‟ option to the 
part 1 activity index, in order to tackle additional/ unrevealed activities. Consequently, 
all comments and suggestions received from them were thoroughly discussed with the 
research supervisor, and changes were made where necessary. After careful 
considerations on multiple fronts, the questionnaire was finalized.  
3.6.2 Pilot Test 
Piloting the research instrument is crucial for a self-completion questionnaire, or 
structured interview as the researcher does not have the opportunity to probe and 
prompt when responders are completing the questionnaire (Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
Bryman and Bell (2007) stated some additional advantages of a pilot study (p. 273), 
listed below. 
1. If the main study is going to employ mainly closed questions, open questions can be 
asked in the pilot to generate the fixed choice answer (e.g. Part 1, Activity index 
keep a blank space to detect unspecified activities) 
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2. Pilot study allows the researcher to determine the adequacy of instructions to 
interviewers, or to respondents completing self-completion/administered 
questionnaire.  
3. Questions that seem not understood or questions that are often not answered should 
become apparent. Such questions can generate missing data. 
 
Likewise, a pilot study serves as a supplementary method to assure content validity as 
well. The main purpose of a pilot study is to carry out a reliability analysis of the 
research instrument, by measuring internal consistency of the questionnaire items. 
Bryman and Bell (2007) defined internal reliability as, „…whether or not respondents’ 
scores on any one indicator tend to be related to their scores on the other indicators’ (p. 
163). According to Nunnally (1978), Cronbach‟s alpha is a superior estimator for 
internal consistency of items. The split-half method could also be used to test for 
internal reliability. Nunnally (1978) stated that a value ranges from 0.5 to 0.6 is 
considered sufficient in the early stages of a research.  Another factor that helps to 
determine internal reliability is the item-total correlations. Item-total correlations 
provide information on the degree of correlations among the indicators of the same 
scale (Lu et al., 2007). An item with a value that is less than 0.25 is considered as very 
weak, and plays a very small role in conceptualising the given factor (Nunnally, 1978). 
Therefore, the study fixed item-total correlation value at 0.3 and any item below that 
value would be omitted.   
In order to test the internal consistency of the measurement developed for this particular 
study, a pilot study was conducted in Sri Lanka. The Cronbach‟s alpha and item-total 
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correlation analysis were examined to test the internal reliability of the measurement. 
The validated questionnaire was distributed to 10 banks and 50 hotels in Colombo, 
Galle and Kandy cities. The researcher personally visited these organisations to deliver 
the questionnaires.  Appointments were made prior to the visits. This helped the 
researcher to meet some of the respondents and briefly explain the background of the 
research. These explanations were crucial in building the responder's confidence, and 
encouraging active participation in the survey. As the result, some respondents provided 
additional information willingly, such as, contacts details and other information of 
certain affiliated professional bodies and other firms in the same chain they were 
attached with. A total of 38 questionnaires from three banks and 35 hotels were 
collected. Eight questionnaires from the hotel sector were discarded, as they were 
returned with incomplete demographic profile and/or many missing values. Therefore, 
only 30 completed questionnaires were analysed from the pilot test.  
The results of the reliability and item-total correlation analysis are described in the 
following paragraphs. Table 3.14 exhibits the results of „vendor management 
capability‟. The vendor management capability maintained the internal reliability, 
where the Cronbach‟s alpha was above 0.6 (α = 0.753). Item-total correlations for all 
five items were higher than 0.3. The item number VM 5 had the lowest item-total 
correlation of 0.372. Its omission increased the overall reliability to 0.815.  However, 
since the item-total correlation was still above the limit (> 0.3), it was included in the 
final questionnaire. 
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Table 3.14: Results of Pilot Study: Vendor Management Capability (n=30) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Table 3.15 shows the reliability results of vendor‟s service performance. The 
variable consists of four dimensions (PTQ, HQ, SQ and OQ).  
Table 3.15: Results of Pilot Study: Vendor‟s Service Performance (n=30) 
 
Items 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted 
VM1 .576 .763 
VM2 .838 .669 
VM3 .705 .718 
VM4 .459 .807 
VM5 .372 .815 
(VM) Vendor Management Capability 
( α = 0.799)  
Items Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
Items 
Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if 
Item 
Deleted 
 Old Value New Value Old  α New α 
HQ1 .456 .690 PTQ1 .636 .701 .486 .656 
PTQ2 .634 .648 .485 .685 HQ2 .539 .653 
PTQ3 -.070 excluded .763 - HQ3 .414 .701 
PTQ4 .230 excluded .639 - HQ4 .478 .678 
PTQ5 .462 .562 .553 .731 HQ5 .543 .651 
PTQ6 .495 .431 .548 .803    
(PTQ) Potential Quality  Old ( α = 0.636 ) / New ( α = 0.776) (HQ)Hard Process quality ( α = 0.723 ) 
SQ1 .603 .769 OQ1 .448 .767 
SQ2 .624 .764 OQ2 .653 .699 
SQ3 .494 .793 OQ3 .588 .722 
SQ4 .328 .822 OQ4 .494 .758 
SQ5 .673 .752 OQ5 .582 .727 
SQ6 .670 .753    
(SQ)Soft process quality ( α = 0.808 ) (OQ)Output quality  ( α = 0.777 ) 
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None of the instrument subscales indicated any value below the threshold level of 
Cronbach‟s alpha (α=0.60).  Regarding item-total correlation (please refer to the old 
values), all items other than PTQ3 and PTQ 4 reported a higher correlation than 0.4. 
Omission of PTQ3 increased the reliability of PTQ dimension to 0.763. Even though the 
omission of PTQ4 increased the reliability by 0.06, the study excluded PTQ3 and PTQ4 
from the item list as both had item-total correlations below 0.3. The new reliability was 
0.776, and item-total correlations (new values) were higher than 0.3. Thus, only four 
items from PTQ (i.e. 1,2,5,6) were  considered for the final questionnaire. 
 
Table 3.16 presents the reliability of partnership quality.  
 
  
 
Table 3.16: Results of Pilot Study: Partnership Quality  (n=30) 
 
Items 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Items 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
COP1 .614 .801 PQT1 .597 .722 
COP2 .455 .820 PQT2 .633 .704 
COP3 .647 .795 PQT3 .565 .744 
COP4 .399 .826 PQT4 .570 .735 
COP5 .567 .808 (PQT)  Trust( α = 0.781 ) 
COP6 .510 .813    
COP7 .660 .793 PQC1 .557 .773 
COP8 .593 .803 PQC2 .625 .743 
(COP) Cooperativeness     
 ( α = 0.828 ) 
PQC3 .666 .722 
PQC4 .602 .752 
(PQC) Commitment    ( α = 0.798 ) 
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The Cronbach‟s alpha for all dimensions was above 0.7, which confirmed a higher level 
of reliability. Item-total correlation also reported values greater than 0.3. However, the 
reliabilities reported in Table 3.16 were the highest values, and it is not advisable to 
exclude any item(s) that is perceived to increase reliability.  
 
Table 3.17 exhibits the reliability analysis summary of partners‟ compatibility. 
Accordingly, both dimensions in the variable (i.e. organisational culture: CPC and 
Competitive priorities: CPP) reported acceptable levels of reliability, which was above 
0.6.  However, item-total correlations were relatively low, but maintained at above 0.3 
level correlations.  
 
  
Table 3.17: Results of Pilot Study: Partners‟ Compatibility  (n=30) 
 
Items 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's Alpha if 
Item Deleted 
Items Corrected Item-
Total Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
CPC1 .606 .306 CPP1 .560 .477 
CPC2 .329 .697 CPP2 .316 .643 
CPC3 .422 .570 CPP3 .376 .609 
(CPC) Compatible Culture   
( α = 0.636 ) 
CPP4 .503 .535 
(CPP) Compatible Competitive Priorities  
 ( α = 0.645 ) 
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Outsourcing success was measured using three dimensions; tactical (OST), strategic 
(OSS) and behavioural (OSB). 
Table 3.18: Results of Pilot Study: Outsourcing Success(n=30) 
 
The reliability analysis of each dimension is shown in Table 3.18. All of them had a 
satisfactory levels of reliability (α> 0.6) and item-total correlation threshold (>0.3).  
In short, only two items from „potential quality (PTQ)‟, which measures the vendors‟ 
service performance, were discarded. Moreover, the reliability of „degree of 
outsourcing‟ was not measured. Degree of outsourcing means „Breadth‟ x „Depth‟. 
However, there is no need for the breadth to be positively and linearly related to Depth. 
This is due to „number of activities outsourced‟ (i.e. Breadth) and „levels of outsourcing 
in each item‟ (i.e. Depth) being two different measures but jointly defined the construct.  
For instance, a firm may outsource few activities (breadth) with high/low depth, while it 
can also outsource higher numbers of activities with high/low depth, and hence there is 
no co-alignment between breadth and depth. Therefore, the measuring reliability is 
inappropriate for these two, as they do not need to correlate (linearly relate). They 
Items 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Items 
Corrected Item-
Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
OST1 .429 .700 OSS1 .323 .838 
OST2 .319 .770 OSS2 .710 .731 
OST3 .577 .636 OSS3 .667 .746 
OST4 .802 .431 OSS4 .610 .765 
(OST) Outsourcing Success: Tactical 
Measures ( α = 0.719) 
OSS5 .663 .748 
(OSS) Outsourcing Success: Strategic Measures   
( α = 0.807 )  
OSB1 .637 .391 (OSB) Outsourcing Success: Behavioural measures 
( α = 0.678 )    OSB2 .424 .675 
OSB3 .430 .661 
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jointly represent the „degree of outsourcing‟, but individually act as two different things. 
For further clarification, the meaning is the same with measuring an area. “Area”= 
(height) x (width), but it is not necessary the „height‟ to be correlated with „width‟ to 
define an area.  
The pilot study however, uncovered some potential modifications in the activity 
indexes. With regard to the banking sector, the human resource (HR) function split into 
„personnel selection‟ and „training‟, as they perform separately and are identified as 
separate functions in outsourcing. Additionally, „legal affairs‟ and „office maintenance‟ 
were also identified as separate functions in outsourcing. The pilot study revealed that 
sales/marketing in the banking sector has sub functions, such as „customer service‟, 
„advertising and promotion‟ and „corporate printing‟.  Accordingly, the new index of the 
degree of outsourcing comprises of 13 activities.   
Table 3.19: Modified Activity Index 
Banking Sector Hotel Sector 
1. ATM 
2. Card processing 
3. Internal auditing 
4. Debt collection 
5. Legal affairs 
6. Account processing 
7. Personnel selection 
8. Training  
9. Information technology 
(IT) 
10. Customer service 
11. Advertising and promotion 
12. Corporate printing 
13. Office  maintenance 
 
 
 
 
1. Reception 
2. Reservation 
3. Laundry 
4. Housekeeping 
5. Food and beverages supplies 
6. Restaurants 
7. Bars 
8. Kitchen operations 
9. Technical services (e.g. repair  
              resources)  
10. Swimming pool maintenance 
11. Gardening services 
12. Administration 
13. Training 
14. Personnel selection 
15. Information systems and technology 
16. Sales/marketing 
17. Leisure activities (e.g. tour packages,     
                   entertainment activities, etc.) 
18. Security and surveillance 
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The hotel sector activities were reduced to 18 items, from an original of 20 proposed by 
Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina (2005a). However, common area cleaning and 
room cleaning was outsourced as a package of „housekeeping‟. Furthermore, sales, 
promotion and advertising operated under „sales/marketing‟. Four types of activities 
were merged into two groups. Next, purchasing and receiving were perceived too 
general, and hence some respondents demanded that the nature of purchases should be 
indicated in the questionnaire, and some left it blank. In two questionnaires respondents 
themselves added a part to „purchasing and supplies‟ with „of food and beverages‟ 
Therefore, the activity was renamed as „food and beverages supplies‟. Additionally, 
„general maintenance‟ also had an overlapping meaning with cleaning aspects in this 
study's context. Thus, it was also renamed as, „technical service‟ and an example was 
provided along with the question (i.e. repair resources) for clarity.  Then, the new lists 
of activities were finalized upon the recommendations of the research supervisor. The 
new activity indexes for both sectors are listed in Table 3. 19.   
Concluding the fact in the instrumentation, the content validity and reliability tests 
indicated the need of some modifications for the initial developed measurement. Based 
on the analysis, the final version of the survey instrument was   developed for final data 
collection (Please refer Appendix B). 
N.B: Appendix B is a combined questionnaire. But two separate questionnaires for 
banks and hotels were prepared for data collection. The main difference is with the 
activity index in Part 01.  
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3.7 DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
Data were collected from mid-level managers (i.e. operational / service/ logistics) in the 
banking and hotel sectors form the month of July to November in 2011.  A preliminary 
search was carried out to identify certain personnel in the organisation(s) who are 
responsible for handling the outsourcing function. Accordingly, the researcher referred 
to the professional bodies which that particular sector is attached to, websites, and 
annual reports in order to obtain particular details. For example, information was 
obtained from „Association of Professional Bankers, Sri Lanka‟ and „Tourist Hotels 
Association, Sri Lanka‟. Based on the information gathered, the target respondents‟ list 
was prepared with their names, designations and personal contact details pertaining to 
each unit of analysis. For some organisations, it was difficult to find personal 
information of the target respondents to whom the researcher made phone calls. The 
respondents‟ list was organized with their names, designations and contact details which 
include address and either telephone number or email address. The data were collected 
in two rounds. 
First, the questionnaire was mailed to the whole population of the hotel sector, taking 
into account only 264 hotels, with the removal of cases used for the pilot test (i.e. 291- 
pilot study 27 = 264 units). A stamped, self-addressed envelope was enclosed. The 
researcher allowed a three weeks period of waiting for the respondents to return the 
questionnaires. Mitchell and Jolley (2006) stated that self-administered questionnaires 
have the advantage of being easily distributed to a large number of people, are able to 
cover wide geographical locations, are economical, and are anonymous, which helps 
keeps respondents honest. Despite those advantages of self- administered questionnaire, 
the postal method was able to gather only eighteen responses.   
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Due to this fact, the researcher contacted the chairman of Tourist Hotels Association, 
Sri Lanka‟ (THASL) for their assistance as a strategy to reach respondents. The primary 
aim was to enhance the respondents‟ confidence in responding to the questionnaire, as 
the request came from a respected body.  Accordingly, eighty questionnaires were 
distributed to the targeted hotel sector invitees, who participated in the  Hotel and 
tourism forum, held on 12
th
 August 2011,   at Kings Court – Cinnamon Lake side Hotel, 
Colombo, Sri Lanka.  The forum was organised by THASL, and altogether, there were 
hundred and fifty seven (157) participants from the hotel sector. Some invitees were 
omitted from the list, such as hotel chain heads and corporate heads, and only mid-level 
managers/executives were selected, according to their designation. Consequently, fifty-
seven completed questionnaires were returned.  Thus, in the first round, the researcher 
collected a total of seventy-five completed responses. 
The second round basically followed two methods of data collection in order to avoid 
common method variance in self-reporting (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Wang and Pho, 
2009). In mid-August, the researcher started to make appointments with the rest of the 
target respondents in the hotel sector sample frame. At that time, these target hotels 
were not registered under THASL. Then, the researcher personally visited and 
approached them in order to collect data via direct interviews. Soft reminders in the 
form of phone call were made before the visit to eliminate idle time and minimize 
waiting. During the period of three months, the researcher conducted fifty-one direct 
interviews. A token of appreciation was given to each respondent (i.e. A pen and a key 
tag of Petronas Twin Towers). Simultaneously, the researcher started to visit places 
where industrial personnel are supposed to visit, and also participated in industrial 
events with the permission of corresponding organising committees, such as  tourism 
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festivals / exhibitions  (e.g. Hotel, Hospitality and Food, Sri Lanka 2011, South Asia‟s 
International Hotel, Hospitality & Tourism Event‟ - Colombo - 27th – 29th  October 
2011; Road to Paradise‟ Tourism Festival,  Colombo - September 28th  -29th  2011) and 
conferences (e.g. Annual convention: Association of Professional Bankers, Sri Lanka‟ - 
November 4
th
 -5
th
  2011).  
Specifically, the purpose of organising the first type of event was to gather stakeholders 
in the hotel sector to demonstrate/market each other‟s products/services (i.e. hoteliers, 
airlines, tour planners, customers and vendors who offer services for hotel sector).  As 
the events were organised for business deals, the mid-level managers‟ presence were 
guaranteed. Therefore, in exhibitions, the researcher personally visited each exhibition 
lot/room presented by the hotel organisations, and had a discussion prior to distributing 
the questionnaire. The purpose was to identify the correct respondent.  After a brief 
explanation regarding the purpose of the study, the questionnaire was distributed to the 
representatives (i.e. either manager or executive), who agreed to their voluntary 
participation in the study. Each submission was marked as „submitted‟ in the sample 
frame.  The researcher was present in the vicinity of the exhibition floor to assist if any 
problems were encountered by the respondents. The purpose was to avoid the 
drawbacks of the absence of the researcher to assist in clarifying ambiguous questions 
encountered by the respondents. This method produced a higher response rate. 
Accordingly, the researcher was able to gather a total of sixty-eight responses from 
hotel sector events over a period of five days. 
Next, the researcher attended the „Annual Convention: Association of Professional 
Bankers, Sri Lanka 2011‟. Unlike the hotel sector, all banks operating in Sri Lanka are 
under the affiliation of „Association of Professional Bankers Sri Lanka‟. Therefore, the 
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convention became a realistic opportunity to reach professionals in the banking sector 
within a shorter period of time. Prior approval was obtained from the organising 
committee for the participation and data collection. The invitees‟ list was requested 
from the organising committee prior to the function in order to filter the target 
respondents. Accordingly, the researcher was positioned parallel to the registration desk 
of the convention to identify particular respondents.  The self-administered 
questionnaire was prepared as a bundle, which was placed in a folder, with some 
additional papers and a pen. The pen served as a double function:  as a form-filling tool 
and as a token of gratitude. Meal and refreshment breaks were used by the researcher to 
remind and help the respondents to fill up the questionnaires. Some questionnaires were 
completed as „direct interviews‟ upon their requests (i.e. some respondents did not like 
to read the questionnaire), while some respondents were seeking assistance to clarify 
some questions. However, many requested a brief explanation of the study purpose and 
implicational value of the study to the banking sector.  A questionnaire drop desk was 
set up at the exit point of the convention premises. The data collection was very much 
successful in terms of number of responses collected, interactive discussions made, and 
the rapport built with industrial personnel. A total of twenty-five questionnaire sets were 
distributed (population, 27 – pilot study, 3).  Finally, twenty-three responses were 
collected from the banking sector. Out of twenty-three, five were directly interviewed.   
In summary, hundred and ninety four (194) completed questionnaires were collected 
from the hotel sector (143 self-administered, 51 direct interviews). Then, twenty-three 
(23) responses were collected from banking organisations (18 self-administered 5 direct 
interviews). The study employed two methods (i.e. self-administered questionnaire and 
direct interviews) of data collection in order to minimize common method variance. A 
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total of 217 questionnaires were subjected to the preliminary scanning process for data 
cleaning. Then, five questionnaires were omitted due to the severe incompleteness. 
Finally the usable quantity of questionnaire was 213 (23 banks, 190 hotels). Based on 
the number of usable questionnaires, the response rate was calculated.  
1. Response rate to the total population 
    
                   ⁄
 
2. Response rate  after pilot test (Population (T) – Pilot study(p)) 
                           ⁄
 
 
3.8 DATA ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 
Data analysis started with the manual checking for accuracy and completeness of the 
returned questionnaires. A code was assigned to each questionnaire for identification 
purpose. Then, all the data were entered into the SPSS version 18.0 spread sheet for 
basic analysis. Prior to the analysis, data were cleaned and subjected to the treatment of 
missing values. The refined data were then submitted to further analysis. 
The data analysis mainly focused on tests for errors, scale purification, tests for 
multivariate assumptions, descriptive statistics, and inference statistics for hypothesis 
testing. Basically, scale purification followed the procedure introduced by Ahire, Golhar 
and Waller (1996). This is further developed by Koufteros (1999) for structural equation 
modelling. The framework is shown in Figure 3.20, and it mainly includes exploratory 
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factor analysis (EFA), Cronbach‟s Alpha reliability and confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA), which assesses unidimensionality, reliability and validity.  
 
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Measurement Property Assessment Framework 
 
3.8.1 Cronbach's Alpha Reliability 
The reliability indicates that the measure is bias-free, and offers consistent measurement 
across time and across the various items in the instrument. Reliability helps assess the 
goodness of fit (Cavana et al., 2001). The most popular test of “inter-item consistency 
reliability” is the Cronbach‟s alpha. It is employed for pilot data collection. According 
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to Cavana et al. (2001), a value of less than 0.6 is considered as poor, while a value of 
over 0.8 reflects high internal consistency.  
3.8.2 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
Malhotra (2004) defined factor analysis as an interdependence technique, in which an 
entire set of interdependent relationships is examined without making the distinction 
between dependent and independent variables. It is also known as a powerful statistical 
technique for data reduction and summarization. The statistical investigation primarily 
focuses on the interpretation of the strength of the relationship of each variable to the 
construct (Hair et al., 2006). The main difference between EFA and CFA is, EFA 
explores the possible underlying factor structure of a set of observed variables, without 
imposing a preconceived structure on the outcome (Child, 1990). Subsequently, the 
researcher is not forcing the numbers of factors that should be extracted; instead, the 
analysis proposes the number of latent factors in the entire measure. Therefore, EFA 
basically simulates observed data; thereby presenting factors discriminated by the 
observed data. Subsequently, EFA outlines the content (i.e. items) of each identified 
factor/component, with their corresponding contribution. EFA is also used to analyse 
common method variance with „none‟ or zero rotation. However, adjustments for 
rotation methods improve the explanation of factor loadings as it could   mitigate some 
of the vagueness associate with preliminary analysis (Child, 1990).  
The „varimax’ is the most commonly used method for rotation. It is an orthogonal 
method of rotation that minimizes the number of variables with high loadings on a 
factor, thereby enhancing the interpretability of the factors (Malhotra, 2004). 
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3.8.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) 
CFA statistics demonstrate how well the specification of factors matches the actual data 
(Hair et al., 2006, p. 774).  Unlike EFA, CFA requires specification of a model „a 
priori‟, which is based on the review of relevant theory and literature to support model 
specification. Therefore, the researcher has to pre-determine the number of factors to 
extract. Basically, CFA plays a critical role in measurement model validation in path or 
structural analyses (MacCallum and Austin, 2000). Confirmatory factor analysis can be 
used to assess the measurement model by examining the constructs‟ unidimensionality, 
reliability and validity.  
The existence of unidimensionality can be established by evaluating the goodness-of-fit 
(GOF) of the proposed model (Bagozzi and Baumgartner, 1994; Garver and Mentzer, 
1999), and each of the variable‟s direction of path and significant level (Garver and 
Mentzer, 1999). The goodness-of-fit (GOF) measures describe how well a specified 
model reproduces the covariance matrix among indicator variables (Hair et al., 2006, p. 
708). A model with good fit provides a valid platform for researchers to subsequently 
analyse the hypothesized relationships among constructs. The model of this study is 
evaluated using the multiple fit criteria, namely: the chi-square statistics (χ2), degree of 
freedom (df), p-value of the chi-square statistic, goodness of fit index (GFI), relative 
chi-square (χ2/df), comparative fit index (CFI), the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) and the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) 
(Bryne, 2001; Hair et al., 2006). However, these GOF indices can be categorized into 
three general groups: absolute, incremental and parsimony fit measures. Absolute 
measures examine how well the deduced theory fits the observed data (Hair et al., 
2006). The incremental indices show how well a specified model fits relative to some 
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alternative baseline model (ibid, p.749). Here, the baseline model is referred to as the 
„null model‟, which assumes the observed variables are not correlated. Next, parsimony 
indices are conceptually similar to the adjusted R
2
 in regression (Hair et al., 2006). 
Thus, it provides information about the best model among competing models.    
However, the primary purpose of CFA is to purify and determine the measurement 
model, thereby developing the structural model in SEM, used for hypothesis testing. In 
this study, the AMOS statistical package was used for structural equation modelling 
(SEM).  
 
3.8.4 Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 
SEM combines the factor (measurement) and path (structural) models into a single 
model, where each latent factor is regressed onto the others.  Basically, SEM has the 
advantage of being able to estimate the magnitude of error terms, unlike the approach of 
path analysis, which relies solely on multiple regression procedures, and  is assumed 
that error terms are zero (Kaplan, 2000). It is also capable of examining a chain of 
dependent relationships concurrently (Hair et al., 2006) hence the analysing power is 
higher in-terms of modelling interactions, nonlinearities, correlated independents, 
measurement errors, correlated error terms, and multiple latent independents/dependents 
relationships (Kumar et al., 2008). Besides, SEM has an attractive graphical modelling 
interface that simplifies model interpretation (Kumar et al., 2008).  
Therefore, the current study applied structural equation modelling (SEM) for inference 
statistical analysis. However, there are two approaches that SEM can perform: the one-
step approach or the two-step approach. In the one-step approach, the estimation of both 
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the measurement and structural relationships of an SEM model are carried out 
simultaneously in a single analysis. The two-step approach separates the estimation in 
two different analyses. This approach is preferable among researchers, due to the fact 
that it facilitates  overcoming the problems related to interpretational confounding (Burt, 
1976) and misspecification (Lance et al., 2007), which are quite inherent in the one-step 
approach (Gallagher et al., 2008).  Furthermore, the two-step approach is concerned 
with a series of structural equations that represents the causal processes observed in the 
study, and the depiction of these structural links in a pictorial path model (Byrne, 2001). 
Moreover, SEM analyses the „goodness of fit‟ in order to ascertain whether the expected 
values of the model fit the observed values for hypothesis testing.  Accordingly, SEM 
will be tested on the twenty hypotheses developed in this study.  
 The researcher however is aware of the potential weaknesses of structural equation 
modelling. These  are, 1) lack of clarity concerning what exactly is being tested, 2) a 
poorly fitting structural (i.e., path) component that is masked by a well-fitting composite 
model, 3)  a large number of equivalent models that will always yield identical fit to the 
target model 4) omitted variables that influence constructs included in the model  and 5) 
low power or sensitivity to detect critical misspecifications. (Kaplan, 2000; Byrne, 
2001; Gallagher et al., 2008).   
 
SUMMARY 
Chapter 3 elaborates the research methodology of the study. The research however, lies 
in the positivist research domain. Thus, quantitative and cross sectional data were 
collected through the survey method. The banking and hotel organisations in Sri Lanka 
were selected as the study unit where mid-level managers/ executives were identified as 
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respondents. A structured questionnaire (i.e. survey instrument) was developed with 
reference to the previous literature. It had been subjected to the pilot tests for content 
validity, and reliability.  The finalized questionnaire was forwarded to the final data 
collection, and several steps were taken to minimize bias associated with the research 
method, such as the measures of the questionnaire consisting of a 5-point and a 7-point 
Likert scale, and two types of methods were employed for collecting data through 
structured questionnaire. This is statistically tested and reported in Chapter 4.  
A total of 213 usable questionnaires were collected by self-administered method and 
direct interviews. Several strategies were taken in order to enhance the response rate, 
including offering a token of gratitude, follow up phone calls, and supports from 
affiliated professional bodies as an intermediary channel to distribute questionnaires. 
Accordingly, the study exceeded the minimum sample size required, and the response 
rate to the population reported is approximately sixty seven per cent.  
The preliminary data analysis was conducted using the SPSS version 18.0, while 
AMOS would be applied for inference statistics. The chapter also outlines the 
advantages of SEM. The complete data analysis is explained in Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4  
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the preliminary data analysis (i.e. descriptive) and structural 
equation modeling (SEM). SPSS version 18.0 software package is used for descriptive 
statistics, while AMOS 18 version is used for SEM. Basically, the SEM technique is 
applied to develop the measurement model, and establish causal relationships predicted 
in the research model. Test for common method variance , multivariate assumptions, 
statistics for scale purification and measurement model validation are also reported. 
Therefore, this chapter provides the evidence(s) of logical induction that supports the 
establishment of rational relationships among the variables in the theoretical model.  
 
4.2 DATA PREPARATION FOR ANALYSIS 
In this study, 213 usable responses were collected from 318 organisations. The unit of 
analysis was the service organisations located in Sri Lanka. Accordingly, 23 banks and 
190 hotels (above 2 Star) were investigated. The collected data were preliminarily 
scanned for accuracy and precision. Then, they were subjected to cleaning process (for 
213 questionnaires). The purpose was to identify outliers and provide treatments for 
missing values. 
4.2.1 Data Cleaning  
The data analysis is started by transcribing data into SPSS version 18.0. Then, they 
were subjected to the cleaning process. Several plot diagrams/graphs helped in 
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identifying the outliers. Outliers are cases that have out-of-range values, as compared to 
the majority of other cases. Their presence in the data may distort statistical test results 
(Hair et al., 2006), such as very high or very low arithmetic mean or the range (Bryman 
and Bell, 2007), which may in turn result in wrong conclusions. Outliers are detectable 
via analysis of the residual scatterplot. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), 
cases that have a standardized residual of more than 3.3, or less than -3.3 in the 
scatterplot are considered outliers.  Few outliers in large samples are common, and 
most of the time, taking any action is unnecessary.  Subsequent checks were carried out 
for „consistency‟ and „missing values‟.  
First, one common case was identified as an outlier. This is due to the fact that the 
degree of outsourcing of that particular firm was zero (i.e. not practising outsourcing), 
and thus, the case is not applicable for the analysis. Then, the rest of the data (i.e. 212) 
were forwarded to statistical checks to identify any common outliers that need to be 
eliminated from the final analysis. Five cases were deleted, due to them being detected 
as outliers. Then, only 207 questionnaires were forwarded into the missing values 
treatments.  
Random missing values can be substituted with „natural values‟ or by „imputed value‟ 
(Malhotra, 2007; Tsikriktsis, 2005).  The neutral value method assigns the mean value 
of the variable (i.e. means response of the variable) to the missing response. Mean 
substitution can be performed in three ways 1) total mean substitution, 2) subgroup 
mean substitution and 3) case mean substitution (Tsikriktsis, 2005). Accordingly, only 
six missing values were found, and replaced with individual case mean value of 
responses for a particular variable. For further confirmation, Boxplot diagrams were run 
again, against each construct in order to verify the cleanliness of data (please refer 
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Appendix C).  Accordingly, there were no missing values reported, while few outliers 
were detected, which are not common for the whole dataset.  
However, some variables required scale transformations or calculations. This is known 
as, „variable respecification‟ (Malhotra, 2007) and it includes „transforming data into 
another scale for meaningful analysis and interpretation‟.  The present study used scale 
transformation for most of the elements of demographic profile.  
4.2.2 Scale Transformation and Respecification 
The workforce, domestic branches of the organization, and the duration of experience in 
outsourcing were subjected to the scale transformation for better demographic profile 
analysis. They were reported directly as there were no previously complete 
categorizations with regards to outsourcing in the Sri Lankan context. The reported data 
for aforementioned demographic items were categorised into three groups 
(low/medium/ high) for descriptive analysis.  
Next, the aggregation of each latent variable was required for inference analysis and 
hence, the sum of the items‟ values in each variable was also calculated. Somehow, it is 
important to explain the calculation of degree of outsourcing. The construct identified as 
a multiplication of „breadth‟ and „depth‟. The relevant data were obtained with 1-5 
Likert Scale, with 1 representing both zero depth and breadth. Thus, it required re-
coding data into a new variable (i.e. 0-4), for the purpose of eliminating the „effect of 
zero outsourcing‟ on calculating the total degree of outsourcing. Subsequent 
descriptions of certain calculations were illustrated, and described later in this chapter.  
The following section analyzed the demographic profile, with subsequent scale 
transformations and calculations.  
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4.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.3.1 Demographic Profile  
The summary of descriptive characteristics of the unit of analysis investigated in this 
study is illustrated in Table 4.1. The table mainly presents the type of the organization, 
and their subcategories.  
 
Table 4.1: Demographic profile of Unit of Analysis 
 
Frequency 
Valid Percent 
% 
Cumulative 
Percent % 
 2 Star 59 28.5 28.5 
3 Star 53 25.6 54.1 
4 Star 56 27.1 81.2 
5 Star 12 5.8 87.0 
5+ Star 4 1.9 88.9 
Total Hotel organizations 184 88.9 88.9 
 
Government Banks 
 
2 
 
1.0 
 
89.9 
Semi government Banks 2 1.0 90.8 
Private Banks 11 5.3 96.1 
Foreign Banks 8 3.9 100.0 
Total Banking organizations 23 11.1 100.0 
Total 207 100.0 100.0 
 
A total of 184 hotels and 23 banking firms were investigated. The majority of hotels 
studied are rated as two stars, followed by three, four, and five stars. The lowest 
percentage of observations is reported from above 5-Star (i.e. 5+) hotels. This is due to 
the fact that the number of high-end hotels available in the country is quite low. As for 
the banking sector, the majority of them are private banks (eleven), followed by foreign 
banks (eight). Government and government-linked banks are comparatively low in 
number. They operate in a wide range of geographical area compared to other types of 
banks.  
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Next, the frequency analysis of the „workforce‟ of organisations is illustrated in Table 
4.2. The workforce ranged from 50 to 2500. The lowest is reported from a 2-star hotel, 
while the maximum is reported from a government owned geographically expanded 
banking organization. The workforce however is categorised into 3 levels (i.e. Low, 
Medium and High), based on percentile values, obtained from SPSS. Firms with a 
workforce of below 120 (<120) are categorised as „low‟ while 121 – 275 as „medium‟, 
and above 276 (>276) as „high‟ level. The frequency of each level of the workforce is 
reported in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2: Demography  Workforce (WF) 
 
 
The majority of hotels investigated are reported to have a medium level of workforce 
(37%). The majority of banks (69.6%) operate at high levels of workforce, while 21.7 
per cent of the banks are at a low level. However, only 8.7 per cent of banks are 
operated at a middle level workforce. This indicates that either the banks are operating 
 
 
group * WF Category 
Crosstabulation 
Total Low WF Medium WF High WF 
group Hotel Count 65 68 51 184 
% within group 35.3% 37.0% 27.7% 100.0% 
% within WF category 92.9% 97.1% 76.1% 88.9% 
% of Total 31.4% 32.9% 24.6% 88.9% 
Bank Count 5 2 16 23 
% within group 21.7% 8.7% 69.6% 100.0% 
% within WF category 7.1% 2.9% 23.9% 11.1% 
% of Total 2.4% 1.0% 7.7% 11.1% 
Total Count 70 70 67 207 
% within group 33.8% 33.8% 32.4% 100.0% 
% within WF category 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% of Total 33.8% 33.8% 32.4% 100.0% 
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with a greater workforce (maybe due to wide geographical expansion), or with a lesser 
workforce (maybe due to focus only limited markets). For example, „Bank of Ceylon‟ 
operates nationally, and offers a full range of services, while „Citibank‟ focuses on 
corporate clients, making geographical expansion unnecessary. 
The next analysis is based on the number of branches in the country (i.e. in 
banks/hotels), or members in the chain (i.e. hotels). This is a factor that helps determine 
the geographical expansion of the business. Relatively, banks have a wider range of 
expansion than hotels.  
The maximum number of branches recorded for the banking sector is 45. As for the 
hotel sector, it is only 6. Considering this distinct numerical difference, different 
percentiles are generated to categorize the groups, as shown in Table 4.3.  
Hotels and banks were then categorised into three groups – low, medium and high. 
„Low level geographical expansion‟ group comprises of hotels with branches below 2 
and banks below 14. „Medium level geographical expansion‟ group includes hotels with 
branches ranging from 3 to 5 and banks ranging from 15 to 30. „High level geographical 
expansion‟ group is represented by hotels of more than 6 branches and banks more than 
30 branches.  
Cross-tabulated figures in Table 4.3, further explains the frequency of each category. 
According to within group percentages, banks reported a higher value in the high and 
low geographical expansion category (i.e. 13% and 52.2% respectively) in comparison 
to hotels. However, nearly 50 per cent of hotels and banks operate with limited 
geographical expansion. This may be due to the geographical limitation of the country 
(i.e. as a whole the total area of the country is only 65610 km²). 
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Table 4.3: Demography: Number of Branches 
 
  Hotels Banks  Total tal 
N Valid 184 23 207  
Missing 0 0  0 0 
Minimum 1 6  
Maximum 6 45  
Percentiles 33.33 2.00 14.00  
66.66 4.00 30.00  
Branches * group Crosstabulation 
Group 
Total Hotel Bank 
Bran 
H/B 
Low level geographical 
expansion 
Count 93 12 104 
% within Bran H/ B 89.0% 11.0% 100.0% 
% within group 50.5% 52.2% 52.2% 
Medium level geographical 
expansion 
Count 82 8 90 
% within Bran H/B 91.0% 9.0% 100.0% 
% within group 44.6% 34.8% 34.8% 
High level geographical 
expansion 
Count 9 3 12 
% within Bran H/B 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 
% within group 4.9% 13.0% 13.0% 
Total Count 184 23 23 
% within Bran H/B 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% within group 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
The next demographic element is organisation‟s „experience in outsourcing‟.  The 
frequency analysis is demonstrated in Table 4.4. The investigated sample, however, has 
a minimum of 2 years, and a maximum of 25 years of experience in outsourcing. Based 
on the percentile values generated, the data were categorised into three groups - low, 
medium and high level of outsourcing experiences.  Low level group has outsourcing 
experience of below 6 years; medium group has 7 to 10 years while the high level group 
has above 11 years outsourcing experiences. The cross-tabulated analysis was 
formulated based on these factors, and it is depicted in Table 4.4.   
   
159 
 
Table 4.4: Experience in Outsourcing 
N Valid 207 
Missing 0 
Mean 8.99 
Minimum 2 
Maximum 25 
Percentiles 33.33 6.00 
66.66 10.00 
 
exp * group Crosstabulation 
group 
Total Hotel Bank 
exp Low level experience Count 66 4 70 
% within exp 94.3% 5.7% 100.0% 
% within group 35.9% 17.4% 33.8% 
Moderate level experience Count 69 8 77 
% within exp 89.6% 10.4% 100.0% 
% within group 37.5% 34.8% 37.2% 
High level experience Count 49 11 60 
% within exp 81.7% 18.3% 100.0% 
% within group 26.6% 47.8% 29.0% 
Total Count 184 23 207 
% within exp 88.9% 11.1% 100.0% 
% within group 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Table 4.4 further shows that, the majority of firms (37.2%) have 7-10 years of 
experiences in outsourcing, while only 29 per cent of firms have more than 11years of 
experiences. However 47.8 per cent of banking firms reported high-level experience, 
while only 26.6 per cent hotels reported a higher level of experience in outsourcing. 
Comparatively, hotels have generally low and medium level of experience in 
outsourcing compared to banks. Based on the arguments drawn from the sample, it can 
be surmised that in the context of Sri Lanka, the banking sector is more matured in 
outsourcing compared to the hotel sector. But, these figures (in Table 4.4), provide 
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evidences of, that there may be a greater potentiality and tendency to adapt outsourcing 
as a business strategy in the hotel sector in future.  
The respondents of this study were identified as managers/middle level 
managers/executives, who are engaged in outsourcing with certain organisations. The 
last question (Section C, Question 06) in the questionnaire was aimed to obtain the 
respondents‟ demographic information: names, designation and contact details. Majority 
of respondents did not specify their designation clearly. For example, there was a 
preference to state one‟s designation vaguely as „manager‟, while other respondents 
stated the department they were employed  (e.g. „operations‟, „services‟, „logistics‟, 
„supply chain‟). Therefore, these department-specific management positions were 
grouped as „middle-level managers‟. In addition to that, some respondents stated their 
designation as „executive‟. Table 4.5 exhibits the frequency of each respondent category 
in the study.  
  
Table 4.5: Respondents‟ Profile of Designation 
 
Title Frequency Percentage to 
Total 
Manager (unspecified) 36 17% 
Middle level manager 88 43% 
Executive 52 25% 
Designation not stated 31 15% 
Total 207 100% 
 
The majority of the respondents are middle level managers (43%), followed by 
executives (25%), and individuals, who specified their designation as „managers‟ 
(17%).  Nevertheless, a total of 31 respondents have refused to state their designation 
details. This might be for personal reasons or unfounded phobias (perceived risk of 
exposing firms‟ data) of exposing data to a third party.  
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4.3.2 Summary of Demographic Profile 
The study investigated hotels (above 2 Star) and banks in Sri Lanka.  A total of 207 
usable questionnaires were forwarded for further analysis. The demographic profile 
examined included organisational type, workforce, geographical expansion and 
experience in outsourcing. Consequently, the hotels were categorised based on the star 
ranking, while banks were categorised in terms of ownership. All other aspects were 
classified into three groups, which are „low, medium and high‟ for a meaningful 
analysis.  
From the result of the demographic profile analysis, banks tended to gravitate towards 
maintaining either a high or low level workforce than hotels. This may be associated 
with the geographical expansion of the banks. Perhaps this is due to the fact that, higher 
geographical expansion of banks requires higher level of workforce and vice versa. 
However, the above mentioned pattern was absent from hotels.  
With regards to the current outsourcing experiences, the banking sector reported higher 
level of experience. However there was a high percentage of medium level experience 
group reported in hotels, followed by the low level group. Therefore these two groups 
will collectively accumulate more experiences in the near future. This indicated that 
outsourcing has become popular among hotels in Sri Lanka. Furthermore, outsourcing 
was confirmed as a middle level management task in this study context.   
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4.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CONSTRUCTS   
This section comprises of simple descriptive analysis of six major constructs, which 
include the degree of outsourcing, vendor management capability, vendors‟ service 
performance, partnership quality, partners‟ compatibility and outsourcing success.  
 
4.4.1 Degree of Outsourcing 
Degree of outsourcing is a combined construct of „breadth of outsourcing‟ and „depth of 
outsourcing‟. The questionnaire listed activities for both types of firms. Respondents 
were asked to mark activities currently outsourced in their respective organisations (i.e. 
breadth). The intensity of outsourcing (i.e. depth) was measured using a 5-point Likert 
scale. Based on the reported data, the degree of outsourcing is calculated as follows. 
 
                                                                              
 
   
                             
                         
 
 
    
                                   ∑           
                           
 
 
 
A total of 18 number of activities for hotels (H), and 13 number of activities for banks 
(B), were listed. Therefore, the calculations were done separately. 
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Table 4.6 shows descriptive statistics for the degree of outsourcing. The depth data is 
reported in a 5-point Likert scale, while breadth is reported as a numerical value. As 
previously noted, the data were re-coded to 0-4 in order to eliminate the effect of zero 
outsourcing, as zero represents no outsourcing at all (in-sourced), while 4 means the 
activity is fully outsourced. Then, the „degree of outsourcing‟ is derived after a series of 
calculations of „breadth‟ and „depth‟, as shown in the formulas above. Due to the effect 
of computation, higher values (8.37± 1.189) are reported in the mean and standard 
deviation.  
 Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics for Degree of Outsourcing 
 
Depth of 
Outsourcing 
Breadth of 
outsourcing 
Degree of 
Outsourcing 
N Valid 207 207 207 
Missing 0 0 0 
Mean 9.3046 .9026 8.3756 
Std. Deviation 1.2538 .0754 1.1895 
Minimum 6.30 .61 5.25 
Maximum 13.82 1.00 11.75 
Note: Initially 5-point Likert scale was used for depth and then recoded to 0-4.  
 Scale: 0= not outsourced at all; 4 = totally outsourced. 
Breadth is the fraction of activities outsourced to total activities listed. 
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With regards to the depth of outsourcing, the firms‟ minimum level of depth for a single 
activity should be 1, and the maximum depth (i.e. intensity) for all activities should be 
18 (as there are 18 maximum activities). In reference to Table 4.6, the mean value for 
depth is 9.3046, with a standard deviation of   1.25. This indicates that the majority of 
firms observed, have average depth of outsourcing. Accordingly, the majority of the 
firms observed prefer to assign an average power to the vendor.  
Next, the mean score of breadth is 0.9026   0754 (M+SD). This explains that the 
majority of firms have applied outsourcing for about 90 per cent of activities. The range 
of breadth can be interpreted as a percentage. The sample shows the minimum breadth 
(i.e. number of activities) as 61 per cent while there are some firms that apply 
outsourcing for all activities.  
The possible range of total degree of outsourcing should be 1 to 18. As there is no „total 
depth of outsourcing‟ reported, there were no firms that outsource whole activities 
(breadth) with total intensity (depth). Thus, the range of degree of outsourcing is 
reported as 5.25 to 11.75 and the mean score is valued at 8.37  1.189 (M+SD). These 
figures indicate that service outsourcing is being moderately practiced in Sri Lanka. 
Thus it has the potential to be further intensified.  
Next, the graphs depicted in Figure 4.1 show that the level of outsourcing is higher in 
banks than hotels. Corporate printing, advertising and promotion and maintenance in the 
banking sector were outsourced more than other activities. Personnel selection, card 
processing and IT were generally outsourced at lower rates.  
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Figure 4.1: Activities Outsourced in Banks and Hotels. 
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With regards to hotels, the majority of them outsourced leisure activities, information 
systems and information technology (IS and IT) and sales and marketing activities. 
Kitchen operations, administration and receptions were the activities that are still 
internalized. However, it is apparent that the hotels have experiences in outsourcing for 
all types of activities listed. 
4.4.2  Vendor Management Capability  
The vendor's management capability was measured with 7-point Likert scale. As shown 
in Table 4.7, the mean score is reported as 5.75  0.1085 (M    . This indicates that 
the majority of respondents have above average (i.e. score 4) level for a vendor 
management system. Among the items in the variable, VM_2 reports the highest value 
(5.81 1.095). It explains the „focal firm‟s ability to monitor vendor(s) appropriately‟. 
The respondents‟ agreement on their „ability to monitor vendor‟ is higher than other 
items in vendor management activities. However, the lowest mean value (5.72  1.027) 
is reported from VM_4, which is „focal firm‟s capability to develop vendor(s)‟. But 
comparatively, there is no significant difference in the respondents‟ agreement on each 
item. This implies that all vendor management activities are perceived as equally 
important.  
Table 4.7: Descriptive statistics for Vendor Management Capability 
Variable/ Items Mean Std. Deviation 
Vendor Management  Capability 5.75 1.085 
VM_1 (Vendor Selection) 5.73 1.142 
VM_2 (Vendor Monitoring) 5.81  1.095 
VM_3 (Performance Evaluation) 5.77  1.095 
VM_4 (Vendor Development) 5.72 1.027 
VM_5 (Compensation) 5.73 1.070 
Valid N (listwise) 207 
Note: A 7-point Likert scale was used.  Scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree 
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4.4.3 Vendors’ Service Performance 
The vendors‟ service performance was measured with 7-point Likert scale. As shown in 
Table 4.8 the construct comprises of four dimensions.  All dimensions are reported 
above 4 mean scores. This implies that the respondents tend to agree with the vendors‟ 
service performance. Hard process quality (HQ) is reported to have the highest value 
among them. This indicates that the respondents have more agreeableness with vendors‟ 
HQ than to other performance aspects of vendor(s).  
 
Table 4.8: Descriptive statistics for Vendors‟ Service Performance 
Dimension Mean Std. Deviation 
Potential quality 5.19 .50 
Hard process quality 5.88 .78 
Soft process quality 4.64 .73 
Output quality 4.21 .82 
Valid N (listwise) 207 
Note: A 7-point Likert scale was used.  Scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree. 
 
 
4.4.4 Partnership Quality  
Table 4.9 provides descriptive statistics of „partnership quality‟ construct. It was 
measured with three dimensions, which are cooperativeness, trust and commitment. All 
three dimensions in the construct report above 4 means scores. Cooperativeness scores 
the highest mean value (5.75   0.917), followed by trust (5.55  1.148). There are no 
notable differences in the respondents‟ agreeableness on cooperativeness and trust in 
comparison to commitment.  
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Table 4.9: Descriptive statistics for Partnership Quality 
Dimension Mean Std. Deviation 
Cooperativeness 5.75 .917 
Trust 5.55 1.148 
Commitment 4.44 1.720 
Valid N (listwise) 207 
Note: A 7-point Likert scale was used.  Scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree. 
 
 
Table 4.9 provides descriptive statistics of „partnership quality‟ construct. It was 
measured with three dimensions, which are cooperativeness, trust and commitment. All 
three dimensions in the construct report above 4 means scores. Cooperativeness scores 
the highest mean value (5.75   0.917), followed by trust (5.55  1.148). There are no 
notable differences in the respondents‟ agreeableness on cooperativeness and trust in 
comparison to commitment.  
 
4.4.5 Partners’ Compatibility 
The partners‟ compatibility construct comprises of corporate cultural compatibility and 
compatibility in competitive priorities dimensions.  A 5-point Likert scale was used to 
measure each dimension. Table 4.10 shows the mean scores of each dimension in the 
construct.  
Table 4.10: Descriptive statistics for Partners‟ Compatibility 
Dimension Mean Std. Deviation 
Culture 3.97 .644 
Competitive 
Priorities 
5.31 .956 
Valid N (listwise) 207 
Note: A 5-point Likert scale was used to measure the  
respondents‟ agreement on the extent of compatibility‟  
Scale: 1 = Not at all; 5 = To a greater extent 
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The mean value is considerably higher in “compatibility in competitive priorities” (3.84 
 0.488) than the „cultural compatibility‟ (3.15 0.541). Therefore the results show that 
the competitive priorities are perceived to be more important than corporate cultural 
compatibility. Both standard deviations reflect a high level stability of responses. 
 
4.4.6 Outsourcing Success  
The success of outsourcing was measured in terms of tactical, strategic and behavioural 
dimensions. Table 4.11 illustrates the mean scores and standard deviations of each 
dimension. Even though the highest value is reported from tactical outcome 
(4.58 1.115), the differences among the mean scores of dimensions are minimal. 
Therefore the responses show that all three types of outcomes are almost equally 
important.  
Table 4.11:  Descriptive statistics for Outsourcing Success. 
Dimension Mean Std. Deviation 
Tactical  4.58 1.115 
Strategic 4.42 .862 
Behavioural 4.22 1.633 
Valid N (listwise) 207 
Note: A 7-point Likert scale was used.  Scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree. 
 
The next section is allocated for checking common methods of variance in the survey.  
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4.5 COMMON METHOD VARIANCE  
This study used self-administered questionnaire for data collection. When respondents 
are self-reporting through a unique scale, there is a probability for indicating different 
ratings, rather than true ratings (Podsakoff et al., 2003). This generates inaccurate 
measures and thereby, establishes inaccurate relationships, which are known as 
„common method variance‟.  Wang and Pho (2009) explained the common method 
variance as a type of spurious internal consistency, which occurs when the apparent 
correlation among indicators, or even constructs, results from their common source 
(p.674). But Conway and Lance (2010) claimed that, there are some 
...misconceptions about method variance  that can impede the progress of 
research: (a) that relationships between self-reported variables are necessarily 
and routinely upwardly biased,(b) that other-reports (or other methods) are 
superior to self-reports, and (c) that rating sources (e.g., self, other) constitute 
mere alternative measurement methods (p.326).  
However, scholars (e.g. Podsakoff et al., 2003; Burton-Jones and Straub 2004) 
recommended testing the common method variances (CMV) in a positivist research 
domain.  The Harman single-factor test is commonly used to test the common method 
variance. It requires loading all the measures in a study into an exploratory factor 
analysis, with the assumption that the presence of CMV is indicated by the emergence 
of either a single factor, or a general factor, accounting for the majority of covariance 
among measures (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p. 889). Consequently the exploratory factor 
analysis test was performed with none-rotated, single factor option. The results of the 
factor analysis revealed that there are fourteen factors with Eigen values above 1.0, 
which together explain 71 per cent of the variance. The largest single factor explained 
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only 20.566 per cent of the variance, which is significantly less. Therefore, the factor 
analysis did not detect a single factor explaining a majority of the covariance (please 
refer Appendix D).  
 
4.6 TESTS FOR MULTIVARIATE ASSUMPTIONS 
4.6.1  Normality 
Normality magnifies the shape of the sample data distribution to the population.  
Subsequent estimates of sample means will have representative variations with the 
population mean (Bryman and Bell, 2007).  Normality is used to describe a curve that is 
symmetrical and bell-shaped. The highest score frequency is depicted in the middle, 
with lower frequencies towards the extremes (Gravetter and Wallnau, 2000). There are 
many statistical methods that could be applied for assessing normality, such as Q-Q 
plots, box plots, and histograms. Histograms basically check the skewness and kurtosis 
of data distribution. A skewness value of above 3, and kurtosis value of above 10, are 
indicative of those that depart from normality (Kline, 1998). However, for a perfectly 
normal distribution, the kurtosis and skewness should be zero (Pallant, 2005). 
Meanwhile, certain scholars (e.g. George and Mallery, 2003; Morgan, et al., 2001) 
stated that the threshold value of + 1.0 is a guideline to determine normality. The 
kurtosis is the measurement of the peak of the curve, which does not effectively affect 
analyses. Negative kurtosis represents a flatter distribution, while a positive value 
denotes a peaked distribution. 
The result in Table 4.12 shows that all the skewness statistics, except PTQ5 and PTQ6   
are less than one (skewness value is ≤ 1). However, PTQ5 and PQT6 reported a value of 
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skewness below 2 (skewness<2). Therefore all items have maintained an appropriate 
level of skewness. The kurtosis statistics which range from -1.022 to 1.811 (-2 > 2) 
show that the data distribution is normal.  
 
Table 4.12:  Skewness and Kurtosis Statistics 
 Minimum  Maximum Skewness Kurtosis  
Vendor management 1 7 -.735 -.278 
VM_2 2 7 -.851 .139 
VM_3 1 7 -.723 -.193 
VM_4 2 7 -.403 -.948 
VM_5 1 7 -.434 -1.063 
Vendor's Performance 3 7 -.357 -.172 
PTQ2 1 7 -.795 1.758 
PTQ5 1 7 -1.290 1.284 
PTQ6 1 7 -1.008 1.811 
HQ1 3 7 -.198 -.323 
HQ2 2 7 .035 -.482 
HQ3 1 7 .046 .934 
HQ4 1 7 .358 -.011 
HQ5 2 7 .278 -.481 
SQ1 2 7 -.872 .201 
SQ2 1 7 -.378 -.706 
SQ3 1 7 -.560 -.538 
SQ4 1 7 -.439 -.753 
SQ5 1 7 -.277 -.824 
SQ6 1 7 -.299 -.853 
OQ1 2 7 .303 -.220 
OQ2 1 6 .186 -.457 
OQ3 1 7 -.078 -.012 
OQ4 1 7 .205 -.597 
OQ5 1 7 .243 -.100 
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Table 4.12: Skewness and Kurtosis Statistics Continued 
 
Partnership Quality 1 7 -.588 -.496 
COP2 2 7 -.539 -.777 
COP3 2 7 -.506 -.795 
COP4 1 7 -.575 -.809 
COP5 1 7 -.712 -.300 
COP6 1 7 -.565 -.690 
COP7 2 7 -.551 -.644 
COP8 1 7 -.491 -.617 
PQT1 1 7 .219 -.319 
PQT2 2 7 .011 -.221 
PQT3 1 7 .309 -.325 
PQT4 2 7 -.037 -.444 
PQC1 2 7 .159 -.610 
PQC2 2 7 .192 -.496 
PQC3 2 7 .326 -.480 
PQC4 2 7 .225 -.247 
Partners' Compatibility 2 5 -.337 -.508 
CPC2 1 5 -.341 -.176 
CPC3 1 5 -.371 -.231 
CPP1 1 5 -.689 .071 
CPP2 1 5 -.355 -.142 
CPP3 2 5 -.341 -.627 
CPP4 1 5 -.402 -.082 
Outsourcing Success 1 7 .101 -.493 
OST2 1 7 .099 -.403 
OST3 1 7 .093 -.968 
OST4 1 7 -.071 -.713 
OSS1 1 7 .047 .001 
OSS2 1 7 .051 -.237 
OSS3 1 7 .496 -.032 
OSS4 1 7 .255 -.522 
OSS5 1 7 .061 .108 
OSB1 1 7 -.445 -.702 
OSB2 1 7 -.416 -.815 
OSB3 1 7 -.248 -1.022 
Valid N (listwise) 207 
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4.6.2  Linearity   
Linearity is essential for all the multivariate techniques which measure correlational 
measures of association. It investigates the presence of a straight-line relationship 
between two variables (independent and dependent variables) (Malhotra, 2004; Hair et 
al., 2006). This implies that relationships should be explained in the form of linear 
relationship, as depicted in following formula.   
                     
A simple regression helps examination of linearity. The Scatterplots, normal probability 
plots, and regression-standardized residuals (Pallant, 2005) will determine the linearity 
between the variables. Accordingly, simple regression is performed for each pair of 
independent and dependent relationships. The fulfilment of this assumption provides 
cues of the existence of homoscedasticity as well.   
4.6.3  Homoscedasticity 
Homoscedasticity is another important assumption in multivariate analysis. It is 
commonly recognised as homogeneity, or uniformity of variance, with regards to the 
“dependent variable exhibiting similar amounts of variance across the range of predictor 
variables” (Stamatis, 2001, p. 140). It is evaluated for pairs of variables. There are two 
approaches for evaluating homoscedasticity, which are the graphical and statistical 
methods. Basically, Scatterplot and Boxplot facilitate the graphical representation of 
homoscedasticity, while Levenes test could be performed for the numerical analysis. 
However, the Levenes test is insensitive to departures from normality, making Bartlett's 
test more appropriate in those situations.   
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In this study, the normal probability plot and scatterplot were used to test the linearity 
and homoscedasticity of data. Figure 4.2 provides the evidence on linearity and 
homoscedasticity of the relationship between the degree of outsourcing (DOO), and 
outsourcing success (OS).   
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Linearity and Homoscedasticity in the Relationship Degree of 
Outsourcing (DOO) and Outsourcing Success (OS) Variables 
 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate the results of linearity and homoscedasticity between 
vendor management capability (VM) and outsourcing success as well as between 
vendors‟ service performance (VSP) and outsourcing success (OS). Consequently, the 
main variables of this study satisfy linearity and homoscedasticity assumptions for 
multivariate analysis.  
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Figure 4.3: Linearity and Homoscedasticity in the Relationship between Vendor 
Management Capability (VM) and Outsourcing Success Variables (OS) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Linearity and Homoscedasticity in the Relationship between Vendors’ 
Service Performance (VSP)  and Outsourcing Success Variables (OS) 
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4.6.4 Multicollinearity  
Multicollinearity is recognized as a problem of model fitting and the interpretation of 
relationships. It refers to the high intercorrelations among the independent variables, 
making it difficult to ascertain and separate the influence of a single independent 
variable on a dependent variable. Thus, the presence of multicollinearity can cause 
several problems such as inaccurate results of regression coefficient estimation 
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). Specifically, partial regression coefficient may not be a 
precise estimate, as the magnitude (i.e.    of beta coefficient (β) may change. Further, 
the stepwise regression may include/remove wrong independent variable(s) in order to 
increase the predictive power (i.e.    value). Therefore, ensuring that no 
multicollinearity problems exist is imperative for conducting a successful multivariate 
analysis. Basically, the correlation matrix of independent variable is useful to determine 
inter-correlations (should be < 0.9). Besides, multicollinearity problems should be taken 
into consideration if the tolerance value is less than 0.10 and VIF more than 10 (Belsley 
et al., 1980). 
Table 4.13: Collinearity Statistics for VSP, PQ, CP and OS 
 
 
  
Dependent Variable 
Dimensions/  
Variable 
Collinearity Statistics 
Tolerance VIF 
VSP 
PTQ .900 1.111 
HQ .525 1.906 
SQ .989 1.011 
OQ .509 1.963 
PQ 
COP .946 1.057 
PQT .794 1.260 
PQC .760 1.315 
CP 
CPC .174 5.741 
CPP .174 5.741 
OS 
OST .379 2.639 
OSS .386 2.592 
OSB .967 1.034 
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Tolerance is a value that measures the degree of the independent variable‟s variability 
not explained by other independent variable in the model. It is determined by using the 
formula 1-R
2
 for each variable. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is the reciprocal of 
the Tolerance (                  ). Table 4.13 illustrates the Collinearity statistics 
for constructs in the study, and only construct CP (i.e. partners compatibility) reports 
Tolerance rates closer to 0.1, where the dimension of the VIFs are moderately high. 
Therefore, the correlation matrix between variables are also performed, and shown in 
Table 4.14.  
As seen in Table 4.14, there is a (p=0.909) significant correlation between CPC and 
CPP, which can be detected as a multicollinearity issue. This will be further investigated 
in the measurement model.  
 
Based on the results of multivariate assumptions, it can be concluded that all variables 
are ensured of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity. Only one variable was 
detected with a multicollinearity issue (i.e. CP), which prompts further investigation in 
scale purification and measurement validation. Finally, the observed data is confirmed 
as suitable for multivariate analysis.  
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Table 4.14: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 DOO  VM PTQ HQ SQ OQ COP PQT PQC CPC CPP OST OSS OSB 
DOO  Pearson Correlation 1              
Sig. (2-tailed)               
VM Pearson Correlation .036 1             
Sig. (2-tailed) .604              
PTQ Pearson Correlation .247** .060 1            
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .387             
HQ Pearson Correlation .331** .031 .262** 1           
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .658 .000            
SQ Pearson Correlation -.044 .458** .049 -.029 1          
Sig. (2-tailed) .532 .000 .484 .677           
OQ Pearson Correlation .315** .008 .299** .687** -.071 1         
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .911 .000 .000 .307          
COP Pearson Correlation .064 .796** .019 .077 .418** .011 1        
Sig. (2-tailed) .361 .000 .787 .267 .000 .874         
PQT Pearson Correlation .371** .028 .243** .405** -.021 .592** -.007 1       
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .691 .000 .000 .768 .000 .915        
PQC Pearson Correlation .339** .228** .165* .251** .034 .249** .205** .443** 1      
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .018 .000 .626 .000 .003 .000       
CPC Pearson Correlation -.045 -.125 .018 .106 -.084 .009 -.068 -.003 -.101 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) .524 .072 .793 .127 .231 .901 .330 .963 .150      
CPP Pearson Correlation -.059 -.131 .006 .123 -.046 .028 -.069 .001 -.099 .909** 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) .400 .060 .932 .077 .511 .687 .326 .984 .154 .000     
OST Pearson Correlation .238** .072 .061 .210** .078 .330** .026 .140* -.011 -.006 -.045 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .306 .384 .002 .262 .000 .708 .044 .877 .926 .522    
OSS Pearson Correlation .261** .017 .015 .209** .043 .302** .003 .162* .051 -.041 -.064 .783** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .809 .833 .003 .539 .000 .965 .020 .466 .560 .360 .000   
OSB Pearson Correlation .051 .295** .055 .070 .496** .070 .329** .034 -.101 -.037 -.032 .177* .118 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .468 .000 .428 .313 .000 .317 .000 .622 .149 .600 .646 .011 .092  
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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4.7 MEASURE REFINEMENT AND VALIDATION    
The scale was purified earlier following the pilot test (n=30) prior to final data 
collection. Cronbach‟s alpha and item-total correlations were used to determine the 
appropriateness of items to each dimension/variable. However, there are twenty 
hypotheses which examine the casual relationships of this study.  Before proceeding to 
the inferential statistics, a scale purification process should be performed for the 
purpose of refining reliable and valid items to the structural model from the 
measurement model (Lu et al., 2007). As stated in Chapter 3, the assessment abides 
tests for unidimensionality, reliability and validity of the measure. The process 
determines the measurement model.  
4.7.1 Unidimensionality  
Hair et al (2006) identified „Unidimensionality‟ as a set of indicators with only one 
underlying latent construct (p.773), which actually measures the homogeneity of 
indicators. Therefore all indicators load as only one construct, and if the correlations 
among indicators could be accounted for a single common factor, it is known as 
unidimensionality. This can be accessed through the exploratory factor analysis, 
followed by a confirmatory factor analysis, as depicted in Figure 4.1. However, it 
should be noted that AMOS and SPSS have different factor extraction 
approaches/methods. AMOS uses „Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE)‟ by default, 
while SPSS uses the „Principle Component‟ analysis method. Hair et al. (2006) stated 
that MLE is an alternative to ordinary least squares used in multiple regressions, and it 
improves the parameter estimates in order to minimize a specified fit function (p.708), 
making the results similar or better. This study applied exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) to whole latent variables to determine the unidimensionality of the measure using 
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principle component analysis in SPSS. Unidimensionality will be further estimate the 
measurement model together with CFA, the result of goodness-of-fit, direction of paths, 
and the respective significant levels of individual variables.  
EFA is conducted using principal component analysis, and Varimax rotation methods, 
with Kaiser normalization (Kinnear and Gray, 1997). Prior to the analysis of EFA, the 
appropriateness of using EFA is determined by the results of KMO and Bartlett‟s test of 
sphericity. The results are displayed in Table 4.15 for vendor management capability 
(VM), vendors‟ service performance (VSP), partnership quality (PQ), partners‟ 
compatibility (CP) and outsourcing success (OS) constructs. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) measure of sampling adequacy is an index used to examine the appropriateness 
of factor analysis, with high values (between 0.5 and 1.0) indicating that factor analysis 
is appropriate (Malhotra, 2004).  
Table 4.15: KMO and Bartlett's Test for the Constructs of VM, VSP, PQ, PC and  OS. 
 VM VSP PQ CP OS For All 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy. 
.871 
.806 .907 . 859 .887 .838 
Bartlett's 
Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. 
Chi-
Square 
1155.74 997.67  3358.93 1250.48 1168.06  9248.24 
 Df 10 190 120 21 66 1770 
 Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
Bartlett's test of sphericity is a test used to examine the hypothesis stating that the 
variables are uncorrelated in the population.  In other words, the population correlation 
matrix is an identity matrix; each variable correlates perfectly with itself (r = 1), but has 
no correlation with the other variables (r = 0) (ibid). Accordingly, the KMO values for 
all constructs are reported to be above 0.8, fulfilling sample adequacy. Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity is significant for all constructs, and justifies that each construct correlates 
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perfectly with itself.  The results of KMO and Bartlett‟s test of sphericity (p<0.001) 
allow to forward data of this study for the EFA.  
Subsequently EFA is performed for each individual construct. Table 4.16 shows the 
EFA results for vendor management capability (VM) variable.  
Table 4.16: The EFA Results of Vendor Management Capability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.16 shows that all factor loadings are above 0.9. It yields only one factor based 
on an Eigenvalue of >1. The number of factors that fall into those variables is in 
accordance with theoretical predictions with the total variance explained by the factor as 
85.541 per cent.   
 
Next, the EFA for vendors‟ service performance (VSP) is evaluated, and shown in 
Table 4.17. The vendors‟ service performance construct consists of four latent variables 
(i.e. PTQ, HQ, SQ and OQ). The VSP scale was borrowed from Gounaris (2005a), 
which was rigorously tested for unidimensionality, reliability and validity. As noted in 
Chapter 3, the scale is known as INDSERV.  
  
Items: VM 
Component  
1. Total variance extracted by 1 factors = 
85.541% 
2. Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis.  
 
1 
VM_1 .908 
VM_2 .935 
VM_3 .947 
VM_4 .926 
VM_5 .908 
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Table 4.17: The EFA Results of VSP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even though the unidimensionality is not well demonstrated in VSP (except soft process 
quality and output quality dimensions), EFA created four factors. The number of factors 
generated is somehow aligned with the basic scale (i.e. INDSERV). These four factors 
explain only 48.141per cent of total variance, which is considerably low. The PTQ (i.e. 
potential quality) items are scattered among three factors and this results in poor 
Items/dimensions: (VSP) 
Component 
1 2 3 4 
Potential Quality 
PTQ1 
 
-.059 
 
.104 
 
.655 
 
.110 
PTQ2 .089 -.038 .243 -.556 
PTQ5 .170 -.047 .063 .620 
PTQ6 .403 -.131 -.051 .196 
Soft Process Quality 
SQ1 
 
.064 
 
.205 
 
.166 
 
.566 
SQ2 .081 .742 .029 .013 
SQ3 -.096 .715 .228 .178 
SQ4 .130 .684 .173 -.003 
SQ5 .221 .677 -.271 .029 
SQ6 .182 .677 -.248 .023 
Hard Process Quality 
HQ1 
 
-.142 
 
-.131 
 
.315 
 
.507 
HQ2 -.135 .184 .618 -.135 
HQ3 -.334 .145 .549 .046 
HQ4 .132 .144 .517 .198 
HQ5 .725 .003 -.055 .159 
Output Quality 
OQ1 
 
.693 
 
.105 
 
.181 
 
-.034 
OQ2 .642 .101 -.088 .107 
OQ3 .660 .138 .319 -.178 
OQ4 .682 .242 .264 -.128 
OQ5 .639 -.039 .437 .058 
1. Total variance extracted by 4 factors = 48.141% 
2. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
3. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
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discriminant validity. Furthermore, SQ1, HQ1 and HQ5 have deviated from the 
theoretically defined location. 
With respect to the factor loadings, the PTQ6 is determined to be below 0.5. The 
deletion of items due to statistical issues is not advisable in the beginning (Hair et al., 
2006), as this may affect construct validity. Moreover, the main purpose of EFA is to 
explore the factor structure (Child, 1990). Thus VSP with all items is forwarded to 
reliability tests for further investigations.  
Thereafter, the EFA for partnership quality (PQ) is assessed, and the results are depicted 
in Table 4.18.  
Table 4.18: The EFA Results of PQ 
 
Items/dimensions
: PQ 
Component 
1 2 3 
Cooperativeness  
COP1 
 
.919 
 
.155 
 
.084 
COP2 .931 .171 .057 
COP3 .911 .190 .065 
COP4 .924 .186 .099 
COP5 .917 .186 .075 
COP6 .855 .302 .026 
COP7 .870 .218 .065 
COP8 .774 .360 -.085 
Trust 
PQT1 
 
.283 
 
.907 
 
.193 
PQT2 .277 .913 .233 
PQT3 .297 .898 .239 
PQT4 .293 .896 .212 
Commitment 
PQC1 
 
.135 
 
.180 
 
.870 
PQC2 .004 .158 .908 
PQC3 -.028 .119 .906 
PQC4 .087 .218 .824 
1. Total variance extracted by 4 factors = 86.308% 
2. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
3. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
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Table 4.18 shows EFA result of partnership quality (PQ) construct. The eigenvalues >1 
generated three factors and all items are reported to be above 0.7 factor loadings. 
Therefore, the unidimensionality of the construct is fully assured.  Total variance 
explained by the three factors is 86.308 per cent which further indicates that the 
observed data successfully distinguished the three factors of partnership quality.  
Next, the EFA for partners‟ compatibility (CP) is assessed. Table 4.19 shows the results 
of the assessment. Theoretically, CP consists of two latent variables (i.e. CPC and CPP), 
but EFA analysis for CP demonstrates that CP itself is a latent variable, as all items fall 
under one factor with high factor loadings. Therefore, CP, as a latent variable has a very 
high unidimensionality, which explains approximately 76 per cent of variance.  
 
Table 4.19: The EFA Results of CP 
 
Items: Partners‟ 
Compatibility 
Component 
1 
CPC1 .870 
CPC2 .883 
CPC3 .808 
CPP1 .906 
CPP2 .843 
CPP3 .870 
CPP4 .917 
1. Total variance extracted by one  factor = 75.979% 
2. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Table 4.20 summarizes the EFA for outsourcing success (OS) construct. It produced 
two factors (eigenvalue>1). Theoretically there are three factors for OS. However, the 
observed data clearly distinguish them into two separate factors. Factor /component 1 
represents the „operational’ measures of outsourcing success, while factor/component 2 
indicates „behavioural‟ measures of outsourcing success. All factor loadings are 
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reported to be above 0.5, which indicates satisfactory convergence as well. However, 
these two factors measure 60.838 per cent of the total variance, which is appropriate.  
Table 4.20: The EFA Results of Outsourcing Success 
 
Items/dimensions: OS 
Component 
1 2 
Tactical measures 
OST1 
 
.749 
 
-.012 
OST2 .740 .195 
OST3 .797 .109 
OST4 .802 .142 
Strategic measures 
OSS1 
 
.774 
 
.191 
OSS2 .732 .054 
OSS3 .665 -.160 
OSS4 .704 .069 
OSS5 .567 -.033 
Behavioural measures  
OSB1 
 
.019 
 
.872 
OSB2 .131 .901 
OSB3 .040 .889 
1. Total variance extracted by 3 factors = 60.838 % 
2. Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
3. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
In conclusion, the results of EFA confirm that VM and PQ successfully satisfied the 
conditions of unidimensionality. EFA proposed changes in the factor structure in CP 
and OS. Thus, in comparison to theory, CP and OS constructs moderately satisfy 
unidimensionality.  Even though VSP is adopted from a previously developed scale, it 
reported poor EFA results. Furthermore, one item was detected (i.e. PTQ6) at below 
threshold level of factor loadings, while SQ1 and HQ1 also deviated from the original 
location. However, none of them were deleted and forwarded to reliability analysis for 
further investigation of their qualification/disqualification for them to be included as 
items in the measurement model. 
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4.7.2 Reliability  
Hair et al (2006) defined reliability as a measure of, the degree to which a set of 
indicators of a latent construct is internally consistent in their measure (p.710). 
Basically, Cronbach‟s alpha is used to determine the internal consistency (i.e. 
reliability) of the measures. As a rule of thumb, the scale is considered reliable when 
Cronbach‟s alpha is greater than 0.7. An alpha value of more than 0.7 would indicate 
that the items are homogeneous, and measuring the same construct. However, Hair et al. 
(1998) recommended that Cronbach‟s alpha values from 0.6 to 0.7 were deemed to be 
the lower limit of acceptability.  
Besides, item-total correlation should be above 0.25 (Nunnally, 1978) for it to qualify as 
a reliable item. As noted in Chapter 3, a pilot study was carried out to test the reliability 
of each construct of the study, and 2 items were removed (i.e. PTQ 3 and PTQ4) from 
the total item list, where item-total correlations were below threshold. However, the 
measurement model is required to perform Cronbach‟s alpha and composite reliability 
for further scale purification.  
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Table 4.21: Cronbach‟s  Alpha Reliability   
 
Variables/Items 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach’s α if 
deleted 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Vendor management capability   0.946 
VM_1 .845 .936  
VM_2 .890 .934  
VM_3 .909 .933  
VM_4 .887 .928  
VM_5 .861 .934  
Vendors‟ potential quality   0.250 
PTQ1 .080 -.079
a
  
PTQ2 -.033 .086  
PTQ5 .010 .022  
PTQ6 -.003 .044  
Vendors‟  hard process quality   0.597 
HQ1 .118 .647  
HQ2 .417 .506  
HQ3 .331 .554  
HQ4 .378 .527  
HQ5 .529 .437  
Vendors‟  soft  process quality   0.725 
SQ1 .188 .763  
SQ2 .535 .663  
SQ3 .517 .669  
SQ4 .498 .676  
SQ5 .519 .669  
SQ6 .522 .669  
Vendors‟  output quality   0.795 
OQ1 .593 .750  
OQ2 .420 .803  
OQ3 .598 .748  
OQ4 .660 .728  
OQ5 .610 .744  
Partnership quality: cooperativeness   0.972 
COP1 .908 .967  
COP2 .924 .966  
COP3 .907 .967  
COP4 .924 .967  
COP5 .914 .967  
COP6 .877 .969  
COP7 .870 .969  
COP8 .792 .974  
Partnership quality: trust   0.982 
PQT1  .945 .979  
PQT2 .970 .972  
PQT3 .957 .975  
PQT4 .944 .979  
Partnership quality: commitment   0.916 
PQC1 .810 .891  
PQC2 .849 .878  
PQC3 .825 .886  
PQC4 .755 .910  
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 Table 4.21: Cronbach‟s  Alpha Reliability Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The construct must be established before assessing its validity. Therefore, Cronbach‟s 
alpha is calculated using SPSS version 18, and the values are shown in Table 4.21. 
Based on facts provided in Table 4.21, all latent variables except PTQ and HQ are 
reported to be above 0.7 Cronbach‟s alpha reliability. Therefore, those variables have 
high internal consistency. Among them, „trust‟ (one of the dimensions of partnership 
quality) reports the highest reliability (0.982).  
As noted previously, PTQ, HQ, SQ and OQ are the dimensions of vendors‟ service 
performance. PTQ dimension is discarded, due to very low alpha value (0.25), and item-
correlations are below the cut-off point (0.25). Despite this, HQ is reported to be below 
threshold level (0.597), but it is very close to the 0.6 minimum level. Even though, the 
deletion of HQ1 could increase the reliability to 0.647, it may affect the content validity 
of the scale. Besides, SQ1 also reports a low item–total correlation (0.188), but the 
Partners‟ compatibility: culture   0.854 
CPC1 .736 .785  
CPC2 .721 .800  
CPC3 .718 .802  
Partners‟ compatibility: competitive 
priorities 
  0.919 
CPP1 .848 .882  
CPP2 .714 .928  
CPP3 .819 .892  
CPP4 .876 .872  
Outsourcing success : tactical   0.840 
 OST1  .615 .823  
 OST2 .686 .792  
 OST3             .685 .792  
OST4 .708 .782  
Outsourcing success: strategic   0.781 
OSS1 .547 .718  
OSS2 .588 .696  
OSS3 .521 .731  
OSS4 .600 .689  
OSS5 .485 .762  
Outsourcing success: behavioural    0.876 
OSB1  .727 .854  
OSB2 .798 .790  
OSB3 .758 .827  
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deletion of the item does not significantly increase the reliability of the variable.  At the 
moment, four items (whole PTQ) are deleted and hence, HQ1 and SQ1 may remain 
with the original scale. Other than the above highlights, „item total correlations‟ of all 
items (except SQ1 and HQ1) range from 0.331 to 0.97. Summarizing the 
aforementioned facts, the reliability test discards the whole PTQ variable, and forwards 
all other variables to the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).   
In addition to Cronbach‟s alpha reliability, CFA computes composite reliability (CR) 
and average variance extracted (AVE). Composite reliability is also known as constructs 
reliability (CR), and is calculated as follows. 
 
 
 
Where,  λ1 = the squared sum of factor loadings 
i    = number of items 
δ1 = the error variance terms for the indicator 
 
Composite reliability (CR) indicates the extent to which a set of indicators is being 
consistent in their measurement of the same construct (Lu et al., 2007). According to 
Nunnally (1978), a scale with a CR value of 0.6 and above is considered to acquire a 
reasonable internal consistency. VE also determines the convergent validity, which will 
be described in the next section. Nevertheless, Hair et al. (2006) stated that, even 
though the measurement reliability is necessary, it is not a sufficient condition for 
determines the validity. Therefore, the validity for each construct is assessed.  
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4.7.3 Validity  
Construct validity concerns the extent to which a set of measured variables actually 
represents the theoretical latent construct those variables are designed to measure (Hair 
et al., 2006, p. 776). It comprises of four components: content , convergent, discriminat 
and nomological. Regarding content validity, the survey instruments considered in the 
present study are established, as they have been aptly developed through a thorough 
review of related literature. It also refined with reference to the relevant experts‟ 
opinions. As noted in Chapter 3, this is assessed in the pre-test stage before finalising 
the measurement instrument for the final data collection. Then, the CFA procedure will 
further determine the convergent and discriminant validity of the constructs in the study.  
Convergent validity represents the extent to which items of the same latent variable are 
measuring the same construct, and it can be assessed by factor loadings. Higher factor 
loadings represent higher convergent validity, while all factor loadings should be 
statistically significant.  
 
 
Where, 
λ = standardized factor loading 
i = number of items 
As Hair et al. (2006) pointed out, a good rule of thumb is that standardized loading 
estimates should be 0.5 or higher, and ideally 0.7 or higher (p. 777). Moreover, the 
average percentage of Varience Extracted (VE) is another indicator of convergence. 
 The Average Variance Extracted (AVE) is an estimate, which calculates the average 
amount of variances in indicators that are accounted for by the underlying factor (Taylor 
n
AVE
n
i
i
 1
2
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and Hunter, 2003). AVE achieves 0.5 or greater (Fornell and Larcker, 1981), taken as 
the cut off value, assures that at least 50 per cent or more of the variances in the 
observed variables are explained by the set of indicators.  
Next, discriminant validity indicates the extent to which a construct is truly distinct 
from other constructs (Hair et al., 2006, p. 778). As a rule of thumb, all construct 
average variance extracted (AVE) estimates should be larger than the corresponding 
„squared inter-construct correlation estimates‟ (SIC).    This indicates that the measured 
variables have more in common with the construct they are associated with, than they 
do with the other constructs.  
Nomological validity is tested by examining whether the correlations between the 
constructs in the measurement model are logical (Hair et al., 2006, p. 778), 
corresponding with previous literature. Although previously developed scales were 
applied in this study, their validity still needs to be tested. Accordingly, the 
measurement model of SEM performs confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), which 
further tests and verifies the reliability and validity of the scales.  
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in SEM was used to test the conceptual model that 
examined the antecedents of outsourcing success in services industry in this study.  
According to Anderson and Gerbing (1988), confirmatory measurement models should 
be evaluated and re-specified before the measurement and structural models are 
examined. Thus, each construct of the model was separately analysed.  Thus, CFA was 
conducted with structural equation model (SEM) using AMOS 18.0 software with 207 
samples to test the underlying dimensions of the five constructs, namely: vendor 
management capability, vendors‟ service performance, partnership quality, partners‟ 
compatibility and outsourcing success.  
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As recommended by Hair et al. (2006), the reported GOF (goodness of fit) indices 
include at least one absolute measure (χ2/df/ p value/GFI/RMSR/ RMSEA), incremental 
measure (NFI/ CFI/ TLI/RNI) and parsimony (PRATIO/ PCFI/ PNFI) fit measure. 
These indices are briefly explained in Table 4.22. Moreover, SEM (AMOS and 
LISREL) compute Hoelter's critical N. Hoelter's critical N helps to judge if the sample's 
size is adequate, when it is Hoelter's N > 200. If Hoelter's N is under 75, it is considered 
unacceptably low to be accepted as a model by chi-square.  
Table 4.22: Goodness of Fit Indices 
 
Fit Measure Fit Measures’ Indicators 
Chi-Square (χ2) A P value greater than 0.05 indicates an acceptable fit. 
CMIN/DF (χ2/df) A value close to one and not exceeding 3 indicates a good fit. 
RMESA A value about 0.05 or less indicates a close fit of the model. 
A value of about 0.08 or less indicates a reasonable error of approximation 
TLI A value between 0 to 1.00. A value close to 1.00 indicating a very good fit. 
CFI A value between 0 and 1, a value close to 1 indicate very good fit. 
NFI A value between 0 and 1, 1 indicates a perfect fit. 
GFI A value always less than or equal to 1, and 1 indicates a perfect fit. 
AGFI A value is bounded above by 1 and is not bounded by 0 and I indicated perfect fit 
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4.8 MEASUREMENT MODEL 
The measurement model is tested and constructed with first order and second order 
CFA. Accordingly, the first section discusses the first order CFA for each construct, in 
order to finalize the first order measurement model (Please refer Appendix E for AMOS 
outputs). Then, the second order CFA will further confirm the appropriateness of the 
measurement model for the structural model. CFA assumes the normality of data, hence 
simultaneously testing it in AMOS output.  
The theoretical model however consists of six constructs, but, only five are forwarded to 
the first order measurement model, and the degree of outsourcing (DOO) is eliminated. 
As previously noted, it is a derived variable (breadth x  depth), and the presences of 
both items are vital to interpret the construct. Therefore, it is identified as an „observed 
variable‟ in AMOS, and will appear only in the second order measurement model. 
 
4.8.1 First Order Measurement Models. 
a) Vendor management capability  
Vendor management capability (VM) is a latent variable consisting of five items, and 
the results of first order CFA analysis for vendor management capability (VM) is shown 
in Figure 4.5.The model is significant at 5per cent level (p=0.023) 
All factor loadings are significant, and are reported to be above 0.8. Thus, a 5-item 
model for vendor management capability construct is assured a convergent validity and 
remains as default.  Next, GOF indices indicate that, the data have a good fit to the 
model (see Table 4.23). 
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*Factor loadings are significant at 0.05 level 
Figure 4.5: 1st order Measurement Model for Vendor Management Capability 
 
Table 4.23: GOF measures of Vendor Management Capability 
 
Absolute Incremental 
CIMIN/DF GFI AGFI RMSEA NFI RFI IFI TLI CFI 
0.587 .997 .983 .000 .999 .995 1.001 1.003 1.000 
The absolute indices confirm that the observed data perfectly fit the theory 
(CIMIN/DF<3; GFI=.997; AGFI=.983). However, RMSEA is a  bit lower and indicates 
the close fit of the model. But, all incremental fit indices report values of above 0.9 to 1. 
This demonstrates that the specified model perfectly fits the baseline (null) model. In 
fact, Hair et al. (2006) do not recommended parsimony measure for assessing single 
model fits.  Accordingly, the results confirm the factor structure, as shown in Figure 4.5. 
Besides, ‘Hoelter's critical N‟ for 0.5 and 0.1 level is greater than 200, and this justifies 
the adequacy of the sample for the interpretation of the model.  
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b) Vendors’ Service Performance (VSP). 
 
Figure 4.6: 1st order Measurement Model for Vendors’ Service Performance 
Previously, vendors‟ service performance (VSP) is refined with Cronbach‟s alpha value, 
and one dimension (i.e. PTQ) is removed from the scale. The rest of the items are 
forwarded into CFA. The first order CFA for VSP is shown in Figure 4.6. 
Accordingly, HQ1, 3, 4; SQ1, 2, 3, 4 report standardized regression weights below 0.5, 
and subsequently, stepwise deletion of items starting from the lowest standardized 
regression weight is conducted. 
For instance, SQ1 reports the lowest value (0.16), hence it is discarded first, followed 
by HQ1, HQ2 and HQ3 in successive stages. Ultimately, the measurement model for 
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VSP is finalized, as depicted in Figure 4.7. The refined model (i.e. model in Figure 4.7) 
represents ‘Hoelter's critical N‟ for 0.5 as 160, and 0.1 as 180, which confirms the 
adequacy of the sample for the model. However, the refined model (in Figure 4.7) 
contains items with low (i.e. HQ3 and SQ4) and marginal convergence validity (i.e. 
HQ4, HQ5 and OQ2). 
Indeed, these items will affect AVE and discriminant validity of the latent 
variables/construct. But the study still wishes to maintain them, as the deletion of 
further items could seriously affect the content validity of the INDSERV scale. The 
above results further indicate a mismatch of the scale to the South Asian context. 
The refined model consists of 12 items (even two of them below 0.5). All standardized 
regression weights and correlations are significant at 5 per cent significance level. The 
observed data however, demonstrates that, the purified scale (with 12 items) has 
satisfactory goodness of fit (GOF) (Table 4.24). 
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*Factor loadings are significant at 0.05 level 
Figure 4.7: Purified 1st order Measurement Model for Vendors’ Service 
Performance 
 
Table 4.24: GOF measures of Vendors‟ Service Performance 
Absolute Incremental 
CIMIN/DF GFI AGFI RMSEA IFI TLI CFI 
1.730 .940 .910 .060 .947 .931 .946 
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According to Table 4.24, the absolute fit indices confirm the fit between the observed 
data and the model. The RMSEA is within range of 0.05- 0.08, indicating that badness 
of fit of the model is negligible.  Then, incremental indices are above 0.9, confirming 
that the construct fits the baseline model, assuming that all observed variables are 
uncorrelated (Hair et al. 2006; p.749).   
 
c) Partnership Quality (PQ) 
The partnership quality construct consists of three latent variables (i.e. cooperativeness, 
trust and commitment). The CFA for PQ is reported in Figure 4.8. All factor loadings 
and correlations are significant and none of items reported less convergence validity.  
With regards to the GOF indices of the model, the majority have reached satisfactory 
levels, as demonstrated in Table 4.25. Absolute GOF indices are however; relatively 
lower than the incremental indices. This is may be due to the slightly higher correlation 
between COP and PQC, but the model is still significant, at a 5 per cent level. 
Furthermore, the RMSEA is below 0.08, satisfying the absolute model fit.  
„Hoelter's critical N‟ for 0.5(116) and 0.1 (127) is above 75, maintaining the adequacy 
of the sample.  Thus, the model in Figure 4.8 can be accepted based on the Chi square 
value.  
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*Factor loadings are significant at 0.05 level 
Figure 4.8: 1st order Measurement Model for Partnership Quality 
 
Table 4.25: GOF measures of Partnership Quality 
Absolute Incremental 
CIMIN/DF GFI RMSEA NFI RFI IFI TLI CFI 
2.211 .886 .077 .952 .942 .973 .968 .973 
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d) Partners’ Compatibility (CP) 
 
*correlation is significant at 0.05 level 
Figure 4.9: 1st order Measurement Model for Partners’ Compatibility 
 
First order CFA for partners‟ compatibility is illustrated in Figure 4.9. All the items 
showed the appropriate convergence validity (>0.8), but there is a significant correlation 
between CPC and CPP which is greater than 1. This implies that the two latent variables 
are highly (over) correlated. Referring to the exploratory factor analysis (EFA for CP) in 
Table 4.19, it suggests that partners‟ compatibility is a latent variable containing all the 
items of CPC and CPP.  
 
Roh et al. (2008) and Carmel and Tjia (2005), however, stated that organisational 
culture and competitive priorities are intricately interwoven.  Therefore, CPC and CPP 
combined as one latent variable and it is tested in CFA, and the outcome is 
demonstrated in Figure 4.10. 
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Figure 4.10: 1
st
 order Measurement Model for Partners‟ Compatibility as a latent 
variable 
 
Accordingly, the standardized regression weights (in Figure 4.10) of all items are 
significant, and most of them are better compared to the previous model (in Figure 4.9). 
These are outlined in Table 4.26. 
 
Table 4.26: Cronbach‟s Alpha and Path comparison of CP models 
Model in Figure 4.9 Model in Figure 4.10 
Path Std.Reg. 
weight  
Path Std.Reg. 
weight  
CPC1 <--- CPC .843 CPC1 <--- CPP .865 
CPC2 <--- CPC .834 CPC2 <--- CPP .795 
CPC3 <--- CPC .751 CPC3 <--- CPP .767 
CPP1 <--- CPP .898 CPP1 <--- CPP .915 
CPP2 <--- CPP .808 CPP2 <--- CPP .742 
CPP3 <--- CPP .851 CPP3 <--- CPP .867 
CPP4 <--- CPP .907 CPP4 <--- CPP .915 
Cronbach‟s α 
CPC 0.854 Cronbach‟s 
α 
CP 0.941 
CPP 0.919 
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Table 4.26 clearly shows the internal consistency (i.e. Cronbach‟s α) of the construct, as 
the latent variable increased. 
Next, the Chi square of the model in Figure 4.10 is significant under 5 per cent level. 
Hoelter's critical N for 0.5(242) and 0.1 (249) also confirms the adequacy of the sample 
for accepting the model, based on Chi square significance. With respect to the model fit 
indices, all absolute, incremental and parsimony indices confirm the appropriateness of 
the model (Please refer Table 4.27).  
Table 4.27: GOF measures of Partners‟ Compatibility 
Absolute Incremental 
CIMIN/DF GFI RMSEA RMR NFI RFI IFI TLI CFI 
1.470 .973 0.048 .014 .988 .980 .996 .993 .996 
 
 
e) Outsourcing Success (OS) 
Outsourcing  success is the main focus (dependent variable) of this study. It is to be 
measured according to three dimensions (i.e. OST, OSS and OSB). The CFA is 
performed in order to confirm the theory deduced with observed data. The basic first 
order CFA model is illustrated in Figure 4.11.  
There are 12 items altogether measuring the construct. The regression weights of all 
items are within the satisfactory level (>0.5), except OSS5 (0.48). Therefore, OSO5 is 
discarded in order to maintain the appropriate convergence of the construct. OSS5 
represents “innovations” as an outcome of outsourcing. This implies that, the context of 
the study does not perceive „innovation‟ as a valid outcome of outsourcing.  
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*correlation is significant at 0.05 level 
Figure 4.11: 1
st
 order Measurement Model for Outsourcing Success. 
 
Furthermore, there is a significant correlation (p=.000) between OST and OSS which 
exceeds the value of 1. This creates a non-positive definite covariance matrix, and 
which demonstrates that these two latent variables are highly correlated. Therefore, 
EFA is recalled to check the factor structure proposed by the observed data, which 
appears in Table 4.20 (the EFA results of OS). The EFA also confirms that the model 
have only two factors, rather than three. Thus, as previously noted, the factors are 
categorised under: „operational measures‟ (OSO) and „behavioural measures‟ (OSB).  
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* Significant at 0.05 level 
 
 
Figure 4.12: 1
st
 order Measurement Model for Outsourcing Success with two 
dimensions. 
 
Based on the categorisation proposed by both EFA and CFA, the model for OS is drawn 
as a construct containing OSO and OSB dimensions.  Subsequently, CFA is performed 
again, with the aforementioned changes, and reported in Figure 4.12.  The standardized 
regression coefficients of items improve slightly. The Cronbach‟s  Alpha for the two 
new components report values of 0.891 (OSO) and 0.876 (OSB), confirming the 
internal consistency. Next, the GOF indices of the model are shown in Table 4.28. 
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Table 4.28: GOF measures of Partners‟ Compatibility 
Absolute Incremental 
CIMIN/DF GFI AGFI RMSEA NFI RFI IFI TLI CFI 
1.413 .947 0.919 .045 .946 .931 .984 .979 .984 
 
All incremental indices confirm the model fit between the baseline null model and the 
default model. Badness of fit is reported (i.e. RMSEA) at only 4.5 per cent, along with 
other absolute measures, which proved the alignment between theory and observed data. 
Additionally, „Hoelter's critical N‟ for 0.5(202) and 0.1 (229) satisfies the adequacy of 
the sample for accepting the model, based on Chi square significance. 
The whole measurement model is developed based on the first order confirmatory factor 
analysis results for each construct. It contains only refined items (except there are some 
items in VSP below threshold level) in each construct, and only „unobserved constructs‟ 
which are individually validated above.  
Figure 4.13 shows the first order measurement model for all „unobserved constructs‟ 
(both exogenous and endogenous variables). The   standardized regression weights of 
the model lie within a range of 0.43 to 0.99, and all of them are significant at 5 per cent 
level of significance. 
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* Significant at 0.05 level 
Figure 4.13: 1
st
 order Measurement Model. 
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However, the lowest value is reported from SQ 4, and the highest is from PQT2.  All 
positive correlations range from 0.00 to 0.69, but there are six negative correlation 
figures in the model, appearing in Table 4.29.  
Table 4.29: Negative correlations paths and their significance 
Path Estimate P 
OSB <--> CP -.111 .147 
CP <--> VM. -.464 *** 
PQT <--> VM -.251 *** 
COP <--> VM -.718 *** 
COP <--> SQ -.013 .862 
COP <--> OSB -.127 .093 
 
Accordingly, negative correlations are significant only for correlations between VM 
with CP, PQT, and COP.  CP, PQT and COP are latent variables that are supposed to 
have a moderating effect. Therefore, the reasons for negative correlations are further 
investigated and explained in the structural model when explaining relationships.  
As far as GOF indices of the model are concerned, they confirmed the appropriateness 
of the model. Those indices are shown in Table 4.30.   
Table 4.30: GOF measures of First order Measurement Model 
Absolute Incremental Parsimony 
CIMIN/DF RMR RMSEA IFI TLI CFI PRATIO 
1.792 .044 .062 .912 .904 .911 .921 
 
Based on figures in Table 4.30, the observed data have confirmed the theory deduced 
(absolute GOF), and tally the default model with the null model (incremental GOF). 
Parsimony Goodness-of-Fit Index (PRATIO) also shows the complexity (number of 
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estimated parameters) of the hypothesized model in the assessment of overall model fit. 
Therefore, the first order measurement model is satisfied the required GOF. is 
confirmed. For further confirmation of the validity of items and model fit, second order 
CFA is performed.  
 
4.8.2 Second Order Measurement Models 
The second order model is performed in two stages (please refer Appendix F for AMOS 
outputs for all second order CFA). First, only independent and dependent variables are 
taken into consideration. Then, the second order CFA is performed with all variables, 
including observed and moderating variables.  
As previously noted, degree of outsourcing (DOO) is introduced as an observed variable 
to the second order models. Figure 4.14 depicts the second order CFA for independent 
and dependent variables. Accordingly, the standard regression weights of all items 
(except SQ4) and covariances are significant at 5 per cent significance level, and are 
above 0.5. This shows that the items in the model ensured the appropriate convergence. 
Next, VM and OS are highly correlated. When synthesising the result with the reality it 
is confirmed that vendor management capability of the firm (VM) has high impact on 
outsourcing success (OS). The model is significant and showing sufficient fit (refer 
Table 4.31).  
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* Significant at 0.05 level 
Figure 4.14: 2
nd
 order Measurement Model with Independent and dependent variables. 
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The CIMIN/DF is close to 1 and below 3; the RMSEA is 0.048, proving the absolute 
model fit. Then, all incremental and parsimony indices depicted in the table are above 
0.9, assuring satisfactory model fit. 
 „Hoelter's critical N‟ of 0.5(158) and 0.1 (166) satisfy the adequacy of the sample, for 
accepting the model based on Chi-square significance. Likewise, the second order 
model without moderating variables assures the appropriate model fit and item 
convergence. 
 
Table 4.31: GOF measures of 2
nd
order Measurement Model without moderating 
variables 
Absolute Incremental Parsimony 
CIMIN/DF RMR RMSEA IFI TLI CFI PRATIO 
1.469 .078 .048 .948 .942 .947 .904 
 
Two moderating constructs are added to the model. Figure 4.15 demonstrates the 
second order CFA for all variables.  
Considering all regression weights of items, only SQ4 is reported to be below 0.5 level. 
Moreover, OS to OSB; VSP to SQ; PQ to PQC are reported to be below 0.5 level as 
well. As demonstrated in Figure 4.15, the correlation between VM and OS is much 
higher.  
Some negative correlations are also detected in the model. Table 4.32 illustrates the 
covariance and significance of these negative correlation paths. Among them, only VM 
and PQ as well as CP and VM paths are significant.   
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Table 4.32: Covariance and their significance 
Path Estimate S.E. C.R. P 
VM. <--> OS. .365 .061 5.950 *** 
VM. <--> VSP. .140 .047 2.996 .003 
VM. <--> PQ. -.340 .045 -7.506 *** 
VM. <--> DOO .302 .078 3.893 *** 
OS. <--> VSP. .166 .040 4.152 *** 
OS. <--> PQ. -.003 .025 -.116 .908 
OS. <--> DOO .344 .064 5.365 *** 
PQ. <--> VSP. .094 .027 3.523 *** 
VSP. <--> DOO .209 .057 3.672 *** 
PQ. <--> DOO .018 .041 .442 .658 
VM. <--> CP. -.401 .073 -5.454 *** 
CP. <--> OS. -.036 .046 -.782 .434 
CP. <--> VSP. .119 .046 2.585 .010 
CP. <--> PQ. .267 .042 6.387 *** 
CP. <--> DOO -.069 .075 -.920 .357 
 
The covariance between CP and DOO, CP and OS as well as OS and PQ are not 
significant. Next, „Hoelter's critical N‟ of 0.5(100) and 0.1 (103) sufficiently satisfy the 
adequacy of the sample for accepting the model based on Chi square significance. The 
GOF indices are shown in Table 4.33. 
 
Table 4.33: GOF measures of 2
nd
 order Measurement Model with moderating variables 
Absolute Incremental Parsimony 
CIMIN/DF RMR RMSEA IFI TLI CFI PRATIO 
2.199 .072 .076 .900 .898 .901 .942 
 
Absolute and incremental indices show a marginal model fit. The CIMIN/DF is close to 
3 and the RMSEA is close to 0.08, which signify a poor goodness of fit. Meanwhile, 
only IFI and CFI achieve the satisfactory level of model fit.  PRATIO however, shows a 
good parsimony level.   
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* Significant at 0.05 level 
Figure 4.15: 2
nd
 order Measurement Model with all variables. 
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4.8.3 Convergent Validity, Construct Reliability and Discriminant Validity. 
The first order CFA is more important in verifying the convergent and discriminant 
validity. The next sections assess them with regards to first order CFA. As previously 
noted, the convergent validity of each variable/construct can be further assessed with 
the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) and Composite Reliability (CR). Table 4.34 
shows AVE and CR for each variable in the measurement model. 
Table 4.34: Standardized Regression Weights, Average Variance Extracted 
and Composite Reliability 
Variable/ 
Items 
Stad.  Reg 
Weights (λ) 
(λ)2 
Item error  
(δ) 
AVE CR 
OS : Behavioural (OSB) 0.70 0.93 
OSB3 0.833 0.694 0.167   
OSB2 0.897 0.805 0.103   
OSB1 0.784 0.615 0.216   
OS: Operational (OSO) 0.52 0.70 
OSS4 0.667 0.445 0.333   
OSS3 0.568 0.323 0.432   
OSS2 0.694 0.482 0.306   
OSS1 0.751 0.564 0.249   
OST4 0.793 0.629 0.207   
OST3 0.790 0.624 0.210   
OST2 0.732 0.536 0.268   
OST1 0.705 0.497 0.295   
Vendor Mgt Capability (VM) 0.81 0.98 
VM_5 0.870 0.757 0.130   
VM_4 0.905 0.819 0.095   
VM_3 0.936 0.876 0.064   
VM_2 0.925 0.856 0.075   
VM_1 0.884 0.781 0.116   
VSP: Hard Process Quality (HQ) 0.32 0.75 
HQ3 0.537 0.288 0.463   
HQ5 0.620 0.384 0.380   
HQ4 0.545 0.297 0.455   
HQ2 0.564 0.318 0.436   
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Table 4.34: Standardized Regression Weights, Average Variance Extracted 
and Composite Reliability Continued.  
 
VSP: Soft Process Quality (SQ) 0.53 0.83 
SQ6 0.830 0.689 0.170   
SQ5 0.851 0.724 0.149   
SQ4 0.432 0.187 0.568   
VSP: Output Quality (OQ) 0.45 0.87 
OQ5 0.657 0.432 0.343   
OQ4 0.737 0.543 0.263   
OQ3 0.696 0.484 0.304   
OQ2 0.547 0.299 0.453   
OQ1 0.697 0.486 0.303   
PQ: Cooperativeness (COP) 0.81 0.98 
COP5 0.933 0.870 0.067   
COP4 0.948 0.899 0.052   
COP3 0.932 0.869 0.068   
COP2 0.944 0.891 0.056   
COP1 0.923 0.852 0.077   
COP6 0.867 0.752 0.133   
COP7 0.871 0.759 0.129   
COP8 0.803 0.645 0.197   
PQ:  Trust (PQT) 0.92 0.99 
PQT4 0.936 0.876 0.064   
PQT3 0.956 0.914 0.044   
PQT2 0.992 0.984 0.008   
PQT1 0.963 0.927 0.037   
PQ : Commitment (PQC) 0.72 0.95 
PQC4 0.795 0.632 0.205   
PQC3 0.902 0.814 0.098   
PQC2 0.874 0.764 0.126   
PQC1 0.832 0.692 0.168   
Partners‟ Compatibility  (CP) 0.71 0.53 
CPP1 0.905 0.819 0.095   
CPP2 0.760 0.578 0.240   
CPP3 0.856 0.733 0.144   
CPP4 0.902 0.814 0.098   
CPC3 0.789 0.623 0.211   
CPC2 0.816 0.666 0.184   
CPC1 0.875 0.766 0.125   
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The AVE of less than 0.5 shows that, on average, more error remains in the item than 
variance explained by the latent factor structure imposed on the measure (Hair, 2006; 
Lu et al, 2007). Table 4.34 shows two variables (HQ=.32, OQ=.45) having lower 
convergence validity (AVE). Even though SQ 4 has the lowest item loading, the SQ 
variable has maintained an appropriate level validity, at the expense of the rest of the 
item loadings in the variable. Moreover, OSO and SQ have achieved marginal construct 
validity. This means that at least 50 per cent or more of the variances in the observed 
variables are explained by the set of indicators. However, with regards to HQ and OQ, 
they are considered acceptable, as not only the direct paths between these items and 
their respective latent variables indicating significant p-values, but they could also 
maintain a satisfactory level of composite reliability (CR).  
Nunnally (1978) stated that, a scale with a CR value of 0.6 and above, being considered 
to have reasonable internal consistency. The results in Table 4.34 indicate good CR 
values for all variables, except partners‟ compatibility (CP = 0.53). However, some 
scholars (e.g. Johnson and Stevens, 2001; Sridharan et al., 2010) still consider a 
composite reliability of above 0.5 as acceptable. The CR of other variables range from 
0.7 to 0.99, meaning that items have a higher level of consistency in their measurement 
of the same construct.  
Then, the discriminant validity is assessed. As previously noted, the discriminant 
validity is the extent to which a construct is truly distinct from other constructs. High 
discriminant validity shows that a construct is unique, and captures some phenomena 
other measures do not (Byrne, 2006). EFA is basically a cue of discriminant validity, 
and as such, by comparing loadings and cross loadings between the individual 
indicators and the constructs, each indicator should load highly with its own construct 
   
216 
 
than others.  Furthermore, it can be evaluated with the pair-wise comparison of average 
variance extracted (AVE) of the latent construct, and squared multiple correlation 
(SMC) between latent constructs (Long 1983; Hair et al., 2006). Consequently, this 
study applied a pair-wise comparison to test the discriminant validity.  
Table 4.35 illustrates the squared multiple correlation (SMC) matrix used for the 
purpose of assessing discriminant validity. The AVE scores are written diagonally, are 
used to compare the squared correlation values. If the AVE scores are higher than the 
squared correlations values, the discriminant validity is said to be present. 
Table 4.35: SMC and AVE matrix for Discriminant Validity 
 
 VM SQ HQ OQ CP COP PQT PQC OSO OSB 
VM 0.81          
SQ .121 0.53         
HQ .074 .113 0.32        
OQ .018 .078 .476 0.45       
CP .215 .008 .070 .028 0.71      
COP .515 .002 .133 .059 .300 0.81     
PQT .063 .213 .084 .022 .077 .248 0.92    
PQC .048 .196 .114 .023 .264 .020 .170 0.72   
OSO .208 .003 .259 .138 .000 .004 .016 .018 0.52  
OSB .243 .047 .059 .005 .012 .016 .062 .087 .047 0.70 
 
 
According to Table 4.35, the majority of variables have high level of discriminant 
validity. Only HQ is weak in discriminating its own items from other constructs. This 
outcome is expected, as some items of HQ variable do not sufficiently maintain their 
convergence validity. As noted above, those items are kept in the scale, as it severely 
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affects content validity otherwise. Additionally, EFA analysis also reveals a 
discriminant issue in the construct VSP (please refer Table 4.17). According to Table 
4.17, the highest scored factor loading item in the HQ dimension of VSP (i.e. HQ 5) has 
fallen into the OQ. This may be the reason why the SMC value (0.476) between HQ and 
SQ is higher than AVE (0.32). However, as previously noted, the construct VSP (PTQ, 
HQ, SQ and OQ) is adopted from the INDSERV scale, which was developed in the 
western context. This study provides evidence of contextual mismatch of borrowed 
scales from a different cultural context. For example, from the beginning of scale 
refinement, the VSP construct demonstrates issues in reliability and validity, creating a 
greater potentiality to explore the reliability and validity of INDSERV scale in different 
cultural contexts.  
Based on these facts, the study finalises the measurement model, as depicted in Figure 
4.13.   
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4.9 STRUCTURAL MODELS AND HYPOTHESES TESTING 
The purpose of the structural model is to draw conclusions from the sample, such as 
causal relationships and predictions. Tests for multivariate assumptions are conducted, 
and the data ensure their suitability for multivariate analysis. The structural model 
presents the relationship between exogenous and endogenous variables. It offers a direct 
test of the theory of interest (Cheng, 2001), as the structural model is used to capture the 
linear regression effects of the exogenous constructs on the endogenous constructs, and 
the regression effects of the endogenous constructs upon each another (Hair et al., 
1998).  
Basically, the theoretical model proposed to test twenty hypotheses. However the 
measurement model (EFA and CFA) strongly and continuously indicates that partners‟ 
compatibility (CP) should be treated as a latent variable. Thus items in the CPC and 
CPP are combined. Therefore, the empirical model is slightly deviated from the 
theoretical model. As a result, six hypotheses have become invalid (i.e. hypotheses 
based on CPC and CPP) for the empirical model. Altogether, the structural model tests 
only fourteen hypotheses. Several structural models are developed in order to test these 
hypotheses.  
Firstly, the basic model is examined. Then, the model is integrated with the moderating 
effects for each variable.   
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4.9.1 Basic Structural Model 
The structural model for basic relationships (only independent and dependent variables) 
is shown in Figure 4.16. This model tests three hypotheses. Referring to Figure 4.16, 
vendor management capability (VM), vendors‟ service performance (VSP) and degree 
of outsourcing (DOO) are exogenous constructs impact on outsourcing success (OS), 
which is the endogenous construct. The results indicate that the effects of VM, VSP and 
DOO towards the OS as positive and significant (P<0.05).  Among them, VM has the 
strongest effect on outsourcing success (β= 0. 64). There is no considerable difference 
in the strength of DOO and VSP of their effects on OS.  
 
* Significant at 0.05 level 
Figure 4.16: Basic Structural Model 
The GOF values are summarized in Table 4.36. Only GFI shows moderate model fit, 
but CIMIN//DF and other fit indices (i.e. RMSEA, RMR) indicate that the absolute 
   
220 
 
model fit is high. In addition to that, most of the incremental and parsimony indices 
confirm the appropriate level model fit.  
Table 4.36: GOF indices for Basic Structural Model 
Absolute Incremental Parsimony 
CIMIN/DF RMR GFI RMSEA IFI TLI CFI PRATIO 
1.472 
.080 .847 
.048 
.947 .941 .947 
.906 
 
Therefore, this model allows making conclusions on the hypothesized relationships. As 
noted above, the model basically tests three hypotheses (i.e. H1, H2 and H3). Table 4.37 
summarizes the statistical finding related to the stated hypotheses.  
Table 4.37: Hypotheses testing results on Direct Paths 
Path Hypotheses Β P S.E C.R Support 
DOO OS 
H1: The degree of outsourcing 
influences the outsourcing success. 
.36 *** .040 3.995 Yes 
VM  OS 
H2: There is a positive relationship 
between vendor management 
capability and outsourcing success. 
.64 *** .055 6.171 Yes 
VSP OS 
H3: There is an association between 
vendor‟s service performance and 
outsourcing success. 
.32 .003 .103 2.955 Yes 
 
According to Table 4.37, three basic direct relationships are significant at 0.05 level. 
Thus, the observed data supported the basic hypothetical relationships. This is aligned 
with the previous literature, and they are further confirmed in the Sri Lankan context. 
Other related post-hoc analyses will be further discussed later in this chapter.  
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4.9.2 Structural Models for Moderating Effects 
In addition to the direct relationships, the study attempts to test two moderating effects, 
which are the partnership quality (PQ) and partners‟ compatibility (CP). A moderator is 
a variable that changes the relationship between two related variables. It can 
increase/reduce the strength of the relationship, or change the direction (i.e. positive to 
negative or vice versa) of the relationship (Lindley and Walker, 1993). The moderator 
does not need to have a significant relationship with predictor/criterion (Hair et al., 
2006). The moderating effects in SEM can be tested in many ways. This mainly relies 
on the nature of the variable. The moderator can be categorical or continuous.  
1. Categorical variables: ‘Multi-group Analysis‟ method is used for categorical 
variables, where groups are clear and logical.  
2. Continuous Variables: „Interaction‟ method can be applied for testing the 
moderating effect. This requires a series of calculations (items in the 
predictor X items in the moderator) to create a new variable for the purpose 
of interaction effect (Hair et al., 2006) 
But there are some situations where continuous variables could be applied to multi-
group analysis. For this purpose, groups are created to have two clear peaks in the 
frequency distribution, and it should be meaningful. Multi-group analysis requires a 
considerably large sample, due to the analysis being based on different groups.  
The moderating variables of the current study are continuous, making the interaction 
method suitable for the analysis. The multiplication of items in the predictor with the 
items in the moderator created a pool of new items. For example, in order to create an 
interaction effect of VM (5 items) into CP (8 items), 40 (5 X 8) items need to be 
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generated. In such cases, item parcelling could be applied to reduce the number of items 
(Hair et al., 2006, p. 826). It is done by considering the exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) for all VM_CP product (cross multiplied) indicators. The numbers of parcels 
were decided by looking at the rotated component matrices for different numbers of 
extracted factors. In most cases, the optimal numbers of parcels are equal to the number 
of dimensions of either variable in moderating effects (i.e. number of dimensions/items 
in VM or CP in the case of VM_CP), but, in some cases, the number of parcels 
proposed by EFA deviate from the conditions above. Please refer Appendix G which 
shows the exploratory factor analysis carried out in order to determine data parcels for 
interaction effect.  
A sequence of steps is followed to introduce moderating variables into the basic model. 
In one turn, only one moderating variable is inserted into the basic structural model with 
regards to a corresponding main relationship. Here, the main relationships are 
DOOOS, VM OS and VSPOS. Separate structural models are performed to test 
the influence from each moderators onto the each relationship (e.g. DOOmCPOS 
VMmCPOS, VMmPQOS, VSPmCPOS, and VSPmPQOS).  
Then, both moderation effects on main relationships (e.g. both VMmCP OS and 
VMmPQOS in one model) are tested in a single model.  Beta (β) coefficients and 
changes in GOF are observed in each model (Refer Appendix H). The comparison of 
GOF indices indicates that the integrated models have higher model fit than single 
models. As a result, β coefficient also reports a higher value for single models. This 
may be due to the correlation between CP and PQ (r=.56). Better GOF and higher β 
coefficient also prove that partners‟ compatibility and partnership quality strengthens 
each other. Furthermore, the integrated models represent the reality (practical) rather 
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than the isolated models. Thus this study presents only integrated structural models for 
relevant tests. Accordingly, the following are the structural models used for testing the 
moderating effects.  
A. Moderating effect of partner‟s compatibility (CP) on the relationship between 
degree of outsourcing (DOO) and outsourcing success (OS).  This model would 
be testing H8. 
B. Moderating effect of partner‟s compatibility (CP) and partnership quality (PQ) 
on the relationship between vendor management capability (VM) and  
outsourcing success (OS). The model would be testing H4 and H9. 
C. Moderating effect of each dimension of the partnership quality (i.e. COP, PQT 
and PQC) construct on the relationship between vendor management capability 
(VM) and outsourcing success (OS). The model would be testing H5a, H5b, and 
H5c. 
D. Moderating effect of partner‟s compatibility (CP) and partnership quality (PQ) 
on the relationship between vendors‟ service performance (VSP) and 
outsourcing success (OS). The model would be testing H6 and H10. 
E. Moderating effect of each dimension of the partnership quality (i.e. COP, PQT 
and PQC) construct on the relationship between vendors‟ service performance 
(VSP) with outsourcing success (OS). This model would be testing H7a, H7b, 
and H7c. 
Consequently, there are five structural models used to test the moderating effect from 
the main construct(s) and individual dimensions. The following discussion is based on 
A-E models.  
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A. Moderating effect of partner’s compatibility (CP) on the relationship 
between degree of outsourcing (DOO) and outsourcing success (OS).   
This model tests hypothesis 8 (H8). DOO is defined as an observed variable, while CP 
is a metric variable. EFA for the interaction effect derives only a single factor, with 
eigenvalue greater than 1. Based on that, the structural model is constructed, shown in 
Figure 4.17.  
The model fit statistics χ2 is significant at 0.05 level, with the GOF summary depicted in 
Table 4.38. The GOF indices also demonstrate that the model has a satisfactory level 
model fit for the predictions.  
 
* Significant at 0.05 level 
 
Figure 4.17: Structural model for interaction effect of DOO and CP on OS 
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Table 4.38: GOF indices for the structural model in Figure 4.17 
Absolute Incremental Parsimony 
CIMIN/DF RMR GFI RMSEA IFI TLI CFI PRATIO 
1.502 
.079 .840 
.049 .939 .932 .938 .910 
 
Therefore, the direct paths to OS are positive and significant, as confirmed in the basic 
structural model in Figure 4.17. However, the moderation effect (i.e. DOOmCP OS) 
is insignificant   (P= 0.243), hence, H8 is rejected. The result is summarized in Table 
4.39. 
 
 
Table 4.39: Hypotheses testing results of moderating effect of Partners‟ Compatibility 
(CP) on to the relationship of DOO and OS 
Path Hypotheses Β P S.E C.R Support 
DOO OS H1: The degree of outsourcing influences 
the outsourcing success. .28 *** 041 2.898 Yes 
DOOmCP 
OS 
H8:  Partners‟ compatibility moderates 
the relationship between degree of 
outsourcing and outsourcing success. -.10 .243 .057 -1.167 No 
 
This concludes that partners‟ compatibility (CP) does not moderate the relationship 
between the degree of outsourcing (DOO) and outsourcing success (OS). 
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B. Moderating effect of partner’s compatibility (CP) and partnership 
quality (PQ) on the relationship between vendor management capability 
(VM) and outsourcing success (OS).  
The purpose of this structural model is to test the aggregated interaction effects from 
each moderating variable on the relationship between VM and OS. The second order 
structural model is performed for the interaction effect of PQ, in order to aggregate the 
impact of the whole construct. CP is a latent variable, making first order modelling 
quite sufficient.   
The calculation of interaction effect between VM and PQ generates a number of items 
for each dimension in the PQ (i.e. COP, PQT and PQC). As mentioned earlier, the 
rotated component matrix in EFA for all products are parcelled into five items for 
VMmCOP, two items for VM_ PQT, and three items for VM_PQC (please refer 
Appendix G). 
Next, there are 35 products for the VM_CP, and the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) 
proposes three parcels. Accordingly, SEM is performed to test both the moderation 
effects (i.e. PQ and CP) on the relationship of the vendor management capability (VM) 
and outsourcing success (OS). Both effects are illustrated in Figure 4.18, showing a 
satisfactory level model fit. The GOF indices are summarized in Table 4.40.  
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  * Significant at 0.05 level 
Figure 4.18: Structural model for the interaction effects of PQ and CP on to the 
relationship of VM and OS 
 
 
Table 4.40: GOF indices for the structural model in Figure 4.18 
Absolute Incremental Parsimony 
CIMIN/DF RMR GFI RMSEA IFI TLI CFI PRATIO 
1.502 .079 .840 .049 .939 .932 .938 .910 
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Table 4.41: Hypotheses testing results of moderating effect of Partnership Quality (PQ) 
and Partners‟ Compatibility (CP) on to the relationship of VM and OS 
Path Hypotheses Β P S.E C.R Support 
VMOS H2: There is a positive relationship 
between vendor management 
capability and outsourcing success. 
.323 *** .045 3.477 Yes 
VMmPQ 
OS 
H4: The relationship between vendor 
management capability and 
outsourcing success is moderated by 
partnership quality. 
-.487 *** .398 -3.954 Yes 
VMmCP 
OS 
H9: Partners‟ compatibility moderates the 
relationship between vendor 
management capability and   
outsourcing success. 
-.606 *** .054 -5.895 Yes 
 
The model χ2 is significant at 0.05 level. Therefore, the model in Figure 4.18 shows an 
appropriate model fit to determine the hypothesized relationships. The related statistics 
for hypothesis testing is summarized in Table 4.41.  
The relationship between VM and OS is positive; this has been tested with Hypothesis 2 
(H2). Then, hypothesis 4 and 9 (H4 & H9) test aggregated moderation effect of each PQ 
and CP constructs on to the relationship between VM and  OS.     
Firstly, H4 is examined. The path analysis shows that the interaction effect of VM and 
PQ (i.e. VMmPQ) to OS is significant (P < .05). Therefore, H4 is accepted. However, 
the interaction effect is negative (β = -.487; C.R = -3. 954; S.E = .398), and has a 
stronger effect than VMOS (β = -.323). This simply means that with the presence of 
the moderator (PQ), the basic relationship (VMOS) becomes negative.  
Secondly, H9 is tested. The path to interaction effect to OS (VMmCP OS) is 
significant (P < .05), and hence, H9 is accepted. But, the interaction effect of VM and 
CP (i.e. VMmCP) to OS also has negative impact (β = -.606; C.R = -5.895; S.E = .054). 
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Therefore, with the presence of CP, the relationship between VM and OS becomes 
negative. Although the interaction effect is negative, it is stronger than the direct impact 
of VM to CP (i.e. β = -.323).  
In conclusion, the partnership quality (PQ) and partners‟ compatibility (CP) moderate 
the relationship between vendor management capability (VM) and outsourcing success 
(OS). However, when comparing both moderators, partners‟ compatibility (β=-.606) has 
a stronger effect than partnership quality (β=-.484) on the relationship between VM and 
OS. Partnership quality (PQ) is a construct comprising of three dimensions. Therefore, 
the moderation effect of each individual dimension on the relationship (VM OS) 
should be examined. This will be discussed in the next structural model.  
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C. Moderating effect of each dimension of the partnership quality (i.e COP, PQT 
and PQC) construct on the relationship between vendor management 
capability (VM) and outsourcing success (OS).   
This structural model tests the effect of each dimension of PQ on the relationship of 
VM OS. Therefore, the first order CFA for PQ is performed with respect to the 
relationship. It is depicted in Figure 4.19.  
 
* Significant at 0.05 level 
 
Figure 4.19: Structural model for the moderation effects of COP, PQT and PQC on to 
the relationship of VM and  OS 
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Accordingly, the model tests three hypotheses (H5a, H5b, H5c).The overall model χ2 is 
significant at 0.05 level. The GOF indices of this model are reported in Table 4.42.  
Table 4.42: GOF indices for the structural model in Figure 4.19 
Absolute Incremental Parsimony 
CIMIN/DF RMR RMSEA IFI TLI CFI PRATIO 
1.843 
.124 
.064 .882 .872 .881 .930 
 
According to Table 4.42, absolute and parsimony measures show good model fit 
compared to incremental measures. The CIMIN/DF < 3; RMSEA< 0.08 and PRATIO 
>0.9 confirms the model fit as satisfactory. Therefore, hypothetical relationships in the 
model are evaluated. The hypotheses and corresponding statistics are shown in Table 
4.43. 
Table 4.43: Hypotheses testing results of moderating effect of Cooperativeness (COP), 
Trust (PQT) and Commitment (PQC) on to the relationship of VM and OS 
Path 
Hypotheses Β P S.E C.R Support 
VMmPQT 
OS 
H5a: The relationship between vendor 
management capability and 
outsourcing success is moderated by 
„trust‟ between partners in the 
partnership. 
-.329 .036 .127 -2.102 Yes 
VMmPQC 
OS 
H5b: The relationship between vendor 
management capability and 
outsourcing success is moderated by 
„commitment‟ of partners to the 
partnership. 
-.130 .551 .810 -.596 No 
VMmCOP 
OS 
H5c: The relationship between vendor 
management capability and 
outsourcing success is moderated by 
„cooperativeness‟ of partners to the 
partnership. 
-.225 .007 .076. -2.686 Yes 
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According to Table 4.43, only VMmPQT (i.e. trust) and VMmCOP (i.e. 
cooperativeness) interaction effects on OS are significant (P<0.05), while VMmPQC 
OS path is not significant.  
Consequently, the hypotheses are assessed. Firstly, H5a proposes the hypothetical 
relationship among PQT, VM and OS. As mentioned earlier, VMmPQT is the 
interaction effect between VM and PQT that assesses the moderation effect. The path 
from moderating variable to the endogenous variable (VMmPQTOS) is significant at 
5 per cent level, and hence H5a is accepted. However, the impact is negative (β=-.329; 
S.E.= 0.127; CR=-2.102). This explains that with the presence of PQT (trust), the 
relationship between VM and OS becomes weaker.  
The H5b proposes the moderating effect of „partners‟ commitment‟ (PQC) to the 
relationship between VM and OS. The path analysis of the structural model above 
(Figure 4.19) proves that, the relationship of VMmPQC OS is not significant.  
Therefore, H5b is rejected. 
H5c examines the moderation impact of partners‟ cooperativeness‟ (COP) to the 
relationship between VM and OS. VMmCOP is the variable that measures moderation 
impact. The path VMmCOP OS is significant at 5 per cent level. Therefore, H5c is 
supported by the observed data. The moderation effect to the endogenous variable is 
negative (β=-0.225; S.E.= 0.076; CR=-2.686), rendering the impact of partners‟ 
cooperativeness on the relationship between VM and OS as negative. This is similar to 
„trust‟, but the strength of trust (β= -.329) is higher than cooperativeness (β= -.225) in 
moderating basic relationships. 
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D. Moderating effect of partner’s compatibility (CP) and partnership quality 
(PQ) on the relationship between vendors’ service performance (VSP) and 
outsourcing success (OS).  
 
  * Significant at 0.05 level 
 
Figure 4.20: Structural model for the interaction effects of PQ and CP on to the 
relationship of VSP and  OS 
 
The purpose of this structural model is to test hypotheses 6 (H6) and hypothesis 10 
(H10). The measurement model finalized 12 items for vendors‟ service performance 
(VSP). There are seven items in CP, and the calculation of interaction effect created (12 
X 7) 84 products. Item parcelling is used with EFA to reduce the number of items. Six 
parcels are identified for the interaction effect for VSP and CP (VSPmCP). A similar 
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procedure is carried out for each dimension of PQ, and the subsequent analysis 
generated six parcels for VSPmPQT; five parcels for VSPmPQC, and six parcels for 
VSPmCOP in order to measure the aggregated interaction effect of VSPmPQ on OS. 
The moderating effects from the two basic constructs (i.e. PQ and CP) on the 
relationship between VSP and OS are shown in Figure 4.20.  
The overall model χ2 is significant at 5 per cent level. The GOF indices in Table 4.44 
also support the model fit.   
Table 4.44: GOF indices for the structural model in Figure 4.20 
Absolute Incremental Parsimony 
CIMIN/DF RMR RMSEA IFI TLI CFI PRATIO 
1.444 .081 .046 .902 .894 .901 .939 
 
According to Table 4.44, goodness of fit indices shows a good model fit compared to 
incremental measures. Specifically, CIMIN/DF < 3; RMSEA< 0.08; IFI, CFI and 
PRATIO >0.9, confirms that the model fit is satisfactory. Therefore, the hypothetical 
relationships in the model are evaluated.  
As previously noted, VSPmCP and VSPmPQ are the (interaction effects) moderating 
effects on the endogenous variable (i.e. OS). The path analyses supported to the 
hypotheses testing with the corresponding statistics are summarized in Table 4.45. 
According to Table 4.45, both interaction effects are (i.e. VSPmPQ and VSPmCP) 
significant to OS (P<0.05), and each hypothesis is assessed accordingly.  
Firstly, H6 explains the hypothetical relationship between VSPmPQ and OS. The path 
from moderating variable to the endogenous variable (VSPmPQOS) is significant, 
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hence H6 is accepted. The impact is positive and strong (β=0.790; S.E= 0.164; 
CR=7.911). This explains that with the presence of PQ, the relationship between VSP 
and OS becomes stronger.  
Next, H10 is assessed. H10 explains the hypothetical relationship between VSPmCP 
and OS. The path from moderating variable to the endogenous variable 
(VSPmCPOS) is also significant, so H10 is accepted. The moderating effect is 
positive (β=.235; S.E= 0.066; CR=3.397). Thus, with the presence of CP, the 
relationship between VSP and OS becomes stronger.  
However, when comparing both moderators, partnership quality (PQ) has a stronger 
effect (β=.790) than partners‟ compatibility (β=.235) on the relationship between VSP 
and OS. 
 
Table 4.45: Hypotheses testing results of moderating effect of Partnership Quality (PQ) 
and Partners‟ Compatibility (CP) on to the relationship of VSP and OS 
Path Hypotheses 
Β P S.E C.R Support 
VSPmPQ 
OS 
H6:  The relationship between vendor‟s 
service performance and outsourcing 
success is moderated by partnership 
quality. 
.790 *** .164 7.911 Yes 
VSPmCP 
OS 
H10: Partners‟ compatibility moderates 
the relationship between vendor‟s 
service performance and outsourcing 
success. 
.235 *** .066 3.397 Yes 
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In summary, the partnership quality (PQ) and partners‟ compatibility (CP) moderate the 
relationship between vendors‟ service performance (VSP) and outsourcing success 
(OS). Partnership quality (PQ) construct however, comprises of three dimensions. 
Therefore, the moderation effect of each individual dimension on the relationship 
(VSP OS) should be examined, and this is discussed in the next structural model.   
 
 
E. Moderating effect of each dimension of the partnership quality (i.e. COP, 
PQT and PQC) construct on the relationship between Vendors’ service 
performance (VSP) and outsourcing success (OS).  
 
This structural model tests the moderating effect of each dimension of PQ (i.e. COP, 
PQT and PQC) on the relationship of VSP and OS. Therefore, first order impact of PQ 
on the relationship is assessed. The structural model is illustrated in Figure 4.21, and 
accordingly, the model tests three hypotheses (H7a, H7b, H7c). The χ2 of the model in 
Figure 4.21 is significant at 5 per cent level, and the GOF indices related to the model 
is summarized in Table 4.46. 
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* Significant at 0.05 level  
Figure 4.21: Structural model for the moderation effects of COP, PQT and PQC on to 
the relationship of VSP and  OS 
 
Table 4.46: GOF indices for the structural model in Figure 4.21 
Absolute Incremental Parsimony 
CIMIN/DF RMR RMSEA IFI CFI PRATIO 
1.870 .100 .065 .805 .803 .949 
 
According to Table 4.46, absolute and parsimony measures show satisfactory model fit 
compared to incremental measures, such as CIMIN/DF < 3; RMSEA< 0.08 and 
PRATIO >0.9. However, incremental indices are moderately satisfied. Accordingly, the 
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hypothetical relationships in the model are evaluated, and the hypotheses and 
corresponding statistics are shown in Table 4.47.  
Table 4.47: Hypotheses testing results of moderating effect of Cooperativeness (COP), 
Trust (PQT) and Commitment (PQC) on to the relationship of VSP and OS 
Path Hypotheses 
Β P S.E C.R Support 
VSPmPQT
 OS 
H7a: The relationship between vendor‟s 
service performance and outsourcing 
success is moderated by „trust‟ 
between partners in the partnership. 
.517 *** .126 5.033 Yes 
VSPmPQC
 OS 
H7b: The relationship between vendor‟s 
service performance and outsourcing 
success is moderated by „commitment‟ 
of partners to the partnership.  
.247 .003 .100 2.972 Yes 
VMmCOP
 OS 
H7c: The relationship between vendor‟s 
service performance and  outsourcing 
success is moderated by 
„cooperativeness‟ of partners to the 
partnership. 
.414 *** .198 3.713 Yes 
 
According to Table 4.47, all three interaction effects to the OS are significant (P<0.05).  
Thus, it is clear that all factors in PQ moderates the relationship between VM and OS.  
Consequently, the hypotheses are assessed. Firstly, H7a states the hypothetical 
relationships among COP, VM and OS. As noted in the previous model, VSPmPQT is 
the interaction effect between VSP and PQT. The path from moderating variable to the 
endogenous variable (i.e. VSPmPQT OS) is significant (p<.05), hence, H7a is 
accepted. The impact is positive and strong (β=-.517; S.E= 0.126; CR=5.033). This 
confirms that with the presence of PQT (trust), the relationship between VM and OS 
becomes stronger.  
Then, H7b is assessed. It explains the moderating effect of „partners‟ commitment‟ (i.e. 
PQC) to the relationship between VSP and OS. The path analysis of the structural 
model (Figure 4.21) proves that, VSPmPQC OS is significant at 5 per cent level.  
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Therefore, H7b is supported by the observed data. The moderating effect to the 
endogenous variable is positive (β=0.247; S.E=0.100; CR=2.972), and with the 
presence of PQC (commitment), the relationship between VSP and OS becomes 
stronger.  
Next, H7c tests the moderation impact of partners‟ cooperativeness‟ (i.e. COP) to the 
relationship between VSP and OS. It is known that VSPmCOP is the variable that 
measures the moderation impact. The path VSPmCOP OS is significant, and 
therefore, H7c is accepted. The moderation effect to the endogenous variable is also 
positive (β= .414; S.E= 0.198; CR=3.713). This is similar to „trust‟ and „commitment‟, 
hence the relationship between VSP and OS becomes stronger with the presence of 
partners‟ „cooperativeness‟. 
However, among the components of the PQ construct, PQT (trust) has the strongest 
moderating effect, followed by COP (cooperativeness). The lowest moderating effect is 
from PQC (commitment).  
In summary, five structural models test fourteen hypotheses. Twelve hypotheses are 
accepted, and upon the acceptance of hypothesis 1(H1), there is a need to perform a post 
hoc analysis. H1 explains the hypothetical relationship between „degree of outsourcing 
(DOO)‟ and „outsourcing success (OS)‟, and a significant, positive relationship is 
confirmed. But, this is only a part of objective one of the study. The rest is to determine 
the impact of different levels/degrees of breadth and depth on outsourcing success. 
Therefore, Breadth (B) and Depth (D) are classified into Low, Medium and High by 
taking their observed scores into account. The frequency of each category is reported in 
Table 4.48. Then, a new grouping variable was created by combining these levels in 
Breadth and Depth such as BL, BM, BH, DL,DM, and DH. 
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Table 4.48:  Breadth and Depth frequency 
 Value Label N 
Breadth (B) 
1 Low (L) 57 
2 Med (M) 60 
3 High (H) 90 
Depth (D) 
1 Low (L) 62 
2 Med (M) 67 
3 High (H) 78 
 
Next, analysis of variance (ANOVA) is performed in order to test the means differences 
of several groups.  The ANOVA result is shown in Table 4.49.  
 
Table 4.49: ANOVA Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: OS 
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Corrected Model 50.957
a
 8 6.370 8.135 .000 
Intercept 1.870 1 1.870 2.388 .124 
Breadth_G 42.378 2 21.189 27.060 .000 
Depth_G .605 2 .303 .387 .680 
Breadth_G * 
Depth_G 
1.123 4 .281 .358 .838 
Error 155.043 198 .783   
Total 206.000 207    
Corrected Total 206.000 206    
a. R Squared = .247 (Adjusted R Squared = .217) 
 
 
The analysis shows that only breadth (B) groups are significant (p<0.05), and multiple 
comparisons for joint groups are conducted to compare every group‟s mean with every 
other group‟s mean. Accordingly, Post Hoc Tukey‟s test is conducted to identify the 
significance of the difference in OS among the groups (please refer to Appendix I for 
ANOVA and Tukey‟s test). According to the significant differences identified by 
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Tukey‟s test, the following groups are identified with their respective mean OS (Table 
4.50).  
Table 4.50: Mean scores of OS for different levels of Breadth and Depth 
Mean-OS 
Depth 
Low Med High 
Breadth Low 3.93 3.75 3.87 
Med 4.55 4.27 4.37 
High 4.81 4.91 4.90 
 
Table 4.50 clearly shows that outsourcing success is higher in high breadth. The highest 
score is reported in high breadth and medium depth category, while the lowest is 
reported in low breadth, medium depth category.  
 
SUMMARY 
This chapter presents all the relevant information pertaining to data analysis. The 
procedure started with data checks, cleaning, and treatments for missing values and data 
transformation. A total of 207 cases were finalized for final data analysis. SPSS 18.0 
and AMOS 18.0 statistical packages were applied accordingly. Tests for multivariate 
assumptions were also performed to verify the appropriateness of data set for further 
analysis. The scale purification process was followed by unidimensionality, internal 
consistency, and validity tests.  
However, it should be noted that only the vendors‟ service performance (VSP) is 
measured with the adopted scale, and it showed a contextual mismatch from the 
beginning of the scale purification. As a result, the numbers of items of the scale were 
reduced to 12 from 22. The exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) proposed partners‟ compatibility (CP) as a latent variable. EFA and 
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CFA also proposed two components, instead of three for outsourcing success. Apart 
from that, all other constructs are aligned with the theory. Finally, the measurement 
(empirical) model slightly deviated from the theoretical model, and consequently, six 
hypotheses were rendered invalid, reducing the empirical model to fourteen hypotheses.  
The structural equation modelling (AMOS) was performed for hypotheses testing. 
Altogether, six models were constructed for each theoretical aspect. All models (Chi 
square) were significant at 5 per cent significance level, and the goodness of fit indices 
demonstrated a satisfactory model fit. This facilitated the assessment of the 
corresponding hypothetical relationship, explained by each structural model. Among the 
fourteen hypotheses, twelve were accepted. Besides, the chapter discussed ANOVA and 
post-hoc analysis results for different degrees of outsourcing (breadth and depth) on 
outsourcing success. The analysis revealed that, only different levels of breadth are 
associated with outsourcing success.  
Based on the statistical insights provided by chapter 4, Chapter 5 presents the 
discussions and the conclusion of this study.  
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CHAPTER 5  
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first section of this chapter discusses the research objectives based on the 
hypotheses tested and post-hoc analysis conducted in Chapter 4. This is followed by the 
implications of the study. Next, the contribution of the study to the accumulated body of 
knowledge and practice is addressed. The limitations of the study and suggestions for 
potential future researches are presented in the final section.  
5.2 DISCUSSION  
Modern businesses are formed in the form of specialists rather than generalists, with the 
aim of providing the best service for their customers. The new way of doing business 
requires collaboration among specialists. Outsourcing is a popular form of collaboration 
as partners could still maintain their leverage within the scope of the business.  
The services sector business transactions are also formulated as a network of specialists. 
For instance, the survey has recognised a hotel service as a collection of specialists of 
leisure activity planners, housekeeping, gardening and interior decoration specialists, 
intermediaries for reservations, etc. The unique characteristics of services outsourcing 
have been highlighted in Chapter 1 and 2. Among these factors, the vendor‟s role in 
which he/she/firm acts for the focal firm in the service delivery process is the most 
fundamental. Therefore, services outsourcing has to be carefully managed in order to 
ensure customer satisfaction. In contrast, managing services sector outsourcing is harder 
than manufacturing sector outsourcing. Concerning the overall issues associating with 
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service outsourcing and gaps in the existing epistemology, the first chapter identified 
three questions that need solving, followed by five research objectives. The following 
section discusses the empirical evidences corresponding to each research objective.  
 
5.2.1 Objective 01 
To investigate the impact of degree of outsourcing on outsourcing success in 
services.  
Outsourcing is one of the options in conducting collaborative business, but firms have 
to manage their leverage on the outsourced function. This is determined by the „degree 
of outsourcing‟ (DOO). As identified in Chapter 1, the existing epistemology bears 
various confusing viewpoints of the impact of degree of outsourcing on the 
organisational performance, and outsourcing success.  Therefore, this study attempts to 
identify the association between degree of outsourcing and outsourcing success. 
Accordingly, hypothesis one (H1) is established. 
 
Hypothesis1: H1: The degree of outsourcing influences the outsourcing success. 
The hypothesis above is accepted at 5 per cent significance level. The positive 
relationship between degree of outsourcing and outsourcing success (β=0.36) is 
confirmed. The finding is aligned with previous literature on the subject (e.g. Gilley and 
Rasheed, 2000; Thouin et al., 2009).  
Next, as noted in the objective, the study aims to examine whether „breadth‟ and „depth‟ 
are equally important in this context. As described in Chapter 4, breadth and depth are 
categorised into three levels; high, medium and low. Consequently, the variance of 
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analysis (ANOVA) revealed that, only the different „levels of breadth‟ affects 
outsourcing success (F= 27.060, df= 2, p< 0.05), while „levels of depth‟ does not. Thus, 
the equilibrium point, where partners depend equally upon each other for valued 
resources (Cook and Yamagishi, 1992) might depends on the level of breadth.  
Then, with corresponding to the findings above, a post-hoc analysis is conducted. 
Tukey‟s test for multiple group comparison helps identify the mean differences among 
different groups. As stated in Chapter 4, the highest mean value is reported from „high 
level‟ breadth and „medium level‟ depth (µ= 4.91). This means that the higher the 
number of activities outsourced, the higher the probability of success. Although level of 
depth is not significant, it is worth noting that, depth should be definitely at a low level 
with respect to the low or medium level breadth, for higher level of success. High level 
depth results in a moderate success. Whenever, the level of breadth   is high, level of 
depth should be kept at medium to ensure optimal success of outsourcing. This indicates 
that there may have a non-linear relationship between the degree of outsourcing and 
firm‟s performance. However, further investigations may help verify whether the 
„curvilinear relationship‟ (Kotabe et al., 2008; Kotabe and Mol, 2009) is a result of 
different levels of depth. 
5.2.2 Objective 02   
To verify the relationship between vendor management capability and outsourcing 
success in services. 
Services outsourcing is identified as a triad made up of focal firm, vendors and 
customers (Li and Choi, 2009). The vendor management is said to be the primary task 
of the focal firm. It is measured in terms of selection, monitoring, evaluation, 
developing vendors (Han et al., 2008; Chan and Chin, 2007; Byramjee et al., 2010) and 
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compensating them appropriately (Sun et al., 2002). The positive relationship between 
vendor management capability and outsourcing performance is a well-established 
phenomenon (Lee, 2001; Chan and Chin, 2007; Han et al., 2008). Therefore, the study 
attempts to verify it further in the context, and ascertain hypothesis two (H2). 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between vendor management capability and 
outsourcing success.  
The empirical evidences of the study further confirms the significant (p< 0.05) positive 
(β=0.64) relationship between vendor management capability and outsourcing success. 
Vendor management obtained the highest score, among the factors that have direct 
impact on outsourcing success. The significant relationship between the two constructs 
is apparently understandable (Lee, 2001; Chan and Chin, 2007; Han et al., 2008).  
Moreover, all activities that measure the vendor management capability are significant 
at 5 per cent level. Within the vendor management activities, the contribution of vendor 
monitoring is the highest (R
2
 = 0.87), followed by vendor evaluation (R
2
 = 0.85). 
Therefore, vendor monitoring and performance evaluation become key aspects of 
contractual governance. In particular, these activities help firms to identify issues 
related to vendors and thereby take corrective actions for improvements (Chan and 
Chin, 2007).  Other vendor management activities are also important, as each of them is 
capable of explaining more than 50 per cent variance of the construct.  
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5.2.3 Objective 03 
To examine the impact of the vendor’s service performance on outsourcing success 
in services. 
This study distinguished the direct involvement of the vendor in the service supply 
chain. As explained by the social exchange theory, the vendors have a greater 
responsibility in managing outsourcing function for the purpose of receiving mutual 
benefits. Thus, the vendors are also denoted as one of the major governance bodies in 
the service-outsourcing context.  Accordingly, H3 is hypothesized as below. .  
 
Hypothesis 03: There is an association between vendor‟s service performance and 
outsourcing success. 
The empirical evidences verified that the vendor‟s service performance has a significant 
positive impact on outsourcing success (P<0.05; β=0.32). In the original study, 
INDSERV has shown a satisfactory reliability and validity (Gounaris, 2005a). It also 
reports superior psychometric properties to SERVQUAL (Lee, G.J, 2011, p. 3180). 
 
Table 5.1: Deleted items in INDSERV scale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dimension Items Description 
Potential Quality PTQ 1 Offers full   service  
PTQ 2 Has required personnel 
PTQ 3 Has required facilities  
PTQ 4 Has required management philosophy 
PTQ 5 Has a low  personnel turn-over  
PTQ 6 Uses network of partners/ associates 
Hard process Quality HQ   1 Keeps  time schedules 
Soft process Quality SQ 1 Accept agreement  enthusiastically  
SQ 2 Listen to our problems  
SQ 3 Opened to suggestions/ideas 
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However, from the pilot study to the final measurement model development, the scale 
had many reliability and validity issues. For instance, initial scale purification process 
with the pilot study data deleted two items from the potential quality, while final data 
led to deletion of the whole dimension (i.e. PQT), as the reliability reported was too 
low. Apart from the above items, another 4 items were discarded (HQ1, SQ1, SQ2, 
SQ3), since their validity is unacceptable. All deleted items are listed in Table 5.1. 
 
According to Table 5.1, it is clear that the context of the study does not oversee a value 
of „potential quality‟ of the vendor in assessing their performance. This reflects that the 
context of the study (i.e. Sri Lanka) does not have sufficient concern for future 
occurrences, and thereby demonstrates the characteristics of „short-term orientation‟ 
nature of   developing countries (Hofstade, 1984).  The reason may be due to high 
economic uncertainty in developing countries. Therefore, 22-item INDSERV scale 
shows a contextual mismatch.  
Despite these facts, Lee G.J (2011) is stated that the dimensions of INDSERV are 
interconnected. He empirically justified that the soft process quality (SQ) and hard 
process quality (HQ) are the mediators between potential quality and output quality, 
instead of their independent roles.  
Among the dimensions remaining in the scale, hard process quality (HQ) shows the 
highest contribution on the vendors‟ service performance (β= 0.98, R2= 96.5%) 
followed by output quality (β= 0.86, R2= 74%). In relation to all items of the INDSERV 
scale, the prominent performance characteristics of a vendor are: attention on details 
(HQ4), has a pleasant personality (SQ4), argues when necessary (SQ5), has creative 
offerings (OQ4), reaches objectives (OQ1) and contributes to focal firm image (OQ3).  
   
249 
 
5.2.4 Objective 04: 
To investigate the effect of partnership quality (PQ) as a moderating variable in 
the relationships between 1) vendor management capability (VM) and outsourcing 
success (OS), 2) vendor’s service performance (VSP) and outsourcing success (OS). 
 Partnership quality explains the relational governance in the resource exchange process. 
This study argues that contractual governance could perform alone without partnership 
quality; hence it does not directly affect outsourcing success. The empirical evidences 
proven that the covariance between partnership quality (PQ) and outsourcing success 
(OS) is not significant (p>0.05). Thus, there is no direct connection between partnership 
quality (PQ) and outsourcing success (OS).  Partnership quality however, has been 
identified as a key element of resource exchange success. However, Williamson (1979) 
Sun et al. (2002) and Lacity et al. (2009) identified contractual and relational are hybrid 
governance structures in exchange.  Donada and Nogatchewsky, (2009) proposed to 
consider the interaction of economic and relational factors in exchange. Accordingly, 
this study identifies the moderating effect of partnership quality on the relationship 
between contractual governance elements and outsourcing success. Accordingly, two 
main hypotheses (H4 & H6) for aggregated effects, and six supplementary hypotheses 
(H5a, H5b, H5c and H7a, H7b, H7c) for the effect from each dimension were developed 
in Chapter 2.  They were subsequently tested in Chapter 4. The next section is allocated 
for the discussion of the results of the hypothesis, based on two parts in objective 4. 
Firstly, the moderation effect of partnership quality (PQ) to the relationship between 
vendor management capability and outsourcing success (VMOS), and secondly, the 
moderation effect of partnership quality (PQ) to the relationship between vendors‟ 
service performance and outsourcing success (VSPOS) will be explained. 
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1. The moderating effect of partnership quality (PQ) on the relationship between 
vendor management capability (VM) and outsourcing success (OS) 
Hypotheses H4 and H5 (a,b,c) facilitate the interpretation of  the moderation effect of 
partnership quality (PQ) to the relationship between vendor management capability and 
outsourcing success (VMOS).  
 
Hypothesis 04:  The relationship between vendor management capability and 
outsourcing success is moderated by partnership quality. 
A second order structural model for the moderation effect of partnership quality on the 
relationship between vendor management capability and outsourcing success is 
assessed. The model explained 99 per cent of variance (R
2
 of the model in Figure 4.14). 
The initial model, which was without the moderation effect, is reported with 95 per cent 
variance. Thus it can be concluded that, the explanation power of the model has 
increased with the moderation effect. It is also deemed that the moderation effect is 
significant and negative (P<0.05; β= -0.49). Accordingly, with the increase of 
partnership quality aspects, a firm can reduce the weight on vendor management 
activities for similar or better outcomes. As explained by Uzzi (1999), when actors are 
socially embedded they have strong understanding of each other which in turn 
influences managerial actions and performance.  Partnership quality is relational, soft 
and cost-free, in comparison to vendor management activities. Therefore, firms could 
minimize time, effort and monitoring expenses of managing vendors by increasing 
relational aspects of partnership. This is demonstrated graphically in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: The relationship between vendor management capability (VM) and 
outsourcing success (OS) for different levels of partnership quality (PQ)  
 
According to Figure 5.1, when the partnership quality (PQ) is low or medium, firms 
have to strive more on vendor management activities (VM) for better outsourcing 
outcomes. When partnership quality is high, less weightage could be placed on vendor 
management activities. The moderate and high levels of vendor management 
capabilities are needed to maintain only low-level of partnership quality. A higher level 
of partnership quality and a higher level of vendor management activities reduce 
outsourcing success, due to heavy weights, and attentions on managerial aspects as well 
as relational aspects.   
However, among the dimensions of the partnership quality, cooperativeness is the 
strongest (λ=0.98), and it explains (R2=0.957) 95.7 per cent variance of the interaction 
effect, followed by commitment (λ=0.98, R2= 0.957).  Next, this study attempts to 
verify the segregated effect of each partnership quality dimension on to the relationship. 
Hypothesis 5a, 5b and 5c are assisted to ascertain the relationships.  
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Hypothesis 5a: The relationship between vendor management capability and 
outsourcing success is moderated by trust between partners in the partnership. 
The results indicate that „trust‟ between partners‟ has a significant but negative effect on 
the relationship between vendor management and outsourcing success (p<0.05, β=-
0.329). Consequently, the effect of trust on vendor management capability and 
outsourcing success is equivalent to the partnership quality (which is the main construct 
of trust). The interaction effect (i.e. VMmPQT) explains 50 per cent variance of the 
construct, and hence the moderation effect is average. The trust however, facilitates 
understanding requirements in the exchange process. Therefore, a higher level of trust 
between the focal firm and vendor could enhance outsourcing success with minimal 
contractual governance. This might be due to the fact that a higher level of trust between 
partners reduces the perceived risk of outsourcing (Benamati and Rajkumar, 2008). This 
finding also supports the bidirectional requirements of outsourcing success as explained 
by Cui et al. (2009). According to Cui et al. (2009) trust is only a partial requirement 
and simultaneous communication, strong partner competence, strong in-house 
competence, clear problem definition and incentive alignment should also be managed.   
This study continues to test the effect of „commitment‟ on outsourcing success (Sun et 
al., 2002; Han at el., 2008; Lai et al., 2009).  
Hypothesis 5b: The relationship between vendor management capability and 
outsourcing success is moderated by commitment of partners to the partnership. 
The „commitment‟ represents each partner‟s dedication in maintaining a strong 
relationship. The results revealed that there is no significant impact (P>0.05) of 
commitment in moderating the relationship between vendor management capabilities 
and outsourcing success. This indicates that the commitment is not mitigating the 
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impact of vendor management activities on outsourcing success. Commitment becomes 
significant to the partnership quality when it comes with cooperativeness and trust (all 
three latent variables are significant to partnership quality at 5 per cent level).  
Therefore, commitment to the partnership alone does not make sense as a moderator.  
Although, there are no similar studies examining the moderating role of commitment on 
the relationship of between vendor management capability and outsourcing success 
(VMOS),  many studies (e.g. Lee, 2001; Petersen et al., 2005; Sun et al., 2008; Han 
et al., 2008; Lai et al., 2009; Lahiri et al., 2009) verified positive outcomes of 
„commitment‟ in a collaborative business context. However, the finding of the present 
study deviates from the existing literature.   
The result (i.e. H5b) shows that, the focal firm‟s contractual governance is not 
motivated by „commitment‟ to the partnership. This result is considered a novelty to the 
existing literature and it carries a greater value to the practice as well. The managers in 
this context may perceive commitment as an important partnership quality element that 
could create a favourable and collaborative working environment. Even though Han et 
al., (2008) state that commitment warrants the maintenance of the partnership (p. 35), 
managers in the context of this study may perceive that vendor‟s commitment is in 
default or/and it could not accumulate a value for work (official) defined in the contract. 
Next, hypothesis 5c test the effect of cooperativeness.  
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Hypothesis 5c: The relationship between vendor management capability and 
outsourcing success is moderated by cooperativeness of partners to the partnership. 
Cooperativeness represents a tangible reciprocal stimulus each party receives in the 
partnership. The empirical evidence proves that cooperativeness significantly moderates 
the relationship between vendor management activities and outsourcing success, but the 
effect is negative (p<0.05, β= -0.225). This interpretation is similar to the effect of main 
construct (i.e. Partnership quality) to the relationship between vendor management 
capability and outsourcing success (VMOS). Accordingly, the higher the level of 
cooperativeness, the weaker the relationship between vendor management and 
outsourcing success (VMOS) is. When partners‟ cooperativeness is higher, the focal 
firm could reduce the weight of vendor management activities for an equivalent or 
better outcome. This will help firms reduce operational expenses, making 
cooperativeness a cost free investment for outsourcing success.  Though there are no 
sufficient evidences on moderating role of cooperativeness, Han et al., (2008) states 
that, cooperativeness positively intensifies the outsourcing relationship (p.40) while it is 
critical to maximize the strategic, economic and technological benefits for outsourcing 
(Lee, 2001, p.332). Likewise, the study confirms the value of cooperative relationship 
for outsourcing success.  
To conclude the first part of objective 4, it is found that partnership quality is significant 
and negatively moderates the influence of vendor management activities on outsourcing 
success. In particular, higher level of trust and cooperativeness between the outsourcing 
partners help firms reduce attention on managing vendors (Bernardes, 2010; Uzzi, 1999). 
This will accumulate value for outsourcing by cutting down operational expenses of 
managing vendors, thereby increasing the positive gains of outsourcing.   
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02.  The moderating effect of partnership quality (PQ) on the relationship 
between vendor’s service performance (VSP) and outsourcing success (OS) 
Hypotheses H6 and H7 (a,b,c)  test on the moderation effect of  partnership quality 
(PQ) to the relationship between vendors‟ service performance and outsourcing success 
(VSP OS).  
Hypothesis 6:  The relationship between vendor‟s service performance and outsourcing 
success is moderated by partnership quality. 
Vendor‟s service performance (VSP) is identified as having a major and direct impact in 
services outsourcing success. This study proposes that partnership quality has a 
moderating effect on the aforementioned relationship. From the second order structural 
model analysis, it is found that the moderation effect of partnership quality on the 
relationship between vendors‟ service performance and outsourcing success is 
significant, positive and strong (P<0.05; β= 0.790). The model explained 96.9 per cent 
of variance (R
2
 of the model in Figure 4.16). The initial model has 95 per cent variance, 
and due to the interaction effects (both PQ and CP), it has increased to 99 per cent. 
Chakrabarty, Whitten and Green (2008) stated that, vendors‟ service quality and 
partnership quality are correlated and hence measuring the same underlying phenomena.  
According to the empirical findings of this study, a higher level of partnership quality 
between firms produces a higher level of vendors‟ performance (i.e. a higher level of 
service quality). Thus, these two variables are not measuring the same underlying 
phenomena but two different aspects of governance in resource exchange (Cook and 
Rice, 2003; Zafirovski, 2005)   Perhaps, the difference might be the variations of 
operationalization of constructs. For example, Chakrabarty et al. (2008) applied 
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SERVQUAL scale to measure the service quality of vendors while this study used 
INDSERV scale.   
As previously noted, partnership quality is relational, soft and a cost-free and it could 
enhance vendors‟ performance. This is due to the fact that partnership quality aspects 
help firms understand each other‟s requirements, strengths and weaknesses. For 
example, the strength of the relationship between vendor‟s service performance on 
outsourcing success (VSP  OS) increased from β= 0. 64 to β=0.790 due to the 
positive influence received from the partnership quality. Therefore, it facilitates 
successive reciprocal stimulus, which creates a constructive and passive working 
environment towards mutual reinforcement (Homans, 1961; Zafirovski, 2005; Ferguson 
et al., 2005).  Figure 5.2 is the graphical representation of the moderating effect of 
partnership quality on the relationship between vendors‟ service performance and 
outsourcing success.  
As shown in Figure 5.2, the strongest impact of vendors‟ service performance (VSP) on 
outsourcing success (OS) is reported from the high level of partnership quality (PQ). 
Thus, a high or medium level partnership quality is required for a higher level of 
vendors‟ performance which maximizes the benefits of outsourcing.  
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Figure 5.2: The relationship between vendors‟ service performance (VSP) on 
outsourcing success (OS) for different levels of partnership quality (PQ) 
 
 
 
In relation to the factors/dimensions of partnership quality, all three of them (i.e. trust, 
commitment and cooperativeness) are significant (p<0.05). The highest contribution to 
the partnership quality is from cooperativeness (λ=.96, R2= 95.6%), followed by 
commitment (λ=.88, R2= 88.3%) and trust (λ=.82, R2= 82.5%).  The study then attempts 
to verify the segregated impact of partnership quality dimensions on the relationship. 
Therefore, hypothesis 7a, 7b and 7c are tested. The following section discusses these 
hypotheses.  
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Hypothesis 7a: The relationship between vendor‟s service performance and 
outsourcing success is moderated by trust between partners in the partnership. 
The above hypothesis (H7a) is accepted (P<0.05). This justifies the fact that, the 
relationship between vendor‟s service performance and outsourcing success is 
significantly and positively (β=0.517) moderated by the level of trust. Therefore, a 
higher level of trust between partners accumulates a value to the vendors‟ service 
performance for a higher level of outsourcing success.  
The level of trust between the focal firm and the vendor is one of the main factors that 
affects collaborative planning effectiveness, and thereby, supply chain and firm 
performance (Lee, 2001; Petersen et al., 2005; Sun et al., 2008;Han et al., 2008; Lai et 
al., 2009; Lahiri et al., 2009). Therefore, this study verifies the knowledge previously 
established. 
 
Hypothesis 7b: The relationship between vendor‟s service performance and 
outsourcing success is moderated by commitment of partners to the partnership. 
The above hypothesis is accepted.  The interaction effect is significant and positive (P< 
0.05, β= .247). Thus, when the partners‟ commitment to the partnership is higher, the 
vendors contribute more to the partnership. For example, Medina-Mun˜oz and Garcı´a-
Falco´n (2000) found that, commitment as one of the success factors of successful 
relationships between hotels and travel agencies. But, the moderating effect of 
commitment is not strong in comparison to trust. This study previously stated that, the 
commitment does not significantly influence vendor management activities (in 
hypothesis 5b). This implies that „commitment to the partnership‟ is a motivational 
factor for the vendor but not for focal firms. Therefore, the focal firm must demonstrate 
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qualities of „commitment‟.  This will help firms to get maximum contribution of 
vendors.  
Hypothesis 7c: The relationship between vendor‟s service performance and outsourcing 
success is moderated by cooperativeness of partners to the partnership. 
The empirical evidence indicates that the influence of vendor‟s service performance on 
outsourcing success is moderated by „cooperativeness‟ of partners to the partnership. 
The effect is significant and positive (p<0.05, β= 0.414). This implies that, the higher 
the cooperativeness between partners, the stronger the influence of vendor‟s service 
performance on outsourcing success. Therefore, a higher level of cooperativeness 
enhances vendor‟s contribution to the partnership. This could be perceived as a 
successful mutual reinforcement, whereby firms could get maximum capacity from 
vendors, while the vendors could benefit from the continuation of their contract with a 
collaborative partner (Lee, 2001; Han et al., 2008; Lacity et al., 2009; Lahiri et al., 
2009).  
To conclude the second part of objective 4, it can be surmised that partnership quality 
has a significant moderation effect on the relationship between vendors‟ service 
performance and outsourcing success. Thus, partnership quality is an important 
relational investment that enhances the vendors‟ performance in order to accomplish 
goals in services outsourcing.  
The overall conclusion of objective 4 is that partnership quality is a relational 
investment, which indirectly enhances the performance of resource exchange in services 
outsourcing.  
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5.2.5 Objective 05:  
To investigate the moderating effect of partners‟ compatibility on the relationships 
between 1) degree of outsourcing and outsourcing success,       2) vendor 
management capability and ooutsourcing success, and    3) vendors‟ service 
performance on outsourcing success. 
From the perspective of resource dependency theory and social exchange theory, 
partners‟ compatibility is identified as a fundamental requirement of a collaborative 
business. It facilitates the level of dependency (Mohr and Spekman, 1994; Sun et al., 
2002; Al-Natour and Cavusoglu, 2009) as well as it provides a platform for successful 
resource exchange (Homans, 1961; Whipple and Frankel, 2000). The service delivery is 
identified as a bi-directional and simultaneous process.  As a result, there is  less 
feasibility to assess compatibility characteristics of vendors in services prior to the 
contract execution. Therefore, the study imputed the effect of partners‟ compatibility as 
a moderator for managing the dependency and resource exchange in outsourcing 
success. Three hypotheses (i.e. H8, H9 and H10) are tested, corresponding to objective 
five.  
 
Hypothesis 8: Partners‟ compatibility moderates the relationship between degree of 
outsourcing and outsourcing success.  
Hypothesis 8 is rejected. Thus, it is accepted the fact that partners‟ compatibility does 
not moderate the influence of degree of outsourcing on outsourcing success (P>0.05). 
This may be due to the reason that in practice the level of compatibility determines 
degree of outsourcing. Thus, compatibility becomes an antecedent factor of degree of 
outsourcing rather than a moderator (Wadhwa and Ravindran, 2007; Liou and Chuang, 
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2010).  Additionally, the study context may not be mature enough to perceive the 
strategic use of partners‟ compatibility to enhance the effectiveness of degree of 
outsourcing. It may viewed as a purposive strategic relationship (Mohr and 
Spekman,1994) in which the assessed compatibility in the early stage remains the same 
throughout  the partnership. Additionally, selecting the most suitable vendor to 
determine degree of outsourcing involves conflicting criteria (Wadhwa and Ravindran, 
2007) and hence assessment also might be invalid.  
Hypothesis 9: Partners‟ compatibility (CP) moderates the relationship between vendor 
management capability (VM) and outsourcing success (OS). 
This hypothesis is accepted. The moderation effects from partnership quality (PQ) and 
partners‟ compatibility (CP) are tested in a single model, and due to these interaction 
effects, the model variance (R
2
) has increased from 95 per cent to 99 per cent. The beta 
coefficient value of -0.61 indicates that the moderation effect (i.e. VMmCP) is negative 
and fairly strong. This shows that a higher level of partners‟ compatibility could reduce 
the weight on vendor management activities for a higher level of outsourcing outcomes. 
Furthermore, when partners are incompatible, firms need to utilize vendor management 
activities to a greater extent. Figure 5.3 graphically shows the nature of moderation.  
According to Figure 5.3, if the vendor is compatible with the firm to a greater extent, 
then the firm could get comparatively higher level of outsourcing success. This requires 
only a minimum level of vendor management activities. If the vendor is moderately or 
less compatible, firms need to conduct a sufficient amount of vendor management 
activities for better outsourcing outcomes. However, the strength of vendor 
management capability to outsourcing success (VMOS) is 0.64 (β=0.64), and the 
strength of the relationship become -0.61(β=-0.61) with the moderation effect of 
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partners‟ compatibility.  This offers a choice to focal firms. In particular, when the 
compatibility is low firms could pay more attention on vendor management activities, or 
as an option they could take necessary actions to enhance vendors‟ agility. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: The relationship between vendor management capability (VM) and 
outsourcing success (OS) for different levels of partners‟ compatibility (CP) 
  
However, resource dependence perspective acknowledges partners‟ compatibility as 
fundamental for higher level of mutual interdependence (Mohr and Spekman, 1994). 
The failure of one party in the dependency might affect the dependent‟s goals in the 
resource exchange process (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Al-Natour and Cavusoglu, 
2009). Selecting a compatible vendor is a challenge for service firms. Moreover, it is 
unfeasible to find a vendor who matches every desired criteria of a focal firm. 
Therefore, the firms could take the necessary actions in order to enhance vendors‟ 
compatibility, such as working as a team and communicating organisational culture and 
values.  Additionally, maintaining a long-term partnership will help firms to understand 
each other‟s behaviours, strengths and weaknesses (Ogden, 2006).  
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Thereafter, the H10 is tested.  
Hypothesis 10: Partners‟ compatibility moderates the relationship between vendor‟s 
service performance and outsourcing success. 
The result indicates that partners‟ compatibility (CP) is a significant moderator (P<0.05, 
β=0.235) to the relationship between vendors‟ service performance (VSP) and 
outsourcing success (OS). The positive β coefficient implies that the higher the 
compatibility between partners, the higher the strength of the relationship between 
vendor‟s service performance and outsourcing success Therefore, a collaborative 
partnership with a compatible vendor brings value to the firm, as they could offer a 
quality services. Figure 5.4 demonstrates the nature of moderation effect.  
Figure 5.4 clearly shows that the effect of vendor‟s service performance (VSP), 
especially from medium to high range on outsourcing success (OS), gets stronger when 
partners‟ compatibility (CP) increases. Accordingly, the vendors should try to be 
adjustable with the business partner in terms of understanding their business culture and 
required competencies (Liou and Chuang, 2010). Resource dependence theory describes 
this as a complementary dependency (Al-Natour and Cavusoglu, 2009; Hessels and 
Terjesen, 2010) which is crucial for successful partnership. This ensures the vendor‟s 
role of „dual citizenship‟ in service delivery to end customer (Daityari et al., 2008). 
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Figure 5.4: The relationship between vendors‟ service performance (VSP) and 
outsourcing success (OS) for different levels of compatibilities (CP). 
 
 
From the resource dependency theoretical perspective, firms should adjust their 
operating boundaries for the purpose of improving performances (Kedia and Lahiri, 
2007; Petersen et al., 2008). Not only the focal firm, the vendors should strive to adjust 
themselves with the focal firm for their survival. Among the compatibility requirements, 
understanding quality aspects (λ=0.92), flexibility requirements (λ=0.92), and operating 
philosophies (λ=.87) are the most important factors for successful outsourcing practice. 
Moreover, the study identifies the value of managing compatibility of partners in 
services outsourcing process, as it could accumulate values for all parties in the 
exchange process.  
The above section has discussed all the five research objectives which derived from 
three research questions. The answers to the research question are next discussed as in 
terms of managerial implications of the study.  
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5.3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The primary aim of this study is to investigate the critical managerial factors affecting 
outsourcing success in the services sector. Service outsourcing is identified as a triadic 
relationship among service provider (i.e. focal firm), vendor and customer. However, 
the study focuses only on business-to-business (B2B) aspects. In reference to the 
epistemology and ontology of the research scope, the following three research questions 
are formulated.  
1. To what extent does organisational dependency impact on the success of 
outsourcing in service firms? 
2. What are the important factors in the exchange of resources that have an 
impact on outsourcing success? 
3. What is the role of partners‟ compatibility in assuring the outsourcing success 
of the service sector?  
Answering these three questions will provide a wide range of suggestions for primary 
stakeholders in the service outsourcing process. Thus, the following discussion on 
implications of the study follows these three questions.  
 
5.3.1 Research Question 01: 
To what extent does organisational dependency impact on the success of 
outsourcing in service firms? 
Managing dependency determines the leverage power of the firm when firms depend on 
external resources (Pfeffer, 2003). Therefore, the degree of outsourcing is identified as 
the crucial decision in managing dependency for outsourcing success. It is associated 
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with two decisions; breadth and depth. As discussed in research objective 1, it is 
revealed that the degree of outsourcing is positively correlated with outsourcing 
success. This finding supports the knowledge previously established by Espino-
Rodrı‟guez and Padro´n-Robaina (2004) and Gilley and Rasheed (2000). Additionally, 
this study observes that each component of degree of outsourcing (i.e. breadth and 
depth) does not equally affect outsourcing performance. It has an optimal point (Kotabe 
and Mol, 2009). Subsequent post-hoc analysis found that only breadth is significantly 
associated with outsourcing success. It also reveals that high level of breadth and 
medium level of depth category reported the highest outsourcing success.  Based on 
these facts, the following insights/recommendations on managing dependency for 
outsourcing success are provided.  
The higher the degree of outsourcing, the more the chances the firms could reach their 
performance objectives in outsourcing. For instance, firms could focus more on 
activities performed with internal resources (Kedia and Lahiri, 2007; Chi, 1994; 
Venkatesen, 1992, Arnold, 2000; Jean et al,. 2008).  Meanwhile, they have to monitor 
outsourced functions in order to make sure that the customer is satisfied at the end (Lee, 
2001, Chen and Paulraj, 2004).  Dependency primarily relies on the number of activities 
outsourced, rather than the power assigned to vendors for each activity. Therefore, a 
careful examination on the resource capability of the firm and ascertaining required 
resource capabilities of potential vendors‟ needs to be done prior to the formal 
execution of the contract (Ozcelik and Altinkemer, 2009; Sampson, 2000).  However, 
from the resource dependence perspective, the breadth fundamentally depends on the 
focal firm‟s resource capability. Though, there is no significant impact of depth of 
outsourcing on outsourcing performance, it can be determined by the vendor‟s resource 
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capability. For example, the focal firm‟s desired level of depth can be altered with 
vendor‟s resource capability. However, Wadhwa and Ravindran (2007) depicted an 
overview of outsourcing process (Fig. 01, p. 3726), but there is no link to revise the 
activities to be outsourced based on the assessments of potential vendors‟ resource 
capability and compatibility. This link is necessary for services (Kannan and Tan, 2004; 
Sun et al., 2002), as it helps to outline the intensity of power assigned to the vendor (i.e. 
depth).   
In conclusion, the degree of outsourcing is perceived as a strategic tool of „altering 
organisational interdependency‟ through collaborations (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
The results, however, demonstrated that only breadth of outsourcing influences the 
outsourcing success. As Gilley and Rasheed (2000) state outsourcing strategies vary 
greatly in their breadth (p.768). Therefore, the firm should identify as many as possible 
functions that could be outsourced within their scope of outsourcing and resource 
capability (Ozcelik and Altinkemer, 2009). The vendor‟s resource capability perhaps 
becomes the key determinant of depth of outsourcing and it should be kept at a 
moderate level for better outcomes. This further confirms that focal firm needs to act as 
a bridge between vendor and customer in the service triad (Li and Choi, 2009). 
Likewise, the study identifies the implications and strategic importance of managing 
breadth and depth for the management of dependency in outsourcing.  
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5.3.2 Research Question 02:  
What are the important factors in the exchange of resources that have an impact 
on outsourcing success? 
The resource exchange process in outsourcing is supported by two governance 
structures. Contractual governance is associated with the accomplishment of legal 
compliances in outsourcing contract, and relational governance performs as a result of 
reciprocity of collaborative business (Ferguson et al., 2005; Zafirovski, 2005; Cook and 
Rice, 2003).  The findings of this study prove that outsourcing success depends on the 
successful contractual governance. From the perspective of the social exchange theory, 
this study identifies each party‟s responsibility in service outsourcing. The bilateral (Cui 
et al., 2009) and direct form of service delivery (Li and Choi, 2009) has highlighted a 
dual responsibility of outsourcing. Accordingly, the empirical evidences confirm that 
the focal firm should carry out sufficient vendor management activities, while vendors 
should strive to deliver the agreed service performance, as both are equally important. 
This further confirms that, exchange activities of each party in the exchange process are 
„enforceable from the economic perspectives‟ (Lee, 2001, p. 325).  
However, as far as the study context is concerned, the most important vendor 
management activities are: having a systematic process to monitor vendors, evaluate 
vendors‟ performance with specified criteria and having systematic processes to develop 
vendors‟ capabilities. 
With respect to the vendors‟ service performance, hard process quality (HQ) is the most 
important aspect, followed by output quality (OQ). The prominent factors in hard 
process quality and output quality are: stay in budget, meet deadlines, look at details to 
perform a task, understand focal firm needs appropriately, be creative in offering 
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services, reach objectives in the contract and contribute to the focal firm‟s image.  These 
aspects are also important to vendors, as they are bound to meet and complement the 
focal firm‟s needs (Wadhwa and Ravindran, 2007, p. 3725). This could guarantee the 
continuation of the current outsourcing contract, and thereby ensure the survival in the 
competitive vendor market. 
Next, the role of relational governance in the exchange process is verified. This is 
denoted and measured as partnership quality. As previous researchers have highlighted  
(e.g. Lee, 2001; Han et al., 2008;Lahiri et al., 2009; Lai et al., 2009; Li and Choi, 2009; 
Bernardes, 2010), relational governance is recognised as a social capital. It facilitates 
the closing of „structural hole‟, and enhances the performance of outsourcing. 
Accordingly, the study tested the moderating impact of partnership quality on the 
success of contractual governance.  A higher level of partnership quality guaranteed a 
higher level of contractual governance performance on outsourcing success. Based on 
that, the study outlined the following recommendations to firms and vendors in the 
service sector.  
In a more abstract point of view, both the focal firm and the vendor should pay attention 
on social capital investments (Bernardes, 2010), as it accumulates greater value to the 
resource exchange process. As Lam and Han (2005) explained the aim of outsourcing is 
to squeeze the operational expenses. This will assist firms in reducing their operational 
expenses on outsourcing, while enhancing the vendor‟s service performance in bilateral 
service delivery. 
As far as social capital/partnership quality characteristics are concerned, trust between 
partners‟ is the most prominent factor (Dyer, 1997; Marshall et al., 2007; Cui et al., 
2009). Higher-level of trust maintained by the partners could reduce the rigid vendor 
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management procedures, and thereby focal firm managers could reduce cost, time and 
efforts in managing vendors. Instead, they could focus on other managerial tasks (Han 
et al., 2008; Lee, 2001; Kroes and Ghosh, 2009). Furthermore, a higher level of trust 
strengthens the vendors‟ service performance towards outsourcing success. This is 
perhaps due to the favourable and comfortable working environment generated through 
trust.   
„As long as the parties keep their commitments, the relationship can last for a long 
time’ (Wasti et al., 2006, p.951). Kannan and Tan (2004) also highlighted the 
importance of strategic commitment from vendor for successful partnership. Thus, 
commitment is another important factor in relational governance. Based on the 
empirical evidences of this study a higher level of commitment facilitates in obtaining a 
greater level of vendor‟s performance. Hence, the focal firm should demonstrate higher 
level of commitment to the partnership. However, vendors should be careful enough to 
take into account other aspects of relational governance, as their commitment alone is 
incapable of adding value to the outsourcing success.  
In fact, the cooperativeness is verified as one of the most important factors in relational 
governance as well. Both parties are motivated by the cooperativeness (reciprocity), 
which they have received from the other party. As a result, the vendors will be more 
dedicated to their responsibilities, while the focal firm could reduce governance by 
contract for better outcomes. Nevertheless, Wasti et al. (2006) found that, cooperation is 
important for strategic partnership but it not necessary for exchange (i.e. information 
exchange). The investments on social capital (i.e. partnership quality) hence produce 
value for resource exchange process.  
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To summarize the important factors in the resource exchange process, each party should 
adhere to their own responsibilities for mutual benefits and survival. Both parties must 
also strive to maintain a higher level of trust, commitment and cooperativeness, as these 
elements could accumulate value for outcomes of outsourcing, at no cost. 
Wasti et al. (2006) state that, a „social climate can be positive even without mutual trust 
and cooperation and as long as the parties keep their commitments’ (p. 951). Despite 
the differences of defining constructs, finding of the current research is the opposite. To 
the perspective of focal firm, trust and cooperativeness become fundamentals of positive 
social climate while commitment is not.  
Likewise, this study identifies the strategic implicational values of contractual 
governance and relational governance in the resource exchange process of services 
outsourcing.  
 
5.3.3 Research Question 03: 
What is the role of partners’ compatibility in assuring the outsourcing success of 
the service sector?  
From the perspective of resource dependence and social exchange theories, it is said that 
partners‟ compatibility is fundamental for the success of interdependence and exchange. 
Therefore, this study investigates the role of compatibility of vendors with the focal 
firm in the context of outsourcing.  
A compatible partner enhances the complementary dependency (Al-Natour and 
Cavusoglu, 2009; Hessels and Terjesen, 2010) and thereby „the success of outsourcing 
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activity is highly dependent on successful selection of vendors’ (Wadhwa and 
Ravindran, 2007, p. 3735). The dependency in outsourcing is related with the degree of 
outsourcing and it should be supported by complementary dependency. However, the 
empirical evidences show that the level of partners‟ compatibility (i.e. level of 
complementary dependency) does not change the impact of the degree of outsourcing 
on the outsourcing success.  
In relation to the contractual governance, a higher-level compatibility could result in a 
higher-level vendors‟ performance. Besides, when partners are compatible, the focal 
firm could reduce the focus on vendor management activities for better outcomes. 
However, based on the impact of partners‟ compatibility to the contractual governance, 
the study outlined the following recommendations to firms and vendors in the service 
sector.  
Firstly, the focal firm should evaluate opportunities to enhance vendors‟ compatibility. 
The best option is cost-free techniques such as „work as a team‟, „communicating 
operating philosophies and values‟. Otherwise, they could also utilize techniques that 
may incur a cost. Chakrabarty et al. (2008) viewed these strategies as a socialization 
process which could be used for improve partnership quality. As a result, a higher level 
partnership quality also assists to enhance the interaction of partners and understand 
each other‟s culture (Daityari et al., 2008; Kannan and Tan, 2004). Nevertheless, the 
programs which focus on to enhance agility between partners are not equally important 
for all types of vendors. The criticality of the function outsourced, the level of 
interaction between the vendor and the customer in service delivery and vendor-
switching cost may also determine the necessity of vendor training and development. 
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Likewise, the focal firms have several opportunities to select the best management 
alternative.  
Next, the vendors should be aware of the importance of their agility with the focal firm, 
as it is crucial for their survival (Wasti et al., 2006). Besides, vendors may get an 
opportunity to work with the focal firm independently, or at a minimum level 
interference (i.e. with less vendor management activities), if they could adjust. This will 
help them to perform well in their transferred role of vendor to service provider in 
process of service delivery (Li and Choi, 2009; Donada and Nogatchewsky, 2009; 
Shamdasani and Sheth, 1994).  
As noted in section 5.2, partnership quality could accumulate value to each party in the 
service-outsourcing context. Apart from that, vendors‟ compatibility with the focal firm 
plays a major role too. The magnitude of impact receives from partnership quality and 
partners‟ compatibility on contractual governance elements, is different. More 
importantly, the impact of partnership quality is higher for vendors‟ service 
performance (VSP) on outsourcing success, than it is for vendor management capability 
(VM) on outsourcing success. Accordingly, partnership quality is more important to 
intensify the contribution received from the vendor than its ability to reduce operational 
expenses of vendor management activities. With regards to partners‟ compatibility, the 
opposite is observed. The influence of partners‟ compatibility is higher for vendor 
management capability (VM) on outsourcing success than it for vendors‟ service 
performance (VSP) on outsourcing success. Therefore, partners‟ compatibility is more 
important to reduce operational expenses of vendor management activities than the 
value accretion for vendors‟ service performance.  
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The previous section answers all three research questions of this study. Simultaneously, 
several managerial implications  discovered during the course of this study are also 
outlined. The next section therefore explicates the theoretical contributions and 
summarizes the managerial contributions of the study.  
 
5.4 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
5.4.1 Theoretical Contribution  
The current study integrates the knowledge of the supply chain management and service 
management in deriving the theoretical framework. Meanwhile, the framework 
addresses the specific nature of the service supply chain with respect to outsourcing (i.e. 
real-time, bilateral and direct). Despite the focal firm‟s responsibility, this study 
assigned a co- responsibility to the vendor, creating a dual responsibility of outsourcing. 
Therefore, the framework of the study deviates from other conventional frameworks in 
the same research area. However, subsequent empirical investigations have confirmed 
the value of direct dual responsibility in services outsourcing.  
The current study also uncovers numerous novel ideas to the theory and practice. As 
noted in Chapter 1, this study specifically accumulates knowledge to the area of services 
outsourcing in three ways. 
First, this study attempts to answer the „neglected aspects‟ of previous studies. 
Accordingly, the impact of partners‟ compatibility on organisational dependency and 
resource exchange is tested. The study found that, only the performance of resource 
exchange is moderated by partners‟ compatibility, while dependency is not. This 
indicates that the impact of „degree of outsourcing‟ on „outsourcing success‟ is not 
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varied upon the level of partners‟ compatibility. As a result, focal firms prefer to 
maintain the level of dependency stated in the contract throughout the contractual 
period. However, the findings support the conception that, the contractual governance 
could better perform when the partners‟ compatibility is high. Accordingly, the study 
proves that the effectiveness of contractual governance is mitigated by the level of 
compatibility between partners.     
Secondly, this study focuses on aspect(s) that have not been empirically tested before. 
Previous studies compounded the notion of „degree of outsourcing‟, and identified the 
type of activities suitable for outsourcing (Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 
2005a; Kotabe and Murray, 2004; Quinn and Hilmer, 1994). Alternatively, this study 
tested the impact of different levels of breadth and levels of depth of outsourcing on 
outsourcing success. The purpose is to identify the important aspect(s) in the degree of 
outsourcing for its success, and consequently, only breadth is identified as important. 
Perhaps, the reason is that breadth may be contingent upon the resource capability of the 
focal firm. The latent meaning of this is aligned with the fundamental theoretical insight 
provided by the resource dependency theory. As such, when firms lack the required 
resources; they tend to establish relationships with other firms in order to strengthen 
their resource base (Pfeffer, 2003). Additionally, high breadth and medium depth jointly 
reported the optimum level outsourcing success. This signals that there is a saturation 
point for the degree of outsourcing. Due to the influence of depth, the relationship 
between degree of outsourcing and outsourcing performance could be non-linear. 
Next, the moderating effect of partnership quality is tested with respect to the variables 
that needed empirical verification. The empirical evidence proves that partnership 
quality moderates the impact of contractual governance. All aspects of partnership 
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quality (i.e. trust, commitment and cooperativeness) are equally important in 
moderating the influence of vendors‟ service performance on outsourcing success.  As 
far as the influence from each dimension is concerned, „partners‟ commitment‟ is not a 
significant factor that influences the effectiveness of vendor management activities. 
This finding is considered a novelty, and it adds substantial value to the practice. The 
empirical evidences also confirm that both relational and contractual governance are 
important to ensure the success of resource exchange and relational governance adds 
value to contractual governance.  
Thirdly, this study addressed „incommensurate‟ issues in the corresponding research 
domain. Consequently, the study applied the resource dependency theory to oversee the 
latent purpose of outsourcing. This opened up the acquisition of any source of 
outcomes, explained by many theories, such as transaction cost economies, resource 
based view, and knowledge base. The resource exchange is perceived as a social 
phenomenon, due to the very nature of service supply chain in outsourcing. Thus, the 
social exchange theory is also applied to oversee the exchange process. Both these 
theories could produce a unique conceptual framework in determining outsourcing 
success. As a whole, these theories help to oversee context without presumptions of 
purpose or outcomes of outsourcing. Eventually, the application of these two theories 
confirms the detachment of the researcher from the research, which is a fundamental 
ontological assumption of positivistic research domain.  
Section 5.3 discussed managerial implications of the study corresponding to each 
research question. Thus, the following section only provides a summary of managerial 
contributions of the study.  
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5.4.2 Managerial Contribution. 
As far as the internal business operations are concerned, the most critical challenge is 
reducing operational expenses in order to increase profitability (Lam and Han, 2005). 
Outsourcing helps firms to cope with the aforementioned challenge. This study explains 
some strategies that help firms increase their business productivity and profitability 
within the outsourcing context. In addition to that, the developed framework can be 
used as a guide to plan for outsourcing process in the services sector, such as 
determining the breadth of outsourcing for the appropriate level of dependency, 
understand the dual responsibility in contractual governance, and the value of relational 
governance as a strategy to enhance overall outsourcing performance. The operational 
level contributions have been discussed in detail in Section 5.3.  
The strategic value of the model developed by the study is its ability to be used as an 
instrument to evaluate the success of outsourcing effort in services sectors. In particular, 
the level of breadth and level of depth, adequacy of vendor management tasks, and the 
level of vendors‟ contribution on outsourcing success can be assessed. Moreover, firms 
can understand the level of compatibility of each vendor, and the level of partnership 
quality they should maintain. This will help firms to improve the outcomes of 
outsourcing. Implementing programs to enhance vendors‟ agility (Daityari et al., 2008) 
and increase investment on social capital are some examples that bring about such 
improvements.  
Furthermore, the vendors‟ market is also competitive; hence they have to strive for 
survival. The INDSERV scale provides general guidelines for vendors about the 
expectations of the focal firm in business-to-business context (Gounaris (2005a). But as 
far as the study context is concerned, not all elements are equally important and valid. 
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Accordingly, vendors in the study context can focus more on the refined elements of 
INDSERV scale. Next, the vendors in the domestic market have to demonstrate an 
appropriate level of cooperativeness and trust, in addition to commitment. This will help 
them work with the firm rather than work to the firm.  These aspects are also creating 
favourable and comfortable working environment. The vendors are required to adjust 
their business culture with the focal firm‟s culture. They should be able to align with 
competencies required by the focal firm as well. This is effective and practical for 
partners who are attached for long-term contracts, sole vendors, and for situations in 
which switching cost of vendor is high.  
Accordingly, the model developed by this study suggests methods for improving 
flexibility of outsourcing effort for mutual benefit and survival. This is the first study on 
the services sector outsourcing in Sri Lanka which focuses on banks and hotels. 
Therefore, the research findings can be directly endorsed in the Sri Lankan banking and 
hotel sector.  
 
5.5 LIMITATION AND DIRECTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Researches in social science are always curtailed by various limitations, such as the 
nature and the complexity of social phenomena, time, and costs. Firstly, this study was 
unable to examine the impact of outsourcing in a business-to-customer (B2C) context. 
Thus, future studies could combine the customer aspects to the model. Another 
limitation of the present study is the exclusion of the impact of resource capabilities of 
both firms (i.e. focal firm and vendor) in determining interdependency. It is suspected 
that the focal firm‟s resource capability may affect breadth, while vendor‟s resource 
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capability might impact depth. Thus, it can be suggested that future research should 
verify the impact of both party‟s resource capability on breadth and depth.  
Next, the present study has identified the need to localize the INDSERV scale for  
developing countries, and future research could perform empirical validation of 
INDSERV in different study contexts. Meanwhile, exploratory studies will help identify 
unique factors for a different context. This prompts the recommendation of the use of 
localized scales when the research context is considerably different from the context 
where the scale originated from.  
Furthermore, this research can be further improved by including external factors 
affecting the outsourcing success in the services sector, such as market uncertainty 
(Gilley and Rasheed, 2000; Espino-Rodrı´guez and Padro´n-Robaina, 2004), market 
thickness (Dyer, 1997; Li and Choi, 2009; De Vita et al., 2010) and anticipated rivalry 
(Lahiri et al., 2009).  
In terms of methodology, the current study applied pure positivistic research 
methodology (only self-administered questionnaire). In the future, this can be tested in 
neo-positivistic research domain of mix method (qualitative study followed by a 
quantitative method or vice versa). This might help uncover the reasons for certain 
issues mentioned above. Additionally, there is a possibility to investigate other types of 
collaborative business amalgamations (i.e. mergers, franchise, alliances) with minor 
adjustments in construct definitions.  
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
One of the main conclusions of this research is that the resource dependency theory is a 
suitable starting point to examine outsourcing.  The findings also confirm that the social 
exchange theory could better interpret the unique characteristics of services outsourcing.  
This study reveals the importance of the degree of outsourcing, vendor management 
capability and vendors‟ service performance in explaining outsourcing success in the 
services context. The findings support the notion that contractual governance performs 
better with relational governance. Furthermore, as compatible partners could contribute 
more to the contractual governance, both vendor and the focal firm should strive to be 
as agile as possible to each other. 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge, as it provides validated explanatory 
dimensions, which constitute the measurement constructs for outsourcing success in 
services sector using structural equation modelling. Accordingly, the model identified 
critical managerial factors in services outsourcing, and those factors altogether explain 
more than 95 per cent variance of the outsourcing success.  Moreover, several practical 
implications which outlined in this study are invaluable for planning and assessing 
outsourcing function, and its success. Finally, the current study could well serve as a 
foundation research for services sector supply chain as it provides future avenues for 
extensive research prospects.  
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APPENDIX A: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PILOT STUDY 
 
Dear Respondents,  
I am a PhD candidate from University of Malaya, Malaysia under the supervision of 
Associate Professor Dr. Ghazali Musa. We are conducting a survey on outsourcing 
practices in service organizations. The purpose of this study is to identify factors that 
influence outsourcing success in the organizations. This survey is preferably answered 
by the person who is in charge of outsourcing in your organization.   
 
This questionnaire enquires you to select information about outsourcing practices, 
responsibilities and outcomes within your firm. We would be grateful if you could 
spend 15-20 minutes of your time to complete this questionnaire. There is no right or 
wrong answer to the questions and please answer all of them.  
 
Note that all your answers to the questions will be treated as strictly confidential. They 
will be analyzed in aggregate form, and no individual firm will be disclosed to anyone 
other than the researchers. Should you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact us 
at the following addresses.   
Thank you very much for you co-operation.  
Associate Professor Dr. Ghazali Musa 
Deputy Dean (Research and Development)  
Faculty of Business and Accountancy 
University of Malaya 
Malaysia.  
 ghaz8zz@gmail.com 
 
Nilakshi W. K Galahitiyawe 
PhD Candidate 
Faculty of Business and Accountancy 
University of Malaya 
Malaysia 
nilakshi@sjp.ac.lk    / 
nilakshi.g@gmail.com 
Tel. No: +601 3284 7950 
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Questionnaire 
Section A: Instructions 
 This section identifies the current level of outsourcing in your organization. 
 Please refer to the scale provided below to answer Part 1 and please tick (√) 
the answer in the appropriate box. 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 1: BANKING 
Your company’s current level of outsourcing in the following function(s) 
 
 
        
Banking Organizations : 
Activity /Function 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. ATM      
2. Card processing      
3. Internal auditing      
4. Debt collection      
5. Account processing       
6. Human  Resource management (HR)      
7. Information technology (IT)      
8. Sales/ Marketing      
Others (Please specify) 
 
 
 
     
 
  
Not  outsourced 
at all 
Outsourced to a 
limited extent 
Outsourced to a 
moderate extent 
Outsourced to  
a greater 
extent 
Totally 
outsourced 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not 
outsourced 
at all 
Outsourced 
to a very 
great extent 
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Part 1: Your Company’s current level of outsourcing in the following 
function(s) 
 
 
        
Hotel Organizations : 
Activity /Function 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. Reception      
2. Reservation      
3. Purchasing and receiving      
4. Common area cleaning      
5. Room cleaning      
6. Laundry      
7. Swimming pool maintenance       
8. Gardening services      
9. Bars      
10. Restaurants      
11. Kitchen operations      
12. General maintenance      
13. Leisure activities       
14. Administration      
15. Employee Training      
16. Personnel selection      
17. Information systems      
18. Sales activities      
19. Promotion and advertising      
20. Safety and Security      
Others (Please specify) 
 
 
 
     
  
Not 
outsourced 
at all 
Outsourced 
to a very 
great extent 
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Section B : Instructions 
Part 2, 3 and 4 require you to response to the statements.  
Please tick (X) your answer in the appropriate box according to your level 
agreement to the statements. 
 
Part 2: This part evaluates the vendor management capability of 
your firm. 
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VM1 
We select only qualified suppliers/vendors 
with satisfactory assessment of selection 
criteria 
       
VM2 
We have systematic process to monitor 
suppliers/vendors 
       
VM3 
We evaluate suppliers’/vendors’ 
performance with specified criteria 
       
VM4 
 
We have systematic process in the 
development of suppliers’/vendors’ 
capabilities. 
(e.g. Training programs, financial 
assistance, technological assistance, etc.) 
       
VM5 
We have the ability to compensate/ pay 
supplier/vendor fees according to the 
contract 
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Part 3: The following statements describe the service quality and 
performance of the supplier/vendor(s). Please tick (X) your answer in 
the appropriate answer to each statement.  
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PTQ 1 
Our suppliers /vendors have the ability to 
perform all tasks specified in the contract 
       
PTQ 2 
Our suppliers/vendors  have the required human 
resource 
       
PTQ 3 
Our suppliers /vendors have the required 
management philosophy 
 
       
PTQ 4 
Our suppliers/vendors have the required  
facilities 
 
       
PTQ 5 
Our suppliers’/vendors’ labour turn-over rate is 
low 
       
PTQ 6 
Our suppliers/vendors  work as a network with 
partners  
       
HQ   1 Our suppliers / vendors maintain  time schedules        
HQ   2 
Our suppliers /vendors perform within the 
agreed budget 
       
HQ 3 Our suppliers/vendors  meet deadlines        
HQ 4 
Our suppliers/vendors  seek more information 
before proceed any task 
       
HQ 5 Our suppliers/vendors  understand our needs        
SQ 1 
Our suppliers/vendors  accept  terms and 
conditions in the contract enthusiastically 
       
SQ 2 Our suppliers/vendors  listen to our problems        
SQ 3 
Our suppliers/vendors are open to 
suggestions/ideas 
       
SQ 4 Our suppliers/vendors  have pleasant personality        
SQ 5 
Our  suppliers/vendors have constructive 
arguments 
       
SQ 6 
Our suppliers / vendors always care about our 
interests 
       
OQ 1 
Our suppliers’/vendors’  performances enable us 
to reach our objectives in outsourcing 
       
OQ 2 
Our suppliers’/vendors’ contributions to our 
business are remarkable   
       
OQ 3 Our suppliers / vendors add value to our image        
OQ 4 Our suppliers/vendors  are creative in their job        
OQ 5 
Our suppliers /vendors are consistent with our 
strategy 
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Part 4: This part measures the quality of relationship maintain by your 
organization and your suppliers / vendors in outsourcing.  
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COP 1 
We share information that affects each other’s 
business 
     
COP 2 
We share business knowledge on core business 
processes 
     
COP 3 We share benefits and  risk of the business      
COP 4 
We make decisions for business objectives and 
directions together. 
     
COP 5 We solve most of the  problems together 
     
COP 6 We are willing to comply with each other’s requests      
COP 7 We are keen  in solving each other’s problems      
CPO 8 We are cooperative in conducting business      
PQT 1 
We always take  decisions which are favourable for 
both of us 
     
PQT 2 We assist each other in performing business      
PQT 3 We are  sincere at all times      
PQT 4 We have friendly relationship      
PQC  
1 
We have strong relationship      
PQC  
2 
We do our best to maintain  a good  relationship      
PQC 3 We always try to keep each other’s promises 
     
PQC 4 We are   willing  to continue the relationship      
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Part 5: 
 
This part identifies the match/fit between 
business partners in outsourcing. i.e. your firm 
and supplier.  Please tick (X) your answer in the 
appropriate box. 
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CPC 1 Your firm and your vendor firm (s) 
have similar operating philosophies  
     
CPC 2 Your firm and your vendor firm(s) 
have a similar management style. 
     
CPC 3 Your firm and your vendor  firm(s) 
have  complementary  goals 
     
CPP 1 Your firm and your vendor  firm(s) 
consider ‘cost’ as an important 
dimension in doing business 
     
CPP 2 Your firm and your vendor  firm(s) 
consider ‘quality’ as an important 
dimension in doing business 
     
CPP 3 Your firm and your vendor  firm 
consider (s) ‘delivery time’ as an 
important dimension in doing 
business 
     
CPP 4 Your firm and your vendor  firm(s) 
consider ‘flexible reaction to 
demand’  as an important 
dimension in doing business 
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Part 6: This part evaluates the success of outsourcing in your 
organization.   Please tick (X) your answer in the appropriate box. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outsourcing significantly contributes to 
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OST 1 Profitability        
OST 2 the reduction in total cost        
OST 3 Increase productivity / 
Occupancy rate 
       
OST 4 quality improvements        
OSS 1 greater focus on core business        
OSS 2 the acquisition of expertise 
knowledge 
       
OSS 3 competitive advantage        
OSS 4 reduce the business risk        
OSS 5 innovations         
 
My organization is… 
       
OSB 1 satisfied with the overall 
relationship with suppliers  
       
OSB 2 willing to continue the contract 
with existing suppliers 
       
OSB 3 
willing to outsource activities 
which are currently   in-sourced 
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Section C: General information about your organization 
 
1. Name of your organization: ……………………………………………….. 
2. Type of your organization (please -X- the answer) 
Bank Hotel 
Government 
Semi –Government 
Private 
Foreign  
Other (please specify) 
1 Star 
2 Star 
3 Star 
4 Star 
5 Star 
 Above 5 Star (5+) 
 
 
3. Number of employees in the organization (approximate 
figure)…………….. 
4. Number of branches in Island wide (in 2010)…………………………… 
5. How long has your organization been outsourcing (number of years)   
…........................................................................... 
6. Please provide your contact details if you are interested in research 
findings 
Your name : 
Designation : 
E-mail  : 
Tel: No.  : 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH 
FOR YOUR VALUABLE TIME AND RESPONSES 
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APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR FINAL DATA COLLECTION. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear Respondents,  
I am a PhD candidate from University of Malaya, Malaysia under the supervision of Associate 
Professor Dr. Ghazali Musa. We are conducting a survey on outsourcing practices in service 
organizations. The purpose of this study is to identify factors that influence outsourcing success 
in the organizations. This survey is preferably answered by the person who is in charge of 
outsourcing in your organization.   
This questionnaire enquires you to select information about outsourcing practices, 
responsibilities and outcomes within your firm. We would be grateful if you could spend 15-20 
minutes of your time to complete this questionnaire. There is no right or wrong answer to the 
questions and please answer all of them.  
Note that all your answers to the questions will be treated as strictly confidential. They will be 
analyzed in aggregate form, and no individual firm will be disclosed to anyone other than the 
researchers. Should you have any questions, do not hesitate to contact us at the following 
addresses.   
Thank you very much for you co-operation.  
Associate Professor Dr. Ghazali Musa 
Deputy Dean (Research and Development)  
Faculty of Business and Accountancy 
University of Malaya 
Malaysia.  
 ghaz8zz@gmail.com 
 
Nilakshi W. K Galahitiyawe 
PhD Candidate 
Faculty of Business and Accountancy 
University of Malaya 
Malaysia 
nilakshi@sjp.ac.lk    / 
nilakshi.g@gmail.com 
Tel. No: +601 3284 7950 
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Questionnaire 
Section A: Instructions 
 This section identifies the current level of outsourcing in your organization. 
 Please refer to the scale provided below to answer Part 1 and please tick (√) 
the answer in the appropriate box. 
 
 
 
 
Part 1: BANKING 
Your company’s current level of outsourcing in the following function(s) 
 
 
        
Banking Organizations : 
Activity /Function 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. ATM      
2. Card processing      
3. Internal auditing      
4. Debt collection      
5. Legal affaires       
6. Account processing      
7. Personnel selection      
8. Training (HR)      
9. Information technology (IT)      
10. Customer service      
11. Advertising &promotion      
12. Corporate printing      
13. Maintenance (cleaning, interior décor)      
 
  
Not  Outsourced  
at all 
Outsourced to a 
limited extent 
Outsourced to 
a moderate 
Extent 
Outsourced to  a 
greater extent 
Totally 
Outsourced 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not 
outsourced 
at all 
Outsourced 
to a very 
great extent 
   
306 
 
Part 1: Your Company’s current level of outsourcing in the following 
function(s) 
 
 
        
Hotel Organizations : 
Activity /Function 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. Reception      
2. Reservation      
3. Laundry      
4. Housekeeping      
5. Food &beverages supplies      
6. Restaurants      
7. Bars      
8. Kitchen operations      
9. Technical services (repair resources)       
10. Swimming pool maintenance      
11. Gardening services      
12. Administration      
13. Training      
14. Personnel selection      
15. Information systems &technology      
16. Leisure activities (e.g. Tour packages, 
entertainment activities, etc.) 
     
17. Security and surveillance       
18. Sales/ Marketing       
  
Not 
outsourced 
at all 
Outsourced 
to a very 
great extent 
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Section B : Instructions 
Part 2, 3 and 4 require you to response to the statements.  
Please tick (X) your answer in the appropriate box according to your level 
agreement to the statements. 
 
Part 2: This part evaluates the vendor management capability of 
your firm. 
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VM1 
We select only qualified suppliers/vendors 
with satisfactory assessment of selection 
criteria 
       
VM2 
We have systematic process to monitor 
suppliers/vendors 
       
VM3 
We evaluate suppliers’/vendors’ 
performance with specified criteria 
       
VM4 
 
We have systematic process in the 
development of suppliers’/vendors’ 
capabilities. 
(e.g. Training programs, financial 
assistance, technological assistance, etc.) 
       
VM5 
We have the ability to compensate/ pay 
supplier/vendor fees according to the 
contract 
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Part 3: The following statements describe the service quality and 
performance of the supplier/vendor(s). Please tick (X) your answer in 
the appropriate answer to each statement.  
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PTQ 1 Our suppliers /vendors have the ability to perform all tasks 
specified in the contract 
       
PTQ 2 Our suppliers/vendors  have the required human resource        
PTQ 5 Our suppliers’/vendors’ labour turn-over rate is low 
       
PTQ 6 Our suppliers/vendors  work as a network with partners         
  
HQ   1 Our suppliers / vendors maintain  time schedules 
       
HQ   2 Our suppliers /vendors perform within the agreed budget        
HQ 3 Our suppliers/vendor  meet deadlines        
HQ 4 Our suppliers/vendors  seek more information before 
proceed any task 
       
HQ 5 Our suppliers/vendors  understand our needs 
       
  
SQ 1 Our suppliers/vendors  accept  terms and conditions in the 
contract enthusiastically 
       
SQ 2 Our suppliers/vendors  listen to our problems        
SQ 3 Our suppliers/vendors are open to suggestions/ideas 
       
SQ 4 Our suppliers/vendors  have pleasant personality        
SQ 5 Our  suppliers/vendors have constructive arguments        
SQ 6 Our suppliers / vendors always care about our interests        
  
OQ 1 Our suppliers’/vendors’  performances enable us to reach 
our objectives in outsourcing 
       
OQ 2 Our suppliers’/vendors’ contributions to our business are 
remarkable   
       
OQ 3 Our suppliers / vendors add value to our image        
OQ 4 Our suppliers/vendors  are creative in their job 
       
OQ 5 Our suppliers /vendors are consistent with our strategy        
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Part 4: This part measures the quality of relationship maintain by your 
organization and your suppliers / vendors in outsourcing.  
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COP 1 We share information that affects each other’s business       
COP 2 We share business knowledge on core business processes       
COP 3 We share benefits and  risk of the business       
COP 4 
We make decisions for business objectives and directions 
together. 
      
COP 5 We solve most of the  problems together 
      
COP 6 We are willing to comply with each other’s requests       
COP 7 We are keen  in solving each other’s problems       
CPO 8 We are cooperative in conducting business       
PQT 1 We always take  decisions which are favourable for both of us       
PQT 2 We assist each other in performing business       
PQT 3 We are  sincere at all times       
PQT 4 We have friendly relationship       
PQC  
1 
We have strong relationship 
      
PQC  
2 
We do our best to maintain  a good  relationship 
      
PQC 3 We always try to keep each other’s promises 
      
PQC 4 We are   willing  to continue the relationship       
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Part 5: 
 
This part identifies the match/fit between 
business partners in outsourcing. i.e. 
your firm and supplier.  Please tick (X) 
your answer in the appropriate box. 
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CPC 1 Your firm and your vendor firm (s) have similar 
operating philosophies  
     
CPC 2 Your firm and your vendor firm(s) have a 
similar management style. 
     
CPC 3 Your firm and your vendor  firm(s) have  
complementary  goals 
     
CPP 1 Your firm and your vendor  firm(s) consider 
‘cost’ as an important dimension in doing 
business 
     
CPP 2 Your firm and your vendor  firm(s) consider 
‘quality’ as an important dimension in doing 
business 
     
CPP 3 Your firm and your vendor  firm consider (s) 
‘delivery time’ as an important dimension in 
doing business 
     
CPP 4 Your firm and your vendor  firm(s) consider 
‘flexible reaction to demand’  as an important 
dimension in doing business 
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Part 6: This part evaluates the success of outsourcing in your 
organization.  
  Please tick (X) your answer in the appropriate box. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Outsourcing significantly contributes to … 
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OST 1 profitability        
OST 2 the reduction in total cost        
OST 3 Increase productivity / Occupancy rate        
OST 4 quality improvements        
OSS 1 greater focus on core business        
OSS 2 the acquisition of expertise knowledge        
OSS 3 competitive advantage        
OSS 4 reduce the business risk        
OSS 5 innovations         
 
My organization is… 
       
OSB 
1 
satisfied with the overall relationship with suppliers  
       
OSB 
2 
willing to continue the contract with existing suppliers 
       
OSB 
3 willing to outsource activities which are currently   in-
sourced 
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Section C: General information about your organization 
 
7. Name of your organization: ……………………………………………….. 
8. Type of your organization (please -X- the answer) 
Bank Hotel 
Government 
Semi –Government 
Private 
Foreign  
Other (please specify) 
1 Star 
2 Star 
3 Star 
4 Star 
5 Star 
 Above 5 Star (5+) 
 
 
9. Number of employees in the organization (approximate 
figure)…………….. 
10.Number of branches in Island wide (in 2010)…………………………… 
11.How long has your organization been outsourcing (number of years)   
…........................................................................... 
12.Please provide your contact details if you are interested in research 
findings 
Your name : 
Designation : 
E-mail  : 
Tel: No.  : 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH 
FOR YOUR VALUABLE TIME AND RESPONSES 
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APPENDIX C: BOXPLOT AND MISSING VALUE VERIFICATION 
 
1. Vendor Management Capability 
EXAMINE VARIABLES=VM_1 VM_2 VM_3 VM_4 VM_5 
  /COMPARE VARIABLE 
  /PLOT=BOXPLOT 
  /STATISTICS=NONE 
  /NOTOTAL 
  /ID=VM 
  /MISSING=LISTWISE. 
 
Explore 
 
[DataSet1] D:\PHD\FINAL.sav 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Vendor management 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
VM_2 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
VM_3 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
VM_4 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
VM_5 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
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2. Vendors’ Service Performance  
 
EXAMINE VARIABLES=PTQ HQ SQ OQ 
  /COMPARE VARIABLE 
  /PLOT=BOXPLOT 
  /STATISTICS=NONE 
  /NOTOTAL 
  /ID=VSP 
  /MISSING=LISTWISE. 
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
PTQ 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
HQ 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
SQ 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
OQ 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
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3. Partnership Quality  
EXAMINE VARIABLES=COP1 COP2 COP3 COP4 COP5 COP6 COP7 COP8 PQT1 PQT2 
PQT3 PQT4 PQC1 PQC2 PQC3 PQC4 
  /COMPARE VARIABLE 
  /PLOT=BOXPLOT 
  /STATISTICS=NONE 
  /NOTOTAL 
  /ID=PQ 
  /MISSING=LISTWISE. 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Partnership Quality 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
COP2 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
COP3 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
COP4 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
COP5 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
COP6 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
COP7 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
COP8 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
PQT1 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
PQT2 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
PQT3 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
PQT4 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
PQC1 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
PQC2 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
PQC3 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
PQC4 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
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4. Partners’ Compatibility 
EXAMINE VARIABLES=CPC1 CPC2 CPC3 CPP1 CPP2 CPP3 CPP4 
  /COMPARE VARIABLE 
  /PLOT=BOXPLOT 
  /STATISTICS=NONE 
  /NOTOTAL 
  /ID=CP 
  /MISSING=LISTWISE. 
 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Partners' Compatibility 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
CPC2 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
CPC3 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
CPP1 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
CPP2 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
CPP3 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
CPP4 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
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5. Outsourcing Success  
 
EXAMINE VARIABLES=OST1 OST2 OST3 OST4 OSS1 OSS2 OSS3 OSS4 OSS5 OSB1 
OSB2 OSB3 
  /COMPARE VARIABLE 
  /PLOT=BOXPLOT 
  /STATISTICS=NONE 
  /NOTOTAL 
  /ID=OS 
  /MISSING=LISTWISE. 
 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 
Cases 
Valid Missing Total 
N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Outsourcing Success 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
OST2 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
OST3 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
OST4 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
OSS1 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
OSS2 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
OSS3 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
OSS4 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
OSS5 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
OSB1 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
OSB2 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
OSB3 207 100.0% 0 .0% 207 100.0% 
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APPENDIX D: HERMAN SINGLE  
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
 
FACTOR 
  /VARIABLES VM_1 VM_2 VM_3 VM_4 VM_5 PTQ1 PTQ2 PTQ5 PTQ6 SQ1 SQ2 SQ3 
SQ4 SQ5 SQ6 HQ1 HQ2 HQ3 HQ4 HQ5 OQ1 OQ2 OQ3 OQ4 OQ5 COP1 COP2 COP3 
COP4 COP5 COP6 COP7 COP8 PQT1 PQT2 PQT3 PQT4 PQC1 PQC2 PQC3 PQC4 CPC1 
CPC2 CPC3 CPP1 CPP2 CPP3 CPP4 OST1 OST2 OST3 
OST4 OSS1 OSS2 OSS3 OSS4 OSS5 OSB1 OSB2 OSB3 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /ANALYSIS VM_1 VM_2 VM_3 VM_4 VM_5 PTQ1 PTQ2 PTQ5 PTQ6 SQ1 SQ2 SQ3 
SQ4 SQ5 SQ6 HQ1 HQ2 HQ3 HQ4 HQ5 OQ1 OQ2 OQ3 OQ4 OQ5 COP1 COP2 COP3 
COP4 COP5 COP6 COP7 COP8 PQT1 PQT2 PQT3 PQT4 PQC1 PQC2 PQC3 PQC4 CPC1 
CPC2 CPC3 CPP1 CPP2 CPP3 CPP4 OST1 OST2 OST3 OST4 
OSS1 OSS2 OSS3 OSS4 OSS5 OSB1 OSB2 OSB3 
  /PRINT INITIAL EXTRACTION 
  /CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25) 
  /EXTRACTION PC 
  /ROTATION NOROTATE 
  /METHOD=CORRELATION. 
 
 
Factor Analysis 
[DataSet1] D:\PHD\FINAL.sav 
 
Communalities 
 Initial Extraction 
Vendor management 1.000 .847 
VM_2 1.000 .832 
VM_3 1.000 .834 
VM_4 1.000 .790 
VM_5 1.000 .759 
Vendor's Performance 1.000 .508 
PTQ2 1.000 .660 
PTQ5 1.000 .594 
PTQ6 1.000 .591 
SQ1 1.000 .637 
SQ2 1.000 .723 
SQ3 1.000 .726 
SQ4 1.000 .599 
SQ5 1.000 .774 
SQ6 1.000 .757 
HQ1 1.000 .649 
HQ2 1.000 .591 
HQ3 1.000 .554 
HQ4 1.000 .545 
HQ5 1.000 .592 
OQ1 1.000 .574 
OQ2 1.000 .612 
OQ3 1.000 .668 
OQ4 1.000 .632 
OQ5 1.000 .680 
Partnership Quality 1.000 .732 
COP2 1.000 .772 
COP3 1.000 .757 
COP4 1.000 .828 
COP5 1.000 .802 
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COP6 1.000 .701 
COP7 1.000 .665 
COP8 1.000 .648 
PQT1 1.000 .913 
PQT2 1.000 .944 
PQT3 1.000 .927 
PQT4 1.000 .904 
PQC1 1.000 .745 
PQC2 1.000 .748 
PQC3 1.000 .833 
PQC4 1.000 .719 
Partners' Compatibility 1.000 .748 
CPC2 1.000 .844 
CPC3 1.000 .631 
CPP1 1.000 .818 
CPP2 1.000 .850 
CPP3 1.000 .805 
CPP4 1.000 .847 
Outsourcing Success 1.000 .626 
OST2 1.000 .666 
OST3 1.000 .714 
OST4 1.000 .698 
OSS1 1.000 .738 
OSS2 1.000 .584 
OSS3 1.000 .634 
OSS4 1.000 .572 
OSS5 1.000 .485 
OSB1 1.000 .798 
OSB2 1.000 .836 
OSB3 1.000 .795 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
 
Total Variance Explained  (Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis). 
 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
 
1 12.339 20.566 20.566 12.339 20.566 20.566 
2 6.096 10.160 30.726 6.096 10.160 30.726 
3 5.002 8.336 39.062 5.002 8.336 39.062 
4 3.779 6.298 45.360 3.779 6.298 45.360 
5 3.394 5.656 51.017 3.394 5.656 51.017 
6 2.120 3.533 54.550 2.120 3.533 54.550 
7 1.766 2.943 57.493 1.766 2.943 57.493 
8 1.593 2.655 60.148 1.593 2.655 60.148 
9 1.333 2.222 62.370 1.333 2.222 62.370 
10 1.230 2.050 64.420 1.230 2.050 64.420 
11 1.170 1.950 66.370 1.170 1.950 66.370 
12 1.133 1.889 68.259 1.133 1.889 68.259 
13 1.061 1.768 70.027 1.061 1.768 70.027 
14 1.037 1.729 71.756 1.037 1.729 71.756 
15 .974 1.624 73.380    
16 .921 1.535 74.914    
17 .852 1.420 76.334    
18 .829 1.381 77.715    
19 .764 1.273 78.988    
20 .760 1.267 80.255    
21 .708 1.180 81.435    
22 .658 1.096 82.531    
23 .652 1.087 83.618    
24 .624 1.040 84.658    
25 .610 1.016 85.675    
26 .553 .922 86.597    
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27 .522 .870 87.467    
28 .494 .823 88.290    
29 .467 .778 89.068    
30 .447 .746 89.814    
31 .440 .734 90.548    
32 .407 .678 91.226    
33 .402 .670 91.896    
34 .380 .634 92.530    
35 .356 .594 93.124    
36 .330 .551 93.674    
37 .317 .528 94.202    
38 .304 .507 94.709    
39 .274 .456 95.165    
40 .264 .440 95.605    
41 .260 .433 96.038    
42 .230 .383 96.421    
43 .214 .356 96.777    
44 .203 .339 97.116    
45 .182 .304 97.420    
46 .171 .285 97.705    
47 .165 .275 97.980    
48 .163 .272 98.252    
49 .149 .248 98.500    
50 .129 .215 98.715    
51 .126 .211 98.926    
52 .117 .195 99.121    
53 .102 .170 99.292    
54 .094 .156 99.448    
55 .079 .132 99.579    
56 .073 .122 99.701    
57 .070 .116 99.817    
58 .050 .083 99.901    
59 .037 .062 99.962    
60 .023 .038 100.000    
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APPENDIX E: 1ST ORDER MEASUREMENT MODEL STATISTICS 
 
1. VENDOR MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY 
Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
VM_5 <--- VM 1.000 
    
VM_4 <--- VM 1.001 .043 23.395 *** par_1 
VM_3 <--- VM .723 .039 18.518 *** par_2 
VM_2 <--- VM .752 .040 18.616 *** par_3 
VM_1 <--- VM 1.059 .062 16.979 *** par_4 
 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
VM_5 <--- VM .836 
VM_4 <--- VM .851 
VM_3 <--- VM .942 
VM_2 <--- VM .944 
VM_1 <--- VM .898 
 
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
VM 
  
.842 .115 7.341 *** par_7 
e2 
  
.321 .036 9.030 *** par_8 
e3 
  
.056 .009 6.278 *** par_9 
e4 
  
.058 .009 6.083 *** par_10 
e5 
  
.228 .028 8.183 *** par_11 
e1 
  
.364 .040 9.078 *** par_12 
 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 12 1.762 3 .023 .587 
Saturated model 15 .000 0 
  
Independence model 5 1207.568 10 .000 120.757 
 
RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .004 .997 .983 .199 
Saturated model .000 1.000 
  
Independence model .596 .271 -.094 .181 
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Baseline Comparisons 
Model 
NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .999 .995 1.001 1.003 1.000 
Saturated model 1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .300 .300 .300 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
 
NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model .000 .000 5.664 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1197.568 1087.135 1315.377 
 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model .009 .000 .000 .027 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 5.862 5.813 5.277 6.385 
 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .000 .000 .096 .780 
Independence model .762 .726 .799 .000 
 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 25.762 26.482 65.754 77.754 
Saturated model 30.000 30.900 79.991 94.991 
Independence model 1217.568 1217.868 1234.231 1239.231 
 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model .125 .131 .159 .129 
Saturated model .146 .146 .146 .150 
Independence model 5.911 5.374 6.482 5.912 
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HOELTER 
Model 
HOELTER 
.05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 914 1327 
Independence model 4 4 
 
 
  
 
 
2. VENDORS’ SERVICE PERFORMANCE (VSP) 
 
Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
HQ5 <--- HQ 1.000 
    
HQ4 <--- HQ .815 .151 5.398 *** 
 
HQ3 <--- HQ .785 .150 5.227 *** 
 
HQ2 <--- HQ .960 .157 6.106 *** 
 
SQ4 <--- SQ 1.000 
    
SQ5 <--- SQ 2.155 .410 5.259 *** 
 
SQ6 <--- SQ 1.971 .360 5.469 *** 
 
OQ4 <--- OQ 1.000 
    
OQ3 <--- OQ .946 .103 9.203 *** 
 
OQ2 <--- OQ .714 .102 6.980 *** 
 
OQ1 <--- OQ .941 .103 9.158 *** 
 
OQ5 <--- OQ .895 .103 8.731 *** 
 
 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
HQ5 <--- HQ .535 
HQ4 <--- HQ .498 
HQ3 <--- HQ .477 
HQ2 <--- HQ .601 
SQ4 <--- SQ .410 
SQ5 <--- SQ .883 
SQ6 <--- SQ .807 
OQ4 <--- OQ .741 
OQ3 <--- OQ .701 
OQ2 <--- OQ .529 
OQ1 <--- OQ .697 
OQ5 <--- OQ .663 
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Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
HQ <--> OQ .429 .076 5.613 *** 
 
HQ <--> SQ .093 .032 2.917 .004 
 
SQ <--> OQ .083 .030 2.753 .006 
 
 
Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
HQ <--> OQ .690 
HQ <--> SQ .359 
SQ <--> OQ .274 
 
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
HQ 
  
.401 .107 3.750 *** 
 
SQ 
  
.167 .059 2.823 .005 
 
OQ 
  
.546 .095 5.754 *** 
 
e13 
  
1.000 
    
e5 
  
.808 .088 9.213 *** 
 
e6 
  
.841 .090 9.326 *** 
 
e7 
  
.655 .078 8.424 *** 
 
e9 
  
.828 .085 9.761 *** 
 
e14 
  
.220 .094 2.327 .020 
 
e15 
  
.347 .084 4.114 *** 
 
e16 
  
.449 .058 7.799 *** 
 
e17 
  
.506 .061 8.288 *** 
 
e18 
  
.717 .076 9.411 *** 
 
e19 
  
.511 .061 8.327 *** 
 
e20 
  
.557 .064 8.641 *** 
 
 
 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 26 89.982 52 .001 1.730 
Saturated model 78 .000 0 
  
Independence model 12 768.274 66 .000 11.641 
 
RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .069 .940 .910 .627 
Saturated model .000 1.000 
  
Independence model .295 .479 .384 .405 
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Baseline Comparisons 
Model 
NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .883 .851 .947 .931 .946 
Saturated model 1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .788 .696 .745 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
 
NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 37.982 15.520 68.307 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 702.274 616.752 795.236 
 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model .437 .184 .075 .332 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 3.729 3.409 2.994 3.860 
 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .060 .038 .080 .213 
Independence model .227 .213 .242 .000 
 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 141.982 145.485 228.633 254.633 
Saturated model 156.000 166.508 415.952 493.952 
Independence model 792.274 793.891 832.267 844.267 
 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model .689 .580 .836 .706 
Saturated model .757 .757 .757 .808 
Independence model 3.846 3.431 4.297 3.854 
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HOELTER 
Model 
HOELTER 
.05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 160 180 
Independence model 24 26 
 
 
3. PARTNERSHIP QUALITY   
Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
COP5 <--- COP 1.000 
    
COP4 <--- COP .938 .034 27.985 *** par_1 
COP3 <--- COP .947 .036 26.004 *** par_2 
COP2 <--- COP .992 .036 27.938 *** par_3 
COP1 <--- COP 1.012 .041 24.695 *** par_4 
COP6 <--- COP .949 .048 19.797 *** par_5 
COP7 <--- COP .933 .046 20.106 *** par_6 
PQT4 <--- PQT 1.000 
    
PQT3 <--- PQT 1.025 .023 45.564 *** par_7 
PQT2 <--- PQT 1.038 .020 52.980 *** par_8 
PQT1 <--- PQT 1.000 
    
PQC4 <--- PQC 1.000 
    
PQC3 <--- PQC .958 .052 18.267 *** par_9 
PQC2 <--- PQC .996 .051 19.717 *** par_10 
PQC1 <--- PQC 1.000 
    
COP8 <--- COP .848 .052 16.297 *** par_11 
 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
COP5 <--- COP .933 
COP4 <--- COP .951 
COP3 <--- COP .934 
COP2 <--- COP .951 
COP1 <--- COP .921 
COP6 <--- COP .857 
COP7 <--- COP .862 
PQT4 <--- PQT .935 
PQT3 <--- PQT .956 
PQT2 <--- PQT .992 
PQT1 <--- PQT .963 
PQC4 <--- PQC .814 
PQC3 <--- PQC .871 
PQC2 <--- PQC .904 
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Estimate 
PQC1 <--- PQC .850 
COP8 <--- COP .789 
 
Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
COP <--> PQT .137 .022 6.166 *** par_12 
PQT <--> PQC .117 .022 5.272 *** par_13 
COP <--> PQC .042 .020 2.087 .037 par_14 
e34 <--> e35 .015 .003 4.643 *** par_15 
e31 <--> e33 .029 .007 4.102 *** par_16 
e31 <--> e32 .036 .007 5.378 *** par_17 
 
Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
COP <--> PQT .494 
PQT <--> PQC .420 
COP <--> PQC .155 
e34 <--> e35 .437 
e31 <--> e33 .283 
e31 <--> e32 .421 
 
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
COP 
  
.270 .030 8.883 *** par_18 
PQT 
  
.286 .030 9.655 *** par_19 
PQC 
  
.272 .033 8.326 *** par_20 
e26 
  
.040 .005 8.539 *** par_21 
e27 
  
.025 .003 7.882 *** par_22 
e28 
  
.036 .004 8.522 *** par_23 
e29 
  
.028 .004 7.901 *** par_24 
e31 
  
.088 .009 9.676 *** par_25 
e32 
  
.082 .009 9.462 *** par_26 
e33 
  
.118 .012 9.757 *** par_27 
e34 
  
.041 .005 8.958 *** par_28 
e35 
  
.029 .003 8.254 *** par_29 
e36 
  
.005 .002 2.422 .015 par_30 
e37 
  
.022 .003 7.816 *** par_31 
e38 
  
.138 .016 8.562 *** par_32 
e39 
  
.079 .011 7.405 *** par_33 
e40 
  
.061 .010 6.294 *** par_34 
e41 
  
.105 .013 8.002 *** par_35 
e30 
  
.050 .006 8.822 *** par_36 
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Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 36 221.073 100 .000 2.211 
Saturated model 136 .000 0 
  
Independence model 16 4591.635 120 .000 38.264 
 
RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .017 .886 .845 .651 
Saturated model .000 1.000 
  
Independence model .164 .178 .069 .157 
 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model 
NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .952 .942 .973 .968 .973 
Saturated model 1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .833 .793 .811 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
 
NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 121.073 81.861 168.022 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 4471.635 4253.712 4696.804 
 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 1.073 .588 .397 .816 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 22.289 21.707 20.649 22.800 
 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .077 .063 .090 .001 
Independence model .425 .415 .436 .000 
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AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 293.073 299.549 413.051 449.051 
Saturated model 272.000 296.466 725.250 861.250 
Independence model 4623.635 4626.513 4676.959 4692.959 
 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model 1.423 1.232 1.651 1.454 
Saturated model 1.320 1.320 1.320 1.439 
Independence model 22.445 21.387 23.538 22.459 
 
HOELTER 
Model 
HOELTER 
.05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 116 127 
Independence model 7 8 
 
 
4. PARTNERS’ COMPATIBILITY (WITH TWO DIMENSIONS)  
Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
CPC3 <--- CPC 1.000 
    
CPC2 <--- CPC 1.135 .088 12.913 *** par_1 
CPC1 <--- CPC 1.137 .087 13.078 *** par_2 
CPP1 <--- CPP 1.000 
    
CPP2 <--- CPP .898 .057 15.867 *** par_3 
CPP3 <--- CPP .923 .052 17.655 *** par_4 
CPP4 <--- CPP .995 .048 20.523 *** par_5 
 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
CPC3 <--- CPC .751 
CPC2 <--- CPC .834 
CPC1 <--- CPC .843 
CPP1 <--- CPP .898 
CPP2 <--- CPP .808 
CPP3 <--- CPP .851 
CPP4 <--- CPP .907 
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Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
CPC <--> CPP .565 .068 8.306 *** par_6 
 
Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
CPC <--> CPP 1.025 
 
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
CPC 
  
.300 .048 6.285 *** par_7 
CPP 
  
1.012 .123 8.257 *** par_8 
e49 
  
.231 .024 9.633 *** par_9 
e50 
  
.170 .019 8.948 *** par_10 
e51 
  
.158 .018 8.811 *** par_11 
e55 
  
.242 .030 8.156 *** par_12 
e54 
  
.435 .047 9.283 *** par_13 
e53 
  
.329 .037 8.928 *** par_14 
e52 
  
.216 .027 7.925 *** par_15 
 
 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 15 254.904 13 .000 19.608 
Saturated model 28 .000 0 
  
Independence model 7 1529.158 21 .000 72.817 
 
RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .049 .780 .527 .362 
Saturated model .000 1.000 
  
Independence model .587 .242 -.011 .181 
 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model 
NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .833 .731 .840 .741 .840 
Saturated model 1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
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Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .619 .516 .520 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
 
NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 241.904 193.719 297.523 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1508.158 1383.601 1640.084 
 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 1.237 1.174 .940 1.444 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 7.423 7.321 6.717 7.962 
 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .301 .269 .333 .000 
Independence model .590 .566 .616 .000 
 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 284.904 286.116 334.895 349.895 
Saturated model 56.000 58.263 149.316 177.316 
Independence model 1543.158 1543.724 1566.487 1573.487 
 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model 1.383 1.149 1.653 1.389 
Saturated model .272 .272 .272 .283 
Independence model 7.491 6.886 8.131 7.494 
 
HOELTER 
Model 
HOELTER 
.05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 19 23 
Independence model 5 6 
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5. PARTNERS’ COMPATIBILITY (AS A LATENT VARIABLE)  
Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model)  
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
CPP1 <--- CPP 1.000 
    
CPP2 <--- CPP .810 .059 13.823 *** par_1 
CPP3 <--- CPP .923 .049 19.012 *** par_2 
CPP4 <--- CPP .985 .045 21.914 *** par_3 
CPC3 <--- CPP .545 .037 14.688 *** par_4 
CPC2 <--- CPP .578 .037 15.724 *** par_5 
CPC1 <--- CPP .624 .033 18.942 *** par_6 
 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
CPP1 <--- CPP .915 
CPP2 <--- CPP .742 
CPP3 <--- CPP .867 
CPP4 <--- CPP .915 
CPC3 <--- CPP .767 
CPC2 <--- CPP .795 
CPC1 <--- CPP .865 
 
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
CPP 
  
1.051 .123 8.514 *** par_7 
e49 
  
.218 .023 9.396 *** par_8 
e50 
  
.205 .022 9.244 *** par_9 
e51 
  
.137 .016 8.559 *** par_10 
e55 
  
.203 .028 7.367 *** par_11 
e54 
  
.561 .059 9.487 *** par_12 
e53 
  
.296 .035 8.539 *** par_13 
e52 
  
.197 .027 7.360 *** par_14 
 
 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 15 19.111 13 .012 1.470 
Saturated model 28 .000 0 
  
Independence model 7 1529.158 21 .000 72.817 
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RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .014 .973 .942 .452 
Saturated model .000 1.000 
  
Independence model .587 .242 -.011 .181 
 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model 
NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .988 .980 .996 .993 .996 
Saturated model 1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .619 .611 .617 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
 
NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 6.111 .000 21.935 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1508.158 1383.601 1640.084 
 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model .093 .030 .000 .106 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 7.423 7.321 6.717 7.962 
 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .048 .000 .091 .486 
Independence model .590 .566 .616 .000 
 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 49.111 50.323 99.101 114.101 
Saturated model 56.000 58.263 149.316 177.316 
Independence model 1543.158 1543.724 1566.487 1573.487 
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ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model .238 .209 .315 .244 
Saturated model .272 .272 .272 .283 
Independence model 7.491 6.886 8.131 7.494 
 
HOELTER 
Model 
HOELTER 
.05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 242 299 
Independence model 5 6 
 
 
6. OUTSOURCING SUCCESS (WITH THREE LATENT VARIABLES) 
Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
OSB3 <--- OSB 1.100 .089 12.369 *** par_1 
OSB2 <--- OSB 1.174 .091 12.845 *** par_2 
OSB1 <--- OSB 1.000 
    
OSS4 <--- OSS 1.000 
    
OSS3 <--- OSS .893 .125 7.126 *** par_3 
OSS1 <--- OSS 1.031 .110 9.389 *** par_4 
OSS2 <--- OSS .977 .115 8.517 *** par_5 
OST4 <--- OST 1.000 
    
OST3 <--- OST 1.131 .092 12.239 *** par_6 
OST1 <--- OST .793 .076 10.453 *** par_7 
OST2 <--- OST .859 .076 11.265 *** par_8 
OSS5 <--- OSS .582 .093 6.236 *** par_12 
 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
OSB3 <--- OSB .826 
OSB2 <--- OSB .905 
OSB1 <--- OSB .781 
OSS4 <--- OSS .645 
OSS3 <--- OSS .556 
OSS1 <--- OSS .775 
OSS2 <--- OSS .686 
OST4 <--- OST .796 
OST3 <--- OST .789 
OST1 <--- OST .694 
OST2 <--- OST .738 
OSS5 <--- OSS .479 
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Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
OSB <--> OSS .240 .099 2.409 .016 par_9 
OSS <--> OST .897 .128 6.991 *** par_10 
OSB <--> OST .349 .127 2.762 .006 par_11 
 
Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
OSB <--> OSS .208 
OSS <--> OST 1.006 
OSB <--> OST .231 
 
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
OSB 
  
1.950 .306 6.365 *** par_13 
OSS 
  
.677 .136 4.972 *** par_14 
OST 
  
1.174 .177 6.643 *** par_15 
e42 
  
1.103 .162 6.825 *** par_16 
e43 
  
.593 .148 4.014 *** par_17 
e44 
  
1.244 .158 7.889 *** par_18 
e46 
  
1.204 .125 9.657 *** par_19 
e47 
  
.728 .080 9.115 *** par_20 
e48 
  
.479 .058 8.241 *** par_21 
e45 
  
.951 .102 9.339 *** par_22 
e58 
  
.914 .110 8.317 *** par_23 
e60 
  
.794 .087 9.142 *** par_24 
e57 
  
.680 .083 8.219 *** par_25 
e61 
  
.770 .078 9.828 *** par_26 
e59 
  
.725 .082 8.841 *** par_27 
 
 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 27 74.759 51 .017 1.466 
Saturated model 78 .000 0 
  
Independence model 12 1196.128 66 .000 18.123 
 
RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .106 .940 .909 .615 
Saturated model .000 1.000 
  
Independence model .724 .368 .254 .312 
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Baseline Comparisons 
Model 
NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .937 .919 .979 .973 .979 
Saturated model 1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .773 .724 .756 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
 
NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 23.759 4.578 50.924 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1130.128 1021.595 1246.065 
 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model .363 .115 .022 .247 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 5.806 5.486 4.959 6.049 
 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .048 .021 .070 .547 
Independence model .288 .274 .303 .000 
 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 128.759 132.396 218.742 245.742 
Saturated model 156.000 166.508 415.952 493.952 
Independence model 1220.128 1221.745 1260.121 1272.121 
 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model .625 .532 .757 .643 
Saturated model .757 .757 .757 .808 
Independence model 5.923 5.396 6.486 5.931 
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HOELTER 
Model 
HOELTER 
.05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 190 214 
Independence model 15 17 
 
 
7. OUTSOURCING SUCCESS (WITH TWO LATENT VARIABLES) 
Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
OSB3 <--- OSB 1.057 .085 12.370 *** par_1 
OSB2 <--- OSB 1.158 .090 12.843 *** par_2 
OSB1 <--- OSB 1.000 
    
OST4 <--- OST 1.000 
    
OST3 <--- OST .993 .081 12.283 *** par_3 
OST1 <--- OST .871 .083 10.444 *** par_4 
OST2 <--- OST .932 .082 11.342 *** par_5 
OSS1 <--- OST .977 .081 12.030 *** par_7 
OSS2 <--- OST .858 .084 10.253 *** par_8 
OSS3 <--- OST .679 .087 7.827 *** par_9 
OSS4 <--- OST .806 .085 9.531 *** par_10 
        
 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
OSB3 <--- OSB .826 
OSB2 <--- OSB .905 
OSB1 <--- OSB .781 
OST4 <--- OST .798 
OST3 <--- OST .792 
OST1 <--- OST .695 
OST2 <--- OST .743 
OSS1 <--- OST .779 
OSS2 <--- OST .684 
OSS3 <--- OST .542 
OSS4 <--- OST .643 
 
Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
OSB <--> OST .140 .050 2.777 .005 par_6 
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Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
OSB <--> OST .225 
 
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
OSB 
  
.607 .095 6.364 *** par_11 
OST 
  
.633 .095 6.668 *** par_12 
e42 
  
.316 .046 6.817 *** par_13 
e43 
  
.180 .045 4.022 *** par_14 
e44 
  
.388 .049 7.892 *** par_15 
e46 
  
.703 .073 9.689 *** par_16 
e47 
  
.529 .058 9.170 *** par_17 
e48 
  
.391 .046 8.418 *** par_18 
e45 
  
.583 .062 9.364 *** par_19 
e58 
  
.370 .045 8.259 *** par_20 
e60 
  
.515 .057 9.110 *** par_21 
e57 
  
.362 .044 8.187 *** par_22 
e59 
  
.445 .051 8.771 *** par_23 
 
 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 23 60.764 43 .038 1.413 
Saturated model 66 .000 0 
  
Independence model 11 1133.949 55 .000 20.617 
 
RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .051 .947 .919 .617 
Saturated model .000 1.000 
  
Independence model .373 .373 .247 .311 
 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model 
NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .946 .931 .984 .979 .984 
Saturated model 1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .782 .740 .769 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
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Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
 
NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 17.764 1.063 42.477 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1078.949 973.183 1192.117 
 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model .295 .086 .005 .206 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 5.505 5.238 4.724 5.787 
 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .045 .011 .069 .608 
Independence model .309 .293 .324 .000 
 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 106.764 109.609 183.417 206.417 
Saturated model 132.000 140.165 351.959 417.959 
Independence model 1155.949 1157.310 1192.609 1203.609 
 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model .518 .437 .638 .532 
Saturated model .641 .641 .641 .680 
Independence model 5.611 5.098 6.161 5.618 
 
HOELTER 
Model 
HOELTER 
.05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 202 229 
Independence model 14 15 
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8. FULL MEASUREMENT MODEL  
Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
OSB3 <--- OSB 1.064 .084 12.723 *** 
 
OSB2 <--- OSB 1.145 .084 13.589 *** 
 
OSB1 <--- OSB 1.000 
    
OSS4 <--- OSO. .888 .093 9.602 *** 
 
OSS3 <--- OSO. .756 .094 8.067 *** 
 
OSS2 <--- OSO. .924 .092 10.026 *** 
 
OSS1 <--- OSO. 1.000 
    
VM_5 <--- VM. 1.000 
    
VM_4 <--- VM. 1.025 .040 25.416 *** 
 
VM_3 <--- VM. .690 .033 20.841 *** 
 
VM_2 <--- VM. .708 .035 20.290 *** 
 
VM_1 <--- VM. 1.002 .055 18.304 *** 
 
HQ4 <--- HQ 1.000 
    
HQ2 <--- HQ 1.011 .152 6.646 *** 
 
SQ6 <--- SQ 1.000 
    
SQ5 <--- SQ 1.024 .080 12.801 *** 
 
SQ4 <--- SQ .520 .086 6.026 *** 
 
OQ5 <--- OQ 1.000 
    
OQ4 <--- OQ 1.122 .129 8.665 *** 
 
OQ3 <--- OQ 1.059 .128 8.295 *** 
 
OQ2 <--- OQ .833 .123 6.784 *** 
 
OQ1 <--- OQ 1.061 .128 8.305 *** 
 
COP5 <--- COP 1.000 
    
COP4 <--- COP .935 .034 27.584 *** 
 
COP3 <--- COP .945 .037 25.809 *** 
 
COP2 <--- COP .986 .036 27.183 *** 
 
COP1 <--- COP 1.015 .041 24.935 *** 
 
PQT4 <--- PQT .968 .027 35.435 *** 
 
PQT3 <--- PQT .990 .024 42.091 *** 
 
PQT2 <--- PQT 1.000 
    
PQT1 <--- PQT .961 .021 44.906 *** 
 
PQC4 <--- PQC .952 .063 14.997 *** 
 
PQC3 <--- PQC 1.000 
    
PQC2 <--- PQC .971 .055 17.779 *** 
 
PQC1 <--- PQC 1.013 .063 16.008 *** 
 
COP6 <--- COP .964 .047 20.493 *** 
 
COP7 <--- COP .943 .046 20.705 *** 
 
COP8 <--- COP .863 .051 16.942 *** 
 
CPP1 <--- CP. 1.086 .060 18.115 *** 
 
CPP2 <--- CP. .910 .068 13.309 *** 
 
CPP3 <--- CP. 1.000 
    
CPP4 <--- CP. 1.066 .059 17.967 *** 
 
HQ3 <--- HQ .992 .154 6.422 *** 
 
HQ5 <--- HQ 1.154 .163 7.088 *** 
 
OST4 <--- OSO. 1.055 .091 11.619 *** 
 
OST3 <--- OSO. 1.052 .091 11.578 *** 
 
OST2 <--- OSO. .975 .092 10.638 *** 
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Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
OST1 <--- OSO. .938 .092 10.192 *** 
 
CPC3 <--- CP. .616 .044 14.134 *** 
 
CPC2 <--- CP. .652 .044 14.963 *** 
 
CPC1 <--- CP. .693 .041 16.954 *** 
 
 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
OSB3 <--- OSB .833 
OSB2 <--- OSB .897 
OSB1 <--- OSB .784 
OSS4 <--- OSO. .667 
OSS3 <--- OSO. .568 
OSS2 <--- OSO. .694 
OSS1 <--- OSO. .751 
VM_5 <--- VM. .870 
VM_4 <--- VM. .905 
VM_3 <--- VM. .936 
VM_2 <--- VM. .925 
VM_1 <--- VM. .884 
HQ4 <--- HQ .545 
HQ2 <--- HQ .564 
SQ6 <--- SQ .830 
SQ5 <--- SQ .851 
SQ4 <--- SQ .432 
OQ5 <--- OQ .657 
OQ4 <--- OQ .737 
OQ3 <--- OQ .696 
OQ2 <--- OQ .547 
OQ1 <--- OQ .697 
COP5 <--- COP .933 
COP4 <--- COP .948 
COP3 <--- COP .932 
COP2 <--- COP .944 
COP1 <--- COP .923 
PQT4 <--- PQT .936 
PQT3 <--- PQT .956 
PQT2 <--- PQT .992 
PQT1 <--- PQT .963 
PQC4 <--- PQC .795 
PQC3 <--- PQC .902 
PQC2 <--- PQC .874 
PQC1 <--- PQC .832 
COP6 <--- COP .867 
COP7 <--- COP .871 
COP8 <--- COP .803 
CPP1 <--- CP. .905 
CPP2 <--- CP. .760 
CPP3 <--- CP. .856 
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Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
OSB <--> OSO. .128 .048 2.684 .007 
 
OSB <--> VM. .368 .067 5.533 *** 
 
OSB <--> HQ .108 .043 2.526 .012 
 
OSB <--> SQ .164 .055 2.991 .003 
 
OSB <--> OQ .038 .042 .901 .368 
 
OSB <--> COP -.052 .031 -1.679 .093 
 
OSB <--> PQT .108 .034 3.211 .001 
 
OSB <--> PQC .120 .033 3.610 *** 
 
OSB <--> CP. -.081 .056 -1.451 .147 
 
OSO. <--> VM. .327 .063 5.212 *** 
 
OSO. <--> HQ .215 .048 4.499 *** 
 
OSO. <--> SQ .034 .050 .683 .495 
 
OSO. <--> OQ .182 .046 3.973 *** 
 
OSO. <--> COP .023 .029 .802 .422 
 
OSO. <--> PQT .052 .031 1.668 .095 
 
OSO. <--> PQC .052 .030 1.719 .086 
 
OSO. <--> CP. .001 .053 .011 .991 
 
VM. <--> HQ .147 .051 2.885 .004 
 
VM. <--> SQ .275 .066 4.146 *** 
 
VM. <--> OQ .084 .050 1.670 .095 
 
VM. <--> COP -.357 .046 -7.688 *** 
 
VM. <--> PQT -.133 .039 -3.376 *** 
 
VM. <--> PQC .109 .038 2.868 .004 
 
VM. <--> CP. -.414 .075 -5.533 *** 
 
HQ <--> SQ .157 .048 3.258 .001 
 
HQ <--> OQ .131 .059 5.581 *** 
 
HQ <--> COP .107 .029 3.741 *** 
 
HQ <--> PQT .091 .029 3.115 .002 
 
HQ <--> PQC .098 .029 3.406 *** 
 
HQ <--> CP. .140 .050 2.808 .005 
 
SQ <--> OQ .152 .049 3.084 .002 
 
SQ <--> COP -.006 .033 -.174 .862 
 
SQ <--> PQT .213 .039 5.407 *** 
 
SQ <--> PQC .190 .038 5.009 *** 
 
SQ <--> CP. .022 .061 .360 .719 
 
OQ <--> COP .083 .028 2.949 .003 
 
CPP4 <--- CP. .902 
HQ3 <--- HQ .537 
HQ5 <--- HQ .620 
OST4 <--- OSO. .793 
OST3 <--- OSO. .790 
OST2 <--- OSO. .732 
OST1 <--- OSO. .705 
CPC3 <--- CP. .789 
CPC2 <--- CP. .816 
CPC1 <--- CP. .875 
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Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
OQ <--> PQT .054 .029 1.877 .060 
 
OQ <--> PQC .051 .028 1.829 .067 
 
OQ <--> CP. .102 .050 2.030 .042 
 
COP <--> PQT .144 .023 6.232 *** 
 
COP <--> PQC .038 .020 1.903 .057 
 
COP <--> CP. .266 .042 6.387 *** 
 
PQT <--> PQC .119 .023 5.189 *** 
 
PQT <--> CP. .144 .039 3.695 *** 
 
PQC <--> CP. .248 .042 5.926 *** 
 
e47 <--> e51 .261 .031 8.377 *** 
 
e12 <--> e13 .108 .021 5.144 *** 
 
e41 <--> e42 .020 .010 2.008 .045 
 
e43 <--> e44 .032 .006 4.866 *** 
 
e35 <--> e36 .015 .003 4.609 *** 
 
 
Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
OSB <--> OSO. .218 
OSB <--> VM. .493 
OSB <--> HQ .244 
OSB <--> SQ .253 
OSB <--> OQ .074 
OSB <--> COP -.127 
OSB <--> PQT .249 
OSB <--> PQC .296 
OSB <--> CP. -.111 
OSO. <--> VM. .457 
OSO. <--> HQ .509 
OSO. <--> SQ .055 
OSO. <--> OQ .371 
OSO. <--> COP .060 
OSO. <--> PQT .125 
OSO. <--> PQC .134 
OSO. <--> CP. .001 
VM. <--> HQ .272 
VM. <--> SQ .348 
VM. <--> OQ .135 
VM. <--> COP -.718 
VM. <--> PQT -.251 
VM. <--> PQC .220 
VM. <--> CP. -.464 
HQ <--> SQ .336 
HQ <--> OQ .690 
HQ <--> COP .365 
HQ <--> PQT .290 
HQ <--> PQC .337 
HQ <--> CP. .265 
SQ <--> OQ .279 
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Estimate 
SQ <--> COP -.013 
SQ <--> PQT .462 
SQ <--> PQC .443 
SQ <--> CP. .028 
OQ <--> COP .244 
OQ <--> PQT .149 
OQ <--> PQC .151 
OQ <--> CP. .166 
COP <--> PQT .498 
COP <--> PQC .142 
COP <--> CP. .548 
PQT <--> PQC .413 
PQT <--> CP. .278 
PQC <--> CP. .514 
e47 <--> e51 .834 
e12 <--> e13 .432 
e41 <--> e42 .205 
e43 <--> e44 .396 
e35 <--> e36 .430 
 
 
   
 
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
OSB 
  
.611 .094 6.467 *** 
 
OSO. 
  
.561 .091 6.165 *** 
 
VM. 
  
.912 .116 7.881 *** 
 
HQ 
  
.319 .078 4.069 *** 
 
SQ 
  
.686 .100 6.848 *** 
 
OQ 
  
.430 .087 4.932 *** 
 
COP 
  
.270 .030 8.880 *** 
 
PQT 
  
.309 .031 9.968 *** 
 
PQC 
  
.268 .033 8.204 *** 
 
CP. 
  
.872 .114 7.617 *** 
 
 
 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 152 2103.335 1174 .000 1.792 
Saturated model 1326 .000 0 
  
Independence model 51 11761.633 1275 .000 9.225 
 
RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .044 .735 .701 .651 
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Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Saturated model .000 1.000 
  
Independence model .216 .164 .131 .158 
 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model 
NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .821 .806 .912 .904 .911 
Saturated model 1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .921 .756 .839 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
 
NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 929.335 805.108 1061.375 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 10486.633 10142.933 10836.854 
 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 10.210 4.511 3.908 5.152 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 57.095 50.906 49.238 52.606 
 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .062 .058 .066 .000 
Independence model .200 .197 .203 .000 
 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 2407.335 2509.984 2913.908 3065.908 
Saturated model 2652.000 3547.481 7071.185 8397.185 
Independence model 11863.633 11898.075 12033.602 12084.602 
 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model 11.686 11.083 12.327 12.184 
Saturated model 12.874 12.874 12.874 17.221 
Independence model 57.590 55.922 59.291 57.758 
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HOELTER 
Model 
HOELTER 
.05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 123 127 
Independence model 24 25 
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APPENDIX F: 2ND ORDER MEASUREMENT MODEL STATISTICS 
 
1. Second order CFA Model without moderating variables  
Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
OSO. <--- OS. 1.000 
    
OSB <--- OS. .794 .154 5.155 *** 
 
HQ <--- VSP. 1.000 
    
SQ <--- VSP. .493 .149 3.307 *** 
 
OQ <--- VSP. 1.100 .198 5.559 *** 
 
OSB3 <--- OSB 1.048 .084 12.432 *** 
 
OSB1 <--- OSB 1.000 
    
OSS4 <--- OSO. .852 .090 9.417 *** 
 
OSS3 <--- OSO. .734 .092 8.004 *** 
 
OSS2 <--- OSO. .899 .090 10.006 *** 
 
OSS1 <--- OSO. 1.000 
    
VM_5 <--- VM. 1.000 
    
VM_4 <--- VM. 1.020 .042 24.050 *** 
 
VM_2 <--- VM. .751 .040 18.575 *** 
 
VM_1 <--- VM. 1.051 .063 16.720 *** 
 
HQ2 <--- HQ 1.160 .199 5.840 *** 
 
SQ6 <--- SQ 1.000 
    
SQ5 <--- SQ 1.107 .147 7.520 *** 
 
OQ5 <--- OQ 1.000 
    
OQ4 <--- OQ 1.096 .126 8.727 *** 
 
OQ3 <--- OQ 1.046 .124 8.421 *** 
 
OQ2 <--- OQ .800 .120 6.696 *** 
 
OQ1 <--- OQ 1.040 .124 8.382 *** 
 
HQ3 <--- HQ .991 .190 5.223 *** 
 
OSB2 <--- OSB 1.155 .088 13.179 *** 
 
SQ4 <--- SQ .510 .093 5.472 *** 
 
HQ5 <--- HQ 1.376 .221 6.228 *** 
 
HQ4 <--- HQ 1.000 
    
VM_3 <--- VM. .730 .039 18.837 *** 
 
OST4 <--- OSO. 1.046 .088 11.894 *** 
 
OST3 <--- OSO. 1.020 .088 11.556 *** 
 
OST2 <--- OSO. .965 .089 10.848 *** 
 
OST1 <--- OSO. .916 .090 10.214 *** 
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Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
OSO. <--- OS. .537 
OSB <--- OS. .416 
HQ <--- VSP. .982 
SQ <--- VSP. .322 
OQ <--- VSP. .859 
OSB3 <--- OSB .822 
OSB1 <--- OSB .784 
OSS4 <--- OSO. .652 
OSS3 <--- OSO. .562 
OSS2 <--- OSO. .689 
OSS1 <--- OSO. .766 
VM_5 <--- VM. .835 
VM_4 <--- VM. .865 
VM_2 <--- VM. .942 
VM_1 <--- VM. .890 
HQ2 <--- HQ .608 
SQ6 <--- SQ .802 
SQ5 <--- SQ .888 
OQ5 <--- OQ .669 
OQ4 <--- OQ .733 
OQ3 <--- OQ .700 
OQ2 <--- OQ .536 
OQ1 <--- OQ .696 
HQ3 <--- HQ .504 
OSB2 <--- OSB .906 
SQ4 <--- SQ .409 
HQ5 <--- HQ .695 
HQ4 <--- HQ .511 
VM_3 <--- VM. .950 
OST4 <--- OSO. .801 
OST3 <--- OSO. .782 
OST2 <--- OSO. .739 
OST1 <--- OSO. .701 
 
Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
VM. <--> OS. .370 .063 5.887 *** 
 
VM. <--> VSP. .117 .043 2.749 .006 
 
VM. <--> DOO .301 .077 3.934 *** 
 
OS. <--> VSP. .152 .039 3.928 *** 
 
OS. <--> DOO .352 .066 5.330 *** 
 
VSP. <--> DOO .189 .054 3.511 *** 
 
e12 <--> e13 .185 .030 6.123 *** 
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Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
VM. <--> OS. .984 
VM. <--> VSP. .245 
VM. <--> DOO .296 
OS. <--> VSP. .711 
OS. <--> DOO .773 
VSP. <--> DOO .326 
e12 <--> e13 .564 
 
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
VM. 
  
.840 .115 7.336 *** 
 
OS. 
  
.168 .064 2.627 .009 
 
VSP. 
  
.272 .080 3.400 *** 
 
DOO 
  
1.236 .122 10.149 *** 
 
RS4 
  
.010 
    
RS3 
  
.506 .084 6.016 *** 
 
RS5 
  
.574 .108 5.331 *** 
 
RS6 
  
.117 .041 2.835 .005 
 
RS2 
  
.416 .080 5.191 *** 
 
e1 
  
.356 .043 8.241 *** 
 
e2 
  
.387 .046 8.482 *** 
 
e3 
  
.451 .051 8.870 *** 
 
e4 
  
.506 .055 9.125 *** 
 
e5 
  
.323 .045 7.141 *** 
 
e6 
  
.178 .042 4.226 *** 
 
e8 
  
.572 .061 9.367 *** 
 
e9 
  
.680 .070 9.662 *** 
 
e10 
  
.523 .057 9.196 *** 
 
e11 
  
.411 .048 8.643 *** 
 
e12 
  
.365 .040 9.140 *** 
 
e13 
  
.295 .033 8.878 *** 
 
e14 
  
.049 .008 6.096 *** 
 
e15 
  
.060 .009 6.619 *** 
 
e16 
  
.245 .029 8.537 *** 
 
e17 
  
.570 .075 7.581 *** 
 
e18 
  
.799 .087 9.217 *** 
 
e20 
  
.355 .085 4.197 *** 
 
e21 
  
.210 .096 2.177 .029 
 
e22 
  
.829 .085 9.764 *** 
 
e25 
  
.549 .064 8.581 *** 
 
e26 
  
.460 .058 7.889 *** 
 
e27 
  
.507 .061 8.285 *** 
 
e28 
  
.710 .076 9.379 *** 
 
e29 
  
.513 .062 8.327 *** 
 
e7 
  
.383 .048 7.958 *** 
 
e53 
  
.812 .088 9.242 *** 
 
e19 
  
.646 .075 8.566 *** 
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Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 68 539.213 367 .000 1.469 
Saturated model 435 .000 0 
  
Independence model 29 3663.697 406 .000 9.024 
 
RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .078 .847 .819 .715 
Saturated model .000 1.000 
  
Independence model .276 .293 .242 .273 
 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model 
NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .853 .837 .948 .942 .947 
Saturated model 1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
 
Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .904 .771 .856 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
 
NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 172.213 114.130 238.286 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 3257.697 3067.782 3454.967 
 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 2.618 .836 .554 1.157 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 17.785 15.814 14.892 16.772 
 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .048 .039 .056 .662 
Independence model .197 .192 .203 .000 
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AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 675.213 698.395 901.838 969.838 
Saturated model 870.000 1018.295 2319.733 2754.733 
Independence model 3721.697 3731.584 3818.346 3847.346 
 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model 3.278 2.996 3.598 3.390 
Saturated model 4.223 4.223 4.223 4.943 
Independence model 18.066 17.145 19.024 18.114 
 
HOELTER 
Model 
HOELTER 
.05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 158 166 
Independence model 26 27 
 
 
 
2. Second order CFA model for All variables  
Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Scalar Estimates (Group number 1 - Default model) 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
OSO. <--- OS. 1.000 
    
OSB <--- OS. .828 .141 5.856 *** 
 
COP <--- PQ. 1.000 
    
PQT <--- PQ. .566 .074 7.649 *** 
 
PQC <--- PQ. .037 .015 2.441 .015 
 
HQ <--- VSP. 1.000 
    
SQ <--- VSP. .614 .145 4.242 *** 
 
OQ <--- VSP. .912 .157 5.804 *** 
 
OSB3 <--- OSB 1.048 .084 12.537 *** 
 
OSB1 <--- OSB 1.000 
    
OSS4 <--- OSO. .878 .092 9.559 *** 
 
OSS3 <--- OSO. .755 .093 8.120 *** 
 
OSS2 <--- OSO. .913 .091 9.985 *** 
 
OSS1 <--- OSO. 1.000 
    
VM_5 <--- VM. 1.000 
    
VM_4 <--- VM. 1.019 .042 24.534 *** 
 
VM_2 <--- VM. .733 .038 19.208 *** 
 
VM_1 <--- VM. 1.043 .059 17.678 *** 
 
HQ2 <--- HQ 1.083 .174 6.217 *** 
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Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
SQ6 <--- SQ 1.000 
    
SQ5 <--- SQ 1.086 .131 8.301 *** 
 
OQ5 <--- OQ 1.000 
    
OQ4 <--- OQ 1.122 .128 8.766 *** 
 
OQ3 <--- OQ 1.043 .126 8.297 *** 
 
OQ2 <--- OQ .784 .120 6.515 *** 
 
OQ1 <--- OQ 1.045 .126 8.314 *** 
 
COP5 <--- COP 1.000 
    
COP4 <--- COP .936 .034 27.344 *** 
 
COP3 <--- COP .947 .037 25.745 *** 
 
COP2 <--- COP .989 .036 27.213 *** 
 
COP1 <--- COP 1.016 .041 24.840 *** 
 
PQT4 <--- PQT .968 .027 35.202 *** 
 
PQT3 <--- PQT .992 .023 42.281 *** 
 
PQT2 <--- PQT 1.000 
    
PQT1 <--- PQT .961 .021 44.944 *** 
 
PQC4 <--- PQC 4.466 .360 12.418 *** 
 
PQC3 <--- PQC 1.000 
    
PQC2 <--- PQC 4.721 .308 15.321 *** 
 
PQC1 <--- PQC 5.009 .349 14.353 *** 
 
COP6 <--- COP .964 .047 20.402 *** 
 
COP7 <--- COP .944 .046 20.587 *** 
 
COP8 <--- COP .864 .051 16.927 *** 
 
CPP1 <--- CP. 1.087 .058 18.680 *** 
 
CPP2 <--- CP. .886 .068 13.004 *** 
 
CPP3 <--- CP. 1.000 
    
CPP4 <--- CP. 1.066 .058 18.510 *** 
 
HQ3 <--- HQ 1.007 .173 5.822 *** 
 
OSB2 <--- OSB 1.150 .086 13.423 *** 
 
SQ4 <--- SQ .511 .092 5.546 *** 
 
HQ5 <--- HQ 1.262 .190 6.643 *** 
 
HQ4 <--- HQ 1.000 
    
VM_3 <--- VM. .713 .036 19.577 *** 
 
OST4 <--- OSO. 1.053 .090 11.714 *** 
 
OST3 <--- OSO. 1.046 .090 11.619 *** 
 
OST2 <--- OSO. .964 .091 10.610 *** 
 
OST1 <--- OSO. .916 .091 10.020 *** 
 
CPC3 <--- CP. .600 .043 13.822 *** 
 
CPC2 <--- CP. .637 .043 14.680 *** 
 
CPC1 <--- CP. .685 .040 17.024 *** 
 
 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
OSO. <--- OS. .526 
OSB <--- OS. .420 
COP <--- PQ. .979 
PQT <--- PQ. .518 
PQC <--- PQ. .186 
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Estimate 
HQ <--- VSP. .984 
SQ <--- VSP. .422 
OQ <--- VSP. .762 
OSB3 <--- OSB .824 
OSB1 <--- OSB .786 
OSS4 <--- OSO. .665 
OSS3 <--- OSO. .572 
OSS2 <--- OSO. .691 
OSS1 <--- OSO. .757 
VM_5 <--- VM. .849 
VM_4 <--- VM. .878 
VM_2 <--- VM. .935 
VM_1 <--- VM. .897 
HQ2 <--- HQ .604 
SQ6 <--- SQ .809 
SQ5 <--- SQ .879 
OQ5 <--- OQ .667 
OQ4 <--- OQ .748 
OQ3 <--- OQ .695 
OQ2 <--- OQ .523 
OQ1 <--- OQ .697 
COP5 <--- COP .932 
COP4 <--- COP .947 
COP3 <--- COP .932 
COP2 <--- COP .946 
COP1 <--- COP .923 
PQT4 <--- PQT .936 
PQT3 <--- PQT .956 
PQT2 <--- PQT .992 
PQT1 <--- PQT .963 
PQC4 <--- PQC .765 
PQC3 <--- PQC .203 
PQC2 <--- PQC .890 
PQC1 <--- PQC .853 
COP6 <--- COP .867 
COP7 <--- COP .870 
COP8 <--- COP .803 
CPP1 <--- CP. .913 
CPP2 <--- CP. .745 
CPP3 <--- CP. .862 
CPP4 <--- CP. .909 
HQ3 <--- HQ .545 
OSB2 <--- OSB .903 
SQ4 <--- SQ .414 
HQ5 <--- HQ .678 
HQ4 <--- HQ .541 
VM_3 <--- VM. .943 
OST4 <--- OSO. .798 
OST3 <--- OSO. .792 
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Estimate 
OST2 <--- OSO. .730 
OST1 <--- OSO. .694 
CPC3 <--- CP. .774 
CPC2 <--- CP. .803 
CPC1 <--- CP. .872 
 
Covariances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
VM. <--> OS. .365 .061 5.950 *** 
 
VM. <--> VSP. .140 .047 2.996 .003 
 
VM. <--> PQ. -.340 .045 -7.506 *** 
 
VM. <--> DOO .302 .078 3.893 *** 
 
OS. <--> VSP. .166 .040 4.152 *** 
 
OS. <--> PQ. -.003 .025 -.116 .908 
 
OS. <--> DOO .344 .064 5.365 *** 
 
PQ. <--> VSP. .094 .027 3.523 *** 
 
VSP. <--> DOO .209 .057 3.672 *** 
 
PQ. <--> DOO .018 .041 .442 .658 
 
VM. <--> CP. -.401 .073 -5.454 *** 
 
CP. <--> OS. -.036 .046 -.782 .434 
 
CP. <--> VSP. .119 .046 2.585 .010 
 
CP. <--> PQ. .267 .042 6.387 *** 
 
CP. <--> DOO -.069 .075 -.920 .357 
 
e47 <--> e51 .279 .033 8.462 *** 
 
e12 <--> e13 .158 .027 5.849 *** 
 
e43 <--> e44 .032 .007 4.882 *** 
 
e35 <--> e36 .015 .003 4.581 *** 
 
e36 <--> e41 .009 .004 2.380 .017 
 
 
Correlations: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate 
VM. <--> OS. .986 
VM. <--> VSP. .271 
VM. <--> PQ. -.717 
VM. <--> DOO .292 
OS. <--> VSP. .752 
OS. <--> PQ. -.014 
OS. <--> DOO .778 
PQ. <--> VSP. .333 
VSP. <--> DOO .339 
PQ. <--> DOO .032 
VM. <--> CP. -.457 
CP. <--> OS. -.096 
CP. <--> VSP. .228 
CP. <--> PQ. .558 
CP. <--> DOO -.066 
e47 <--> e51 .843 
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Estimate 
e12 <--> e13 .524 
e43 <--> e44 .399 
e35 <--> e36 .431 
e36 <--> e41 .207 
 
Variances: (Group number 1 - Default model) 
   
Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
VM. 
  
.868 .115 7.546 *** 
 
CP. 
  
.885 .115 7.700 *** 
 
OS. 
  
.158 .060 2.651 .008 
 
PQ. 
  
.258 .034 7.661 *** 
 
VSP. 
  
.309 .083 3.726 *** 
 
DOO 
  
1.236 .122 10.149 *** 
 
RS4 
  
.010 
    
RS9 
  
.010 
    
RS3 
  
.506 .083 6.060 *** 
 
RS5 
  
.536 .096 5.556 *** 
 
RS6 
  
.186 .047 3.991 *** 
 
RS7 
  
.011 .015 .740 .459 
 
RS2 
  
.412 .078 5.289 *** 
 
RS8 
  
.226 .023 9.684 *** 
 
e1 
  
.362 .043 8.388 *** 
 
e2 
  
.371 .044 8.456 *** 
 
e3 
  
.465 .052 9.002 *** 
 
e4 
  
.516 .056 9.219 *** 
 
e5 
  
.320 .044 7.273 *** 
 
e6 
  
.183 .040 4.589 *** 
 
e8 
  
.556 .059 9.356 *** 
 
e9 
  
.670 .069 9.663 *** 
 
e10 
  
.519 .056 9.230 *** 
 
e11 
  
.425 .048 8.797 *** 
 
e12 
  
.337 .037 9.222 *** 
 
e13 
  
.269 .030 8.968 *** 
 
e14 
  
.055 .007 7.306 *** 
 
e15 
  
.067 .009 7.717 *** 
 
e16 
  
.229 .026 8.723 *** 
 
e17 
  
.597 .073 8.174 *** 
 
e18 
  
.768 .083 9.211 *** 
 
e20 
  
.343 .077 4.448 *** 
 
e21 
  
.226 .085 2.673 .008 
 
e22 
  
.825 .085 9.758 *** 
 
e25 
  
.553 .065 8.544 *** 
 
e26 
  
.438 .058 7.583 *** 
 
e27 
  
.514 .062 8.269 *** 
 
e28 
  
.723 .077 9.402 *** 
 
e29 
  
.512 .062 8.249 *** 
 
e30 
  
.041 .005 8.691 *** 
 
e31 
  
.027 .003 8.231 *** 
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Estimate S.E. C.R. P Label 
e32 
  
.036 .004 8.678 *** 
 
e33 
  
.031 .004 8.274 *** 
 
e34 
  
.048 .005 8.872 *** 
 
e35 
  
.041 .005 8.908 *** 
 
e36 
  
.028 .003 8.232 *** 
 
e37 
  
.005 .002 2.527 .012 
 
e38 
  
.022 .003 7.798 *** 
 
e39 
  
.146 .018 8.218 *** 
 
e40 
  
.241 .024 10.101 *** 
 
e41 
  
.061 .013 4.653 *** 
 
e42 
  
.097 .016 6.035 *** 
 
e7 
  
.381 .047 8.048 *** 
 
e43 
  
.083 .009 9.464 *** 
 
e44 
  
.077 .008 9.447 *** 
 
e45 
  
.111 .011 9.751 *** 
 
e46 
  
.213 .023 9.367 *** 
 
e47 
  
.198 .021 9.199 *** 
 
e48 
  
.131 .015 8.480 *** 
 
e49 
  
.211 .028 7.620 *** 
 
e50 
  
.306 .035 8.623 *** 
 
e51 
  
.555 .059 9.477 *** 
 
e52 
  
.209 .028 7.483 *** 
 
e53 
  
.765 .083 9.179 *** 
 
e19 
  
.652 .074 8.827 *** 
 
 
Model Fit Summary 
CMIN 
Model NPAR CMIN DF P CMIN/DF 
Default model 129 2745.984 1249 .000 2.199 
Saturated model 1378 .000 0 
  
Independence model 52 11904.508 1326 .000 8.978 
 
RMR, GFI 
Model RMR GFI AGFI PGFI 
Default model .072 .889 .837 .815 
Saturated model .000 1.000 
  
Independence model .216 .165 .132 .159 
 
Baseline Comparisons 
Model 
NFI 
Delta1 
RFI 
rho1 
IFI 
Delta2 
TLI 
rho2 
CFI 
Default model .860 .850 .900 .898 .901 
Saturated model 1.000 
 
1.000 
 
1.000 
Independence model .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
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Parsimony-Adjusted Measures 
Model PRATIO PNFI PCFI 
Default model .942 .725 .809 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 1.000 .000 .000 
 
NCP 
Model NCP LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 1496.984 1349.258 1652.390 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 10578.508 10232.985 10930.557 
 
FMIN 
Model FMIN F0 LO 90 HI 90 
Default model 13.330 7.267 6.550 8.021 
Saturated model .000 .000 .000 .000 
Independence model 57.789 51.352 49.675 53.061 
 
RMSEA 
Model RMSEA LO 90 HI 90 PCLOSE 
Default model .076 .072 .080 .000 
Independence model .197 .194 .200 .000 
 
AIC 
Model AIC BCC BIC CAIC 
Default model 3003.984 3093.357 3433.905 3562.905 
Saturated model 2756.000 3710.693 7348.486 8726.486 
Independence model 12008.508 12044.534 12181.809 12233.809 
 
ECVI 
Model ECVI LO 90 HI 90 MECVI 
Default model 14.582 13.865 15.337 15.016 
Saturated model 13.379 13.379 13.379 18.013 
Independence model 58.294 56.616 60.003 58.469 
 
HOELTER 
Model 
HOELTER 
.05 
HOELTER 
.01 
Default model 100 103 
Independence model 25 26 
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APPENDIX G: EFA FOR DATA PARCELLING 
 
1. Interaction effect between Vendor Management Capability and Cooperativeness 
(VMmCOP) 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of Variance Cumulative 
% 
1 25.142 62.855 62.855 25.142 62.855 62.855 7.339 18.348 18.348 
2 3.066 7.664 70.520 3.066 7.664 70.520 6.956 17.390 35.738 
3 1.950 4.875 75.394 1.950 4.875 75.394 6.767 16.919 52.656 
4 1.730 4.324 79.719 1.730 4.324 79.719 6.761 16.903 69.559 
5 1.238 3.096 82.815 1.238 3.096 82.815 5.302 13.256 82.815 
6 1.117 2.794 85.608       
7 .972 2.431 88.039       
8 .904 2.261 90.300       
9 .740 1.851 92.151       
10 .528 1.321 93.472       
11 .486 1.216 94.688       
12 .336 .840 95.528       
13 .281 .702 96.230       
14 .226 .565 96.795       
15 .169 .423 97.219       
16 .133 .333 97.552       
17 .109 .273 97.825       
18 .097 .242 98.067       
19 .092 .229 98.296       
20 .084 .211 98.507       
21 .080 .201 98.708       
22 .062 .156 98.864       
23 .057 .142 99.006       
24 .047 .118 99.124       
25 .042 .105 99.229       
26 .039 .098 99.328       
27 .037 .093 99.420       
28 .033 .084 99.504       
29 .031 .077 99.581       
30 .029 .072 99.653       
31 .027 .067 99.720       
32 .021 .053 99.773       
33 .017 .041 99.815       
34 .016 .039 99.854       
35 .014 .035 99.889       
36 .013 .032 99.920       
37 .012 .029 99.949       
38 .010 .024 99.973       
39 .007 .017 99.990       
40 .004 .010 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
VM_1mCOP1 .271 .728 .233 .355 .124 
VM_1mCOP2 .438 .474 .365 .454 .104 
VM_1mCOP3 .622 .268 .264 .534 -.009 
VM_1mCOP4 .469 .396 .465 .461 .140 
VM_1mCOP5 .370 .472 .504 .349 .226 
VM_1mCOP6 .074 .423 .452 .453 .370 
VM_1mCOP7 .268 .133 .741 .321 .244 
VM_1mCOP8 .169 .183 .092 .893 .115 
VM_2mCOP1 .256 .745 .410 .195 .188 
VM_2mCOP2 .395 .523 .548 .286 .194 
VM_2mCOP3 .614 .339 .423 .426 .021 
VM_2mCOP4 .403 .446 .617 .277 .183 
VM_2mCOP5 .299 .492 .640 .157 .268 
VM_2mCOP6 .039 .439 .611 .321 .433 
VM_2mCOP7 .223 .236 .810 .190 .321 
VM_2mCOP8 .197 .218 .278 .840 .148 
VM_3mCOP1 .293 .776 .268 .229 .181 
VM_3mCOP2 .436 .604 .392 .325 .158 
VM_3mCOP3 .614 .359 .305 .436 .000 
VM_3mCOP4 .466 .492 .472 .359 .165 
VM_3mCOP5 .325 .558 .493 .224 .250 
VM_3mCOP6 .058 .473 .461 .375 .456 
VM_3mCOP7 .282 .239 .683 .237 .361 
VM_3mCOP8 .201 .234 .184 .873 .123 
VM_4mCOP1 .403 .641 .029 .087 .546 
VM_4mCOP2 .583 .454 .290 .221 .338 
VM_4mCOP3 .766 .220 .155 .345 .235 
VM_4mCOP4 .574 .392 .409 .249 .343 
VM_4mCOP5 .438 .447 .399 .110 .424 
VM_4mCOP6 .095 .296 .206 .240 .822 
VM_4mCOP7 .344 .068 .413 .089 .730 
VM_4mCOP8 .198 .150 .187 .882 .142 
VM_5mCOP1 .515 .549 .014 .035 .534 
VM_5mCOP2 .687 .359 .271 .163 .341 
VM_5mCOP3 .833 .135 .096 .292 .289 
VM_5mCOP4 .672 .272 .343 .181 .345 
VM_5mCOP5 .507 .383 .361 .061 .429 
VM_5mCOP6 .140 .220 .205 .226 .810 
VM_5mCOP7 .411 -.023 .389 .072 .725 
VM_5mCOP8 .285 .042 .168 .819 .203 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 9 iterations. 
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2. Interaction effect between Vendor Management capability and Trust (VMmPQT) 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 15.726 78.631 78.631 15.726 78.631 78.631 9.307 46.537 46.537 
2 1.521 7.605 86.236 1.521 7.605 86.236 7.940 39.699 86.236 
3 .863 4.315 90.551       
4 .487 2.435 92.986       
5 .459 2.296 95.282       
6 .327 1.634 96.916       
7 .307 1.535 98.450       
8 .123 .613 99.063       
9 .054 .268 99.331       
10 .030 .150 99.481       
11 .022 .112 99.593       
12 .020 .102 99.695       
13 .015 .077 99.773       
14 .013 .064 99.837       
15 .009 .044 99.881       
16 .007 .035 99.916       
17 .006 .031 99.947       
18 .005 .025 99.971       
19 .004 .018 99.989       
20 .002 .011 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 Component 
1 2 
VM_1mPQT1 .847 .337 
VM_1mPQT2 .876 .326 
VM_1mPQT3 .857 .355 
VM_1mPQT4 .864 .316 
VM_2mPQT1 .786 .497 
VM_2mPQT2 .806 .481 
VM_2mPQT3 .796 .488 
VM_2mPQT4 .787 .462 
VM_3mPQT1 .753 .512 
VM_3mPQT2 .772 .520 
VM_3mPQT3 .760 .535 
VM_3mPQT4 .766 .506 
VM_4mPQT1 .488 .783 
VM_4mPQT2 .500 .802 
VM_4mPQT3 .483 .795 
VM_4mPQT4 .482 .776 
VM_5mPQT1 .355 .867 
VM_5mPQT2 .378 .875 
VM_5mPQT3 .375 .868 
VM_5mPQT4 .356 .854 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. 
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3. Interaction effect between Vendor Management  and Commitment (VMmPQC) 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 12.874 64.369 64.369 12.874 64.369 64.369 6.991 34.953 34.953 
2 1.669 8.346 72.715 1.669 8.346 72.715 4.488 22.441 57.394 
3 1.273 6.364 79.078 1.273 6.364 79.078 4.337 21.684 79.078 
4 .903 4.513 83.591       
5 .663 3.314 86.905       
6 .578 2.889 89.794       
7 .507 2.536 92.330       
8 .465 2.323 94.653       
9 .244 1.218 95.871       
10 .192 .962 96.832       
11 .143 .715 97.548       
12 .110 .548 98.096       
13 .099 .496 98.592       
14 .073 .363 98.955       
15 .060 .301 99.257       
16 .038 .190 99.447       
17 .035 .175 99.622       
18 .031 .157 99.779       
19 .027 .137 99.915       
20 .017 .085 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 Component 
1 2 3 
VM_1mPQC1 .400 .678 .295 
VM_1mPQC2 .806 .165 .308 
VM_1mPQC3 .802 .262 .340 
VM_1mPQC4 .359 .135 .775 
VM_2mPQC1 .447 .747 .287 
VM_2mPQC2 .812 .320 .310 
VM_2mPQC3 .773 .391 .296 
VM_2mPQC4 .382 .277 .761 
VM_3mPQC1 .361 .780 .269 
VM_3mPQC2 .834 .296 .256 
VM_3mPQC3 .791 .325 .295 
VM_3mPQC4 .265 .233 .826 
VM_4mPQC1 .265 .881 .205 
VM_4mPQC2 .700 .401 .269 
VM_4mPQC3 .692 .435 .255 
VM_4mPQC4 .209 .246 .842 
VM_5mPQC1 .349 .768 .226 
VM_5mPQC2 .735 .393 .279 
VM_5mPQC3 .686 .415 .242 
VM_5mPQC4 .260 .254 .781 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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4. Interaction effect between Vendor Management and Partners‟ Compatibility 
(VMmCP) 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 18.484 52.811 52.811 18.484 52.811 52.811 12.329 35.226 35.226 
2 4.568 13.053 65.863 4.568 13.053 65.863 8.277 23.647 58.873 
3 2.428 6.938 72.801 2.428 6.938 72.801 4.875 13.928 72.801 
4 1.908 5.452 78.253       
5 1.588 4.536 82.789       
6 .963 2.751 85.540       
7 .831 2.374 87.913       
8 .788 2.251 90.165       
9 .503 1.437 91.602       
10 .477 1.364 92.965       
11 .462 1.321 94.286       
12 .383 1.093 95.379       
13 .289 .825 96.204       
14 .192 .549 96.754       
15 .161 .459 97.213       
16 .145 .414 97.627       
17 .120 .344 97.971       
18 .112 .319 98.289       
19 .092 .262 98.551       
20 .083 .238 98.790       
21 .074 .212 99.002       
22 .066 .190 99.192       
23 .050 .143 99.334       
24 .043 .122 99.456       
25 .038 .110 99.566       
26 .033 .094 99.660       
27 .026 .075 99.734       
28 .019 .055 99.789       
29 .018 .052 99.842       
30 .014 .039 99.880       
31 .012 .035 99.915       
32 .010 .028 99.943       
33 .008 .024 99.967       
34 .007 .021 99.988       
35 .004 .012 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 Component 
1 2 3 
VM_1mCPC1 .807 .186 .203 
VM_1mCPC2 .296 .823 .107 
VM_1mCPC3 .356 .152 .784 
VM_1mCPP1 .777 .312 .127 
VM_1mCPP2 .243 .844 .088 
VM_1mCPP3 .731 .198 .210 
VM_1mCPP4 .705 .327 .364 
VM_2mCPC1 .835 .116 .218 
VM_2mCPC2 .289 .825 .080 
VM_2mCPC3 .335 .076 .846 
VM_2mCPP1 .836 .253 .117 
VM_2mCPP2 .207 .858 .061 
VM_2mCPP3 .771 .176 .188 
VM_2mCPP4 .751 .280 .403 
VM_3mCPC1 .817 .142 .205 
VM_3mCPC2 .258 .841 .128 
VM_3mCPC3 .305 .151 .861 
VM_3mCPP1 .787 .299 .167 
VM_3mCPP2 .182 .881 .138 
VM_3mCPP3 .726 .241 .251 
VM_3mCPP4 .712 .341 .401 
VM_4mCPC1 .808 .178 .167 
VM_4mCPC2 .279 .832 .105 
VM_4mCPC3 .292 .139 .853 
VM_4mCPP1 .777 .316 .127 
VM_4mCPP2 .222 .862 .095 
VM_4mCPP3 .721 .217 .209 
VM_4mCPP4 .702 .355 .361 
VM_5mCPC1 .746 .091 .144 
VM_5mCPC2 .181 .783 .124 
VM_5mCPC3 .229 .116 .841 
VM_5mCPP1 .714 .219 .142 
VM_5mCPP2 .146 .802 .144 
VM_5mCPP3 .646 .168 .209 
VM_5mCPP4 .623 .269 .398 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
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5. Interaction effect between Vendors‟ Service Performance and  Cooperativeness                
(VSPmCOP) 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulativ
e % 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 22.686 23.631 23.631 22.686 23.631 23.631 14.260 14.854 14.854 
2 10.012 10.429 34.061 10.012 10.429 34.061 9.932 10.346 25.200 
3 6.277 6.539 40.599 6.277 6.539 40.599 8.859 9.228 34.428 
4 5.976 6.225 46.825 5.976 6.225 46.825 7.575 7.891 42.319 
5 4.405 4.589 51.413 4.405 4.589 51.413 6.849 7.135 49.453 
6 4.275 4.453 55.867 4.275 4.453 55.867 6.157 6.413 55.867 
7 3.923 4.086 59.953       
8 3.596 3.746 63.699       
9 2.899 3.020 66.719       
10 2.518 2.623 69.341       
11 2.216 2.308 71.650       
12 2.103 2.191 73.841       
13 1.956 2.038 75.879       
14 1.677 1.747 77.626       
15 1.413 1.472 79.098       
16 1.346 1.403 80.501       
17 1.132 1.179 81.680       
18 1.036 1.079 82.759       
19 .963 1.003 83.762       
20 .948 .988 84.750       
21 .890 .927 85.677       
22 .811 .845 86.521       
23 .704 .733 87.254       
24 .678 .706 87.960       
25 .603 .628 88.588       
26 .601 .627 89.215       
27 .582 .607 89.822       
28 .538 .561 90.382       
29 .514 .536 90.918       
30 .495 .516 91.434       
31 .449 .468 91.902       
32 .436 .454 92.356       
33 .383 .399 92.754       
34 .361 .376 93.130       
35 .331 .345 93.475       
36 .327 .341 93.816       
37 .320 .334 94.150       
38 .313 .326 94.476       
39 .293 .305 94.781       
40 .268 .280 95.060       
41 .261 .271 95.332       
42 .245 .255 95.586       
43 .233 .243 95.829       
44 .227 .236 96.065       
45 .206 .215 96.280       
46 .192 .200 96.480       
47 .190 .198 96.678       
48 .170 .177 96.855       
49 .160 .167 97.022       
50 .159 .165 97.188       
51 .153 .159 97.346       
52 .147 .153 97.499       
53 .133 .138 97.637       
54 .126 .131 97.769       
55 .121 .126 97.895       
56 .116 .121 98.016       
57 .113 .118 98.134       
58 .111 .115 98.249       
59 .108 .112 98.362       
60 .097 .101 98.462       
61 .092 .096 98.559       
62 .088 .092 98.651       
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63 .083 .086 98.737       
64 .080 .084 98.821       
65 .079 .083 98.904       
66 .074 .077 98.981       
67 .071 .074 99.054       
68 .068 .070 99.125       
69 .064 .067 99.192       
70 .060 .063 99.255       
71 .060 .062 99.317       
72 .056 .059 99.376       
73 .053 .056 99.431       
74 .048 .050 99.481       
75 .043 .045 99.526       
76 .040 .042 99.568       
77 .040 .042 99.610       
78 .037 .039 99.648       
79 .036 .038 99.686       
80 .031 .033 99.719       
81 .029 .030 99.749       
82 .028 .030 99.779       
83 .025 .026 99.805       
84 .024 .025 99.830       
85 .022 .023 99.853       
86 .021 .021 99.875       
87 .018 .019 99.893       
88 .017 .017 99.911       
89 .015 .015 99.926       
90 .014 .015 99.941       
91 .012 .013 99.954       
92 .011 .011 99.965       
93 .010 .010 99.975       
94 .009 .009 99.984       
95 .008 .009 99.992       
96 .007 .008 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
SQ4mCOP1 .105 .145 .078 .037 -.053 .775 
SQ4mCOP2 .141 .235 .056 .046 -.104 .783 
SQ4mCOP3 .154 .253 .091 .016 -.090 .749 
SQ4mCOP4 .135 .229 .096 .017 -.082 .764 
SQ4mCOP5 .139 .281 .084 .053 -.038 .778 
SQ4mCOP6 .137 .308 .024 .073 -.054 .679 
SQ4mCOP7 .108 .197 .055 .023 .024 .725 
SQ4mCOP8 .116 .000 -.013 .042 .000 .465 
SQ5mCOP1 .031 .693 .042 -.018 -.047 .138 
SQ5mCOP2 -.025 .761 .065 .024 -.010 .187 
SQ5mCOP3 -.083 .796 .066 .069 -.031 .177 
SQ5mCOP4 -.054 .726 .045 .054 -.024 .168 
SQ5mCOP5 .009 .678 .043 .016 -.001 .243 
SQ5mCOP6 -.003 .634 .054 .035 .071 .240 
SQ5mCOP7 -.024 .629 .129 .011 .058 .188 
SQ5mCOP8 -.162 .468 -.037 .160 .166 -.081 
SQ6mCOP1 .043 .765 .055 .028 .050 -.038 
SQ6mCOP2 .064 .811 .048 .047 .012 .028 
SQ6mCOP3 .035 .833 -.013 .094 .094 .038 
SQ6mCOP4 .021 .784 .003 .063 .044 .017 
SQ6mCOP5 .056 .724 .052 .021 .002 .075 
SQ6mCOP6 .031 .641 .071 .020 .076 .170 
SQ6mCOP7 .041 .662 .137 -.033 .058 .049 
SQ6mCOP8 -.121 .560 -.136 .124 .168 -.118 
HQ2mCOP1 .146 -.012 .552 .000 .402 .129 
HQ2mCOP2 .097 -.018 .595 .120 .365 .084 
HQ2mCOP3 .128 -.022 .550 .135 .444 .136 
HQ2mCOP4 .092 -.044 .605 .070 .472 .141 
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HQ2mCOP5 .089 -.020 .540 .114 .454 .144 
HQ2mCOP6 .097 -.008 .479 .096 .466 .121 
HQ2mCOP7 .167 .047 .428 .066 .417 .126 
HQ2mCOP8 .042 -.094 .377 .132 .429 .141 
HQ3mCOP1 .239 .044 .107 .072 .737 -.118 
HQ3mCOP2 .182 .089 .045 .111 .755 -.144 
HQ3mCOP3 .229 .092 .067 .002 .784 -.120 
HQ3mCOP4 .214 .067 .087 .023 .801 -.108 
HQ3mCOP5 .230 .063 .095 .056 .801 -.081 
HQ3mCOP6 .211 .103 .067 -.014 .766 -.037 
HQ3mCOP7 .229 .062 .111 .038 .770 -.010 
HQ3mCOP8 .229 .164 .113 -.100 .622 -.052 
HQ4mCOP1 .121 -.073 .076 .625 .014 .125 
HQ4mCOP2 .126 -.025 .050 .721 .032 .133 
HQ4mCOP3 .142 -.028 .072 .760 -.004 .101 
HQ4mCOP4 .138 -.038 .018 .753 -.002 .121 
HQ4mCOP5 .097 -.067 .067 .655 .041 .169 
HQ4mCOP6 .019 -.039 .102 .556 .042 .229 
HQ4mCOP7 .053 -.080 .102 .590 .097 .187 
HQ4mCOP8 .074 -.039 .061 .554 .018 .154 
HQ5mCOP1 .210 .051 .710 .280 .044 .013 
HQ5mCOP2 .168 .112 .761 .281 .000 .034 
HQ5mCOP3 .192 .085 .763 .304 .005 .026 
HQ5mCOP4 .222 .065 .766 .250 .027 .046 
HQ5mCOP5 .218 .082 .725 .245 .061 .081 
HQ5mCOP6 .216 .113 .672 .151 .027 .055 
HQ5mCOP7 .231 .127 .675 .165 .042 .065 
HQ5mCOP8 .140 -.033 .503 .172 .105 .015 
OQ1mCOP1 .586 .227 .486 -.016 .003 -.216 
OQ1mCOP2 .585 .250 .468 -.017 -.059 -.179 
OQ1mCOP3 .609 .201 .436 .053 .038 -.126 
OQ1mCOP4 .638 .209 .461 -.029 -.018 -.172 
OQ1mCOP5 .633 .239 .442 -.070 .000 -.160 
OQ1mCOP6 .531 .197 .441 -.088 -.004 -.084 
OQ1mCOP7 .575 .207 .476 -.086 .029 -.165 
OQ1mCOP8 .439 .032 .235 .054 .133 -.111 
OQ2mCOP1 .190 .211 .239 .518 .012 -.223 
OQ2mCOP2 .177 .240 .271 .665 .062 -.195 
OQ2mCOP3 .189 .250 .269 .709 -.016 -.174 
OQ2mCOP4 .192 .200 .242 .689 -.008 -.219 
OQ2mCOP5 .153 .181 .245 .626 .059 -.175 
OQ2mCOP6 .159 .249 .206 .567 .109 -.096 
OQ2mCOP7 .165 .233 .214 .541 .106 -.146 
OQ2mCOP8 .182 .210 .117 .476 -.007 -.134 
OQ3mCOP1 .583 -.080 .256 .150 .100 .244 
OQ3mCOP2 .655 -.100 .195 .122 .010 .261 
OQ3mCOP3 .666 -.139 .192 .214 .022 .264 
OQ3mCOP4 .649 -.134 .235 .184 .045 .240 
OQ3mCOP5 .636 -.115 .249 .112 .038 .262 
OQ3mCOP6 .516 -.043 .221 .108 .148 .217 
OQ3mCOP7 .561 -.067 .277 .108 .134 .262 
OQ3mCOP8 .480 -.258 .136 .219 .133 .217 
OQ4mCOP1 .646 .232 -.007 .134 .188 .187 
OQ4mCOP2 .654 .238 -.040 .221 .117 .219 
OQ4mCOP3 .663 .215 -.021 .184 .206 .175 
OQ4mCOP4 .696 .199 -.041 .155 .170 .200 
OQ4mCOP5 .658 .207 -.025 .105 .182 .225 
OQ4mCOP6 .535 .209 .023 .082 .218 .200 
OQ4mCOP7 .573 .184 .065 .051 .238 .237 
OQ4mCOP8 .472 .081 -.080 .174 .227 .093 
OQ5mCOP1 .726 -.158 .160 .133 .152 -.042 
OQ5mCOP2 .778 -.152 .137 .174 .112 -.017 
OQ5mCOP3 .768 -.208 .121 .183 .122 -.007 
OQ5mCOP4 .794 -.174 .124 .156 .106 -.047 
OQ5mCOP5 .791 -.113 .108 .132 .153 -.033 
OQ5mCOP6 .677 -.085 .155 .076 .183 .009 
OQ5mCOP7 .716 -.115 .185 .112 .211 -.037 
OQ5mCOP8 .629 -.267 .035 .107 .132 .025 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 11 iterations. 
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6. Interaction effect between Vendors‟ Service Performance and Trust (VSPmPQT) 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of Variance Cumulative 
% 
1 13.853 28.861 28.861 13.853 28.861 28.861 8.825 18.386 18.386 
2 5.821 12.128 40.988 5.821 12.128 40.988 6.554 13.654 32.040 
3 4.535 9.449 50.437 4.535 9.449 50.437 5.687 11.848 43.888 
4 3.997 8.327 58.764 3.997 8.327 58.764 5.440 11.334 55.222 
5 3.164 6.593 65.356 3.164 6.593 65.356 3.958 8.246 63.468 
6 2.899 6.039 71.395 2.899 6.039 71.395 3.805 7.927 71.395 
7 2.792 5.816 77.211       
8 2.082 4.337 81.548       
9 1.788 3.724 85.272       
10 1.649 3.435 88.708       
11 1.211 2.523 91.231       
12 .956 1.992 93.223       
13 .617 1.286 94.509       
14 .485 1.010 95.520       
15 .437 .911 96.430       
16 .244 .508 96.939       
17 .192 .399 97.338       
18 .155 .323 97.662       
19 .150 .313 97.975       
20 .110 .229 98.203       
21 .098 .204 98.408       
22 .078 .164 98.571       
23 .073 .153 98.724       
24 .061 .128 98.852       
25 .059 .122 98.974       
26 .051 .106 99.081       
27 .047 .098 99.179       
28 .043 .090 99.268       
29 .040 .083 99.351       
30 .038 .079 99.430       
31 .036 .076 99.506       
32 .030 .062 99.568       
33 .026 .055 99.623       
34 .024 .050 99.673       
35 .021 .043 99.716       
36 .018 .039 99.755       
37 .017 .036 99.791       
38 .017 .035 99.826       
39 .015 .031 99.857       
40 .013 .028 99.885       
41 .012 .026 99.911       
42 .010 .020 99.931       
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43 .008 .017 99.948       
44 .007 .015 99.963       
45 .006 .012 99.976       
46 .005 .009 99.985       
47 .004 .008 99.993       
48 .003 .007 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
SQ4mPQT1 .169 .153 .039 .128 .062 .890 
SQ4mPQT2 .173 .144 .037 .127 .066 .896 
SQ4mPQT3 .177 .132 .041 .117 .062 .897 
SQ4mPQT4 .182 .113 .067 .104 .061 .850 
SQ5mPQT1 -.021 .820 .156 .086 -.011 .202 
SQ5mPQT2 -.024 .867 .152 .117 .019 .182 
SQ5mPQT3 -.017 .839 .140 .124 .018 .174 
SQ5mPQT4 -.011 .850 .144 .099 .016 .157 
SQ6mPQT1 .180 .878 .047 .042 .039 .022 
SQ6mPQT2 .170 .880 .039 .076 .060 -.006 
SQ6mPQT3 .159 .879 .034 .068 .066 -.034 
SQ6mPQT4 .155 .885 .047 .068 .059 -.047 
HQ2mPQT1 .197 .118 .822 -.034 .111 -.028 
HQ2mPQT2 .192 .137 .834 -.024 .096 -.013 
HQ2mPQT3 .191 .138 .831 -.040 .097 -.005 
HQ2mPQT4 .184 .138 .811 -.021 .081 .003 
HQ3mPQT1 .146 .023 .171 -.050 .887 .065 
HQ3mPQT2 .135 .062 .159 -.071 .898 .084 
HQ3mPQT3 .129 .070 .156 -.079 .894 .076 
HQ3mPQT4 .137 .061 .142 -.077 .881 .070 
HQ4mPQT1 .180 -.024 -.055 .751 -.004 .123 
HQ4mPQT2 .176 .021 -.047 .757 -.006 .146 
HQ4mPQT3 .158 .002 -.062 .747 -.018 .145 
HQ4mPQT4 .166 -.008 -.044 .742 -.020 .107 
HQ5mPQT1 .078 .070 .648 .453 .148 .097 
HQ5mPQT2 .079 .084 .655 .461 .135 .109 
HQ5mPQT3 .080 .079 .668 .437 .106 .111 
HQ5mPQT4 .085 .082 .651 .453 .115 .103 
OQ1mPQT1 .695 .079 .072 .152 .131 -.030 
OQ1mPQT2 .690 .119 .073 .146 .110 -.022 
OQ1mPQT3 .679 .107 .076 .140 .111 -.024 
OQ1mPQT4 .675 .073 .083 .152 .101 -.032 
OQ2mPQT1 .171 .204 .281 .712 -.099 -.004 
OQ2mPQT2 .172 .253 .272 .720 -.116 -.009 
OQ2mPQT3 .157 .222 .284 .700 -.118 -.030 
OQ2mPQT4 .161 .217 .277 .693 -.118 -.053 
OQ3mPQT1 .592 .006 .360 .028 -.343 .249 
OQ3mPQT2 .599 -.005 .384 .034 -.355 .274 
OQ3mPQT3 .573 -.028 .397 .034 -.369 .279 
OQ3mPQT4 .572 -.020 .372 .025 -.351 .250 
OQ4mPQT1 .777 .211 .158 .056 .114 .149 
OQ4mPQT2 .766 .220 .166 .073 .117 .176 
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OQ4mPQT3 .754 .201 .196 .053 .114 .165 
OQ4mPQT4 .771 .168 .190 .055 .101 .131 
OQ5mPQT1 .798 -.055 .018 .176 .040 .063 
OQ5mPQT2 .799 -.044 .005 .189 .033 .097 
OQ5mPQT3 .792 -.076 .019 .179 .005 .105 
OQ5mPQT4 .787 -.069 .031 .196 .021 .093 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
 
7. Interaction effect between Vendors‟ Service Performance and Commitment (VSPmPQC) 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Compon
ent 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 11.186 23.304 23.304 11.186 23.304 23.304 6.812 14.192 14.192 
2 4.594 9.570 32.874 4.594 9.570 32.874 5.420 11.291 25.483 
3 3.280 6.834 39.708 3.280 6.834 39.708 4.452 9.275 34.758 
4 2.790 5.813 45.521 2.790 5.813 45.521 4.264 8.883 43.641 
5 2.473 5.152 50.673 2.473 5.152 50.673 3.375 7.032 50.673 
6 2.311 4.814 55.487       
7 2.023 4.215 59.702       
8 1.929 4.018 63.720       
9 1.832 3.817 67.537       
10 1.611 3.356 70.893       
11 1.325 2.761 73.654       
12 1.274 2.654 76.308       
13 1.183 2.464 78.772       
14 1.096 2.283 81.055       
15 .919 1.916 82.971       
16 .886 1.846 84.817       
17 .784 1.633 86.449       
18 .645 1.343 87.792       
19 .560 1.167 88.959       
20 .491 1.023 89.982       
21 .450 .938 90.920       
22 .425 .885 91.805       
23 .390 .813 92.618       
24 .362 .754 93.372       
25 .324 .675 94.047       
26 .302 .629 94.675       
27 .271 .565 95.241       
28 .243 .507 95.748       
29 .198 .413 96.161       
30 .192 .399 96.561       
31 .176 .366 96.926       
32 .168 .350 97.276       
33 .160 .334 97.610       
34 .147 .306 97.916       
35 .123 .255 98.171       
36 .121 .252 98.423       
37 .112 .234 98.656       
38 .105 .219 98.875       
39 .094 .195 99.071       
40 .080 .166 99.237       
41 .074 .153 99.390       
42 .062 .129 99.519       
43 .051 .107 99.626       
44 .047 .098 99.724       
45 .043 .089 99.813       
46 .039 .082 99.895       
47 .032 .066 99.961       
48 .019 .039 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 
SQ4mPQC1 .267 .527 .122 -.390 .038 
SQ4mPQC2 .274 .520 .066 -.358 .022 
SQ4mPQC3 .172 .494 .207 -.444 .021 
SQ4mPQC4 .227 .531 .119 -.207 .025 
SQ5mPQC1 .018 .704 .099 .150 .019 
SQ5mPQC2 -.043 .757 .135 .143 .085 
SQ5mPQC3 -.047 .711 .122 .220 .029 
SQ5mPQC4 -.011 .635 .151 .008 .135 
SQ6mPQC1 .109 .661 -.095 .147 -.061 
SQ6mPQC2 .008 .694 -.153 .174 .039 
SQ6mPQC3 .059 .695 -.035 .253 .010 
SQ6mPQC4 .049 .634 -.008 .018 .091 
HQ2mPQC1 .234 .103 .021 .467 .103 
HQ2mPQC2 .242 .035 .072 .485 .278 
HQ2mPQC3 .210 -.001 .061 .611 .275 
HQ2mPQC4 .156 .097 .264 .240 .265 
HQ3mPQC1 .160 .097 .067 .069 .747 
HQ3mPQC2 .182 .041 .069 .105 .849 
HQ3mPQC3 .182 .030 -.041 .225 .802 
HQ3mPQC4 .051 .132 .252 -.044 .727 
HQ4mPQC1 .260 .009 .507 .081 -.099 
HQ4mPQC2 .219 -.094 .673 .040 .088 
HQ4mPQC3 .166 -.024 .526 .175 .035 
HQ4mPQC4 .155 .011 .695 -.062 .121 
HQ5mPQC1 .237 .140 .273 .549 -.094 
HQ5mPQC2 .219 .082 .460 .494 .016 
HQ5mPQC3 .252 .165 .260 .660 .022 
HQ5mPQC4 .086 .111 .572 .206 .088 
OQ1mPQC1 .629 .164 -.010 .314 .060 
OQ1mPQC2 .599 .100 .026 .255 .244 
OQ1mPQC3 .587 .055 -.098 .485 .161 
OQ1mPQC4 .441 .140 .265 -.001 .232 
OQ2mPQC1 .094 .162 .425 .453 -.038 
OQ2mPQC2 -.028 .113 .553 .479 .096 
OQ2mPQC3 .053 .176 .347 .658 .013 
OQ2mPQC4 -.003 .136 .682 .184 .127 
OQ3mPQC1 .697 .063 .231 .050 -.167 
OQ3mPQC2 .721 .003 .236 .053 -.087 
OQ3mPQC3 .643 .026 .112 .214 -.048 
OQ3mPQC4 .482 .107 .424 -.057 -.032 
OQ4mPQC1 .595 .299 .246 -.003 .095 
OQ4mPQC2 .610 .236 .288 .000 .229 
OQ4mPQC3 .550 .208 .156 .175 .214 
OQ4mPQC4 .455 .259 .464 -.105 .233 
OQ5mPQC1 .713 -.038 .036 .131 .097 
OQ5mPQC2 .729 -.107 .118 .119 .272 
OQ5mPQC3 .682 -.079 .009 .288 .275 
OQ5mPQC4 .497 -.028 .344 -.084 .262 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 9 iterations. 
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8. Interaction effect between Vendors‟ Service Performance and Partners‟ Compatibility 
(VSPmCP).  
 
Total Variance Explained 
Compone
nt 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 22.630 26.940 26.940 22.630 26.940 26.940 11.101 13.216 13.216 
2 7.295 8.684 35.624 7.295 8.684 35.624 8.289 9.868 23.084 
3 5.123 6.099 41.723 5.123 6.099 41.723 8.223 9.789 32.873 
4 4.410 5.250 46.974 4.410 5.250 46.974 6.796 8.090 40.963 
5 4.031 4.799 51.773 4.031 4.799 51.773 6.601 7.858 48.821 
6 3.463 4.123 55.896 3.463 4.123 55.896 5.943 7.075 55.896 
7 3.437 4.091 59.987       
8 2.880 3.429 63.416       
9 2.563 3.052 66.468       
10 2.478 2.949 69.417       
11 2.158 2.570 71.987       
12 1.828 2.176 74.163       
13 1.757 2.091 76.254       
14 1.398 1.664 77.918       
15 1.309 1.559 79.477       
16 1.242 1.479 80.956       
17 1.024 1.219 82.175       
18 .983 1.170 83.345       
19 .828 .985 84.331       
20 .806 .960 85.291       
21 .776 .924 86.215       
22 .744 .886 87.101       
23 .721 .859 87.959       
24 .657 .782 88.741       
25 .615 .732 89.474       
26 .540 .642 90.116       
27 .505 .601 90.717       
28 .477 .568 91.285       
29 .462 .550 91.835       
30 .415 .494 92.329       
31 .390 .464 92.793       
32 .382 .455 93.248       
33 .347 .413 93.661       
34 .343 .408 94.069       
35 .310 .368 94.437       
36 .284 .338 94.775       
37 .263 .313 95.089       
38 .257 .306 95.395       
39 .249 .297 95.692       
40 .232 .276 95.968       
41 .220 .262 96.230       
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42 .202 .241 96.471       
43 .194 .231 96.702       
44 .193 .230 96.932       
45 .180 .215 97.146       
46 .173 .206 97.352       
47 .163 .194 97.546       
48 .159 .189 97.735       
49 .146 .173 97.909       
50 .143 .170 98.079       
51 .132 .157 98.236       
52 .124 .147 98.384       
53 .114 .136 98.520       
54 .106 .126 98.646       
55 .096 .114 98.760       
56 .086 .102 98.862       
57 .084 .101 98.963       
58 .081 .097 99.060       
59 .074 .088 99.148       
60 .070 .083 99.231       
61 .067 .080 99.310       
62 .059 .070 99.380       
63 .051 .061 99.441       
64 .045 .054 99.495       
65 .044 .053 99.547       
66 .043 .051 99.598       
67 .041 .049 99.647       
68 .039 .046 99.693       
69 .035 .041 99.735       
70 .030 .035 99.770       
71 .028 .033 99.804       
72 .026 .031 99.834       
73 .023 .028 99.862       
74 .022 .026 99.888       
75 .020 .024 99.912       
76 .017 .020 99.933       
77 .013 .016 99.949       
78 .012 .014 99.963       
79 .010 .012 99.974       
80 .009 .011 99.985       
81 .007 .009 99.994       
82 .004 .004 99.998       
83 .002 .002 100.000       
84 .000 .000 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
SQ4mCPC1 .175 -.184 .181 -.012 .565 .322 
SQ4mCPC2 .118 -.001 .366 .077 .488 .144 
SQ4mCPC3 .107 -.199 .210 .063 .493 .131 
SQ4mCPP1 .188 -.172 .292 .029 .637 .221 
SQ4mCPP2 .150 .003 .305 .059 .478 .133 
SQ4mCPP3 .135 -.185 .289 -.007 .499 .334 
SQ4mCPP4 .202 -.096 .284 .025 .652 .225 
SQ5mCPC1 .054 .114 .611 .057 .004 .329 
SQ5mCPC2 -.027 -.032 .678 .130 .081 .181 
SQ5mCPC3 .012 .012 .556 .138 -.059 .135 
SQ5mCPP1 -.016 .091 .772 .050 -.042 .263 
SQ5mCPP2 .000 -.026 .615 .102 .058 .200 
SQ5mCPP3 .023 .127 .765 .108 .017 .240 
SQ5mCPP4 .036 .060 .784 .108 -.034 .248 
SQ6mCPC1 .114 .081 .654 -.017 .147 .009 
SQ6mCPC2 .060 .016 .657 .137 .336 -.117 
SQ6mCPC3 .038 .063 .603 .123 .105 -.198 
SQ6mCPP1 .104 .098 .774 .057 .211 -.088 
SQ6mCPP2 .088 .009 .582 .099 .337 -.111 
SQ6mCPP3 .055 .088 .793 .067 .075 -.035 
SQ6mCPP4 .127 .136 .793 .093 .211 -.109 
HQ2mCPC1 .108 .598 .092 .183 .065 .144 
HQ2mCPC2 .114 .548 .047 .330 .257 .038 
HQ2mCPC3 .034 .530 .011 .408 .016 -.076 
HQ2mCPP1 .153 .711 .088 .217 .110 .074 
HQ2mCPP2 .130 .543 .018 .335 .251 .033 
HQ2mCPP3 .130 .672 .118 .231 .014 .134 
HQ2mCPP4 .163 .627 .105 .270 .151 .100 
HQ3mCPC1 .237 .035 .182 .669 -.035 .176 
HQ3mCPC2 .143 .163 .134 .742 .084 .091 
HQ3mCPC3 .103 .225 .161 .631 -.057 -.024 
HQ3mCPP1 .223 .092 .178 .701 -.003 .119 
HQ3mCPP2 .184 .156 .096 .709 .071 .084 
HQ3mCPP3 .161 .088 .202 .738 -.068 .170 
HQ3mCPP4 .177 .135 .206 .783 -.009 .131 
HQ4mCPC1 .027 .252 .110 .008 .625 .025 
HQ4mCPC2 .050 .343 .008 .100 .665 -.037 
HQ4mCPC3 .048 .222 -.061 .042 .584 -.029 
HQ4mCPP1 .104 .325 .011 .012 .702 -.011 
HQ4mCPP2 .046 .322 .023 .104 .652 -.055 
HQ4mCPP3 .014 .321 .018 -.023 .574 .080 
HQ4mCPP4 .077 .326 .010 .014 .765 .029 
HQ5mCPC1 .257 .648 .083 -.076 .028 .177 
HQ5mCPC2 .229 .608 -.037 .103 .242 .142 
HQ5mCPC3 .141 .490 .026 .281 .024 .093 
HQ5mCPP1 .263 .724 .055 -.004 .112 .158 
HQ5mCPP2 .225 .606 -.038 .122 .231 .150 
HQ5mCPP3 .232 .710 .056 -.026 .003 .225 
HQ5mCPP4 .263 .666 .053 .031 .156 .190 
OQ1mCPC1 .591 .436 .202 -.079 -.036 -.047 
OQ1mCPC2 .567 .352 .135 .064 .241 -.218 
OQ1mCPC3 .414 .343 .149 .152 .015 -.230 
OQ1mCPP1 .620 .479 .180 -.016 .102 -.147 
OQ1mCPP2 .555 .340 .116 .075 .210 -.221 
OQ1mCPP3 .586 .457 .200 -.068 -.055 -.084 
OQ1mCPP4 .644 .432 .228 -.013 .120 -.124 
OQ2mCPC1 .235 .127 .227 .103 .049 .715 
OQ2mCPC2 .094 .152 .069 .195 .236 .706 
OQ2mCPC3 .098 .112 .021 .059 .032 .666 
OQ2mCPP1 .178 .185 .130 .076 .085 .775 
OQ2mCPP2 .102 .156 .053 .181 .197 .709 
OQ2mCPP3 .177 .176 .151 .111 .076 .777 
OQ2mCPP4 .194 .204 .121 .127 .108 .803 
OQ3mCPC1 .519 .124 .050 .398 .130 .219 
OQ3mCPC2 .562 .097 -.007 .496 .278 .040 
OQ3mCPC3 .324 .231 -.022 .476 .142 -.016 
OQ3mCPP1 .603 .159 .027 .419 .212 .099 
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OQ3mCPP2 .566 .109 -.027 .504 .259 .043 
OQ3mCPP3 .528 .181 .032 .424 .077 .201 
OQ3mCPP4 .601 .170 .052 .443 .242 .113 
OQ4mCPC1 .513 .146 .214 .258 .112 .387 
OQ4mCPC2 .567 .143 .219 .334 .240 .119 
OQ4mCPC3 .358 .152 .118 .354 .112 .130 
OQ4mCPP1 .598 .176 .200 .264 .192 .264 
OQ4mCPP2 .564 .173 .182 .335 .223 .131 
OQ4mCPP3 .570 .197 .223 .281 .059 .319 
OQ4mCPP4 .612 .198 .241 .303 .190 .251 
OQ5mCPC1 .736 .002 .028 .036 -.017 .195 
OQ5mCPC2 .706 .111 -.117 .162 .084 .078 
OQ5mCPC3 .483 .170 .004 .143 .007 .161 
OQ5mCPP1 .769 .092 -.075 .092 .045 .154 
OQ5mCPP2 .688 .105 -.059 .212 .100 .081 
OQ5mCPP3 .756 .087 -.038 .054 -.045 .209 
OQ5mCPP4 .796 .093 -.035 .085 .027 .175 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 8 iterations. 
 
9. Interaction effect between Degree of outsourcing  and Partners‟ Compatibility (DOOmPC) 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative 
% 
1 3.897 55.665 55.665 3.897 55.665 55.665 
2 1.314 18.778 74.443    
3 .817 11.678 86.121    
4 .404 5.776 91.896    
5 .258 3.684 95.580    
6 .208 2.969 98.550    
7 .102 1.450 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Component Matrixa 
 Component 
1 
DOOmCPC1 .728 
DOOmCPC2 .764 
DOOmCPC3 .534 
DOOmCPP1 .709 
DOOmCPP2 .719 
DOOmCPP3 .875 
DOOmCPP4 .843 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis. 
a. 1 components extracted. 
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APPENDIX H: MODEL FIT COMPARISON 
 
1. Models for Moderating Effects of CP and PQ on the relationship between 
Vendor management capability (VM) and Outsourcing success (OS). 
 
GOF Indices Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VMmCP VMmPQ VMmCP and VMmPQ 
CMIN/DF 1.429 1.740 1.704 
P .000 .000 .000 
GFI .838 .784 .773 
AGFI .811 .755 .745 
RMR .092 .108 .115 
RMSEA .054 .060 .058 
NFI .841 .803 .790 
RFI .826 .787 .775 
IFI .946 .905 .901 
TLI .940 .897 .893 
CFI .946 .904 .900 
PRATIO .913 .927 .933 
 
GOF Indices Beta Coefficients 
(Dependent Variable OS)  
VMmCP VMmPQ 
Model 1  -.52 
Model 2 -.45  
Model 3 -.49 -61 
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2. Models for Moderating Effects of CP and PQ on the relationship between 
Vendors’ service performance (VSP) and Outsourcing success (OS). 
 
GOF Indices Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VSPmCP VSPmPQ VSPmCP and VSPmPQ 
CMIN/DF 1.688 1.782 1.444 
P .000 .000 .000 
GFI .755 .740 .764 
AGFI .721 .709 .739 
RMR .080 .080 .081 
RMSEA .053 .062 .046 
NFI .730 .722 .739 
RFI .715 .702 .722 
IFI .892 .855 .902 
TLI .876 .843 .894 
CFI .882 .853 .901 
PRATIO .936 .934 .939 
 
 
GOF Indices Beta Coefficients 
(Dependent Variable OS)  
VSPmCP VSPmPQ 
Model 1 .23 - 
Model 2 - .74 
Model 3 .24 .79 
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APPENDIX I: ANOVA AND TUKEY’S TEST FOR BREADTH AND DEPTH 
GROUPS 
 
Between-Subjects Factors 
 Value Label N 
Breath 
1 Low 57 
2 Med 60 
3 High 90 
Depth 
1 Low 62 
2 Med 67 
3 High 78 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: OS 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 50.957
a
 8 6.370 8.135 .000 
Intercept 1.870 1 1.870 2.388 .124 
Breath_G 42.378 2 21.189 27.060 .000 
Depth_G .605 2 .303 .387 .680 
Breath_G * Depth_G 1.123 4 .281 .358 .838 
Error 155.043 198 .783 
  
Total 206.000 207 
   
Corrected Total 206.000 206 
   
a. R Squared = .247 (Adjusted R Squared = .217) 
 
 
*Only breath is significant, Therefore  Multiple comparisons for joint groups 
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Table : Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: OS   Tukey HSD 
(I) DOO_G (J) DOO_G Mean Difference (I-J) Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper Bound 
BL-DL BL-DM .18410 .23232 .997 -.5446 .9128 
BL-DH .06256 .26863 1.000 -.7800 .9051 
BM-DL -.61915 .22894 .153 
-
1.3372 
.0989 
BM-DM -.33727 .22894 .867 
-
1.0553 
.3808 
BM-DH -.43529 .22894 .614 
-
1.1533 
.2828 
BH-DL -.87449* .24458 .013 
-
1.6416 
-.1074 
BH-DM -.97845* .20964 .000 
-
1.6360 
-.3209 
BH-DH -.96591* .18886 .000 
-
1.5583 
-.3736 
BL-DM BL-DL -.18410 .23232 .997 -.9128 .5446 
BL-DH -.12154 .28383 1.000 
-
1.0118 
.7687 
BM-DL -.80325* .24659 .035 
-
1.5767 
-.0298 
BM-DM -.52137 .24659 .467 
-
1.2948 
.2521 
BM-DH -.61939 .24659 .233 
-
1.3928 
.1540 
BH-DL -1.05859* .26118 .002 
-
1.8778 
-.2394 
BH-DM -1.16255* .22879 .000 
-
1.8801 
-.4450 
BH-DH -1.15001* .20991 .000 
-
1.8084 
-.4916 
BL-DH BL-DL -.06256 .26863 1.000 -.9051 .7800 
BL-DM .12154 .28383 1.000 -.7687 1.0118 
BM-DL -.68171 .28107 .276 
-
1.5633 
.1998 
BM-DM -.39983 .28107 .888 
-
1.2814 
.4817 
BM-DH -.49785 .28107 .701 
-
1.3794 
.3837 
BH-DL -.93705* .29395 .043 
-
1.8590 
-.0151 
BH-DM -1.04101* .26558 .004 
-
1.8740 
-.2080 
BH-DH -1.02847* .24951 .002 
-
1.8110 
-.2459 
BM-DL BL-DL .61915 .22894 .153 -.0989 1.3372 
BL-DM .80325* .24659 .035 .0298 1.5767 
BL-DH .68171 .28107 .276 -.1998 1.5633 
BM-DM .28188 .24341 .964 -.4816 1.0453 
BM-DH .18386 .24341 .998 -.5796 .9473 
BH-DL -.25534 .25818 .987 
-
1.0651 
.5544 
BH-DM -.35930 .22536 .807 
-
1.0661 
.3475 
BH-DH -.34676 .20617 .757 -.9934 .2999 
BM-DM BL-DL .33727 .22894 .867 -.3808 1.0553 
BL-DM .52137 .24659 .467 -.2521 1.2948 
BL-DH .39983 .28107 .888 -.4817 1.2814 
BM-DL -.28188 .24341 .964 
-
1.0453 
.4816 
BM-DH -.09802 .24341 1.000 -.8615 .6654 
BH-DL -.53722 .25818 .489 
-
1.3470 
.2725 
BH-DM -.64119 .22536 .109 
-
1.3480 
.0656 
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BH-DH -.62864 .20617 .064 
-
1.2753 
.0180 
BM-DH BL-DL .43529 .22894 .614 -.2828 1.1533 
BL-DM .61939 .24659 .233 -.1540 1.3928 
BL-DH .49785 .28107 .701 -.3837 1.3794 
BM-DL -.18386 .24341 .998 -.9473 .5796 
BM-DM .09802 .24341 1.000 -.6654 .8615 
BH-DL -.43920 .25818 .745 
-
1.2490 
.3706 
BH-DM -.54316 .22536 .284 
-
1.2500 
.1637 
BH-DH -.53062 .20617 .205 
-
1.1773 
.1160 
BH-DL BL-DL .87449* .24458 .013 .1074 1.6416 
BL-DM 1.05859* .26118 .002 .2394 1.8778 
BL-DH .93705* .29395 .043 .0151 1.8590 
BM-DL .25534 .25818 .987 -.5544 1.0651 
BM-DM .53722 .25818 .489 -.2725 1.3470 
BM-DH .43920 .25818 .745 -.3706 1.2490 
BH-DM -.10396 .24123 1.000 -.8606 .6526 
BH-DH -.09142 .22341 1.000 -.7921 .6093 
BH-DM BL-DL .97845* .20964 .000 .3209 1.6360 
BL-DM 1.16255* .22879 .000 .4450 1.8801 
BL-DH 1.04101* .26558 .004 .2080 1.8740 
BM-DL .35930 .22536 .807 -.3475 1.0661 
BM-DM .64119 .22536 .109 -.0656 1.3480 
BM-DH .54316 .22536 .284 -.1637 1.2500 
BH-DL .10396 .24123 1.000 -.6526 .8606 
BH-DH .01254 .18450 1.000 -.5661 .5912 
Table Continued : Multiple Comparisons 
 
Dependent Variable: OS Tukey HSD 
BH-DH BL-DL .96591* .18886 .000 .3736 1.5583 
BL-DM 1.15001* .20991 .000 .4916 1.8084 
BL-DH 1.02847* .24951 .002 .2459 1.8110 
BM-DL .34676 .20617 .757 -.2999 .9934 
BM-DM .62864 .20617 .064 -.0180 1.2753 
BM-DH .53062 .20617 .205 -.1160 1.1773 
BH-DL .09142 .22341 1.000 -.6093 .7921 
BH-DM -.01254 .18450 1.000 -.5912 .5661 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
Mean-OS 
Depth 
Low Med High 
Breath Low 3.93 3.75 3.87 
Med 4.55 4.27 4.37 
High 4.81 4.91 4.90 
 
 
